Patent Law: Cases & Materials ~ Version 2.0 by Miller, Joseph S
University of Georgia School of Law
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Books Faculty Scholarship
2015
Patent Law: Cases & Materials ~ Version 2.0
Joseph S. Miller
University of Georgia School of Law, getmejoe@uga.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/books
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Books by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Miller, Joseph S., "Patent Law: Cases & Materials ~ Version 2.0" (2015). Books. 97.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/books/97
Patent Law: Cases & Materials 




Joseph Scott Miller 
Professor 











© 2015 Joseph Scott Miller 

  Miller’s Patent Cases 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1	  
Chapter 1: Invention .................................................................................... 3	  
Applegate v. Scherer ..................................................................................... 3	  
Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. ............................................ 7	  
General Electric Co v. Wilkins ..................................................................... 12	  
Chapter 2: Claims ....................................................................................... 21	  
The Claim Mechanism ............................................................................ 21	  
Blocking Patents ..................................................................................... 21	  
Claim Construction ................................................................................ 21	  
Piggy Pushers v. Skidders Footwear ............................................................ 27	  
Teashot.LLC v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. ............................... 30	  
Claim Definiteness .................................................................................. 32	  
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. .................................................... 33	  
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. ....................................................... 39	  
In re Packard .............................................................................................. 47	  
Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc. .................................................... 52	  
Triton Tech v. Nintendo ............................................................................. 56	  
EON Corp. IP Holdings v. AT&T Mobility ............................................... 60	  
Chapter 3: Written Disclosure ..................................................................... 67	  
Enablement ............................................................................................ 67	  
In re Hoffmann .......................................................................................... 67	  
Automotive Techs. Int’l v. BMW of North America .................................... 69	  
MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs. ........................................... 77	  
Written Description ................................................................................ 83	  
Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc. ........................................................ 83	  
New Railhead Mfg. v. Vermeer Mfg. ........................................................... 88	  
PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. ..................................................... 93	  
Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc. ................................................ 103	  
AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc. ...................... 114	  
Chapter 4: Utility ..................................................................................... 122	  
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107 ........................................ 122	  
Chapter 5: Novelty & Loss of Right .......................................................... 127	  
In re Hafner ............................................................................................. 127	  
Inherent Anticipation ........................................................................... 131	  
In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation ........................................................... 131	  
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ........................................ 138	  
In re Ngai ................................................................................................. 144	  
King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. ............................................. 146	  
Statutory Bars ...................................................................................... 155	  
Pronova BioPharma Norge v. Teva Pharm. ............................................... 155	  
Hamilton Beach Brands v. Sunbeam Prods. ............................................... 163	  
Steven C. Carlson & Leeron G. Kalay, Old World Fix for a  
New Patent Problem?, IP Law & Business, Apr/May 2009 ........................ 173	  
Miller’s Patent Cases 
B.A. Ballou & Co. v. Citytrust .................................................................. 173	  
Metallizing Eng’g v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts ................................... 177	  
D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp. ................................................. 181	  
§ 102(e) ............................................................................................... 186	  
Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co. .................................... 186	  
1952 Patent Act – 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) ...................................................... 188	  
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner .......................................................... 188	  
In re Hilmer ............................................................................................. 190	  
In re Giacomini ........................................................................................ 196	  
§ 102(g) ............................................................................................... 200	  
Litchfield v. Eigen .................................................................................... 200	  
Peeler v. Miller ......................................................................................... 205	  
Brown v. Barbacid .................................................................................... 213	  
Brown v. Barbacid .................................................................................... 220	  
Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co. ............................................................ 225	  
Amkor Technology v. International Trade Commission ............................ 233	  
Chapter 6: Nonobviousness ...................................................................... 241	  
Electromechanical Cases ....................................................................... 241	  
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc. .......................................... 241	  
Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp. ........................................................... 245	  
In re Giannelli .......................................................................................... 249	  
The “Analogous Arts” Question ........................................................... 253	  
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. ................................ 253	  
In re Klein. ............................................................................................... 258	  
K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp. ................................................................. 264	  
Biochemical Cases ................................................................................. 268	  
Takeda Chemical Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. ..................................... 268	  
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc. ................................................... 277	  
Common Sense & Objective Indicia ...................................................... 285	  
Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc. ................................................................... 285	  
Randall Mfg. v. Rea .................................................................................. 290	  
In re Chaganti .......................................................................................... 296	  
Chapter 7: Infringement ........................................................................... 301	  
The Doctrine of Equivalents ................................................................. 301	  
Brilliant Instruments Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC ........................................... 301	  
Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. ..................................................... 308	  
Joint Infringement & Active Inducement .............................................. 313	  
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp. ........................................................ 313	  
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc. ....................................... 316	  
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. ................................................................ 319	  
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. .................................................. 324	  
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. ....................................... 333	  
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. ................................................ 339	  
Patent Territoriality & Transborder Business ........................................ 346	  
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. .................................................. 346	  
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
 
National Steel Car v. Canadian Pacific Railway .......................................... 352	  
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd. ..................................................... 363	  
Meyer Intellectual Properties Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc. ..................................... 375	  
Export .................................................................................................. 384	  
Union Carbide Chems. v. Shell Oil Co. .................................................... 384	  
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. ............................................................... 387	  
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. ..................................... 396	  
Import ................................................................................................. 400	  
Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. .................................... 400	  
Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. ................................................ 407	  
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ................................................ 417	  
A Note about the NTP Case ..................................................................... 422	  
Defenses: Exhaustion, Reconstruction & Repair .................................... 423	  
Bowman v. Monsanto ............................................................................... 423	  
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Comm’n ................................. 428	  
Chapter 8: Patentable Subject Matter ........................................................ 435	  
Biotech & Medicine .............................................................................. 435	  
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. ......................................... 438	  
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. .................... 447	  
Computed-Implemented Processes ........................................................ 455	  
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l ................................................................... 455	  
Clones .................................................................................................. 463	  
In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh) ............................................................ 463	  
 

  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  1 
Introduction 
I use these materials to teach a 3-credit Patent Law & Policy course. Many of 
the students in such a course will already have taken an IP Survey course of some 
kind. Although I have minimized overlapping cases with the patent-law chapter of 
Loren & Miller’s Intellectual Property Law: Cases & Materials (Semaphore Press), 
students are bound to benefit from reviewing conepts they learned in an IP Survey. 
The book contains edited cases, patent figures, and excerpts, along with brief 
introductions to some of the subjects. The most important thing to keep in mind, 
however, is that this set of cases and materials is not designed as a self-contained, 
free-standing casebook. Rather, I have designed it for use in close conjunction with 
a specific softcover hornbook published by Wolters Kluwer, Janice Mueller’s Patent 
Law, Fourth Edition (Aspen Student Treatise Series 2013). At the start of each new 
topic, I have indicated which pages of Mueller’s Patent Law are most relevant to the 
cases I present. My thought is that others may wish to teach Patent Law in the same 
way, and that is why I make this set of edited cases available. 
Finally, a note on my approach to editing cases: I indicate my omissions with an 
elipsis, and omissions present in the original with asterisks. I do not, however, indi-
cate deletions or abridgments of citations or footnotes. Where I retain footnotes, I 
have tried to preserve the numbering they bear in the official case reports, but I can-
not guarantee complete success on that score. In any event, one should always refer 
back to the official report of a case for the authoritative text. 
If you decide to use this case collection to teach a course of your own—as I 
hope some people will—please check back to ensure that you have the most up-to-
date version. This version (2.0) issued in June 2015. 
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Chapter 1: Invention 
If you’ve been exposed to patent law before—for example, in an IP Survey 
course—you are, quite rightly, accustomed to thinking of the patent claim as a cen-
tral feature, perhaps the central feature, of modern patent law. 
But before there is a patent claim, there is an inventor who has made an inven-
tion, a working solution to a practical problem. Both the patent claim and the well-
drafted written disclosure that supports the claim result from many hours of effort 
on the part of numerous people who come together to prepare a patent, well after 
an invention has already been made. The Patent Act recognizes this when it re-
quires, in 35 U.S.C. § 112(b), that 
 [t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention. 
The “claims” and the “invention” referenced here are different things, or this pro-
vision would make no sense. Similarly, the Patent Act’s originality requirement, em-
bodied in—among other places—35 U.S.C. § 102(f) [’52 Act]†, prohibits a person 
from applying for a claim where “he did not himself invent the subject matter 
sought to be patented[.].” This fatal derivation from another, which prevents  
patenting, surely precedes the drafting of any claim. 
The cases below explore questions about who is, and isn’t, an inventor under 
the Patent Act. In so doing, they shed light on what an invention is, even before any 
claim is written. Keeping the reality of inventors and inventions in mind is a good 
way to avoid letting patent law questions descend into dysfunctional word games. As 
you read these cases, make note of both (a) what one must prove in order to 
demonstrate that one is an invention’s inventor, and (b) the types of evivdence one 
uses to prove it. 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 8-16, 219-222 
Applegate v. Scherer 
332 F.2d 571 (CCPA 1964) 
Rich, Judge: 
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Patent Interfer-
ences in favor of the junior party to interference No. 90,131, Scherer, Frensch and 
Stahler, who are involved on their application serial No. 714,028, filed February 10, 
1958. 
The senior party-appellants, Applegate and Howell (herein “Applegate”), are 
involved on their application serial No. 652,316, filed April 11, 1957. 
                                                
† When I cite a provision that the 2011 America Invents Act (“AIA”) has super-
seded, I indicate that status with a shorthand “[’52 Act],” referring to the wholesale 
recodification embodied in the 1952 Patent Act and the minor amendments thereto 
(through 2010). 
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The invention is defined in the following single count: 
A method for controlling sea lampreys which comprises adding to a body 
of water inhabited by said lampreys 3-trifluoromethyl-4-nitrophenol.[†] 
The Scherer application is assigned to Farbwerke Hoechst AG, of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, whose New York representative was Progressive Color Com-
pany. The Applegate application is assigned to the Government of the United 
States, represented by the Department of the Interior. 
By way of background, for several decades the sea lamprey had been causing 
havoc in the Great Lakes to commercial and game fish. The Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice of the Department of the Interior, under the direction of Applegate and How-
ell, was engaged in a large-scale screening program, seeking chemical compounds 
which would control the sea lamprey without undue harm to desirable fish species. 
The scheme was to treat streams where the lamprey spawn with a chemical which 
would destroy the larvae. 
Prior to the invention here involved, as the result of examining thousands of 
compounds, 3-bromo-4-nitrophenol[‡] had been found to be efficacious. This fact 
was disclosed in the December 17, 1955, issue of Chemical Week. Thereafter Pro-
gressive Color Company wrote a letter to the Fish and Wildlife Service on December 
29, 1955 (Mr. L. C. Balling to Mr. Applegate), saying: 
 In various publications—specifically we refer to the December 17th is-
sue of Chemical Week—we have observed comments on the difficulty en-
countered in finding a suitable chemical compound for the elimination of 
lampreys. We have also noted that your endeavors heretofore for an effec-
tive control of lampreys have focused on a chemical compound, viz. 3-
bromo-4-nitrophenol, but because of the very high cost of this material 
your agency is still looking for an effective agent which perhaps could be 
procured at a reasonable cost. 
 For your guidance we would like to mention that we are the representa-
tives of Farbwerke Hoechst A.G., Frankfurt (Main) West Germany, one of 
the largest chemical manufacturers in that country and have communicated 
with them on this subject. The Pesticide Department of Farbwerke 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note — The chemical structure of this compound is as follows:               ] 
 
‡ [ Ed. Note — The chemical structure of this compound is as follows:               ] 
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Hoechst has advised us that the production of 3-bromo-4-nitrophenol is 
rather difficult and for that reason are unable to offer it to us. However, 
they believe that a similar chemical compound namely 3-trifluormethyl-4-
nitrophenol [sic] may even be more effective for the purpose you have in 
mind, and in the event you are interested in this matter we would be very 
glad to furnish you with free samples of this material. In the affirmative 
please be kind enough and let us hear from you indicating at the same time 
what quantities you wish to receive for conducting the necessary tests. 
Applegate replied to this letter on January 19, 1956, as follows: 
 I wish to thank you for your letter of December 29, 1955 in which you 
offer to provide us with a sample of 3-trifluormethyl-4-nitrophenol [sic] 
for testing as a candidate sea lamprey larvicide. 
 Due to financial limitations and personnel shortages, we have not been 
accepting further substances for testing. These restrictions have forced us 
to limit our laboratory work exclusively to tests of the several substances 
which have shown some promise as specific sea lamprey larvicides. Howev-
er, since we are interested in exploring the structures related to 3-bromo-4-
nitrophenol, and since the substance you offer is similar to this compound, 
we feel that it would be advantageous to work it into our program. 
 Only a small quantity of about three to four grams would be required 
for our preliminary screening tests. If you can arrange to have this amount 
of 3-trifluormethyl-4-nitrophenol [sic] shipped to us, we will be glad to 
explore its possibilities as a specific larvicide. 
In February, 1956, the sample was delivered, it was tested, found to be effec-
tive, the patent applications followed, and the interference was declared. 
Both parties are in agreement with the board’s view that the sole issue is origi-
nality, or, who made the invention. Scherer contends that the subject matter of the 
count was fully disclosed to Applegate in the letter from Progressive Color Compa-
ny of December 29, 1955, by reason of which fact Applegate did not make the in-
vention. The board so held. In support of its decision, the board pointed out that 
Applegate (called as a witness by Scherer, the only party taking testimony) testified 
that before the date of the letter he did not know of the chemical of the count. The 
gist of the board’s opinion is contained in the following paragraph: 
There is no doubt that the Scherer et al. letter of December 29, 1955 
(Exh. 3) was a conception of the invention of the count. The letter names 
the chemical as a substitute for the bromo-compound, which had been 
added to water, for the elimination of sea lampreys (Applegate et al. Exh. 
6). This is all that the count requires. It is sufficient if an inventor is able to 
make a disclosure which would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the disclosure without extensive research or experimentation. In 
re Tansel, 253 F.2d 241. We conclude, therefore, that the aforementioned 
letter amply meets the test of conception set forth in In re Tansel, and so 
constitutes a full disclosure of the invention of the count in late December, 
1955. This date is well prior to Applegate et al’s. record date. 
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In view of the disclosure to him of a complete conception of the invention of 
the count, the board found, as a corollary, that the reduction to practice by Apple-
gate, by the tests which demonstrated effectiveness for the intended purpose, inured 
to the benefit of Scherer, citing several precedents including this court’s decision in 
Shumaker v. Paulson, 136 F.2d 700. 
Applegate’s attack on the decision below is on the theory that Scherer did not 
conceive the invention; and to show that Scherer had no conception the further 
theory is propounded that under the law there could not be a conception until there 
was a reduction to practice, which reduction to practice was by Applegate who, 
therefore, was the first to conceive. Not having a conception of the invention, it is 
argued, Scherer could not communicate the invention to Applegate and therefore 
Applegate did not derive the invention from Scherer, as the board held he did. The 
case principally relied on to support this theory, which appears also to have been re-
lied on heavily before the board, is Smith v. Bousquet, 111 F.2d 157 (CCPA 1940). 
The board correctly pointed out that Smith v. Bousquet was not a case involving 
an issue of originality. Recently in Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891 (CCPA 1962), we 
expressed agreement with views of the Board of Patent Interferences characterizing 
Smith v. Bousquet as an unusual type of case, the board saying, “In this type of re-
search the inventor’s mind cannot formulate a completed invention until he finally 
performs a successful experiment.” We do not consider the instant situation to be of 
that type. In any event, the important distinction is that Smith and Bousquet were 
independent inventors pursuing their work separately, a situation which bears no 
parallel to the one here where one party communicated the totality of the invention 
defined in the count to the other, whether it be called a “conception” or by any 
other name. 
It appears to us that appellants, as is too often the case, are relying on para-
graphs lifted from a discussion of one situation to argue for a certain decision in an 
entirely different situation. An originality or derivation case, which this is, is quite 
unlike a case involving independent inventors, between whom true “priority” must 
be decided.1  
Appellants seem to propose that there cannot be a conception of an invention 
of the type here involved in the absence of knowledge that the invention will work. 
                                                
1 The board’s opinion herein twice speaks of the issue as “priority” and, of course, 
expresses its decision as an award of “priority” to Scherer, which is a mere formality 
compelled by 35 U.S.C. § 135 which treats all interferences as involving an issue of 
priority. It is evident, however, that in an originality case the issue is not who is the 
first or prior inventor, but who made the invention. Applications “interfere” when 
one applicant gets the invention from the other, by fair means or foul, as well as 
when each makes the invention independently. In awarding “priority” to the sole 
inventor in an originality or derivation case, it should be realized that this is merely 
the employment of patent law jargon which is not to be taken literally. It might be 
well on the next revision of the statutes to use language suited to all situations so 
that the board does not have to make an award of “priority” where no issue of prior-
ity exists. 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  7 
Such knowledge, necessarily, can rest only on an actual reduction to practice. To 
adopt this proposition would mean, as a practical matter, that one could never 
communicate an invention thought up by him to another who is to try it out, for, 
when the tester succeeds, the one who does no more than exercise ordinary skill 
would be rewarded and the innovator would not be. Such cannot be the law. A con-
trary intent is implicit in the statutes and in a multitude of precedents. 
Thinking of the matter in this light and asking who made the invention, clearly 
it was Scherer who had the thought and not Applegate who merely made the test. 
The decision of the board is affirmed. 
Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. 
110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
Rader, Judge: 
In this patent infringement case, Gambro Lundia AB (Gambro) appeals and 
Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter) cross-appeals … . The [Gambro] patent at 
issue, U.S. Patent No. 4,585,552 (’552 patent), claims a “system for the measure-
ment of the difference between two fluid flows in separate ducts.” This invention 
recalibrates sensors during hemodialysis to accurately measure the impurities re-
moved from a patient’s blood. Due to error in the district court’s analys[i]s of inva-
lidity … this court reverses. 
Background 
Hemodialysis, commonly called dialysis, removes contaminants and excess fluid 
from the patient’s blood when the kidneys do not function properly. Hemodialysis 
works by passing a dialysate solution through a machine, called a dialyzer, which 
functions as an artificial kidney. In the dialyzer, the dialysate passes on one side of a 
porous diffusion membrane, while the patient’s blood passes on the other side. Be-
cause of the pressure differential across the membrane, blood contaminants and ex-
cess fluid diffuse through the membrane from the patient’s blood into the dialysate. 
These impurities diffused from the patient’s blood are known as ultrafiltrate. 
After hemodialysis, the volume of the dialysate is greater. The difference be-
tween the initial and end volumes of dialysate can be used to calculate the amount 
of the ultrafiltrate removed from a patient’s blood. This calculation is critical to the 
success of hemodialysis. Removal of too much or too little ultrafiltrate may lead to 
severe medical problems or even death. 
Repgreen Limited (Repgreen), a British bioengineering company, improved ul-
trafiltrate calculation. Keith Wittingham, Repgreen’s chief designer, introduced the 
Repgreen monitoring system, the UFM 1000, in late 1977. Wittingham’s develop-
ment relied on the research of Professor Michael Sanderson. The UFM 1000 used 
two electromagnetic flow sensors to measure the difference between the rate of di-
alysate flow into and out of the dialyzer. The difference in flow rates indicated the 
quantity of ultrafiltrate leaving the system. To calibrate the system for an accurate 
measurement of dialysate flow rates, the operator would direct clean dialysate 
through both sensors before dialysis. This calibration method, however, could not 
account for clogging in the outflow sensor during dialysis. Over time, the ultrafil-
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trate would build up behind the outflow sensor and disrupt the accuracy of the 
measurements. Experts refer to this increasing inaccuracy as “drift.” 
In the late 1970s, Gambro sought to improve ultrafiltrate monitoring. During 
1979, Wittingham met with Gambro engineers on two occasions to discuss 
Repgreen’s development of an ultrafiltrate monitor for Gambro. In July 1979, after 
Repgreen went bankrupt, Gambro purchased Repgreen’s hemodialysis technology, 
including the rights to the UFM 1000 monitor. After acquiring Repgreen’s tech-
nology, Gambro’s research team worked for three years on improving ultrafiltration 
monitors. In June 1982, four Gambro engineers, including Bengt-Ake Gummesson, 
refined the monitoring system. Their invention ultimately issued as the ’552 patent. 
… 
The Gambro invention uses valves to direct clean dialysate around the dialyzer 
to recalibrate the sensors during dialysis. The invention’s valve system can direct 
clean dialysate through the first flow sensor, around the dialyzer, and through the 
second flow sensor. To recalibrate, the invention momentarily blocks passage of 
contaminated dialysate through the outflow sensor. Instead, clean dialysate flows 
through the outflow sensor and recalibrates the detectors with the same clean dialy-
sate flowing through both intake and outflow sensors. After the brief recalibration, 
the hemodialysis continues with contaminated dialysate flowing through the second 
sensor. Claim 1 of the ’552 patent reads: 
[1] In dialysis equipment including a dialyser, a system for measuring the 
difference in the rate of flow between first and second fluid streams, said 
first fluid stream comprising clean dialysis solution flowing to the dialyser 
and said second fluid stream comprising spent dialysis solution flowing 
from the dialyser, said system comprising 
[2] a first duct for receiving said first fluid stream flowing therethrough, 
[3] a second duct for receiving said second fluid stream flowing 
therethrough, 
[4] measuring means for measuring the difference in the rate of flow be-
tween said first and second fluid streams within said first and second ducts, 
[5] and transferring means for preventing the flow of said second fluid 
stream through said second duct while flowing said first fluid stream 
through both said first and second ducts without passing said first fluid 
stream through the dialyser and without altering said rate of flow of said 
first fluid stream between said first and second ducts such that said rate of 
flow of said first fluid stream through said first and second ducts is substan-
tially equal, 
[6] whereby the measured difference of the rate of flow of said first fluid 
stream flowing through said first and second ducts is adaptable as a refer-
ence. 
(Paragraph enumeration added.) 
In 1984, Baxter acquired the dialysis equipment division of Extracorporeal, Inc. 
Dissatisfied with the accuracy of the Extracorporeal technology, Baxter developed 
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the Baxter SPS 550 and began marketing the device in December 1987. Gambro 
filed suit against Baxter … in March 1992 claiming the Baxter SPS 550 infringed 
the ’552 patent. In defense, Baxter asserted the invalidity … of the ’552 patent. 
After a ten-day bench trial on the issues of infringement [and] validity … the 
district court held claim 1 of the Gambro ’552 patent invalid for … derivation … . 
The district court also entered judgment in favor of Baxter on infringement, con-
tributory infringement, inducing infringement, and willful infringement due to the 
invalidity … of the ’552 patent. …  
Discussion 
I. Derivation 
The trial judge found that Gambro had derived the ’552 invention from a Wit-
tingham proposal left in the files when Gambro acquired Repgreen’s dialysis tech-
nology. This court reviews a finding of derivation as a question of fact. This requires 
acceptance of the district court’s findings unless clearly erroneous or predicated on 
an improper legal foundation. To show derivation, the party asserting invalidity 
must prove both prior conception of the invention by another and communication 
of that conception to the patentee. This court reviews a determination of prior con-
ception, which must be proven by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence, 
as a question of law based on underlying factual findings. 
Turning first to conception, the district court found that Wittingham had con-
ceived the invention no later than July 1979. The court based this finding on Wit-
tingham’s testimony and the Wittingham proposal left in the Repgreen file. Alt-
hough the district court found Wittingham highly credible, an inventor’s testimony, 
standing alone, is insufficient to prove conception. Conception requires corrobora-
tion of the inventor’s testimony. 
Thus, this court must weigh whether the Wittingham proposal, prepared in 
1979, corroborates Wittingham’s testimony of conception. The proposal is a four-
page document alluding to an ultrafiltration monitor with valves that automatically 
zero the sensors upon start-up. The proposal briefly discusses the Auto Zero/Start 
feature: 
To ensure ease of operation the process of shunting the kidney in order to 
zero monitor will be done automatically on pressing of the start button. 
This will also initiate the automatic zeroing of unit. 
Baxter contends that this document also discloses the concept of recalibration 
(or zeroing) during dialysis. In support of this contention, Baxter identifies the fol-
lowing passage from the proposal: 
A zero button may also be necessary in order to zero Ultrafiltration Moni-
tor but not start the automatic control (start signal cannot be allowed till 
20 minutes after switch on?). 
Baxter argues that the only reason to zero the monitor without starting the au-
tomatic control is to zero the monitor when it is already started—in other words, 
during dialysis. 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
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Baxter’s novel interpretation of this single ambiguous passage in the Witting-
ham proposal, however, lacks sufficient support to corroborate Wittingham’s con-
ception testimony. First, the reference is so unclear that even Wittingham conceded 
that this single sentence does not state expressly the concept of recalibration during 
dialysis. In fact, the parenthetical within the sentence suggests that the device should 
not be in use “till 20 minutes after switch on.” For this reason, among others, Pro-
fessor Sanderson, an expert in dialysis whose early research formed the basis of Wit-
tingham’s work, testified that one of ordinary skill in dialysis in 1982 would not 
have understood this obscure passage to disclose recalibration during dialysis. Pro-
fessor Sanderson noted that the Repgreen monitor needed twenty minutes to stabi-
lize before use. Therefore, this obscure sentence more reasonably suggests the use of 
the zero button during the pre-dialysis warm-up period. 
In addition, the obscure sentence states that depressing the button calibrates 
the monitor, but does “not start the automatic control.” In its ordinary start-up op-
eration, the Repgreen monitor would calibrate the monitor, start the automatic con-
trol, and finally automatically begin the dialysis. The reference to “zeroing” before 
the automatic control phase thus suggests calibration before dialysis, not during di-
alysis. Further, if Wittingham had conceived of recalibration during dialysis—an im-
portant advance in the dialysis art—the four-page Wittingham proposal would surely 
contain more than a single cryptic sentence memorializing the advance. Accordingly, 
this court determines that the Wittingham proposal does not corroborate concep-
tion. 
The only other evidence offered by Baxter to corroborate conception is the tes-
timony of Mr. Smith, Wittingham’s supervisor at Repgreen. Referring to the am-
biguous sentence, Smith testified that the Wittingham proposal included the idea of 
calibration during dialysis. The trial judge, however, did not rely on this self-serving 
testimony in finding prior conception. Moreover, as noted above, the language of 
the Wittingham proposal itself belies Smith’s testimony about calibration during di-
alysis. In sum, this court concludes that Baxter failed to meet its burden of proving 
by facts supported by clear and convincing evidence that Wittingham conceived the 
invention of the ’552 patent. 
The second prong of the derivation test—communication of the prior concep-
tion to the named inventor—poses similar difficulties for Baxter. As an initial matter, 
the district court applied the wrong legal standard. Citing New England Braiding 
Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the district court con-
cluded that Baxter did not need to prove communication of the entire conception, 
but rather only so much of the invention “as would have made it obvious to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.” Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 896 F. 
Supp. 1522, 1540 (D. Colo. 1995) (citing New England Braiding, 970 F.2d at 
883). Based on this reasoning, the district court applied the obviousness standard in 
35 U.S.C. § 103 to determine that the named inventors received enough infor-
mation to make the invention obvious to one skilled in the dialysis art. This reason-
ing, however, misconstrues the dictum in New England Braiding and introduces 
incorrectly an obviousness analysis into the test for derivation. 
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The Supreme Court announced the standard for finding communication of a 
prior conception over 125 years ago in Agawam Woolen v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583 
(1868). The Court required a showing that the communication “enabled an ordi-
nary mechanic, without the exercise of any ingenuity and special skill on his part, to 
construct and put the improvement in successful operation.” Id. (emphasis added). 
This court’s predecessor consistently applied this Supreme Court standard. See, e.g., 
Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (CCPA 1974) (“Communication of a com-
plete conception must be sufficient to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to con-
struct and successfully operate the invention.”) (emphasis added). 
This court recognizes that the district court’s incorrect derivation standard 
springs from dictum in this court’s New England Braiding decision. In that case, 
this court noted: “To invalidate a patent for derivation of invention, a party must 
demonstrate that the named inventor in the patent acquired knowledge of the 
claimed invention from another, or at least so much of the claimed invention as 
would have made it obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.” New England Braid-
ing, 970 F.2d at 883. This dictum did not in fact incorporate a determination of 
obviousness into a § 102(f) analysis. Indeed, this court in New England Braiding 
did not apply such a test. 
The New England Braiding court upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction 
because the record showed a likelihood that New England Braiding’s patent was 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f). The record showed that George Champlin, the 
named inventor, worked for the A.W. Chesterton Co. and participated in experi-
ments that developed the invention. One Chesterton employee testified that 
Champlin had said, when he left to start his own company, that he wanted to patent 
the experimental braiding if Chesterton decided not to do so. Champlin denied the-
se allegations. Id. at 883-84. The key issue was a credibility determination between 
the witnesses for the two parties. The sufficiency of the communication, particularly 
whether the invention was obvious in light of such disclosure, was not at issue. 
Thus, New England Braiding did not incorporate an obviousness test into the 
§ 102(f) analysis. 
Applying the correct standard—whether the communication enabled one of or-
dinary skill in the art to make the patented invention—this court discerns insufficient 
evidence of communication. Wittingham testified that he was not sure that he had 
discussed calibration during dialysis with anyone at Gambro, and he did not discuss 
the sensor contamination problem. The trial judge based his finding of communica-
tion solely on Wittingham’s written proposal. Gambro acquired this document when 
it acquired Repgreen’s technology. During discovery, the proposal appeared in the 
files of one of the named inventors. However, as discussed above, the proposal does 
not disclose recalibration during dialysis to one skilled in the art at the relevant time. 
If the proposal does not disclose recalibration during dialysis, it cannot serve as the 
basis for a communication of that idea. Thus, under the correct legal standard, the 
record evidence is insufficient to support a finding of communication. The district 
court erred in finding communication and conception, and, hence, the finding of 
derivation is also clearly erroneous. 
… 
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General Electric Co v. Wilkins 
750 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Lourie, Judge:  
Thomas A. Wilkins appeals from [a] decision … entering declaratory judgment 
in favor of General Electric Company and GE Wind Energy, LLC that Wilkins is not 
a coinventor of GE’s U.S. Patent 6,921,985 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256. Because 
Wilkins failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to co-
inventorship of the ’985 patent, we affirm. 
Background 
Wind turbines convert wind into electrical energy that is supplied to the power 
grid. Random events such as lightning strikes and animal contacts can cause wires of 
the power grid to short, resulting in a reduction in the amount of voltage on the 
power grid. Such “low voltage events” can damage nearby wind turbines, either by 
causing the blades of a turbine to rotate out of control or by causing electric current 
to back up into the generator rotor of a turbine. Conventionally, wind turbines pro-
tected against those harms by disconnecting from the power grid during a low volt-
age event. However, as wind began providing a greater percentage of the overall 
grid power, utilities began to require that wind turbines remain connected to the 
grid and continue to operate during a low voltage event. The ability of wind tur-
bines to meet that requirement is known as “low voltage ride through” (“LVRT”). 
GE’s ’985 patent names five co-inventors who were each members of a team of 
GE engineers based in Salzbergen, Germany that was tasked with meeting the 
standard of a German utility company, which required wind turbines to ride 
through voltage drops down to 15% of nominal voltage.  
The ’985 patent is directed to controlling key components of a wind turbine 
that would allow it to remain connected to the power grid and to safely ride 
through a low voltage event. ’985 patent, col. 2, ll. 24-34. The LVRT solution de-
scribed in the ’985 patent involves: (i) a blade pitch controller that varies the angles 
of the wind turbine blades to maintain safe rotation speeds; (ii) a converter control-
ler that “guard[s] against excessive currents in the inverters” by selectively activating 
and deactivating a circuit to shunt excess current away from the turbine’s sensitive 
components; and (iii) a turbine controller that provides overall control of the tur-
bine and shuts down nonessential components during a low voltage event. 
The independent claims of the ’985 patent reflect those specific controller func-
tions. Claims 1 and 15 are representative and read as follows: 
1. A wind turbine generator comprising: a blade pitch control system to 
vary a pitch of one or more blades; a turbine controller coupled with the 
blade pitch control system; a first power source coupled with the turbine 
controller and with the blade pitch control system to provide power during 
a first mode of operation; and an uninterruptible power supply coupled to the 
turbine controller and with the blade pitch control system to provide power 
during a low voltage event; wherein the turbine controller causes the blade 
pitch control system to vary the pitch of the one or more blades in re-
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sponse to the transition in response to detection of a transition from the 
first mode of operation. 
15. A wind turbine generator comprising: a generator; a power converter 
coupled with the generator, the power converter having an inverter cou-
pled to receive power from the generator, a converter controller coupled 
with the inverter to monitor a current flow in the inverter wherein the con-
verter controller is coupled to receive power from an uninterruptible power 
supply during a low voltage event, and a circuit coupled with the input of 
the inverter and with the converter controller to shunt current from the in-
verter and generator rotor in response to a control signal from the convert-
er controller. 
Col. 6, l. 65 – col. 7, l. 13; col. 7, l. 58 – col. 8, l. 3 (emphases added). Each claim 
requires an uninterruptible power supply (“UPS”), which powers the various con-
trollers so that they can perform their functions during a low voltage event. Wilkins 
is not named as a co-inventor of the ’985 patent. 
Wilkins began working for GE’s predecessor company Enron Wind Corpora-
tion, doing business as Zond Wind Energy Systems (“Enron”), in 1998. In the 
course of that employment, Wilkins was involved in adapting wind turbines to meet 
certain LVRT requirements at an Enron-owned wind farm in Minnesota known as 
Lake Benton II. After modification, the Lake Benton II wind turbines were capable 
of riding through voltage drops down to 70% of nominal voltage. Although those 
turbines incorporated a small capacitor that briefly powered one sensor during a grid 
outage, that capacitor did not power the converter controller during a low voltage 
event, nor did modification of the Lake Benton II wind turbines contemplate blade 
pitch control or a circuit that shunted excess current away from the generator rotor 
and inverter in order to achieve LVRT. After GE acquired certain assets from Enron, 
Wilkins worked as an engineer at a GE wind turbine facility in Tehachapi, California. 
It is undisputed that the German team had developed detailed specifications 
and concept documents of its LVRT solution by July 2002 and was planning a 
presentation to review the technical details, including the use of controllers powered 
by a UPS, which were available for download through an internal GE website. 
Correspondence between Wilkins and two of the named inventors in spring and 
summer of 2002 indicates that the German team was consulting Wilkins for confir-
mation that their invention, which was then implemented on German wind turbines, 
would work with the different “60 Hz” grid requirements and turbine components 
used in the United States. In particular, the correspondence revealed that the work 
done at Lake Benton II was not interchangeable with the specifications and re-
quirements of the German LVRT design, and no mention was made of a UPS  
coupled to a converter for the purpose of LVRT. Wilkins traveled to Germany in 
August 2002. Although Wilkins admitted that no documents exist for that trip, he 
alleged that he shared his ideas from Lake Benton II and conveyed specific elements 
of the ’985 patent to the German team at that time. 
In October 2002, Wilkins and a team of GE engineers in California were tasked 
with developing an LVRT solution for the utility company Florida Power and Light. 
In the course of that work, Wilkins prepared a document entitled “Design and Cost 
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Analysis,” in which he summarized several ideas, along with a proposal to use a 
UPS. The figures depicted in that Design and Cost Analysis “reflect *** [w]here to 
place the UPS in the circuit” and show that the UPS was proposed to insulate the 
wind turbine from the power grid during a low voltage event by placing the UPS 
between the power grid and the turbine. In that arrangement, the turbine controller 
and converter controller would be situated between the grid and the UPS, and 
therefore could only receive power from the grid during a low voltage event and not 
from the UPS. Wilkins admitted that the Design and Cost Analysis does not show 
the UPS powering the wind turbine’s blade pitch controller, and that, although the 
document does discuss a shunting circuit, it is not the selectively activating and de-
activating circuit of the ’985 patent. Wilkins left GE later in 2002. 
The ’985 patent is one of several asserted by GE against Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Power Systems Americas, Inc. in at least two lawsuits, 
including a patent infringement case in … Texas and an investigation before the 
United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”). The ’985 patent is also 
one of the patents at issue in an antitrust suit that Mitsubishi brought against GE in 
… Arkansas. 
In the ITC proceeding, Mitsubishi challenged the validity of the ’985 patent 
and hired Wilkins to search for relevant prior art. Wilkins worked approximately 
1,000 hours[†] in an effort to invalidate the ’985 patent, for which he received ap-
proximately $200,000. Mitsubishi also argued that the ’985 patent was unenforce-
able based on a claim that GE intentionally failed to name Wilkins as a coinventor. 
The [ITC] administrative law judge rejected that argument, concluding that Wilkins 
had co-invented the ’985 patent but finding that GE did not intend to deceive the 
[PTO] by failing to name Wilkins as a co-inventor. The ITC did not review the 
ALJ’s finding that there was no inequitable conduct, and Mitsubishi did not chal-
lenge that determination on appeal to this court. 
Following the ITC proceedings, Wilkins averred that he retained ownership 
rights in the ’985 patent and U.S. Patent 6,924,565, which is directed to continu-
ous reactive power support for wind turbine generators that GE prosecuted in Wil-
kins’s name after he left the company. Wilkins subsequently entered into another set 
of agreements with Mitsubishi under which Mitsubishi paid him $100,000 for an 
option to license the ’985 patent and an additional $200,000 for “consulting” 
work. In return, Wilkins agreed to “take all necessary and reasonable steps” to sup-
port Mitsubishi in actions against GE regarding the ’985 patent. 
In due course, Mitsubishi exercised its option, and during licensing negotia-
tions Wilkins’s counsel demanded significant additional funds for Wilkins to “stay in 
the game” against GE, making clear that Mitsubishi’s offer of $200,000 was “inad-
equate for Wilkins to keep his place at the table.” Wilkins’s counsel promised that 
Mitsubishi would have “every ability to coordinate and manage Wilkins’ involve-
ment to maximize [Mitsubishi]’s position in the litigation” if it agreed to pay more. 
Mitsubishi consequently paid Wilkins a nonrefundable licensing fee of $1.5 million 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note — At 40 hrs/wk, it takes 25 weeks, or about six months, to work 1,000 
hours. ] 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  15 
and retained an option to extend that license upon payment of an additional $1 mil-
lion. 
GE subsequently filed suit in … California seeking to quiet title to the ’985 and 
’565 patents. Wilkins counterclaimed, seeking (i) to be added as a named inventor 
of the ’985 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 256 and (ii) a declaration that he has an own-
ership interest in the ’985 and ’565 patents. Mitsubishi intervened and also filed 
counterclaims seeking a declaration that Wilkins is a coinventor and co-owner of the 
’985 patent. 
The district court initially found that GE was likely to prevail on its claims and 
preliminarily enjoined Wilkins from licensing either of the patents in suit. After sub-
sequently refusing four times to take an unqualified oath to tell the truth at his dep-
osition, behavior that the court deemed “not acceptable,” Wilkins filed a declaration 
calling the district court “obtuse,” “overly assumptive,” and “ignorant.” The district 
court eventually dismissed GE’s ownership claims on summary judgment as 
timebarred by the statute of limitations. The court then conducted a bench trial on 
Wilkins’s and Mitsubishi’s inventorship counterclaims and held that they had failed 
to establish that Wilkins co-invented the subject matter of any claim of the ’985  
patent.  
In reaching that conclusion, the district court determined that Wilkins had un-
dermined his own credibility. The court noted that Wilkins had received approxi-
mately $2 million from Mitsubishi by the time of the trial and pointed to the docu-
mentary evidence showing that Wilkins had indeed demanded those substantial 
payments in order for him to “stay in the game” so that Mitsubishi could “manage” 
him. The court thus concluded that Wilkins was “biased,” “a purchased wit-
ness/party,” and “more concerned about gaining personal advantage than testifying 
truthfully.” The court found that Wilkins lacked credibility based on his “purpose-
fully evasive” responses to even basic questions, noting that Wilkins was “repeatedly 
impeached during cross-examination, to the point where the veracity of even simple 
answers w[as] called into question.” The district court judge described Wilkins as 
“one of the worst witnesses I have ever seen.” 
The district court analyzed all of the evidence presented, including: documents 
from Wilkins’s work at Lake Benton II, upon which Wilkins had based his primary 
inventorship theory; testimony from the German engineers and Wilkins’s cor-
respondence with them regarding his 2002 work and trip; Wilkins’s Design and 
Cost Analysis; and GE’s prosecution of the ’985 patent. Based on its credibility de-
termination, factual findings, and review of the entire record, the court concluded 
that Wilkins and Mitsubishi had not carried their burden to prove inventorship by 
clear and convincing evidence because, “[s]imply put, there [we]re no reliable doc-
uments that verify what, if anything, Mr. Wilkins contributed to any of the claims of 
the ’985 patent.” 
Mitsubishi and Wilkins timely appealed. GE cross-appealed from the summary 
judgment orders holding that its quiet title claims were time-barred. By voluntary 
dismissal, the appeal was terminated as to Mitsubishi, as was GE’s cross-appeal. The 
record indicates that Wilkins subsequently filed related suits … assert[ing] claims for 
malicious prosecution and abuse of process against GE and its counsel in the district 
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court action that is the subject of this appeal, seeking $1.5 billion in damages from 
GE and its counsel based upon their assertion of breach of contract claims against 
Wilkins in the district court. The district court in the instant case denied Wilkins’s 
motion for sanctions premised on the same arguments underlying those new com-
plaints, but Wilkins did not appeal that determination. …  
Discussion 
Inventorship is a question of law, which we review without deference. Ethicon, 
Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We review the 
district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error. Id. Because the issuance of 
a patent creates a presumption that the named inventors are the true and only inven-
tors, id., the burden of showing misjoinder or nonjoinder of inventors is a heavy one 
and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, Hess v. Advanced Cardiovas-
cular Sys., 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Credibility determinations are enti-
tled to strong deference. See Celsis In Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 
929 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
Although Wilkins admits that his credibility was impeached, he asserts that 
those instances of impeachment only extended to immaterial and tangential points 
and notes that the ALJ did not criticize Wilkins’s credibility in the previous ITC ac-
tion. Wilkins argues that the district court erred in concluding that he is not a co-
inventor of GE’s ’985 patent because the court did not compare the conception de-
scribed in Wilkins’s Design and Cost Analysis document to the claims. Wilkins fur-
ther contends that the Design and Cost Analysis is among the corroborating evi-
dence that the court did not analyze as a whole under the rule of reason standard. 
Wilkins maintains that he is an inventor because that conception document meets 
every limitation of the independent claims; he asserts that he conceived of using a 
UPS as claimed for LVRT and that the claims of the ’985 patent do not limit the 
location of the UPS. 
GE responds that Wilkins’s impeachment went to core issues including the 
work that he supposedly did and the interactions that he supposedly had with the 
named inventors. GE contends that the district court correctly applied the rule of 
reason standard, but that Wilkins did not first provide any credible testimony for the 
court to corroborate. 
We agree with both GE and the district court that, in light of all the record evi-
dence, Wilkins did not prove his inventorship claim by clear and convincing evi-
dence because he did not present any credible testimony that could be corroborated. 
In order to guard “against courts being deceived by inventors who may be tempted 
to mischaracterize the events of the past through their testimony,” the law requires 
corroboration of a putative inventor’s credible testimony, the sufficiency of which is 
measured under a “rule of reason” standard. Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, 
Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, as a threshold matter, in 
order for the rule of reason requirement to even apply there must be some evidence 
that a fact-finder can find reasonable; the putative inventor must first provide credi-
ble testimony that only then must be corroborated. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. Found. v. 
Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1308-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting inventor-
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ship theory based upon putative inventor’s discredited testimony). The very purpose 
of the rule of reason requirement is to verify the credibility of a putative inventor’s 
story. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 266 F.3d 1358, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1461; Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“An evaluation of all pertinent evidence must be made so that a 
sound determination of the credibility of the inventor’s story may be reached.”). 
The district court found that Wilkins was biased, based in part on his financial 
relationship with Mitsubishi. The court’s determination is supported by documen-
tary evidence showing that Wilkins demanded and received substantial payments in 
order for him to “stay in the game” so that Mitsubishi could “manage” him. The 
court also found that Wilkins further undermined his own credibility while testifying 
at trial because his responses to even basic questions were “purposefully evasive” and 
he was “repeatedly impeached during cross-examination, to the point where the ve-
racity of even simple answers w[as] called into question.” Based on the trial record, 
we find no clear error in the district court’s assessment that the substance of Wil-
kins’s testimony, which addressed central issues such as conception and contribu-
tion, was inconsistent and purposefully evasive. We agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that Wilkins left his case with no credibility. 
Although Wilkins is correct that the ALJ did not criticize Wilkins’s credibility in 
the previous ITC action, that ITC decision was made without the benefit of the 
complete factual record, including the relationship between Wilkins and Mitsubishi, 
and without observing the shifting and inconsistent testimony that he repeatedly 
provided at the district court trial. The ALJ’s findings, made only in the context of 
an inequitable conduct analysis, are insufficient to overcome the district court’s 
credibility determinations in this proceeding concerning correction of inventorship. 
Accordingly, without credible testimony from Wilkins, there was nothing to 
corroborate. And although there was no need for the district court to assess any cor-
roborating evidence, the court nevertheless carefully and thoroughly analyzed all of 
the evidence presented under the rule of reason standard and concluded that it did 
not contain clear and convincing evidence showing that Wilkins made any inventive 
contribution to the claims of the ’985 patent. The district court expressly assessed 
witness testimony and dozens of supposedly corroborating documents, including 
Wilkins’s Lake Benton II documents, the 2002 correspondence between Wilkins 
and the named German inventors, Wilkins’s October 2002 Design and Cost Analy-
sis, and documents from GE’s prosecution of the ’985 patent. We see no error in 
the district court’s analysis of that evidence. 
Moreover, we find no merit in Wilkins’s suggestion that the district court 
should be faulted because its opinion does not specifically address every admitted 
trial exhibit. A district court need not write an opinion that expressly discusses every 
admitted exhibit. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (recognizing that a district court need not provide a “complete discussion of 
all possible permutations and combinations” of the evidence because we “presume 
that a fact finder reviews all evidence presented unless he explicitly expresses other-
wise”). But even so, the district court’s opinion in this case makes clear that it did 
take all of the admitted evidence into account in reaching its decision. The court 
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concluded “that the heavy burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence has not 
been met, and therefore that Mr. Wilkins should not be named a coinventor of the 
’985 patent” after “[h]aving considered the evidence presented at trial and the par-
ties’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted after trial.” 
Similarly, the district court did not err simply because, after cataloging the 
many problems with each piece of purportedly corroborating evidence proffered by 
Wilkins, it did not expressly dismiss that same evidence for the second time “as a 
whole.” See, e.g., Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 522 F.3d 1279, 1295-96 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting inventorship claim after individually addressing flaws 
with each piece of corroborating evidence); Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, 
148 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that the district court appropriately 
excluded evidence “lacking detail and clarity” from its rule of reason analysis). The 
district court considered the entire record and found that it did not support Wil-
kins’s inventorship claim. Wilkins does not argue that any of those factual findings 
were clearly erroneous, and we likewise identify no clear error. Wilkins’s argument 
depends on a selective reading of the record, which ignores facts that are unhelpful 
to his case and is in itself contrary to a proper rule of reason analysis. 
Although Wilkins appears to have relied on his work at Lake Benton II when 
advocating his inventorship theory before the tribunals below, he suggests now that 
the October 2002 Design and Cost Analysis that he prepared for Florida Power and 
Light clearly and convincingly demonstrates his contribution to the German team’s 
LVRT solution and the claims of the ’985 patent, viz., use of a UPS. Notwithstand-
ing that the record is devoid of proof that the German engineers relied on anything 
discussed in that document as part of their conception and that Wilkins provided no 
credible testimony for that document to corroborate, our review of the record veri-
fies that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the document does not 
disclose any of the subject matter claimed in the ’985 patent. 
Record evidence confirms that Wilkins collected ideas from many different col-
laborating GE sources when preparing the Design and Cost Analysis. Wilkins him-
self conceded that the idea to use a UPS to perform LVRT was not novel in 2002. 
Accordingly, if all Wilkins allegedly contributed to the ’985 patent was the idea to 
use a UPS, then he would have contributed nothing beyond what was already 
known in the art. That is not sufficient to name Wilkins as a co-inventor. Fina Oil & 
Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A] person will not be 
a coinventor if he or she does no more than explain to the real inventors concepts 
that are well known and the current state of the art.”). As the district court noted, 
Wilkins did not invent or contribute to the use of the circuit recited in claim 15 of 
the ’985 patent to protect the converter by shunting current away from the sensitive 
components of the wind turbine system. And the prosecution history of the ’985 
patent shows that it was the combination of a UPS and such a circuit that allowed 
GE to overcome a prior art rejection in getting its claims allowed. 
Moreover, on its face, the Design and Cost Analysis does not even depict the 
key feature Wilkins claims to have invented, i.e., a UPS powering the wind turbine’s 
three controllers. As discussed above, the plain language of the ’985 patent claims 
requires the UPS to be “coupled to” the requisite controllers to provide power dur-
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ing a low voltage event. But the figures in Wilkins’s Design and Cost Analysis depict 
the turbine controller and converter controller situated between the power grid and 
the UPS so that they could only receive power from the grid during a low voltage 
event and not from the UPS, which is depicted as situated to insulate the other 
components of the wind turbine from the grid. Furthermore, Wilkins admitted that 
his Design and Cost Analysis does not show the UPS powering the wind turbine’s 
blade pitch controller. The district court thus did not clearly err in concluding that 
the Design and Cost Analysis did not recite the UPS limitations claimed in the ’985 
patent. 
A co-inventor “must contribute in some significant manner to the conception 
or reduction to practice of the invention [and] make contribution to the claimed 
invention that is not insignificant in quality, when that contribution is measured 
against the dimension of the full invention.” Nartron Corp. v. Schukra U.S.A., Inc., 
558 F.3d 1352, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Wilkins’s evidence is bereft of any such 
proof. The undisputed record confirms that the German inventors had already con-
ceived of their controller-based LVRT solution before corresponding with Wilkins 
to discuss American grid requirements or meeting with Wilkins in Germany. See Sy-
mantec, 522 F.3d at 1296 (holding that evidence of discussions between named in-
ventor and putative co-inventor concerning subject matter of claimed invention was 
insufficient to establish co-inventorship). 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in de-
termining that the heavy burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence was not 
met, and therefore that Wilkins should not be named a coinventor of the ’985  
patent. The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed. 
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Chapter 2: Claims 
The patent claim establishes the boundaries of the patentee’s right to exclude 
others. It is thus a central mechanism of patent law. This chapter proceeds in three 
steps. First, it specifies the portion of Mueller’s Patent Law that describes the claim 
mechanism in detail. Second, it turns to the techniques for construing disputed 
claim terms. Third, it explores a validity doctrine that is intertwined with the claim 
construction process—namely, claim definiteness. 
The Claim Mechanism 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 77-80, 90-100, 114-115, 446-449 
Blocking Patents 
Al invents the knife, and obtains a patent on it. Barb later invents the switch-
blade, and obtains a patent on it. Al’s sole patent claim is the one on the left, and 
Barb’s sole patent claim is the one on the right. 
Al’s knife claim Barb’s switchblade claim 
A knife comprising: 
a handle; 
and a blade, said blade having at least 
one sharpened edge, and said blade be-
ing affixed at one end of said blade to 
one end of said handle. 
A knife comprising: 
a handle; 
a blade, said blade having one sharpened 
edge, and said blade being movably af-
fixed at one end of said blade to one end 
of said handle; 
and means for locking said blade in an 
open position or in a closed position 
Can Barb make switchblades without Al’s permission, or would it infringe Al’s 
claim for her to do so? What about Al … can he make switchblades without Barb’s 
permission, or would it infringe Barb’s claim for Al to do so? If neither can enter the 
lucrative switchblade market without Al’s say-so, and the switchblade market 
wouldn’t even exist were it not for Barb’s inventive skill, should they find a way to 
share the gains of supplying that market? 
Claim Construction 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 449-465 
The first claim construction case relates to a humble concern—namely, the slip-
periness of socks. First read the patent in dispute, then read the decision. 
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Piggy Pushers v. Skidders Footwear 
544 Fed. Appx. 984 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
Per Curiam 
Piggy Pushers sued Skidders Footwear … for patent infringement. After con-
struing the asserted claims and granting summary judgment of noninfringement, the 
district court entered final judgment in favor of Skidders. Piggy Pushers appeals. For 
the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
Background 
Piggy Pushers owns U.S. Patent No. 6,385,779, which is directed to infant 
socks with “gripper” surfaces that provide traction for crawling and walking. Each 
claimed sock is infant-sized and includes a gripper—a friction-enhancing material, 
such as rubber—covering at least a portion of the upper, lower, and toe surfaces of 
the sock. The placement of the gripper surface allows it to touch the floor whether 
the infant is crawling (when part of the top of the foot, or the toes, touch the floor) 
or walking (when the bottom of the foot touches the floor), thus distinguishing pri-
or-art socks that allegedly provided traction only on the bottom of the sock. Claim 1 
is representative … . Figures 2 and 3 of the ’779 patent depict alternative embodi-
ments of the claimed inventions, showing both tube- and foot-shaped socks, as well 
as gripper surfaces composed of a single piece of frictional material, e.g., 12, or a 
series of ribs, e.g., 113[.] 
On July 6, 2010, Piggy Pushers 
brought suit against Skidders for alleg-
edly infringing the ’779 patent. Skid-
ders makes footwear, including the ac-
cused product for twelvemonth-old 
children, pictured [at right.] The prod-
uct consists of a foot-surrounding sock 
bonded to a rubber outsole. 
On March 5, 2012, the district 
court issued its opinion construing vari-
ous terms of the ’779 patent. First, the 
court construed the preamble of each 
claim at issue as limiting the claimed 
invention as a whole to a “sock.” As to 
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the meaning of the term “sock,” the court said that “[n]othing in the claim lan-
guage or the specifications suggests that the inventor intended ‘sock’ to mean any-
thing other than what a person of ordinary skill in the art of footwear would under-
stand it to mean.” The court then said that it was construing “sock” to mean “a 
knitted or woven covering for the foot”—even while indicating that the ordinary 
meaning governed to distinguish a shoe. The court construed “sock member” to 
mean “a part of the sock” and construed “a sock member sized to fit a foot of an 
infant learning to crawl” to mean “a sock member of a size such that it conforms to 
the foot of an infant learning to crawl.” Neither party argued that “gripper mem-
ber” required construction; accordingly, the court did not construe that phrase. 
On August 6, 2012, Skidders moved for summary judgment of noninfringe-
ment, which the district court granted on November 2, 2012. The district court re-
cited evidence that the accused product has various qualities consistent with shoes—
such as a thick, durable outsole, a separate insole, a fixed size and shape, a design 
not intended to be worn inside a shoe, and left-foot and right-foot designations—
evidence to which Piggy Pushers “raised few challenges.” At the same time, the dis-
trict court noted that there was “no dispute that the Accused Product consists of a 
sock that has been bonded to a rubber outsole”; that Skidders had described the 
accused product as “sock-like,” as a “sock with rubber outsole,” and as a “hybrid 
sockshoe design”; and that “retailers could not decide whether to put [the accused 
product] in the hosiery department or the shoe department.” 
Considering the evidence presented, the district court concluded that Piggy 
Pushers was entitled to summary judgment of noninfringement. Although Piggy 
Pushers had shown “a question of fact as to whether the Accused Product is a hy-
brid shoe and sock,” the court reasoned, the ’779 patent “addresses a sock,” not “a 
hybrid sockshoe,” and there was “simply no evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could conclude that [Skidders’s] product is a sock.” That conclusion—which ap-
pears to have relied on the ordinary meaning of “sock” in addition to the “knitted 
or woven covering for the foot” language of the claim-construction opinion—
sufficed for summary judgment of noninfringement. As an alternative basis for 
granting summary judgment, the district court agreed with Skidders that “any rea-
sonable jury would find that because the sock member of the Accused Product is 
bonded to a rigid rubber sole, the sock portion of the Accused Product does not 
conform to the foot,” as required by the district court’s construction. For those rea-
sons, the district court entered judgment in favor of Skidders, a judgment that be-
came final upon the stipulated dismissal of counterclaims without prejudice. 
Piggy Pushers appeals. …  
Discussion 
Piggy Pushers challenges the district court’s construction of the preambles as 
limiting the claims, its conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that the accused 
product is a “sock,” and its conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that the 
sock portion of the accused product conforms to the foot. We review the district 
court’s claim construction and its grant of summary judgment de novo. 
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A 
Because some preambles are limiting and others not, we focus on the sole con-
crete issue at stake in deciding whether the particular preambles here are limiting—
namely, whether, when the elements recited in the body of the claims are combined 
as claimed, the result must itself be a sock. We think the answer plain from the speci-
fication, which uniformly describes what results from combining the sock member 
with the gripper member as itself remaining a “sock.” In particular, the specification 
distinguishes a sock from a “shoe,” which can be undesirable or difficult to put on 
an infant; so the addition of the gripper cannot transform the sock into a shoe. More 
generally, introducing the invention, the specification explains that “socks can be 
disadvantageous on smooth floor surfaces *** because there is a very low coefficient 
of friction between fabric material of the socks and the floor surface,” (emphasis 
added), and that the inventors have conceived and described a particular kind of 
“sock” that overcomes that problem, without the use of a “shoe,” and does so for 
crawling infants, not just those who can walk. 
The requirement that the combined elements form a “sock” is a “fundamental 
characteristic of the claimed invention.” Poly-Am., L.P. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., 
383 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We therefore affirm the construction of the 
preambles as limiting to the extent necessary to express the idea that the claims each 
cover a sock, not a shoe or another article that may be derivative or partly made up 
of a sock but is not itself a sock. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 
1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether to treat a preamble term as a claim limita-
tion is determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole and the 
invention described in the patent.”). 
B 
That conclusion decides this case, because “[n]o reasonable juror could con-
clude that the Accused Product is a sock as defined in the patent.” D. Ct. (emphasis 
added). Once the preamble language is accepted as a limitation of the whole  
product to a “sock,” Piggy Pushers’s only meaningful argument about whether the 
accused product is a “sock” relies on “sock” having only the meaning of “a knitted 
or woven covering for the foot.” But that approach, while understandable given 
some aspects of the district court’s claim construction opinion, is not ultimately sen-
sible considering the full context of the patent and the litigation. 
The “knitted or woven covering” formulation is necessarily incomplete. If it 
meant to exclude all non-knitted and non-woven components, it could not fit this 
patent, which is all about adding such components. Once it is acknowledged that 
additions to the knitted or woven material are allowed, nothing in the “knitted or 
woven covering” formulation itself supplies a principle to identify what additions are 
allowed. Yet there must be such a limit, given the undisputed exclusion of shoes—
which can readily include foot coverings made of woven material such as canvas. 
For such reasons, the governing construction of “sock” must, instead, include 
its ordinary meaning, captured centrally but not exclusively by the knitted-or-woven 
covering language. That is evidently how the district court understood the construc-
tion it was applying on summary judgment: the ultimate product must remain a 
“sock” in its ordinary meaning, even with the addition of friction-enhancing com-
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ponents. Importantly, Piggy Pushers does not argue here that there was a change of 
construction that unfairly denied it the opportunity to present evidence—which it 
plainly did present—on whether the accused product was covered by the fuller un-
derstanding of “sock” that incorporated the word’s ordinary meaning. 
Under that construction, Piggy Pushers has no challenge to the summary-
judgment ruling. It argues that the accused product includes a sock, but that is not 
enough. It had evidence that Skidders sometimes described the product as a “sock 
with rubber outsole,” or in similar terms, but never simply as a sock. It had evidence, 
too, that “retailers could not decide whether to put [it] in the hosiery department or 
the shoe department.” But such evidence showed at most a hybrid character of the 
product. Piggy Pushers had no evidence to respond to Skidders’s evidence that the 
product, with its rigid rubber sole severely constraining flexibility in shape and size, 
was not a “sock” under that term’s ordinary meaning, applied within the context of 
this patent. In these circumstances, there is no evidence from which a jury could  
reasonably find that the product actually is a sock. 
In light of that conclusion, we need not reach the district court’s alternative 
ground of decision, concerning a requirement that a covered product conform to 
the foot. 
…  
Teashot.LLC v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. 
595 Fed. Appx. 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Prost, Chief Judge:  
Teashot.LLC (“Teashot”) appeals from a final judgment of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Colorado of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 
5,895,672 in favor of Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., Keurig, Inc., and 




The ’672 patent seeks to adapt prior art coffee pod machines to make tea with-
out the attendant weak taste from the short brewing time. The ’672 patent thus 
teaches the use of special tea composition in the known brewing pod or container as 
reflected in representative claim 1: 
1. A tea extraction system for production of a serving of tea extract in a 
coffee brewing device, comprising: 
(a) a tea extraction container for containing a tea composition, said tea ex-
traction container comprising a sealed body having at least one internal 
compartment, said internal compartment containing said tea composition; 
wherein said sealed body is constructed of a water-permeable material 
which allows flow of a fluid through said sealed body to produce a tea ex-
tract from said tea composition; and, 
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(b) a tea composition comprising from about 2 grams to about 10 grams 
of tea having a particle size of from about 0.40 mm to about 0.75 mm. 
II. District Court Proceedings 
Teashot accuses Green Mountain’s tea-brewing K-Cups of infringing the ‘672 
patent. The accused K-Cup has a foil lid, which would be punctured by a needle to 
inject water during use. 
The district court 
construed the claim ele-
ment “sealed body is con-
structed of a water-
permeable material which 
allows flow of a fluid 
through said sealed body 
to produce a tea extract 
from said tea composition” as “the portions of the sealed body into which fluid 
flows and out of which fluid flows are water-permeable material allowing flow of a 
fluid through said sealed body to produce a tea extract from said tea composition.” 
The district court concluded that the K-Cups do not literally infringe because the K-
Cups do not have a “water-permeable material” for water to flow into the sealed 
bodies. … The district court therefore entered summary judgment of non-
infringement in favor of Green Mountain. 
Teashot appeals the claim construction and summary judgment of no literal in-
fringement … . 
Discussion 
I. Claim Construction 
…  
Teashot argues that the district court’s construction deviates from the claim 
text and improperly imports limitations from the specification by requiring fluid to 
flow into and out of the sealed body through water-permeable material. Green 
Mountain counters that the phrase “which allows,” linking “water-permeable ma-
terial” to the “flow of a fluid through said sealed body,” requires that fluid flows 
through the “sealed body” via the “water-permeable material.” 
We agree with Green Mountain that the claim text identifies “water-permeable 
material” as the means through which fluid could flow through the “sealed body.” 
The specification confirms this conclusion. Every discussion in the specification of 
fluid flowing through the “sealed body” refers to the “water-permeable material.” 
The ’672 patent mentions no other means through which fluid could flow through 
the “sealed body.” 
Teashot contends, however, that Figure 4 in the ’672 patent teaches an embod-
iment in which water enters a sealed body through an opening in a material that is 
not otherwise permeable to water. Teashot further contends that the district court’s 
claim construction improperly excludes this embodiment in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4, however, is limited to disclosing an arrangement in which multiple tea 
containers can be accessed individually to add different tea compositions, but used 
together for brewing. Figure 4 and its descriptions do not show any details of entry 
or exit means in the containers for water to flow through. From this silence, we can-
not assume Figure 4 to depart from the consistent teachings elsewhere in the ’672 
patent that water can flow through a “sealed body” via a “water-permeable materi-
al.” We are therefore not persuaded by Teashot that the district court erred in con-
struing this claim element. 
II. Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement 
…  
Literal infringement requires that “every limitation set forth in a claim must be 
found in an accused product, exactly.” Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 
F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
Teashot does not dispute that its owner and the inventor of the ’672 patent, in 
testimonies quoted by Green Mountain, admitted that the lid of the K-Cup is not 
water permeable. Teashot also does not dispute the following admission that the 
mere puncturing of the K-Cup lid fails to transform the material into a water-
permeable material: 
Q Correct me if I’m wrong, when you puncture the foil lid, the actual foil 
remains water impermeable, correct? 
A The—the foil around the hole, yes. 
Q Yes. The hole no longer has foil in it, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Hence the hole. 
A Right. 
Q The water doesn’t flow through the foil; it flows through an open 
space. Correct? 
A Correct. 
Appellee Br. 31 (quoting Joint Appndx. A1203). 
Nevertheless, Teashot contends that a factual dispute remains as to whether the 
K-Cup’s lid, once punctured, becomes a “water-permeable material.” Teashot cites 
no support in the record that a skilled artisan would consider “water-permeable ma-
terial” to encompass material not permeable to water but having merely a puncture 
hole. We do not find Teashot’s unsupported arguments—especially against its ad-
missions quoted by Green Mountain—create a genuine factual dispute sufficient to 
survive summary judgment. 
…  
Claim Definiteness 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 81-90, 101-108 
Claims are property boundaries. If one can’t definitively construe a claim, and 
thus discern proper public notice of what’s inside and what’s outside the exclusion 
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zone, the claim fails of its essential purpose. At the same time, the mere fact that a 
claim construction question is tough can’t be enough, by itself, to invalidate a claim; 
if it were, a significant number of extant patent claims would not survive scrutiny. 
The claim definiteness requirement embodied in § 112(b) entails balancing these 
considerations. Secondarily, the claim definiteness requirement helps cabin a particu-
lar type of patent claim, known as a “means plus function” claim, to its proper 
scope. The cases below begin with the need for a definitive boundary, then turn to 
the rigors of mean-plus-function claiming. 
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) 
Ginsburg, Justice: 
The Patent Act requires that a patent specification “conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as [the] invention.” 35 U.S. C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006 ed.) (emphasis 
added). This case, involving a heartrate monitor used with exercise equipment, con-
cerns the proper reading of the statute’s clarity and precision demand. …  
I 
Authorized by the Constitution “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to *** Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
*** Discoveries,” Art. I, §8, cl. 8, Congress has enacted patent laws rewarding in-
ventors with a limited monopoly. “Th[at] monopoly is a property right,” and “like 
any property right, its boundaries should be clear.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002). See also Markman v. Westview In-
struments, 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (“It has long been understood that a patent 
must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture *** .”). Thus, 
when Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790, it directed that patent grantees 
file a written specification “containing a description *** of the thing or things *** 
invented or discovered,” which “shall be so particular” as to “distinguish the inven-
tion or discovery from other things before known and used.” Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 
§ 2, 1 Stat. 110. 
The patent laws have retained this requirement of definiteness even as the focus 
of patent construction has shifted. Under early patent practice in the United States, 
we have recounted, it was the written specification that “represented the key to the 
patent.” Markman, 517 U.S. at 379. Eventually, however, patent applicants began 
to set out the invention’s scope in a separate section known as the “claim.” See gen-
erally 1 R. Moy, Walker on Patents § 4.2, pp. 4-17 to 4-20 (4th ed. 2012). The  
Patent Act of 1870 expressly conditioned the receipt of a patent on the inventor’s 
inclusion of one or more such claims, described with particularity and distinctness. 
See Act of July 8, 1870, § 26, 16 Stat. 201 (to obtain a patent, the inventor must 
“particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combination 
which [the inventor] claims as his invention or discovery”). 
The 1870 Act’s definiteness requirement survives today, largely unaltered. Sec-
tion 112 of the Patent Act of 1952, applicable to this case, requires the patent appli-
cant to conclude the specification with “one or more claims particularly pointing out 
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and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his inven-
tion.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006 ed.). A lack of definiteness renders invalid “the 
patent or any claim in suit.” § 282, ¶ 2(3).1  
II 
A 
The patent in dispute, U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753, issued to Dr. Gregory 
Lekhtman in 1994 and assigned to respondent Biosig Instruments, Inc., concerns a 
heart-rate monitor for use during exercise. Previous heart-rate monitors, the patent 
asserts, were often inaccurate in measuring the electrical signals accompanying each 
heartbeat (electrocardiograph or ECG signals). The inaccuracy was caused by elec-
trical signals of a different sort, known as electromyogram or EMG signals, gener-
ated by an exerciser’s skeletal muscles when, for example, she moves her arm, or 
grips an exercise monitor with her hand. These EMG signals can “mask” ECG sig-
nals and thereby impede their detection.  
Dr. Lekhtman’s invention claims to improve on prior art by eliminating that 
impediment. The invention focuses on a key difference between EMG and ECG 
waveforms: while ECG signals detected from a user’s left hand have a polarity oppo-
site to that of the signals detected from her right hand, EMG signals from each hand 
have the same polarity. The patented 
device works by measuring equalized 
EMG signals detected at each hand and 
then using circuitry to subtract the 
identical EMG signals from each other, 
thus filtering out the EMG interference. 
As relevant here, the ’753 patent 
describes a heart-rate monitor contained 
in a hollow cylindrical bar that a user grips with both hands, such that each hand 
comes into contact with two electrodes, one “live” and one “common.” The device 
is illustrated in figure 1 of the patent, reproduced [above]. 
Claim 1 of the ’753 patent, which contains the limitations critical to this dis-
pute, refers to a “heart rate monitor for use by a user in association with exercise 
apparatus and/or exercise procedures.” The claim “comprise[s],” among other ele-
ments, an “elongate member” (cylindrical bar) with a display device; “electronic cir-
cuitry including a difference amplifier”; and, on each half of the cylindrical bar, a live 
electrode and a common electrode “mounted *** in spaced relationship with each 
other.” The claim sets forth additional elements, including that the cylindrical bar is 
                                                
1 In the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, enacted 
in 2011, Congress amended several parts of the Patent Act. Those amendments 
modified §§ 112 and 282 in minor respects . . . . In any event, the amended versions 
of those provisions are inapplicable to patent applications filed before September 16, 
2012, and proceedings commenced before September 16, 2011. Here, the applica-
tion for the patent-in-suit was filed in 1992, and the relevant court proceedings were 
initiated in 2010. Accordingly, this opinion’s citations to the Patent Act refer to the 
2006 edition of the United States Code. 
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to be held in such a way that each of the user’s hands “contact[s]” both electrodes 
on each side of the bar. Further, the EMG signals detected by the two electrode 
pairs are to be “of substantially equal magnitude and phase” so that the difference 
amplifier will “produce a substantially zero [EMG] signal” upon subtracting the sig-
nals from one another. 
B 
The dispute between the parties arose in the 1990’s, when Biosig allegedly dis-
closed the patented technology to StairMaster Sports Medical Products, Inc. Ac-
cording to Biosig, StairMaster, without ever obtaining a license, sold exercise ma-
chines that included Biosig’s patented technology, and petitioner Nautilus, Inc., 
continued to do so after acquiring the StairMaster brand. In 2004, based on these 
allegations, Biosig brought a patent infringement suit against Nautilus … . 
With Biosig’s lawsuit launched, Nautilus asked the [PTO] to reexamine the 
’753 patent. The reexamination proceedings centered on whether the patent was 
anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art—principally, a patent issued in 1984 to 
an inventor named Fujisaki, which similarly disclosed a heart-rate monitor using two 
pairs of electrodes and a difference amplifier. Endeavoring to distinguish the ’753 
patent from prior art, Biosig submitted a declaration from Dr. Lekhtman. The decla-
ration attested, among other things, that the ’753 patent sufficiently informed a per-
son skilled in the art how to configure the detecting electrodes so as “to produce 
equal EMG [signals] from the left and right hands.” Although the electrodes’ de-
sign variables—including spacing, shape, size, and material—cannot be standardized 
across all exercise machines, Dr. Lekhtman explained, a skilled artisan could under-
take a “trial and error” process of equalization. This would entail experimentation 
with different electrode configurations in order to optimize EMG signal cancella-
tion.4 In 2010, the PTO issued a determination confirming the patentability of the 
’753 patent’s claims. 
Biosig thereafter reinstituted its infringement suit, which the parties had volun-
tarily dismissed without prejudice while PTO reexamination was underway. In 2011, 
the District Court conducted a hearing to determine the proper construction of the 
patent’s claims … . According to Biosig, th[e] “spaced relationship” referred to the 
distance between the live electrode and the common electrode in each electrode 
pair. Nautilus, seizing on Biosig’s submissions to the PTO during the reexamina-
tion, maintained that the “spaced relationship” must be a distance “greater than the 
width of each electrode.” The District Court ultimately construed the term to mean 
“there is a defined relationship between the live electrode and the common elec-
trode on one side of the cylindrical bar and the same or a different defined relation-
                                                
4 Dr. Lekhtman’s declaration also referred to an expert report prepared by Dr. Hen-
rietta Galiana, Chair of the Department of Biomedical Engineering at McGill Uni-
versity, for use in the infringement litigation. That report described how Dr. Galia-
na’s laboratory technician, equipped with a wooden dowel, wire, metal foil, glue, 
electrical tape, and the drawings from the ’753 patent, was able in two hours to 
build a monitor that “worked just as described in the *** patent.” 
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ship between the live electrode and the common electrode on the other side of the 
cylindrical bar,” without any reference to the electrodes’ width. 
Nautilus moved for summary judgment, arguing that the term “spaced relation-
ship,” as construed, was indefinite under § 112, ¶ 2. The District Court granted the 
motion. Those words, the District Court concluded, “did not tell [the court] or  
anyone what precisely the space should be,” or even supply “any parameters” for 
determining the appropriate spacing. 
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded. A claim is indefinite, the majority 
opinion stated, “only when it is ‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambig-
uous.’” 715 F.3d 891, 898 (2013) (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, 
Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Under that standard, the majority 
determined, the ’753 patent survived indefiniteness review. Considering first the 
“intrinsic evidence”—i.e., the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution 
history—the majority discerned “certain inherent parameters of the claimed appa-
ratus, which to a skilled artisan may be sufficient to understand the metes and 
bounds of ‘spaced relationship.’” Id. at 899. These sources of meaning, the majority 
explained, make plain that the distance separating the live and common electrodes 
on each half of the bar “cannot be greater than the width of a user’s hands”; that is 
so “because claim 1 requires the live and common electrodes to independently de-
tect electrical signals at two distinct points of a hand.” Id. Furthermore, the majority 
noted, the intrinsic evidence teaches that this distance cannot be “infinitesimally 
small, effectively merging the live and common electrodes into a single electrode 
with one detection point.” Id. The claim’s functional provisions, the majority went 
on to observe, shed additional light on the meaning of “spaced relationship.” Sur-
veying the record before the PTO on reexamination, the majority concluded that a 
skilled artisan would know that she could attain the indicated functions of equa-
lizing and removing EMG signals by adjusting design variables, including spacing. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Schall reached the majority’s result employing 
“a more limited analysis.” Id. at 905. …   
III 
A 
Although the parties here disagree on the dispositive question—does the ’753 
patent withstand definiteness scrutiny—they are in accord on several aspects of the 
§ 112, ¶ 2 inquiry. First, definiteness is to be evaluated from the perspective of 
someone skilled in the relevant art. Second, in assessing definiteness, claims are to be 
read in light of the patent’s specification and prosecution history. Third, 
“[d]efiniteness is measured from the viewpoint of a person skilled in [the] art at the 
time the patent was filed.” Brief for Respondent 55 (emphasis added).  
The parties differ, however, in their articulations of just how much imprecision 
§ 112, ¶ 2 tolerates. In Nautilus’ view, a patent is invalid when a claim is “ambigu-
ous, such that readers could reasonably interpret the claim’s scope differently.” Brief 
for Petitioner 37. Biosig and the Solicitor General would require only that the pa-
tent provide reasonable notice of the scope of the claimed invention. See Brief for 
Respondent 18; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9-10. 
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Section 112, we have said, entails a “delicate balance.” Festo, 535 U.S. at 731. 
On the one hand, the definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent 
limitations of language. See id. Some modicum of uncertainty, the Court has recog-
nized, is the “price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.” Id. at 
732. One must bear in mind, moreover, that patents are “not addressed to lawyers, 
or even to the public generally,” but rather to those skilled in the relevant art. Car-
negie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 437 (1902) (also stating that 
“any description which is sufficient to apprise [steel manufacturers] in the language 
of the art of the definite feature of the invention, and to serve as a warning to others 
of what the patent claims as a monopoly, is sufficiently definite to sustain the pa-
tent”). 
At the same time, a patent must be precise enough to afford clear notice of 
what is claimed, thereby “‘appris[ing] the public of what is still open to them.’” 
Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 
(1891)).6 Otherwise there would be “[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and 
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims.” United Carbon 
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). And absent a meaningful 
definiteness check, we are told, patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject 
ambiguity into their claims. Eliminating that temptation is in order, and “the patent 
drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambiguity in *** patent claims.” Halli-
burton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
To determine the proper office of the definiteness command, therefore, we 
must reconcile concerns that tug in opposite directions. Cognizant of the competing 
concerns, we read § 112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the 
specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope 
of the invention with reasonable certainty. The definiteness requirement, so under-
stood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute precision is unattainable. 
The standard we adopt accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certain-
ty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard 
to their subject-matter.” Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 
(1916). See also United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 236 (“claims must be reasonably clear-
cut”); Markman, 517 U.S. at 389 (claim construction calls for “the necessarily so-
phisticated analysis of the whole document,” and may turn on evaluations of expert 
testimony). 
                                                
6 See also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) 
(“The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in claims is met only 
when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went before in the art and 
clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.”); General Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The limits of a patent must 
be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive 
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be dedicated 
ultimately to the public.”). 
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B 
In resolving Nautilus’ definiteness challenge, the Federal Circuit asked whether 
the ’753 patent’s claims were “amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambigu-
ous.” Those formulations can breed lower court confusion, for they lack the pre-
cision § 112, ¶ 2 demands. It cannot be sufficient that a court can ascribe some 
meaning to a patent’s claims; the definiteness inquiry trains on the understanding of 
a skilled artisan at the time of the patent application, not that of a court viewing 
matters post hoc. To tolerate imprecision just short of that rendering a claim “insol-
ubly ambiguous” would diminish the definiteness requirement’s public-notice func-
tion and foster the innovation-discouraging “zone of uncertainty,” United Carbon, 
317 U.S. at 236, against which this Court has warned. 
Appreciating that “terms like ‘insolubly ambiguous’ may not be felicitous,” 
Brief for Respondent 34, Biosig argues the phrase is a shorthand label for a more 
probing inquiry that the Federal Circuit applies in practice. The Federal Circuit’s 
fuller explications of the term “insolubly ambiguous,” we recognize, may come clos-
er to tracking the statutory prescription. See, e.g., 715 F.3d at 898 (case below) 
(“[I]f reasonable efforts at claim construction result in a definition that does not 
provide sufficient particularity and clarity to inform skilled artisans of the bounds of 
the claim, the claim is insolubly ambiguous and invalid for indefiniteness.”). But al-
though this Court does not “micromanag[e] the Federal Circuit’s particular word 
choice” in applying patent-law doctrines, we must ensure that the Federal Circuit’s 
test is at least “probative of the essential inquiry.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton 
Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). Falling short in that regard, the ex-
pressions “insolubly ambiguous” and “amenable to construction” permeate the 
Federal Circuit’s recent decisions concerning § 112, ¶ 2’s requirement. We agree 
with Nautilus and its amici that such terminology can leave courts and the patent 
bar at sea without a reliable compass.10 
                                                
10 The Federal Circuit suggests that a permissive definiteness standard “accords re-
spect to the statutory presumption of patent validity.” 715 F.3d at 902. See also 
§ 282, ¶ 1 (“[a] patent shall be presumed valid,” and “[t]he burden of establishing 
invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such inva-
lidity”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (invalidity de-
fenses must be proved by “clear and convincing evidence”). As the parties appear to 
agree, however, this presumption of validity does not alter the degree of clarity that 
§ 112, ¶ 2 demands from patent applicants; to the contrary, it incorporates that  
definiteness requirement by reference. See § 282, ¶ 2(3) (defenses to infringement 
actions include “[i]nvalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply 
with *** any requirement of [§ 112]”). 
The parties nonetheless dispute whether factual findings subsidiary to the ulti-
mate issue of definiteness trigger the clear-and-convincing evidence standard and, 
relatedly, whether deference is due to the PTO’s resolution of disputed issues of 
fact. We leave these questions for another day. The court below treated definiteness 
as “a legal issue [the] court reviews without deference,” 715 F.3d at 897, and Biosig 
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IV 
Both here and in the courts below, the parties have advanced conflicting argu-
ments as to the definiteness of the claims in the ’753 patent. Nautilus maintains that 
the claim term “spaced relationship” is open to multiple interpretations reflecting 
markedly different understandings of the patent’s scope, as exemplified by the disa-
greement among the members of the Federal Circuit panel. Biosig responds that 
“spaced relationship,” read in light of the specification and as illustrated in the ac-
companying drawings, delineates the permissible spacing with sufficient precision. 
 “[M]indful that we are a court of review, not of first view,” Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005), we decline to apply the standard we have 
announced to the controversy between Nautilus and Biosig. As we have explained, 
the Federal Circuit invoked a standard more amorphous than the statutory definite-
ness requirement allows. We therefore follow our ordinary practice of remanding so 
that the Court of Appeals can reconsider, under the proper standard, whether the 
relevant claims in the ’753 patent are sufficiently definite. 
… 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) 
Breyer, Justice:  
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), we explained 
that a patent claim is that “portion of the patent document that defines the scope of 
the patentee’s rights.” Id. at 372. We held that “the construction of a patent, in-
cluding terms of art within its claim,” is not for a jury but “exclusively” for “the 
court” to determine. Id. That is so even where the construction of a term of art has 
“evidentiary underpinnings.” Id. at 390. 
Today’s case involves claim construction with “evidentiary underpinnings.” 
And, it requires us to determine what standard the Court of Appeals should use 
when it reviews a trial judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute. Should the 
Court of Appeals review the district court’s factfinding de novo as it would review a 
question of law? Or, should it review that factfinding as it would review a trial 
judge’s factfinding in other cases, namely by taking them as correct “unless clearly 
erroneous?” See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6). We hold that the appellate court 
must apply a “clear error,” not a de novo, standard of review. 
I 
The basic dispute in this case concerns the meaning of the words “molecular 
weight” as those words appear in a patent claim. The petitioners, Teva Pharmaceuti-
cals (along with related firms), own the relevant patent. The patent covers a manu-
facturing method for Copaxone, a drug used to treat multiple sclerosis. The drug’s 
active ingredient, called “copolymer-1,” is made up of molecules of varying sizes. 
                                                                                                                                
has not called our attention to any contested factual matter—or PTO determination 
thereof—pertinent to its infringement claims. 
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And the relevant claim describes that ingredient as having “a molecular weight of 5 
to 9 kilodaltons.” 
The respondents, Sandoz, Inc. (and several other firms), tried to market a ge-
neric version of Copaxone. Teva sued Sandoz for patent infringement. Sandoz de-
fended the suit by arguing that the patent was invalid. The Patent Act requires that a 
claim “particularly poin[t] out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 (2006 ed.); see Nautilus, 
Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2125, n. 1 (2014). The phrase 
“molecular weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons,” said Sandoz, did not satisfy this require-
ment. 
The reason that the phrase is fatally indefinite, Sandoz argued, is that, in the 
context of this patent claim, the term “molecular weight” might mean any one of 
three different things. The phrase might refer (1) to molecular weight as calculated 
by the weight of the molecule that is most prevalent in the mix that makes up co-
polymer-1. (The scientific term for molecular weight so calculated is, we are told, 
“peak average molecular weight.”) The phrase might refer (2) to molecular weight 
as calculated by taking all the different-sized molecules in the mix that makes up co-
polymer-1 and calculating the average weight, i.e., adding up the weight of each 
molecule and dividing by the number of molecules. (The scientific term for molecu-
lar weight so calculated is, we are told, “number average molecular weight.”) Or, 
the phrase might refer (3) to molecular weight as calculated by taking all the  
different-sized molecules in the mix that makes up copolymer-1 and calculating their 
average weight while giving heavier molecules a weight-related bonus when doing 
so. (The scientific term for molecular weight so calculated, we are told, is “weight 
average molecular weight.”) In Sandoz’s view, since Teva’s patent claim does not 
say which method of calculation should be used, the claim’s phrase “molecular 
weight” is indefinite, and the claim fails to satisfy the critical patent law requirement. 
The District Court, after taking evidence from experts, concluded that the  
patent claim was sufficiently definite. Among other things, it found that in context a 
skilled artisan would understand that the term “molecular weight” referred to mo-
lecular weight as calculated by the first method, i.e., “peak average molecular 
weight.” In part for this reason, the District Court held the patent valid. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held to the contrary. It found that the term 
“molecular weight” was indefinite. And it consequently held the patent invalid. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit reviewed de novo all aspects of the Dis-
trict Court’s claim construction, including the District Court’s determination of 
subsidiary facts. 
Teva filed a petition for certiorari. And we granted that petition. The Federal 
Circuit reviews the claim construction decisions of federal district courts throughout 
the Nation, and we consequently believe it important to clarify the standard of re-
view that it must apply when doing so. 
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II 
A 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) states that a court of appeals “must 
not *** set aside” a district court’s “[f]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erro-
neous.” In our view, this rule and the standard it sets forth must apply when a court 
of appeals reviews a district court’s resolution of subsidiary factual matters made in 
the course of its construction of a patent claim. We have made clear that the Rule 
sets forth a “clear command.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). 
“It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude certain categories of factual 
findings from the obligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court’s findings 
unless clearly erroneous.” Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 
Accordingly, the Rule applies to both subsidiary and ultimate facts. And we have 
said that, when reviewing the findings of a “‘district court sitting without a jury, ap-
pellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide fac-
tual issues de novo.’” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) [a patent case] ). 
…  
Our opinion in Markman neither created, nor argued for, an exception to Rule 
52(a). The question presented in that case was a Seventh Amendment question: 
Should a jury or a judge construe patent claims? 517 U.S. at 372. We pointed out 
that history provides no clear answer. Id. at 388. The task primarily involves the 
construction of written instruments. Id. at 386, 388, 389. And that task is better 
matched to a judge’s skills. Id. at 388 (“The construction of written instruments is 
one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors un-
burdened by training in exegesis”). We consequently held that claim construction 
falls “exclusively within the province of the court,” not that of the jury. Id. at 372. 
When describing claim construction we concluded that it was proper to treat 
the ultimate question of the proper construction of the patent as a question of law in 
the way that we treat document construction as a question of law. Id. at 388-391. 
But this does not imply an exception to Rule 52(a) for underlying factual disputes. 
We used the term “question of law” while pointing out that a judge, in construing a 
patent claim, is engaged in much the same task as the judge would be in construing 
other written instruments, such as deeds, contracts, or tariffs. Id. at 384, 386, 388, 
389; see also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502, 510 
(1917) (patent claims are “aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the 
bounds to the grant which it contains”); Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 
102 U.S. 222, 227 (1880) (analogizing patent construction to the construction of 
other written instruments like contracts). Construction of written instruments often 
presents a “question solely of law,” at least when the words in those instruments are 
“used in their ordinary meaning.” Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 
259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922). But sometimes, say when a written instrument uses 
“technical words or phrases not commonly understood,” id. at 292, those words 
may give rise to a factual dispute. If so, extrinsic evidence may help to “establish a 
usage of trade or locality.” Id. And in that circumstance, the “determination of the 
matter of fact” will “preced[e]” the “function of construction.” Id.; see also 12 R. 
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Lord, Williston on Contracts §§ 34:1, 34:19 (4th ed. 2012) (In contract interpreta-
tion, the existence of a “usage”—a “practice or method” in the relevant industry—
“is a question of fact”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This factual determina-
tion, like all other factual determinations, must be reviewed for clear error. See Pull-
man-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287 (The Rule does not “exclude certain categories of 
factual findings” and applies to both “subsidiary” and “ultimate” facts). 
Accordingly, when we held in Markman that the ultimate question of claim 
construction is for the judge and not the jury, we did not create an exception from 
the ordinary rule governing appellate review of factual matters. Markman no more 
creates an exception to Rule 52(a) than would a holding that judges, not juries, de-
termine equitable claims, such as requests for injunctions. A conclusion that an issue 
is for the judge does not indicate that Rule 52(a) is inapplicable. 
While we held in Markman that the ultimate issue of the proper construction of 
a claim should be treated as a question of law, we also recognized that in patent 
construction, subsidiary factfinding is sometimes necessary. Indeed, we referred to 
claim construction as a practice with “evidentiary underpinnings,” a practice that 
“falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact.” 517 
U.S. at 378, 388. We added that sometimes courts may have to make “credibility 
judgments” about witnesses. Id. at 389. In other words, we recognized that courts 
may have to resolve subsidiary factual disputes. And, as explained above, the Rule 
requires appellate courts to review all such subsidiary factual findings under the 
“clearly erroneous” standard. 
…  
Finally, practical considerations favor clear error review. We have previously 
pointed out that clear error review is “particularly” important where patent law is at 
issue because patent law is “a field where so much depends upon familiarity with 
specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the general store-
house of knowledge and experience.” Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 
U.S. 605, 610 (1950). A district court judge who has presided over, and listened to, 
the entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater opportunity to gain that fa-
miliarity than an appeals court judge who must read a written transcript or perhaps 
just those portions to which the parties have referred. 
B 
Sandoz argues that claim construction mostly consists of construing a set of 
written documents that do not give rise to subsidiary factual disputes. It adds that 
separating “factual” from “legal” questions is often difficult. And Sandoz, like the 
Federal Circuit itself, argues that it is simpler for that appellate court to review the 
entirety of the district court’s claim construction de novo rather than to apply two 
separate standards.  
But even were we free to ignore the Federal Rule (which we are not), we would 
not find this argument convincing. Courts of appeals have long found it possible to 
separate factual from legal matters. At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s efforts to 
treat factual findings and legal conclusions similarly have brought with them their 
own complexities. 
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Finally, the Circuit feared that “clear error” review would bring about less uni-
formity. Neither the Circuit nor Sandoz, however, has shown that (or explained 
why) divergent claim construction stemming from divergent findings of fact (on 
subsidiary matters) should occur more than occasionally. After all, the Federal Cir-
cuit will continue to review de novo the district court’s ultimate interpretation of the 
patent claims. And the attorneys will no doubt bring cases construing the same 
claim to the attention of the trial judge; those prior cases will sometimes be binding 
because of issue preclusion, see Markman, 517 U.S. at 391, and sometimes will serve 
as persuasive authority. Moreover, it is always possible to consolidate for discovery 
different cases that involve construction of the same claims. And, as we said in 
Markman, subsidiary factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated 
claim construction. Id. at 389-390. 
C 
The dissent argues that claim construction does not involve any “factfinding,” 
or, if it does, claim construction factfinding is akin to the factfinding that underlies 
our interpretation of statutes. Its first, broader contention runs contrary to our 
recognition in Markman that claim construction has “evidentiary underpinnings” 
and that courts construing patent claims must sometimes make “credibility judg-
ments” about witnesses. 517 U.S. at 389-390. Indeed, as discussed in Part III, this 
case provides a perfect example of the factfinding that sometimes underlies claim 
construction: The parties here presented the District Court with competing fact-
related claims by different experts, and the District Court resolved the issues of fact 
that divided those experts. 
The dissent’s contention also runs contrary to Sandoz’s concession at oral ar-
gument that claim construction will sometimes require subsidiary factfinding. Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 33-34, 38-40. It is in tension with our interpretation of related areas of 
patent law, such as the interpretation of “obviousness,” which we have said involves 
subsidiary factfinding subject to Rule 52(a)’s clear error review. And it fights the 
question presented in this case, which assumes the existence of such fact-finding. See 
Pet. for Cert. i (whether “a district court’s factual finding in support of its construc-
tion of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, *** or only for clear error”). 
Neither do we find factfinding in this context sufficiently similar to the factfind-
ing that underlies statutory interpretation. Statutes, in general, address themselves to 
the general public; patent claims concern a small portion of that public. Statutes typ-
ically (though not always) rest upon congressional consideration of general facts re-
lated to a reasonably broad set of social circumstances; patents typically (though not 
always) rest upon consideration by a few private parties, experts, and administrators 
of more narrowly circumscribed facts related to specific technical matters. The pub-
lic, and often an adversarial public, typically considers and discusses the relevant 
general facts before Congress enacts a statute; only private parties, experts, and ad-
ministrators likely consider the relevant technical facts before the award of a patent. 
Given these differences, it is not surprising that this Court has never previously 
compared patent claim construction in any here relevant way to statutory construc-
tion. As discussed [above], however, the Court has repeatedly compared patent 
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claim construction to the construction of other written instruments such as deeds 
and contracts. 
D 
Now that we have set forth why the Federal Circuit must apply clear error re-
view when reviewing subsidiary factfinding in patent claim construction, it is neces-
sary to explain how the rule must be applied in that context. We recognize that a 
district court’s construction of a patent claim, like a district court’s interpretation of 
a written instrument, often requires the judge only to examine and to construe the 
document’s words without requiring the judge to resolve any underlying factual dis-
putes. As all [the] parties [in this case] agree, when the district court reviews only 
evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the 
patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a de-
termination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.  
In some cases, however, the district court will need to look beyond the patent’s 
intrinsic evidence and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for ex-
ample, the background science or the meaning of a term in the relevant art during 
the relevant time period. See, e.g., Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 546 
(1871) (a patent may be “so interspersed with technical terms and terms of art that 
the testimony of scientific witnesses is indispensable to a correct understanding of its 
meaning”). In cases where those subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to 
make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the “evi-
dentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we discussed in Markman, and 
this subsidiary factfinding must be reviewed for clear error on appeal. 
For example, if a district court resolves a dispute between experts and makes a 
factual finding that, in general, a certain term of art had a particular meaning to a 
person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, the district court must 
then conduct a legal analysis: whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that same 
meaning to that term in the context of the specific patent claim under review. That is 
because “[e]xperts may be examined to explain terms of art, and the state of the art, 
at any given time,” but they cannot be used to prove “the proper or legal construc-
tion of any instrument of writing.” Winans v. New York & Erie R. Co., 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 88, 100-101 (1859); see also Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (“‘Where technical 
terms are used, or where the qualities of substances *** or any similar data necessary 
to the comprehension of the language of the patent are unknown to the judge, the 
testimony of witnesses may be received upon these subjects, and any other means of 
information be employed. But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court pro-
ceeds upon its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true 
and final character and force.’” (quoting 2 W. Robinson, Law of Patents § 732 
(1890) (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the question we have answered here concerns review of the district 
court’s resolution of a subsidiary factual dispute that helps that court determine the 
proper interpretation of the written patent claim. The district judge, after deciding 
the factual dispute, will then interpret the patent claim in light of the facts as he has 
found them. This ultimate interpretation is a legal conclusion. The appellate court 
can still review the district court’s ultimate construction of the claim de novo. But, to 
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overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute, the Court of Ap-
peals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made a clear 
error. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(6). 
In some instances, a factual finding will play only a small role in a judge’s ulti-
mate legal conclusion about the meaning of the patent term. But in some instances, 
a factual finding may be close to dispositive of the ultimate legal question of the 
proper meaning of the term in the context of the patent. Nonetheless, the ultimate 
question of construction will remain a legal question. Simply because a factual find-
ing may be nearly dispositive does not render the subsidiary question a legal one. 
“[A]n issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispos-
itive of the ultimate” legal question. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). It 
is analogous to a judge (sitting without a jury) deciding whether a defendant gave a 
confession voluntarily. The answer to the legal question about the voluntariness of 
the confession may turn upon the answer to a subsidiary factual question, say 
“whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the de-
fendant.” Id. at 112. An appellate court will review the trial judge’s factual determi-
nation about the alleged intimidation deferentially (though, after reviewing the fac-
tual findings, it will review a judge’s ultimate determination of voluntariness de 
novo). See id. at 112-118. An appellate court similarly should review for clear error 
those factual findings that underlie a district court’s claim construction. 
III 
We can illustrate our holding by considering an instance in which Teva, with 
the support of the Solicitor General, argues that the Federal Circuit wrongly re-
viewed the District Court’s factual finding de novo. See Brief for Petitioners 54-56; 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31-32. Recall that Teva’s patent claim 
specifies an active ingredient with a “molecular weight of about 5 to 9 kilodaltons.” 
… The term might refer to the weight of the most numerous molecule, it might re-
fer to weight as calculated by the average weight of all molecules, or it might refer to 
weight as calculated by an average in which heavier molecules count for more. The 
claim, Sandoz argues, does not tell us which way we should calculate weight. 
To illustrate, imagine we have a sample of copolymer-1 (the active ingredient) 
made up of 10 molecules: 4 weigh 6 kilodaltons each, 3 weigh 8 kilodaltons each, 
and 3 weigh 9 kilodaltons each. Using the first method of calculation, the “molecu-
lar weight” would be 6 kilodaltons, the weight of the most prevalent molecule.  
Using the second method, the molecular weight would be 7.5 (total weight, 75, 
divided by the number of molecules, 10). Using the third method, the molecular 
weight would be more than 8, depending upon how much extra weight we gave to 
the heavier molecules. 
Teva argued in the District Court that the term “molecular weight” in the pa-
tent meant molecular weight calculated in the first way (the weight of the most 
prevalent molecule, or peak average molecular weight). Sandoz, however, argued 
that figure 1 of the patent showed that Teva could not be right. (We have set forth 
figure 1 in the Appendix, below). That figure, said Sandoz, helped to show that the 
patent term did not refer to the first method of calculation. Figure 1 shows how the 
weights of a sample’s molecules were distributed in three different samples. The 
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curves indicate the number of molecules of each weight that were present in each of 
the three. For example, the figure’s legend says that the first sample’s “molecular 
weight” is 7.7. According to Teva, that should mean that molecules weighing 7.7 
kilodaltons were the most prevalent molecules in the sample. But, look at the curve, 
said Sandoz. It shows that the most prevalent molecule weighed not 7.7 kilodaltons, 
but slightly less than 7.7 (about 6.8) kilodaltons. After all, the peak of the first mo-
lecular weight distribution curve (the solid curve in the figure) is not at precisely 7.7 
kilodaltons, but at a point just before 7.7. Thus, argued Sandoz, the figure shows 
that the patent claim term “molecular weight” did not mean molecular weight cal-
culated by the first method. It must mean something else. It is indefinite. 
The District Court did not accept Sandoz’s argument. Teva’s expert testified 
that a skilled artisan would understand that converting data from a chromatogram to 
molecular weight distribution curves like those in figure 1 would cause the peak on 
each curve to shift slightly; this could explain the difference between the value indi-
cated by the peak of the curve (about 6.8) and the value in the figure’s legend (7.7). 
Sandoz’s expert testified that no such shift would occur. The District Court credited 
Teva’s expert’s account, thereby rejecting Sandoz’s expert’s explanation. The Dis-
trict Court’s finding about this matter was a factual finding—about how a skilled 
artisan would understand the way in which a curve created from chromatogram data 
reflects molecular weights. Based on that factual finding, the District Court reached 
the legal conclusion that figure 1 did not undermine Teva’s argument that molecu-
lar weight referred to the first method of calculation (peak average molecular 
weight). 
When the Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decision, it recognized 
that the peak of the curve did not match the 7.7 kilodaltons listed in the legend of 
figure 1. But the Federal Circuit did not accept Teva’s expert’s explanation as to 
how a skilled artisan would expect the peaks of the curves to shift. And it failed to 
accept that explanation without 
finding that the District Court’s 
contrary determination was 
“clearly erroneous.” The Feder-
al Circuit should have accepted 
the District Court’s finding un-
less it was “clearly erroneous.” 
Our holding today makes clear 
that, in failing to do so, the 
Federal Circuit was wrong. 
…  
  
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  47 
In re Packard 
751 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Per Curiam 
This case raises an important question: what standard for indefiniteness should 
the PTO apply to pre-issuance claims? The parties point to no case in which we pre-
viously have addressed this question. 
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) held Mr. Packard’s applied-for 
patent claims indefinite, and therefore not in compliance with the statutory drafting 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) … . Mr. Packard, on appeal to this court, insists 
that the Board misapplied the standard of indefiniteness by finding his claims indefi-
nite on grounds that they “contain[] words or phrases whose meaning is unclear.” 
He believes that, had the Board applied an “insolubly ambiguous” standard[†] to his 
claims, those claims would not have been held indefinite. 
For the reasons we shall explain, we affirm the Board’s rejection of Mr. Pack-
ard’s claims. 
Background 
The application in this appeal covers a coin change holder. The coin holder is a 
thin plastic card that has four different channels on its front surface for storing dif-
ferent types of coins, as shown in the patent figures reproduced below. 
Figure 1 shows a frontal view of the card and Figure 2 shows a cross-section of 
the card.  
The examiner rejected Mr. Packard’s original 
application on three grounds: lack of adequate 
written description, claim indefiniteness, and ob-
viousness. Following this rejection, Mr. Packard 
cancelled all of his original claims and substituted 
a new set of claims numbered 28 through 37. 
Claims 28 through 37 are at issue in this ap-
peal, of which claims 28, 29 and 34 are repre-
sentative: 
28. I claim a small, thin, flat plane, rectangu-
lar change holding card and wallet/billfold 
or purse construction with the front top side 
of the card comprising three raised, straight, 
parallel, double flanged separators and two 
raised, straight, parallel, double flanged side 
edges and a raised side edge end thereby 
forming four parallel, side by side, flanged 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note: The Federal Circuit issued this decision on May 6, 2014, eight days 
after the Supreme Court heard argument in the Nautilus case (on April 28, 2014). 
The Supreme Court issued its decision in Nautilus about a month after Packard, on 
June 2, 2014. ] 
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coin holding channels or rows of the same length and of different widths, 
one for quarters, one for dimes, one for nickels, and one for pennies, that 
are similarly blocked at one side edge by the raised side end edge with the 
other side of the channel/rows open except for small, fixed, flexible, par-
tially moveable, rubber or plastic retainers that are attached to the topside 
and ends of the double flanged separators such that coins can be retained 
on the card and yet slide freely above the surface of the card and obliquely 
overlap as necessary within the channel/rows between the separators while 
the bottom, back side of the card is constructed with a wallet, billfold or 
purse extending from it. 
29. The change holding card wallet, billfold, purse of claim 28, wherein 
the change holding card is constructed as part of the wallet, billfold, or 
purse and affixed to a surface and contained within the wallet, billfold or 
purse. 
34. I claim a small thin uniformly flat plane rectangular coin holding card 
[c]omprising side edge retainers, a closed side retainer, small in-
clined/sloped end protrusions, multiple raised parallel, straight and double 
flanged channel/row separators, small flexible protruding retainers on the 
top side ends of the channel/row separators, all of which are arranged on 
the upper surface of the card such that a various denomination of coins can 
be held and retained on the card within a respective channel/row and can 
slide freely within the double flanges and slightly above the flat surface of 
the card and can also be stored obliquely partially overlapping. 
The examiner, in his final rejection, again found the pending claims invalid on 
the same three grounds: claims 28-33 and 37 for lack of written description, claims 
28-37 for indefiniteness, and claims 28-37 for obviousness. … Regarding indefinite-
ness, the examiner pointed out that several claim limitations failed to meet the re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) because they lacked an antecedent basis or were 
otherwise unclear. 
Mr. Packard appealed the examiner’s final rejection to the Board … . In the 
course of affirming the examiner’s indefiniteness rejection, the Board applied the 
review standard set forth in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) 
§ 2173.05(e), namely, “[a] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases 
whose meaning is unclear.” On rehearing, the Board declined to modify its decision. 
Mr. Packard appeals the Board’s decision. In its response to Mr. Packard’s 




Petitioner Packard … contends that the “insolubly ambiguous” standard of this 
court for indefiniteness is mandated not only for our use in deciding cases in which 
the patent has already issued and is being challenged (“post-issuance cases”), but 
also for cases in which no patent has yet issued and in which the applied-for claims 
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are being evaluated by the PTO (“pre-issuance cases”). He states that this standard 
is more favorable to his case than the standard applied to his claims by the PTO. 
For the reasons we shall explain, we … conclude that, when the PTO has ini-
tially issued a well-grounded rejection that identifies ways in which language in a 
claim is ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing 
and defining the claimed invention, and thereafter the applicant fails to provide a 
satisfactory response, the PTO can properly reject the claim as failing to meet the 
statutory requirements of § 112(b). The satisfactory response by the applicant can 
take the form of a modification of the language identified as unclear, a separate defi-
nition of the unclear language, or, in an appropriate case, a persuasive explanation 
for the record of why the language at issue is not actually unclear. On the facts be-
fore us, this holding suffices to uphold the rejection that occurred here. 
2. 
The grounds for this holding derive from a combination of the PTO’s examina-
tion function under 35 U.S.C. § 131 et seq. and the substantive standard of 35 
U.S.C. § 112(b). Congress assigned to the PTO the responsibility to examine appli-
cations to ensure compliance with the statutory criteria for issuance of a patent. 35 
U.S.C. § 131. In the PTO, an applicant’s “claim is, or is supposed to be, examined, 
scrutinized, limited, and made to conform to what he is entitled to.” Keystone 
Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877). 
Congress also provided for examination to be an interactive process, which it 
commonly is. One or more rejections or objections by an examiner based on identi-
fied problems are followed by one or more responses from the applicant that address 
the identified problems, whether by revising claims or by furnishing information and 
explanation that shows why the initially perceived problems are not problems after 
all. 35 U.S.C. § 132; see also §§ 133, 134. The examination system regularly in-
volves substantive interaction with applicants, relying on their distinctive incentives 
and abilities to enhance understanding and to help the PTO ensure compliance with 
statutory standards.2 
The PTO must be able to make the congressionally created examination process 
work so that it fulfills its purpose of producing patents whose claims meet the statu-
tory standards. We earlier approved a procedural mechanism for the PTO to use in 
doing this, which we refer to as the “prima facie case.” See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1984). “In the prosecution of a patent, the initial burden falls on 
the PTO [examiner] to set forth the basis for any rejection.” Hyatt v. Dudas, 492 
F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The PTO thus meets its obligation to explain 
adequately the shortcomings it perceives so that the applicant is properly notified 
                                                
2 See, e.g., Star Fruits S.N.C. v. United States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (upholding examiner demand, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.105, for “information 
that the applicant is in the best position to most cheaply provide”); see also PTO, 
Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on Issues Related to the Identifi-
cation of Prior Art During the Examination of a Patent Application, 64 Fed. Reg. 
28803, 28805 (1999) (stressing that “inventors are generally in the best position to 
be aware of the state of the art”). 
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and able to respond. “Once the applicant is so notified, the burden shifts to the ap-
plicant to rebut the prima facie case with evidence and/or argument.” Id. 
The “prima facie case” determination is a purely procedural device that operates 
at the examiner level to clarify how the interaction process proceeds. Thereafter any 
final rejection by the examiner, and any review of the rejection, whether by the 
Board or through appeal to the courts, turns on the substantive question of the mer-
its of the rejection. Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472 (citing In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 
1048, 1052 (CCPA 1976) (“When prima facie obviousness is established and evi-
dence is submitted in rebuttal, the decision-maker must start over. *** An earlier 
decision should not, as it was here, be considered as set in concrete, and applicant’s 
rebuttal evidence then be evaluated only on its knockdown ability. *** [A] final 
finding of obviousness may of course be reached, but such finding will rest upon 
evaluation of all facts in evidence, uninfluenced by any earlier conclusion 
reached.”)); see also In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
The same approach to making the examination process work is an appropriate 
one for addressing the question of indefiniteness. We have elsewhere noted that in-
definiteness rejections by the PTO arise in a different posture from that of indefi-
niteness challenges to an issued patent. See Exxon Research & Eng’g v. United States, 
265 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). It makes good sense, for definiteness and 
clarity as for other validity requirements, for the PTO initially to reject claims based 
on a well-founded prima facie case of lack of clarity (in its several forms) based on 
the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the entire written de-
scription and developing prosecution history. Then, if the applicant does not ade-
quately respond to that prima facie case, to confirm that rejection on the substantive 
basis of having failed to meet the requirements of § 112(b). Furthermore, we can 
reach that conclusion and decide the present case without regard to the proper for-
mulation of the judicially-applied indefiniteness standard that may be appropriate for 
post-issuance assessment of indefiniteness, a matter currently under review by the 
Supreme Court. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., cert. granted, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3195 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-369). 
As the statutory language of “particular[ity]” and “distinct[ness]” indicates, 
claims are required to be cast in clear—as opposed to ambiguous, vague, indefi-
nite—terms. It is the claims that notify the public of what is within the protections 
of the patent, and what is not. See, e.g., Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 
(1876); United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). 
At the same time, this requirement is not a demand for unreasonable precision. 
The requirement, applied to the real world of modern technology, does not con-
template in every case a verbal precision of the kind found in mathematics. Nor 
could it do so in a patent system that actually works, in practice, to provide effective 
protection for modern-day inventions. Rather, how much clarity is required neces-
sarily invokes some standard of reasonable precision in the use of language in the 
context of the circumstances. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 
F.2d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 1958) (“[P]atentable inventions cannot always be described 
in terms of exact measurements, symbols and formulae, and the applicant necessarily 
must use the meager tools provided by language, tools which admittedly lack exacti-
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tude and precision. If the claims, read in the light of the specifications, reasonably 
apprise those skilled in the art both of the utilization and scope of the invention, and 
if the language is as precise as the subject matter permits, the courts can demand no 
more.”). 
The PTO, in examining an application, is obliged to test the claims for reasona-
ble precision according to these principles. We have recognized the importance of 
the role that the PTO can play in ensuring that patent claims are clear and unam-
biguous. For example, in In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989), a  
patent interference case, the court said: 
during patent prosecution … claims can be amended, ambiguities should 
be recognized, scope and breadth of language explored, and clarification 
imposed. *** An essential purpose of patent examination is to fashion 
claims that are precise, clear, correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way 
can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during 
the administrative process. 
Recently, in Halliburton Energy Servs. v. M-I LLC, 514 F.3d 1244, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (affirming the district court’s finding that the term “fragile gel” was indefi-
nite), the court said: 
We note that the patent drafter is in the best position to resolve the ambi-
guity in the patent claims, and it is highly desirable that patent examiners 
demand that applicants do so in appropriate circumstances so that the pa-
tent can be amended during prosecution rather than attempting to resolve 
the ambiguity in litigation. 
3. 
Given the role of the applicant in the process, it is a reasonable implementation 
of the examination responsibility, as applied to § 112(b), for the PTO, upon pro-
viding the applicant a well-grounded identification of clarity problems, to demand 
persuasive responses on pain of rejection. That approach decides this case, because 
Mr. Packard did not offer a satisfactory response to well-grounded indefiniteness 
rejections in this case. The examiner here, having ample grounds, set forth a variety 
of ways in which he found the claims imprecise or confusing, sometimes not even 
understandable, considering them in light of the written description.  
Mr. Packard did not respond adequately to this group of claim language prob-
lems. He ignored some entirely. As to others, he offered brief explanations of what 
he thought certain material in the written description and figures showed. But he 
did not focus on the claim language difficulties, nor did he propose clarifying  
changes or show why, on close scrutiny, the existing claim language really was as 
reasonably precise as the circumstances permitted.  
The Board relied on this failure of response to the examiner’s well-grounded re-
jections in affirming on the merits the examiner’s final rejection. The Board re-
viewed and agreed with the examiner’s identification of the indefiniteness problems 
that constituted Mr. Packard’s failure to adequately comply with the statutory re-
quirements of § 112(b), and for which there had been no satisfactory response from 
Mr. Packard. On reconsideration, the Board stood by its affirmance of the rejection, 
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noting the crucial distinction between what Mr. Packard argued and what is re-
quired to address an indefiniteness problem: Mr. Packard’s “arguments focus on 
what is contained in the disclosure, whereas the indefiniteness to which [§ 112(b)] 
is applied is in the language of the claims.” 
In some cases it is difficult enough for courts to construe claims when the 
draftsperson has made every effort to be clear and concise, let alone when the claims 
have readily observable ambiguities or incoherencies within them. Because Mr. 
Packard had an opportunity to bring clarity to his claim language, we affirm the 
Board’s findings as to indefiniteness under the MPEP standard properly applied by 
the PTO, the standard which we have here approved. 
…  
Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc. 
778 F.3d 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Moore, Judge: 
Pacing Technologies appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment that Garmin International’s accused products do not infringe the asserted 
claims of Pacing’s U.S. Patent No. 8,101,843. We affirm. 
Background 
The ’843 patent is directed to methods and systems for pacing users during ac-
tivities that involve repeated motions, such as running, cycling, and swimming. The 
preferred embodiment of the ’843 patent describes a method for aiding a user’s  
pacing by providing the user with a tempo (for example, the beat of a song or flash-
es of light) corresponding to the user’s desired pace. 
Pacing alleges that Garmin GPS fitness watches and microcomputers used by 
runners and bikers infringe the ’843 patent. The Garmin Connect website allows 
users to design and transfer workouts to the Garmin devices. Workouts consist of a 
series of intervals to which the user can assign a duration and target pace value. The 
devices display the intervals of a particular workout during operation, for example, 
by counting down the time for which the user intends to maintain a particular pace. 
The devices may also display the user’s actual pace, e.g., 50 to 70 spm, or steps per 
minute. The devices do not play music or output a beat corresponding to the user’s 
desired or actual pace. 
Claim 25 of the ’843 patent, the only asserted independent claim, reads as fol-
lows (emphases added): 
A repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user comprising: 
a web site adapted to allowing the user to pre-select from a set of user-
selectable activity types an activity they wish to perform and entering one 
or more target tempo or target pace values corresponding to the activity; 
a data storage and playback device; and 
a communications device adapted to transferring data related to the pre-
selected activity or the target tempo or the target pace values between the 
web site and the data storage and playback device. 
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The district court construed the term “playback device” as “a device capable of 
playing audio, video, or a visible signal.” The district court also held that the pre-
amble to claim 25 is a limitation and construed it to mean “a system for providing a 
sensible output for setting the pace or rate of movement of a user in performing a 
repetitive motion activity.” This construction did not address whether the repetitive 
motion pacing system was required to play back the pace information using a tem-
po. 
Garmin moved for summary judgment of noninfringement, contending that 
the accused devices are not “playback devices” under the district court’s construc-
tion. Pacing argued that the accused devices are “playback devices” because they 
“play” workout information to the user, which can include the user’s target and ac-
tual pace. To resolve this dispute, the district court supplemented its construction of 
“playback device” in the summary judgment order, holding that “[t]o be a playback 
device as envisioned in the patent, the device must play back the pace information.” 
The court relied on the use of the term in the context of the specification and on its 
earlier decision that the preamble to claim 25 is limiting. The court granted sum-
mary judgment of noninfringement to Garmin, reasoning that while “[t]he [ac-
cused] devices repeat back or display the pace input or selections,” they “do not 
‘play’ the target tempo or pace information *** as audio, video, or visible signals.” 
Both parties characterize the court’s construction of the term “playback device” as 
implicitly requiring the devices to play the pace information as a metronomic tempo, 
as described in the preferred embodiment of the ’843 patent. …  
Discussion 
“[W]hen the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the pa-
tent claims and specification[], along with the patent’s prosecution history), the 
judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, and the Court 
of Appeals will review that construction de novo.” Teva Pharm. USA Inc. v. Sandoz, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Because the only evidence at issue on appeal and 
presented to the district court in this claim construction was intrinsic, our review of 
the constructions is de novo. We review a grant of summary judgment from a court 
in the Ninth Circuit de novo. Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 767 
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
I. Claim Construction 
On appeal, the parties dispute whether the asserted claims require the claimed 
devices to play back the pace information using a tempo, such as the beat of a song 
or flashes of light. This dispute turns on whether the preamble to claim 25 is lim-
iting and on the construction of a “repetitive motion pacing system” as recited in 
the preamble. 
We hold that the preamble to claim 25, which reads “[a] repetitive motion  
pacing system for pacing a user *** ,” is limiting. “Preamble language that merely 
states the purpose or intended use of an invention is generally not treated as limiting 
the scope of the claim.” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). However, “[w]hen limitations in the body of the claim rely upon and derive 
antecedent basis from the preamble, then the preamble may act as a necessary com-
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ponent of the claimed invention.” Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 323 F.3d 
1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
That is the case here. The term “user” in the preamble of claim 25 provides an-
tecedent basis for the term “user” in the body of that claim. The body of claim 25 
recites “a web site adapted to allowing the user to preselect from a set of user-
selectable activity types an activity they wish to perform and entering one or more 
target tempo or target pace values corresponding to the activity.” (Emphasis added). 
The term “repetitive motion pacing system” in the preamble of claim 25 similarly 
provides antecedent basis for the term “repetitive motion pacing system” recited as a 
positive limitation in the body of claim 28, which depends from claim 25. Claim 28 
of the ’843 patent reads: “[t]he repetitive motion pacing system of claim 25, where-
in the repetitive motion pacing system can determine a geographic location of the 
data storage and playback device.” Because the preamble terms “user” and “repeti-
tive motion pacing system” provide antecedent basis for and are necessary to under-
stand positive limitations in the body of claims in the ’843 patent, we hold that the 
preamble to claim 25 is limiting. 
The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “repetitive motion pacing system 
for pacing a user” does not require the claimed system to pace the user by playing 
back the pace information using a tempo. However, claim terms are construed in 
light of the specification and prosecution history, not in isolation. See Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The specification 
and prosecution history compel departure from the plain meaning in only two in-
stances: lexicography and disavowal. Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t, 669 F.3d 
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal 
are “exacting.” GE Lighting Solutions, LLC v. AgiLight, Inc., 750 F.3d 1304, 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). To act as a lexicographer, a patentee must “clearly set forth a defi-
nition of the disputed claim term” and “clearly express an intent to define the 
term.” Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. Similarly, disavowal requires that “the specifica-
tion [or prosecution history] make[] clear that the invention does not include a par-
ticular feature.” SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
We have found disavowal or disclaimer based on clear and unmistakable state-
ments by the patentee that limit the claims, such as “the present invention includes 
*** ” or “the present invention is *** ” or “all embodiments of the present inven-
tion are *** .” See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 
929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 
1316-19 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1343-44. We have 
found disclaimer when the specification indicated that, for “successful manufacture,” 
a particular step was “require[d].” Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 
F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We have found disclaimer when the specification 
indicated that the invention operated by “pushing (as opposed to pulling) forces,” 
and then characterized the “pushing forces” as “an important feature of the present 
invention.” SafeTCare Mfg. v. Tele-Made, Inc., 497 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). We also have found disclaimer when the patent repeatedly disparaged an 
embodiment as “antiquated,” having “inherent inadequacies,” and then detailed the 
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“deficiencies [that] make it difficult” to use. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Int’l Sec. 
Exch., LLC, 677 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Likewise, we have used dis-
claimer to limit a claim element to a feature of the preferred embodiment when the 
specification described that feature as a “very important feature *** in an aspect of 
the present invention,” and disparaged alternatives to that feature. Inpro II Licens-
ing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
When a patentee “describes the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole,” he 
alerts the reader that “this description limits the scope of the invention.” AGA Med. 
Corp., 717 F.3d at 936. 
Here, the specification similarly contains a clear and unmistakable statement of 
disavowal or disclaimer. In a section entitled “Summary and Objects of the Inven-
tion,” the ’843 patent states that “it is a principal object of the present invention to 
provide a computer-implemented, network-based system having a networked server, 
database, client computer, and input/output device for use by individuals engaged 
in repetitive motion activities *** .” It then lists 18 additional features, each time 
preceding the feature with the phrase “[i]t is another object of the present inven-
tion” or “[i]t is still another object of the present invention.” This is a common 
practice in patent drafting. Many times, the patent drafter will cast certain features as 
“an object of the present invention,” and often those “objects of the present inven-
tion” correspond to features recited in the claims. That is the case here, as many of 
the different “objects of the present invention” disclosed in the ’843 patent are re-
cited as features in one or more independent or dependent claims. The characteriza-
tion of a feature as “an object” or “another object,” or even as a “principal object,” 
will not always rise to the level of disclaimer. In this case, where the patent includes 
a long list of different “objects of the present invention” that correspond to features 
positively recited in one or more claims, it seems unlikely that the inventor intended 
for each claim to be limited to all of the many objects of the invention. However, 
the ’843 patent goes further, and includes additional language that constitutes un-
mistakable disclaimer when considered in the context of the patent as a whole. Im-
mediately following the enumeration of the different objects of the present inven-
tion, the ’843 patent states that “[t]hose [listed 19 objects] and other objects and 
features of the present invention are accomplished, as embodied and fully described 
herein, by a repetitive motion pacing system that includes *** a data storage and 
playback device adapted to producing the sensible tempo.” With these words, the 
patentee does not describe yet another object of the invention—he alerts the reader 
that the invention accomplishes all of its objects and features (the enumerated 19 
and all others) with a repetitive motion pacing system that includes a data storage 
and playback device adapted to produce a sensible tempo. In the context of this pa-
tent, this clearly and unmistakably limits “the present invention” to a repetitive mo-
tion pacing system having a data storage and playback device that is adapted to pro-
ducing a sensible tempo. 
Pacing argues that a “repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user” cannot 
be limited to devices that produce a sensible tempo because the ’843 patent disclos-
es an embodiment of a repetitive motion pacing system where the playback device 
does not need to produce a sensible tempo. Pacing points to the specification’s de-
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scription of a repetitive motion pacing system having a playback device that plays 
video landscapes to a user who is, for example, running on a treadmill, with the vid-
eo “automatically calibrated to match the speed of the user’s *** pace,” to simulate 
the user running through the actual landscape. Pacing argues that if the claim is 
construed to limit the invention to a repetitive motion pacing device adapted to 
producing a sensible tempo, this particular embodiment will not be covered. Pacing 
argues that for this reason, we should reject the construction. 
We disagree for two reasons. First, it is not clear that our construction excludes 
this embodiment. Our construction requires the repetitive motion pacing system to 
produce a sensible tempo, but it does not exclude additional features, such as out-
putting video matching a user’s pace. Moreover, the description of the embodiment 
that Pacing points to does not, as Pacing argues, exclude the production of a sensi-
ble tempo as required by the construction. Just because an embodiment does not 
expressly disclose a feature does not mean that embodiment excludes that feature. 
Second, even if Pacing is correct that this embodiment does not play a sensible tem-
po and therefore would be excluded under our construction, this is not a reason to 
ignore the specification’s clear and unmistakable disavowal. It is true that construc-
tions that exclude the preferred embodiment are disfavored. Vitronics Corp. v. Con-
ceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). However, in a case such as 
this, where the patent describes multiple embodiments, every claim does not need to 
cover every embodiment. See Aug. Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011). This is particularly true where the plain language of a limita-
tion of the claim does not appear to cover that embodiment. The preamble of claim 
25 differs from the preambles of the other seven independent claims. Claim 25 re-
quires a “repetitive motion pacing system for pacing a user.” The plain language re-
quires the system to pace the user. We conclude that the system of claim 25 must be 
capable of producing a sensible tempo for pacing the user. 
II. Infringement 
We hold that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 
Garmin devices produce a sensible tempo. Merely displaying the rate of a user’s 
pace—for example, displaying “100 steps per minute”—does not produce a sensible 
tempo. Garmin’s accused devices are therefore not repetitive motion pacing devices. 
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the 
’843 patent. 
Triton Tech v. Nintendo 
753 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Moore, Judge: 
Triton Tech appeals from the district court’s judgment that the means-plus-
function term “integrator means” renders the asserted claims of Triton’s U.S. 
Patent No. 5,181,181 invalid for indefiniteness. We affirm. 
Background 
Triton sued Nintendo, alleging that the Wii Remote used in combination with 
a related accessory infringes the ’181 patent. The ’181 patent is directed to an input 
device for a computer. It discloses that a user can communicate with a computer by 
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moving the input device—much like using a mouse, but in three dimensions. Col. 2, 
ll. 50-67. The input device sends commands to the computer based on the input 
device’s three-dimensional position, attitude (i.e., orientation), and motion. Ab-
stract. For example, a user may be able to manipulate an object that is represented 
graphically on the computer by moving the input device in a manner in which the 
user wishes to manipulate the object. Col. 1, ll. 15-22. 
The input device includes components for determining its position, attitude, 
and motion. In the preferred embodiment, these components include three accel-
erometers and three rotational rate sensors for measuring linear acceleration along, 
and rotational velocity about, three orthogonal axes. Col. 3, ll. 3-29, Fig. 1(d). The 
preferred embodiment also includes a conventional microprocessor that is pro-
grammed to periodically read and numerically integrate over time digitized accelera-
tion and rotational rate values to calculate the position, attitude, and motion values 
for the input device. Col. 7, ll. 15-25. The ’181 patent does not further explain how 
the numerical integration is performed, only that it is performed in a “conventional 
manner.” Col. 10, ll. 7-9. The input device then outputs these values to the com-
puter to facilitate the user’s interaction with the computer. Col. 11, ll. 14-42. 
Claim 4 is representative of the asserted claims: 
An input device for providing information to a computing device, compris-
ing: *** 
a first acceleration sensor ***; a second acceleration sensor ***; a third ac-
celeration sensor [each producing analog acceleration sensor signals]; 
a first rotational rate sensor ***; a second rotational rate sensor ***; a 
third rotational rate sensor ***; *** 
an analog-to-digital converter associated with said input device which 
quantizes said analog acceleration sensor signals to produce digital acceler-
ation sensor values; 
a first-in, first-out buffer memory which temporarily stores said digital ac-
celeration sensor values from said analog-to-digital converter in sequential 
order for later processing; 
integrator means associated with said input device for integrating said ac-
celeration signals over time to produce velocity signals for linear translation 
along each of *** first, second and third axes; and 
communication means associated with said input device for communicating 
information between said input device and said computing device. 
(Emphases added). 
Each asserted claim recites an “integrator means.” The district court held that 
this term rendered the asserted claims indefinite. It determined that the correspond-
ing structure for performing the recited integrating function was a “conventional 
microprocessor having a suitably programmed read-only memory.” [Claim Con-
struction Order (“CCO”)] at 14. It found that the ’181 patent did not disclose any 
algorithm for performing the recited integrating function. Id. at 15-16. It noted 
that the ’181 patent broadly discloses using “numerical integration,” but deter-
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mined that this alone was not a sufficient disclosure because “‘[n]umerical integra-
tion’ *** is not a single algorithm, but rather a whole class of algorithms that can be 
used to calculate definite integrals *** .” Id. at 16. The district court thus conclud-
ed that the asserted claims were indefinite. Id. at 15-16 (citing Aristocrat Techs. 
Austr. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Gaming Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Tri-
ton appeals. …  
Discussion 
… Section 112 ¶ 6 allows a patentee to express an element of a claim as a 
means for performing a specified function. 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 (2006). In ex-
change for using this form of claiming, the patent specification must disclose with 
sufficient particularity the corresponding structure for performing the claimed func-
tion and clearly link that structure to the function. Ibormeith IP, LLC v. Mercedes-
Benz USA, LLC, 732 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2013). If the function is per-
formed by a general purpose computer or microprocessor, then the specification 
must also disclose the algorithm that the computer performs to accomplish that 
function. Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333. Failure to disclose the corresponding algo-
rithm for a computer-implemented means-plus-function term renders the claim in-
definite. Ergo Licensing LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
Triton concedes that the structure corresponding to “integrator means” is a 
conventional microprocessor, and contends that the ’181 patent discloses an algo-
rithm for performing the integrating function with enough specificity to render the 
claims discernible to a person of ordinary skill. First, Triton argues that merely using 
the phrase “numerical integration” is sufficient disclosure of an algorithm because 
numerical integration was well known to those skilled in the art. Second, Triton ar-
gues that the ‘181 patent discloses a two-step algorithm for accomplishing the inte-
grating function: (1) sampling measured values over time and (2) accumulating by 
continuously summing areas defined by the sampled values. Triton asserts that the 
’181 patent discloses the sampling step as acquiring instantaneous values from the 
different sensors, formatting them to digital values, and then storing them for fur-
ther processing. Appellant’s Br. 20-21 (citing ’181 patent, col. 3, ll. 30-38; col. 9, ll. 
2-6, 28-37, 49-59). Triton contends that the ’181 patent discloses the accumulating 
step as “clearing all numeric integration accumulators” and continually performing 
numerical integration to compute the position and attitude values. Id. at 21-22 (cit-
ing ’181 patent, col. 7, l. 65 – col. 8, l. 3; col. 10, ll. 51-62; col. 7, ll. 21-36; col. 8 
ll. 11-12). 
We affirm the district court’s determination that the asserted claims of the ’181 
patent are indefinite because the specification does not disclose an algorithm for per-
forming the claimed integrating function of the “integrator means.” It is certainly 
true that an algorithm can be expressed in many forms, including flow charts, a se-
ries of specific steps, mathematical formula, prose, and so on. Finisar Corp. v. Di-
recTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However, merely using 
the term “numerical integration” does not disclose an algorithm—i.e., a step-by-step 
procedure—for performing the claimed function. Ergo Licensing, 673 F.3d at 1365 
(“Even described in prose, an algorithm is still a step-by-step procedure for accom-
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plishing a given result.”). As the district court correctly determined, numerical inte-
gration is not an algorithm but is instead an entire class of different possible algo-
rithms used to perform integration. CCO at 16. Disclosing the broad class of “nu-
merical integration” does not limit the scope of the claim to the “corresponding 
structure, material, or acts” that perform the function, as required by § 112. Indeed, 
it is hardly more than a restatement of the integrating function itself. Disclosure of a 
class of algorithms “that places no limitations on how values are calculated, com-
bined, or weighted is insufficient to make the bounds of the claims understandable.” 
Ibormeith, 732 F.3d at 1382. 
The fact that various numerical integration algorithms may have been known to 
one of ordinary skill in the art does not rescue the claims. “[A] bare statement that 
known techniques or methods can be used does not disclose structure.” Biomedino, 
LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also ePlus, Inc. 
v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 519 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The district court 
correctly recognized that “[a]lthough a person of skill in the art might be able to 
choose an appropriate numerical integration algorithm and program it onto a mi-
croprocessor, the [p]atent discloses no algorithm at all.” CCO at 16. We thus con-
clude that the district court correctly found that the ’181 patent’s disclosure of 
“numerical integration” does not satisfy the disclosure requirement of § 112 ¶ 6; 
“numerical integration” is not an algorithm. 
We hold that Triton has waived its second argument that the ’181 patent dis-
closes a two-step algorithm that consists of sampling and accumulating. Triton did 
not make this argument to the district court. Instead, it argued that the correspond-
ing structure for “integrator means” is a conventional microprocessor “that per-
forms integration.” Plaintiff’s Opening Claim Construction Brief at 14. It explained 
that “[the position, velocity, and attitude values] are computed and numerically in-
tegrated in a ‘known manner,’” and that “[n]umerical integration describes the ways 
in which a numerical value is reached from the integration of definite integrals.” 
Plaintiff’s Reply Claim Construction Brief at 7. It did not argue that the ’181 patent 
discloses a two-step numerical algorithm. It argued only that the term “numerical 
integration” was sufficient. 
To the extent that Triton now argues that one of skill in the art would have 
understood the bare disclosure of “numerical integration” as disclosing a particular 
two-step algorithm, we find that it also waived that argument. Triton argued to the 
district court that “numerical integration describes the ways in which a numerical 
value is reached from *** integration,” that “the method of numerical integration 
would [have been] obvious” and that the specification disclosed “numerical integra-
tion” such that “one of ordinary skill in the art could identify a preferred mathemat-
ical equation with which to perform the function of integrating.” Id. at 7-8. Thus, 
at best, Triton argued to the district court that one of skill in the art would have 
been able to identify a preferred integration algorithm because different methods for 
performing numerical integration were well known. Triton did not argue below that 
one of skill in the art would have understood the disclosure of “numerical integra-
tion” as describing a particular two-step algorithm. It cannot make that argument 
for the first time on appeal. 
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In exchange for expressing “integrator means” as a means-plus-function term, 
Triton was required to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed integrating 
function. Because it did not do so, the asserted claims are indefinite. 
…  
EON Corp. IP Holdings v. AT&T Mobility 
__ F.3d __ (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
Prost, Chief Judge: 
In these consolidated cases, EON Corp. IP Holdings asserts U.S. Patent No. 
5,663,757 against a number of defendants. The district court granted the defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment, holding all claims of the ’757 patent invalid as 
indefinite. In particular, the district court found that the specification failed to dis-
close an algorithm to provide structure for various computer-implemented means-
plus-function elements. On appeal, we affirm. 
I. Background 
The asserted ’757 patent, which issued on September 2, 1997, is directed to 
software embodied in a “local subscriber data processing station” that operates in 
tandem with a television to interconnect various interactive features of the television. 
The software allows actions such as “impulse purchase transactions with immediate 
payment,” audience participation voting, and sorting television programs by theme. 
EON alleges that “the modern iteration of the ’757 patent’s local subscriber data 
processing station is a smartphone with certain capabilities.” 
Consequently, on September 23, 2010, EON filed an action against seventeen 
defendants, including smartphone manufacturers, cellular network providers, and 
smartphone content providers (“the FLO TV case”). Nine months later, on June 
14, 2011, EON sued several other defendants in a separate action (“the AT&T 
case”). The two cases were consolidated through claim construction. 
At the same time, the ’757 patent went through two reexaminations. The 
claims were amended in the first reexamination, and all claims as amended were con-
firmed in the second reexamination. However, on November 1, 2013, the defend-
ants in the FLO TV action moved for summary judgment of invalidity for indefi-
niteness. To resolve the motion, the district court held a claim construction hearing 
… , a summary judgment hearing … , and a hearing to receive expert testimony … . 
Soon after the hearings, the district court granted summary judgment to the FLO 
TV defendants, finding that all claims of the ’757 patent were invalid as indefinite. 
The eight terms that were held to be indefinite are the following: 
1. “means under control of said replaceable software means for indicating ac-
knowledging shipment of an order from a remote station” (Claim 7); 
2. “means controlled by replaceable software means operable with said oper-
ation control system for *** reconfiguring the operating modes by adding 
or changing features and introducing new menus” (Claims 1-6, 8-10); 
3. “means responsive to said self contained software for establishing a mode of 
operations for selection of one of a plurality of authorized television program 
channels” (Claim 8); 
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4. “means establishing a first menu directed to different interactively selectable 
program theme subsets available from said authorized television program 
channels” (Claim 8); 
5. “means for causing selected themes to automatically display a second menu” 
(Claim 8); 
6. “means controlled by replaceable software means operable with said oper-
ation control system for establishing and controlling a mode of operation 
that records historical operating data of the local subscriber’s data processing 
station” (Claim 9); 
7. “means controlled by replaceable software means operable with said op-
erat[ion] control system for establishing and controlling fiscal transactions 
with a further local station” (Claim 10); and 
8. “means for establishing an accounting mode of operation for maintaining 
and reporting fiscal transactions incurred in the operation of the local sub-
scriber’s data processing station” (Claim 10). 
Following its summary judgment order, the district court entered final judg-
ment of invalidity …  
II. Discussion 
We review the grant of summary judgment of indefiniteness de novo, applying 
the same standard used by the district court. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Sur-
gical Corp., 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1998). … We review the district 
court’s ultimate conclusion of indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112 de novo. Eidos 
Display, LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 779 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In this 
case, the district court made numerous detailed findings of fact. Because the indef-
initeness inquiry here is intertwined with claim construction, see Atmel Corp. v. Info. 
Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] court’s determi-
nation of the structure that corresponds to a particular means-plus function limita-
tion is indeed a matter of claim construction.”), we review these subsidiary factual 
determinations for clear error. Teva Pharm. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 836 
(2015); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact *** must not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous *** .”). 
The parties agree that the claim terms at issue are all means-plus-function terms 
governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.1 … Means-plus-function claim limitations under 
§ 112 ¶ 6 must satisfy the definiteness requirement of § 112 ¶ 2. S3 Inc. v. NVID-
IA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
The parties also agree that the functions claimed in the terms at issue are all 
performed by computer software. It is well-established that the corresponding struc-
ture for a function performed by a software algorithm is the algorithm itself. See 
WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
                                                
1 Paragraph 6 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 was replaced with newly designated § 112(f) 
when § 4(c) of the America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on 
September 16, 2012. Because the applications resulting in the patents at issue in this 
case were filed before that date, we will refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. 
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Accordingly, “[i]n cases involving a computer-implemented invention in which the 
inventor has invoked means-plus-function claiming, this court has consistently re-
quired that the structure disclosed in the specification be more than simply a general 
purpose computer or microprocessor.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int’l Game 
Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
A. The Katz Exception 
In this case, EON does not dispute that the ’757 patent discloses no algo-
rithms. It is uncontested that the only structure disclosed in the ’757 patent is a mi-
croprocessor. For this reason, EON relies on an exception to the algorithm rule cre-
ated in In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303 
(Fed. Cir. 2011). Katz held that a standard microprocessor can serve as sufficient 
structure for “functions [that] can be achieved by any general purpose computer 
without special programming.” Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. In Katz, claim terms in-
volving basic “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” functions were not necessarily 
indefinite because a general purpose computer need not “be specially programmed 
to perform the recited function.” Id. However, other claim terms involving condi-
tionally coupling calls were indefinite because those functions required special pro-
gramming and no algorithm was disclosed. Id. at 1315. 
This court has since analyzed the “narrow” Katz exception once, finding that it 
did not apply. See Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012). A representative example of one of the means-plus-function 
terms at issue in Ergo follows: 
programmable control means coupled with said adjusting means for con-
trolling said adjusting means, said programmable control means having da-
ta fields describing metering properties of individual fluid flows. 
U.S. Patent No. 5,507,412 claim 1. The Ergo court explained that “[i]t is only in 
the rare circumstances where any general-purpose computer without any special 
programming can perform the function that an algorithm need not be disclosed.” 
Id. at 1365. The court found that an algorithm was needed to lend sufficient struc-
ture to the terms at issue because “[t]he ‘control means’ at issue in this case cannot 
be performed by a general-purpose computer without any special programming. 
The function of ‘controlling the adjusting means’ requires more than merely plug-
ging in a generalpurpose computer.” Id. 
EON asserts that the functions claimed in the ‘757 patent do not involve “spe-
cial programming”—and thus fall within the Katz exception—because they are rela-
tively simple to implement. However, the Katz exception is not so broad. As we 
stated in Katz, a microprocessor can serve as structure for a computer-implemented 
function only where the claimed function is “coextensive” with a microprocessor 
itself. Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. Examples of such coextensive functions are “receiv-
ing” data, “storing” data, and “processing” data—the only three functions on which 
the Katz court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded for the district 
court to determine whether disclosure of a microprocessor was sufficient. 
Katz’s “special programming” language has its origins in WMS Gaming. As 
mentioned above, WMS Gaming held that the corresponding structure for a soft-
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ware algorithm is the algorithm. In WMS Gaming, disclosure of a general purpose 
computer was insufficient because “[a] general purpose computer, or microproces-
sor, programmed to carry out an algorithm creates ‘a new machine, because a gen-
eral purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is pro-
grammed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program 
software.’” WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1348 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 
1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010))). …   
… After WMS Gaming, a number of cases held means-plus-function claims in-
definite for failure to disclose a sufficient algorithm. See, e.g., Blackboard, Inc. v.  
Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. 
VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV 
Grp., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1338. For 
the “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing” claim terms, Katz distinguished those 
cases using WMS Gaming’s vocabulary, which culminated in Katz’s “special pro-
gramming” phrase: 
Those cases involved specific functions that would need to be implemented 
by programming a general purpose computer to convert it into a special 
purpose computer capable of performing those specified functions. See, 
e.g., Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1333-34; Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 
F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005); WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349. By 
contrast, in the seven claims identified above, Katz has not claimed a spe-
cific function performed by a special purpose computer, but has simply re-
cited the claimed functions of “processing,” “receiving,” and “storing.” 
Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms “processing,” “re-
ceiving,” and “storing,” discussed below, those functions can be achieved 
by any general purpose computer without special programming. 
Katz, 639 F.3d at 1316. 
Taken in context, then, “special programming” does not denote a level of 
complexity. On this point, the district court erred in holding that “special pro-
gramming” does not encompass commercially available off-the-shelf software. To 
the contrary, and as originally described in Katz, “special programming” includes 
any functionality that is not “coextensive” with a microprocessor or general purpose 
computer. Id. In other words … the general purpose computer becomes a special 
purpose computer when loaded with the special programming, so a general purpose 
computer or microprocessor no longer lends sufficient structure to the claim. There-
fore, as is plain from this review, the Katz exception is a necessary corollary to the 
general rule stated in WMS Gaming and further elaborated in Aristocrat and other 
later cases. A microprocessor or general purpose computer lends sufficient structure 
only to basic functions of a microprocessor. All other computer-implemented func-
tions require disclosure of an algorithm. 
… WMS Gaming and Katz are consistent with recent Supreme Court prece-
dent, including Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., which warned against  
“diminish[ing] the definiteness requirement’s public-notice function and foster[ing] 
the innovation-discouraging zone of uncertainty against which this Court has 
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warned.” 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2014). The disclosure of structure under § 112 
¶ 6 serves the “purpose of limiting the scope of the claim to the particular structure 
disclosed, together with equivalents.” Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1336. A general pur-
pose computer is flexible—it can do anything it is programmed to do. Id. at 1333. 
Therefore, the disclosure of a general purpose computer or a microprocessor as cor-
responding structure for a software function does nothing to limit the scope of the 
claim and “avoid pure functional claiming.” Id. As such, when a patentee invokes 
means-plus-function claiming to recite a software function, it accedes to the recipro-
cal obligation of disclosing a sufficient algorithm as corresponding structure. 
B. Role of the Person of Ordinary Skill in the Art 
EON also argues that a microprocessor can serve as sufficient structure for a 
software function if a person of ordinary skill in the art could implement the soft-
ware function. This argument is meritless. In fact, we have repeatedly and unequivo-
cally rejected this argument: a person of ordinary skill in the art plays no role what-
soever in determining whether an algorithm must be disclosed as structure for a 
functional claim element. See Noah Sys. v. Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1385; Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337. 
To elaborate, “our case law regarding special purpose computer-implemented 
means-plus-functions claims is divided into two distinct groups: First, cases in which 
the specification discloses no algorithm; and second, cases in which the specification 
does disclose an algorithm but a defendant contends that disclosure is inadequate.” 
Noah, 675 F.3d at 1313. Where the specification discloses no algorithm, the skilled 
artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant. Id. (citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337). Where 
the specification discloses an algorithm that the accused infringer contends is inade-
quate, we judge the disclosure’s sufficiency based on the skilled artisan’s perspective. 
Id. (citing Aristocrat, 521 F.3d at 1337; AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance 
Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). The parties agree that the 
’757 patent’s specification discloses no algorithms, so this case falls in the first cate-
gory, in which the skilled artisan’s knowledge is irrelevant. 
…  
C. Application of the Algorithm Requirement to this Case 
In light of the foregoing discussion, resolution of this case is straightforward. 
The district court made explicit factual findings, based on expert testimony, that 
each of the eight claim terms at issue recited complicated, customized computer 
software. We see no clear error in any of the district court’s factual findings, nor any 
error in the district court’s ultimate conclusion of indefiniteness. 
Significantly, EON does not contend on appeal that the terms at issue recite 
functions that are coextensive with a microprocessor. EON also does not differenti-
ate between any of the claim terms in its argument. In fact, EON cites to testimony 
from its expert that a person skilled in the art would need to consult algorithms out-
side the specification to implement the claimed functions. Similarly, based on expert 
testimony, the district court found that “special code would have to be written in 
order to accomplish the claimed functionality.” As discussed above, this finding 
proves more than is necessary, [inasmuch] as the defendants [need] only show by 
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clear and convincing evidence that the terms at issue do not recite basic functions of 
a microprocessor. Therefore, the ’757 patent’s disclosure of a microprocessor does 
not lend sufficient structure to the means-plus-function terms at issue, and the ’757 
patent’s claims are indefinite. 
…  
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Chapter 3: Written Disclosure 
It is conventional in patent law to think of the patent document as the record 
of a bargain between an inventor, who discloses an invention, and the general pub-
lic, which confers on the inventor an exclusion right as a reward for that disclosure. 
“The disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to ex-
clude.’” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 
(2001) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)); see 
also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“Such description is the quid pro quo of the patent system; the public must receive 
meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing the invention 
for a limited period of time.”). 
The Patent Act, in § 112(a), establishes two core validity requirements that es-
tablish the terms of this bargain. (We’ve already discussed the claim definiteness re-
quirement, which is set forth separately in § 112(b).) These requirements help us 
police the terms of the public’s bargain with the inventor, assuring that [1] we re-
ceive adequate consideration (this is the enablement requirement), and [2] we are 
dealing with the right party, i.e., the actual inventor (this is the written description 
requirement). These requirements go to the quality of the written disclosure and its 
fit with the claims it purports to justify, which is separate from the question whether 
the invention substantively merits the patent reward. (We scrutinize substantive 
merit with three other validity requirements—utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.) 
The third requirement in § 112(a), known as best mode, has become something of a 
sidelight given its demotion in the 2011 America Invents Act: failure to comply with 
this requirement is no longer a defense in an infringement case. 
The cases in this chapter focus on enablement and written description. 
Enablement 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 117-131 
In re Hoffmann 
558 Fed. Appx. 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Per Curiam 
Eugene Hoffmann and David Lund appeal the rejection of their application for 
a patent on a “[t]ropical hurricane control system.” The rejected claims describe a 
process for weakening a tropical storm by injecting a super coolant such as liquid 
nitrogen into the eye wall of the storm from airplanes. The examiner rejected the 
claims for lack of enablement, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board affirmed. We 
agree with the Board’s decision and affirm. 
Background 
Hoffmann and Lund’s patent application, No. 11/504,474, describes a “meth-
od and system for diminishing the intensity of tropical cyclones by delivering super 
coolant from [an] aircraft into the eye wall of the tropical cyclone.” According to 
the specification, delivering “a sufficient quantity” of super coolant into the storm’s 
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eye wall “breaks the forming or recently formed eye wall, which will cause the eye 
wall to implode.” Although the method has never been tested, the specification con-
tains a set of “preliminary calculations” detailing the amount of super coolant and 
number of airplanes necessary to address an example storm of small size. 
Independent claim 36 is representative of the claims: 
A process for disrupting a formed or forming tropical cyclone eye wall or 
eye or center of lowest pressure comprising: Introduction of a super cool-
ant chemical agent sprayed with force (the super coolant is stored in a ves-
sel under pressure) and or released from pre-measured containers from an 
appropriate number of large aircraft to reduce the temperature within the 
eye wall (top to bottom at sea level), thereby circulating the super coolant 
throughout the eye wall by the centrifugal force of the eye wall, alternative-
ly into the eye or center of lowest pressure to reduce the temperature in 
the eye or center of lowest pressure and the water beneath, thereby reduc-
ing the wind and storm surge of the eye wall or raising the pressure in the 
eye or center of lowest pressure and converting it back to a tropical rain-
storm. 
The examiner rejected the claims for failure to comply with the enablement re-
quirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The examiner relied on three principal grounds 
for his conclusion on lack of enablement. First, he noted that the preliminary calcu-
lations contained several unexplained assumptions and mathematical errors. Second, 
the examiner noted that the specification itself acknowledged the need for experi-
mentation to determine the amount of super coolant needed and the optimal time 
to strike. Finally, the examiner cited 
a variety of publications by weather 
scientists who expressed serious 
doubts about the viability of weath-
er modification plans like Hoffmann 
and Lund’s. The examiner ultimate-
ly concluded that Hoffmann and 
Lund “failed to provide a disclosure 
of the invention which would en-
able one of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and/or use the invention 
without undue experimentation.” 
The Board affirmed the exam-
iner’s rejection after applying the 
eight factor analysis set forth by In 
re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). 
Hoffmann and Lund appeal. … 
We review the Board’s decision on 
enablement de novo and its underly-
ing factual findings for substantial 
evidence. See In re Gartside, 203 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  69 
F.3d 1305, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 
1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
Discussion 
Section 112(a) of the patent statute requires that the specification of a patent 
describe “the manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains *** to make and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). A specification is not 
enabling if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be unable to practice the in-
vention without “undue experimentation.” Wands, 585 F.2d at 737. …  When re-
jecting a claim for lack of enablement, the initial burden is on the PTO to set forth 
“a reasonable explanation” of why it believes the specification is not enabling. In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the 
applicant to provide “suitable proofs indicating that the specification is indeed ena-
bling.” Id. at 1562. 
We agree with the Board that the PTO has met its burden and that Hoffmann 
and Lund have failed to meet theirs. As an initial matter, the examiner’s findings are 
more than enough to constitute a “reasonable explanation” of the doubts regarding 
enablement. Id. at 1561. The “preliminary calculations” contain figures that are ei-
ther inaccurate or incoherent, raising the possibility that a person of ordinary skill 
would need to correct those errors in order to practice the claimed method. The 
patent itself acknowledges a need for further experimentation to determine the nec-
essary or optimal value of certain variables. And perhaps most significantly, the very 
efficacy of the method itself is subject to considerable doubt in the scientific com-
munity. These points are sufficient to meet the PTO’s burden. 
Hoffmann and Lund, on the other hand, offer little to meet their burden to 
show that the specification is indeed enabling. Their primary argument is that the 
specification must be enabling because the government has secretly implemented 
their method and abated or redirected many hurricanes over the past several years. 
But they have no evidence to support this theory. All they have is a speculative infer-
ence of government use drawn from the fact that relatively few named storms have 
made landfall in the United States in recent years. Hoffmann and Lund also argue 
that the specification is enabling because it contains a table estimating the number 
of airplanes necessary to treat tropical storms of different sizes. But that is not 
enough information to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the 
method without undue experimentation. 
…  
Automotive Techs. Int’l v. BMW of North America 
501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Automotive Technologies International, Inc. (“ATI”) appeals from the decision 
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granting 
summary judgment of invalidity of claims 1-44 of U.S. Patent 5,231,253 under  
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. … Because we conclude that the asserted claims of the ’253 
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patent are invalid for lack of enablement, we affirm the decision of the district court 
granting summary judgment of invalidity. … 
Background 
The technology at issue involves crash sensing devices for deployment in an oc-
cupant protection apparatus, such as an airbag, during an impact or crash involving 
the side of a vehicle. ATI is the assignee of the ’253 patent, entitled “Side Impact 
Sensors.” The invention is directed to a velocity-type sensor placed in a position 
within a vehicle in order to sense a side impact. A velocity-type sensor is a sensor 
that triggers when a velocity change sensed in a crash exceeds a threshold value. 
Representative claim 1 reads as follows: 
A side impact crash sensor for a vehicle having front and rear wheels, said 
sensor comprising: 
(a) a housing; 
(b) a mass within said housing movable relative to said housing in response 
to accelerations of said housing; 
(c) means responsive to the motion of said mass upon acceleration of said 
housing in excess of a predetermined threshold value, for initiating an oc-
cupant protection apparatus; and 
(d) means for mounting said housing onto at least one of a side door of 
the vehicle and a side of the vehicle between the centers of the front and 
rear wheels, in such a position and a direction as to sense an impact into 
the side of said vehicle. 
’253 patent, col. 10, ll. 59 – col. 11, ll. 1-5. 
The prior art sensors used for sensing side impacts were crush sensor 
devices configured to trigger only when crushed or deformed, thereby closing a cir-
cuit. Such sensors, however, are deficient in that they will not trigger during a crash 
in which a side door is not hit directly but the impact is severe enough such that the 
occupant would need the protection of an airbag. Velocity-type sensors, on the oth-
er hand, can be adjusted to a desired sensitivity to detect a side impact and deploy 
an airbag, even though the side door is not directly hit. According to ATI, conven-
tional wisdom was that velocity-type sensors, which had been successfully used for 
sensing impacts to the front of a vehicle, would activate too slowly to deploy an air-
bag during a side impact crash. The inventors of 
the ’253 patent discovered that velocity-type sen-
sors when properly designed could successfully 
and timely operate to deploy an airbag in a side 
collision. An example of a velocity type sensor 
according to the invention is illustrated [in Figure 
1 from the ’253 patent]: 
When installed on a vehicle, the sensor faces the outside of the side door in the 
direction of the arrow B. When the sensor is subjected to a crash pulse of sufficient 
magnitude and duration, the flapper 11 moves toward the second contact 18. The 
first contact 17 engages with the second contact 18 and closes an electrical circuit to 
initiate deployment of an airbag. Because side impact sensors require greater insensi-
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tivity for short, impulsive velocity changes, the specification discloses that an inertial-
ly damped sensor is the most suitable type of sensor for properly sensing side crash-
es. The specification states, however, that other sensors that are simpler and easier to 
manufacture, can be used to effectively sense a side impact. Such sensors include 
spring-mass sensors and viscously-damped sensors. 
The specification also states that an electronic sensor assembly can be used to 
sense side impacts. ’253 patent, col. 10, ll. 1-15. The following figure, Figure 11, 
depicts such an electronic sensor assembly[.] The accompanying text states that Fig-
ure 11 is a “conceptional view of an electronic sensor assembly 201 built according 
to the teachings of this invention. This sensor contains a sensing mass 202 which 
moves relative to housing 203 in response to the acceleration of housing 203 which 
accompanies a side impact crash.” The specification further states that the motion of 
the sensing mass “can be sensed by a variety of tech-
nologies using, for example, optics, resistance change, 
capacitance change or magnetic reluctance change.” 
The enablement of this electronic side impact sensor 
is at issue in this appeal. 
In May 2001, ATI filed a complaint against numerous defendants in the auto-
motive industry, alleging infringement of the ’253 patent. In September 2003, the 
district court conducted a Markman hearing, and, in March 2004, the court issued 
an order construing the relevant claims. Relevant to this appeal, the court construed 
the phrase, “means responsive to the motion of said mass upon acceleration of said 
housing in excess of a predetermined threshold value, for initiating an occupant pro-
tection apparatus.” The parties agreed, and the court found, that the limitation was 
in means-plus-function format and that the stated function is initiating an occupant 
protection apparatus. The parties disagreed as to the structure corresponding to the 
claimed function. ATI contended that the corresponding structure included not on-
ly mechanical switch assemblies, but also electronic switch assemblies, as identified in 
the specification. The defendants countered that the only clearly linked structure 
identified in the specification is a mechanical switch assembly. 
The district court agreed with ATI that the specification contains structure cor-
responding to the claimed function in the form of mechanical and electronic means. 
The court noted that the specification includes several descriptions of mechanical 
switches as preferred embodiments that would perform the intended function of in-
itiating an occupant protection apparatus. The court also observed that Figure 11 
and its accompanying textual description in column 10, lines 3-14, describe, albeit 
in vague detail, an alternative structure for initiating the occupant protection appa-
ratus in the form of an electronic switch. The court concluded: 
Corresponding structure includes mechanical switches with two contacts 
that engage in response to a force of sufficient magnitude and duration, 
and their equivalents. The specification identifies such mechanical switches 
in Figures 1 and 2 at column 6, lines 7-32; Figure 5 at column 8, lines 53-
60; Figure 6 at column 8, lines 61-66; and Figures 8 and 9, lines 30-60. 
Corresponding structure also includes an electronic switch or assembly as 
described in Figure 11 at column 10, lines 3-14, of the patent specification 
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and its equivalents. The electronic switch or assembly contains a sensing 
mass that moves relative to the housing in response to the acceleration of 
the housing caused by a side impact crash. 
… 
After the district court issued its claim construction order, various defendants 
including Honda Motor Co., DaimlerChrysler Co., Ford Motor Co., Hyundai  
Motor Co., Mazda Motor Co., and Saab Cars Sales USA, Inc., filed a motion for 
summary judgment that claims 1-44 are invalid for failing to comply with the writ-
ten description requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. Delphi Corporation also 
filed a motion for summary judgment that the claims that cover an electronic side 
impact sensor are invalid for lack of enablement. The court addressed and granted 
both motions … . 
… 
The district court next granted Delphi’s motion for summary judgment of in-
validity for lack of enablement. Delphi argued that the claims of the ’253 patent that 
cover an electronic sensor were invalid for failing to teach those skilled in the art 
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue experi-
mentation. The court noted that the corresponding structure for the “means  
responsive” claim limitation included both mechanical means and electronic means 
and therefore the full scope of the claims included both types of sensors. The court 
determined, however, that the specification failed to enable electronic sensors for 
sensing side impacts. The court reasoned that the specification failed to provide suf-
ficient details to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use an 
electronic sensor. The court observed that not only did ATI’s representative admit 
that the specification failed to disclose structure for the general references to sensing 
technology, but that Figure 11, the only depiction of an electronic sensor in the 
’253 patent, was not meant to represent any specific design of an electronic sensor. 
Moreover, the court determined that the text describing Figure 11 was “vague” and 
that the specification “fails to disclose reasonable basic enabling structure to show 
how one skilled in the art would use existing electronic sensing technologies to 
achieve the desired novel characteristics of an electronic acceleration sensor.” 
The district court also considered the factors set forth in In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and concluded that they weighed in favor of a finding that 
undue experimentation would have been necessary to make or use an electronic side 
impact sensor based upon the disclosure. Relying on testimony from Delphi’s expert 
and ATI’s expert, the court found that the factors of quantity of experimentation 
necessary, the amount of direction or guidance presented in the specification, and 
the absence of a working example favored a finding of lack of enablement. 
The district court finally considered and rejected ATI’s argument that the 
claims are enabled because one embodiment or mode of practicing the invention, 
viz., a mechanical means, is enabled. The court noted that ATI “vigorously advo-
cated” for and obtained a broad claim construction that both mechanical and elec-
trical sensors be included within the scope of the claims. Because the specification 
does not enable both the mechanical and electronic side impact sensors, the court 
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concluded that the full scope of the claims was not enabled and that the claims are 
invalid for lack of enablement. 
Discussion 
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, reapplying the 
standard applicable at the district court. Whether the subject matter of a patent 
claim satisfies the enablement requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 is a question 
of law, reviewed de novo, based on underlying facts, reviewed for clear error. AK 
Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Because a 
patent is presumed to be valid, the evidentiary burden to show facts supporting a 
conclusion of invalidity is one of clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
On appeal, ATI argues that because one embodiment of the invention is en-
abled, viz., a mechanical side impact sensor, the enablement requirement is satisfied. 
… ATI further argues that, in any event, the specification does enable an electronic 
side impact sensor assembly. According to ATI, the specification discusses specific 
structure for an electronic side impact sensor and depicts such a structure in Figure 
11. ATI contends that Delphi’s expert never addressed whether making an electron-
ic side impact sensor based on the disclosure would require undue experimentation. 
ATI also contends that electronic sensors, albeit for sensing frontal impacts, were 
widely known at the time of filing and therefore there was no need for the specifica-
tion to describe them in detail. 
Delphi and General Motors (hereinafter collectively “Delphi”) respond that it is 
well established that the specification must enable the full scope of the claims as con-
strued by the court, and the full scope of the claims includes mechanical side impact 
sensors and electronic side impact sensors. According to Delphi, providing an en-
abling disclosure of only mechanical side impact sensors is insufficient to satisfy the 
enablement requirement because the full scope of the claims is not enabled. Delphi 
further responds that the short recitation of an electronic sensor in the specification 
does not in fact enable an electronic side impact sensor because it does not teach 
one skilled in the art how to make and use such a sensor without undue experimen-
tation. Delphi further responds that the specification expressly states that side impact 
sensing is a new field and hence ATI could not rely on the knowledge of one of or-
dinary skill in the art to supply the missing details. Moreover, Delphi asserts that the 
district court correctly found that the Wands factors, viz., the quantity of experi-
mentation, the lack of direction or guidance presented, and the nature of the prior 
art, favor a conclusion of invalidity for lack of enablement. 
We agree with Delphi that the district court correctly granted summary judg-
ment that the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement. … We have stated 
that the “enablement requirement is satisfied when one skilled in the art, after read-
ing the specification, could practice the claimed invention without undue experi-
mentation.” AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244; see also Wands, 858 F.2d at 736-37. 
The district court construed the relevant phrase “means responsive to the mo-
tion of said mass” to include both mechanical side impact sensors and electronic side 
impact sensors for performing the function of initiating an occupant protection ap-
paratus. The parties do not dispute that construction; nor do they dispute that the 
specification enables mechanical side impact sensors. Under the district court’s con-
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struction, however, that full scope must be enabled, and the district court was cor-
rect that the specification did not enable the full scope of the invention … .  
… [A]lthough two full columns and five figures of the ’253 patent detail  
mechanical side impact sensors, only one short paragraph and one figure relate to an 
electronic sensor. Importantly, that paragraph and figure do little more than provide 
an overview of an electronic sensor without providing any details of how the elec-
tronic sensor operates. Figure 11 shows a very general view of an electronic side im-
pact sensor. That figure only shows a boxed housing and a sensing mass. In contrast, 
Figure 1 shows a mechanical sensor in much more detail, making it clear from the 
figure how the sensor operates. The specification even states that Figure 11 is a 
“conceptional view” of an electronic sensor. This is supported by the statement of 
one of the inventors that Figure 11 “is not meant to represent any specific design or 
sensor or anything, just a concept.” Figure 11 represents a concept of an electronic 
sensor, not a figure providing details that would show one skilled in the art how to 
make or use an electronic side impact sensor. 
Moreover, the textual description of Figure 11, which is the only description of 
an electronic sensor in the patent, provides little detail concerning how the electron-
ic sensor is built or operated. The specification states the following: 
FIG. 11 is a conceptional view of an electronic sensor assembly 201 built 
according to the teachings of this invention. This sensor contains a sensing 
mass 202 which moves relative to housing 203 in response to the accelera-
tion of housing 203 which accompanies a side impact crash. The motion of 
the sensing mass 202 can be sensed by a variety of technologies using, for 
example, optics, resistance change, capacitance change or magnetic reluc-
tance change. Output from the sensing circuitry can be further processed 
to achieve a variety of sensor response characteristics as desired by the sen-
sor designer. 
’253 patent, col. 10, ll. 3-14. That general description, however, fails to provide a 
structure or description of how a person having ordinary skill in the art would make 
or use an electronic side impact sensor. Indeed, inventor Breed admitted that the 
specification fails to disclose structure for any of the technologies mentioned.  
Noticeably absent is any discussion of the circuitry involved in the electronic side 
impact sensor that would provide more detail on how the sensor operates. The mere 
boxed figure of the electronic sensor and the few lines of description fail to apprise 
one of ordinary skill how to make and use the electronic sensor. 
ATI argues that despite this limited disclosure, the knowledge of one skilled in 
the art was sufficient to supply the missing information. We do not agree. In Genen-
tech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997), we stated: 
“It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply 
the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” Al-
though the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel aspect of 
an invention must be enabled in the patent. The novel aspect of this invention is 
using a velocity-type sensor for side impact sensing. During prosecution, ATI stated 
that prior to its invention, “it was assumed that [conventional] inertial sensors 
would actuate too slowly to deploy an air bag in a side impact situation” and also 
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that it “was unexpected that frontal impact sensors, properly designed, would work 
in sensing side impacts.” ATI further stated that the “essential concept of the inven-
tion” is to use “an inertial or acceleration sensor on a motor vehicle for sensing side 
impacts.” Thus, according to ATI, using inertial or acceleration sensors to sense side 
impacts represented a “breakthrough” in side impact crash sensing. Given that the 
novel aspect of the invention is side impact sensors, it is insufficient to merely state 
that known technologies can be used to create an electronic sensor. As we stated in 
Genentech, the rule that a specification need not disclose what is well known in the 
art is “merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling dis-
closure.” 108 F.3d at 1366. We further stated that the “omission of minor details 
does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement requirement. However, 
when there is no disclosure of any specific starting material or of any of the con-
ditions under which a process can be carried out, undue experimentation is re-
quired.” Id. 
Moreover, the specification states that: “Side impact sensing is a new field. The 
only prior art in the literature utilizes a crush sensing switch as a discriminating sen-
sor to detect a side crash.” ’253 patent, col. 8, ll. 45-47. In fact, ATI stated that at 
the time it filed the application for the ’253 patent, it did not know of any electronic 
sensors used to sense side impact crashes. Given that side impact sensing was a new 
field and that there were no electronic sensors in existence that would detect side 
impact crashes, it was especially important for the specification to discuss how an 
electronic sensor would operate to detect side impacts and to provide details of its 
construction. As was the case in Genentech, the specification provides “only a start-
ing point, a direction for further research” on using electronic sensors for sensing 
side impact crashes; it does not provide guidance to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art on how to make or use an electronic side impact sensor. 108 F.3d at 1366. The 
specification fails to provide “reasonable detail” sufficient to enable use of electronic 
side impact sensors. Id. 
The inadequacy of the description of an electronic side impact sensor is high-
lighted by comparison with the extensive disclosure of how to make and use a  
mechanical side impact sensor, consisting of two full columns. If such a disclosure is 
needed to enable making and using a mechanical side impact sensor, why is not a 
similar disclosure needed to enable making and using an electronic side impact sen-
sor, which is an essential aspect of the invention? 
In determining that undue experimentation would have been required to make 
and use an electronic side impact sensor, the district court properly relied on testi-
mony from Delphi’s expert. Delphi’s expert discussed at length how a “great deal of 
experimentation” would have been necessary to make an electronic side impact sen-
sor after reading the specification of the ’253 patent. He identified and discussed 
two distinct problems in developing an electronic side impact sensor: how to sense 
the motion of the mass in order to properly output a stream of data, and how to 
appropriately process the data. Moreover, Breed stated that based on his experience, 
electronic sensors for detecting side impact crashes could not be obtained commer-
cially in 1990 and would have had to be developed. Inventor Breed admitted that 
he had never built an electronic sensor for side impact. The testimony from Delphi’s 
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expert and the inventor’s own testimony provide additional support for the con-
clusion of a lack of enablement. 
ATI argues that its expert, Dr. Dix, testified that one skilled in the art would 
know how to adapt then-existing technology to create an electronic side impact sen-
sor and that his testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact. Dix’s declaration 
states that electronic sensors were commercially available before the filing of the 
’253 patent and that, based on engineering texts in 1989, one would have known 
how to select a commercial accelerometer, how to use analog circuits, and how to 
program and interface a microprocessor to process the signal using the existing prior 
art. Dix’s testimony, however, fails to discuss what types of tests would need to have 
been conducted to adapt existing electronic sensors for side impact sensing and does 
not provide any detail on how to adapt the existing technology. The testimony con-
cludes that no undue experimentation was required to make an electronic side im-
pact sensor, but, having failed to provide any detail regarding why no experimenta-
tion was necessary, the declaration does not create a genuine issue of material fact as 
to enablement. 
We also reject ATI’s argument that because the specification enables one mode 
of practicing the invention, viz., mechanical side impact sensors, the enablement re-
quirement is satisfied. We addressed and rejected a similar argument made in Liebel-
Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In that case, the 
invention was a front-loading fluid injector system with a replaceable syringe capable 
of withstanding high pressure for delivering a contrast agent to a patient. Id. at 
1373. We construed the asserted claims, as urged by the patentee, to include an in-
jector with and without a pressure jacket. Although the specification clearly enabled 
an injector with a pressure jacket, we concluded that it did not enable an injector 
without such a jacket and that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement. Id. at 
1379. We stated that there “must be ‘reasonable enablement of the scope of the 
range’ which, in this case, includes both injector systems with and without a pres-
sure jacket.” Id. at 1380. 
Similarly, in this case, the claim construction of the relevant claim limitation re-
sulted in the scope of the claims including both mechanical and electronic side im-
pact sensors. Disclosure of only mechanical side impact sensors does not permit one 
skilled in the art to make and use the invention as broadly as it was claimed, which 
includes electronic side impact sensors. Electronic side impact sensors are not just 
another known species of a genus consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly different 
sensor compared with the well-enabled mechanical side impact sensor that is fully 
discussed in the specification. Thus, in order to fulfill the enablement requirement, 
the specification must enable the full scope of the claims that includes both electron-
ic and mechanical side impact sensors, which the specification fails to do. 
We stated in Liebel: “The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully 
pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it 
then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not 
meet.” Id. at 1380. ATI sought to have the scope of the claims of the ’253 patent 
include both mechanical and electronic side impact sensors. It succeeded, but then 
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was unable to demonstrate that the claim was fully enabled. Claims must be enabled 
to correspond to their scope. 
… 
MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs. 
687 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
Rader, Chief Judge: 
The [district court] granted summary judgment that claims 1-5, 23-26, and 28 
of U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 are invalid for a lack of enablement. Because the rec-
ord supports the trial court’s judgment, this court affirms. 
I. 
Appellant Massachusetts Institute of Technology is the assignee of the ’922  
patent and appellant MagSil Corporation is the patent’s exclusive licensee. The ap-
plication leading to the ’922 patent was filed in March 1995 and issued in May 
1997. The patent claims read-write sensors for computer hard disk drive storage sys-
tems. Hard disk drives store digital data in microscopic magnetic patterns on the 
surface of spinning platters, or disks, inside the drive. 
 
As shown in Fig. 1, the ’922 patent’s sensor uses a quantum mechanical effect 
where electric current can pass, or “tunnel,” from one electrode (e.g., 10) through a 
thin insulating barrier layer (14) into a second electrode (e.g., 12). 
With two ferromagnetic electrodes, a tri-layer tunnel junction requires the cur-
rent flow to depend on the magnetization direction of the electrodes. The junction 
resistance is higher when the magnetization direction of one electrode (e.g., 28 in 
10) is antiparallel (i.e., having the opposite direction) to that of the other electrode 
(e.g., 28 in 12) and lower when the directions are parallel. Therefore, the tunnel 
junction resistance changes with a change in magnetization direction. 
The ’922 patent claims both a method of manufacturing a tri-layer tunnel junc-
tion and the junction itself. The asserted claims, however, only claim the tunnel 
junction device. Claim 1 is representative of the two asserted independent claims 
and reads: 
1. A device forming a junction having a resistance comprising: 
a first electrode having a first magnetization direction, 
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a second electrode having a second magnetization direction, and 
an electrical insulator between the first and second electrodes, wherein ap-
plying a small magnitude of electromagnetic energy to the junction revers-
es at least one of the magnetization directions and causes a change in the 
resistance by at least 10% at room temperature. 
(Emphasis added). 
According to the background section of the ’922 patent’s specification, scien-
tists had known “for many years” the basic theory underlying “tunnel resistance a-
rising from conduction electron spin polarization.” Past efforts, however, failed to 
“produce an adequate level of change in the tunneling resistance (ΔR/R)” for prac-
tical applications. At room temperature, these past efforts had obtained only a 2.7% 
change in resistance. The ’922 invention, by contrast, achieved a “ten percent 
change in the tunneling resistance with respect to magnetic field (H) variation,” in 
some cases “as much as 11.8% change was seen.” 
The specification further teaches that 
[t]his increase in ΔR/R is believed to depend, inter alia, on a decrease in 
surface roughness, which apparently directly couples the two electrodes fer-
romagnetically. Also, the quality of the intervening insulator between the 
[electrodes] is significantly improved over the prior art devices. This is be-
lieved to be important in keeping the surface integrity of the [electrodes]. 
Col. 2, ll. 51-58. The asserted claims, however, do not include the process steps of 
fabricating the device and require neither smoother layers nor a specifically improved 
insulator. The specification also explains manufacture of the tri-layer tunnel junction 
and ways to incorporate this device into read-write sensor heads for data storage. 
MagSil filed suit in December 2008 against several defendants including Hita-
chi Global Storage Technologies, Inc., Hitachi America, Ltd., Hitachi Data Systems 
Corporation, and Shenzhen Excelstor Technology, Ltd. (collectively “Hitachi”), 
alleging that their disk drive products infringe the ’922 patent. The non-Hitachi de-
fendants have since been dismissed from the case. … After Markman proceedings, 
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found the 
asserted claims invalid as a matter of law for lack of enablement. The district court 
entered its final judgment for Hitachi and MagSil timely appealed to this court … . 
II. 
… Enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual findings. In re 
Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988). A party must prove invalidity based on 
non-enablement by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. 
Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003). … “To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled 
in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘un-
due experimentation.’” Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The en-
ablement determination proceeds as of the effective filing date of the patent. Plant 
Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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Enablement serves the dual function in the patent system of ensuring adequate 
disclosure of the claimed invention and of preventing claims broader than the dis-
closed invention. See AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244. This important doctrine prevents 
both inadequate disclosure of an invention and overbroad claiming that might oth-
erwise attempt to cover more than was actually invented. Thus, a patentee chooses 
broad claim language at the peril of losing any claim that cannot be enabled across 
its full scope of coverage. “The scope of the claims must be less than or equal to the 
scope of the enablement to ensure that the public knowledge is enriched by the  
patent specification to a degree at least commensurate with the scope of the claims.” 
Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat’l 
Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 
(Fed. Cir. 1999)); see also In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970) (“[T]he 
scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement 
provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”). 
The asserted claims of the ’922 patent broadly claim any tri-layer tunnel junc-
tion device wherein “applying a small magnitude of electromagnetic energy to the 
junction *** causes a change in the resistance by at least 10% at room temperature.” 
The district court construed the limitation “a change in resistance of at least 10%” 
as: 
a change in resistance of at least 10% using the formula ΔR/R = (R1-
R2)/R1, where ΔR/R represents the percent change in resistance, R1 is the 
resistance of the junction before the application of electromagnetic energy 
reverses at least one of the magnetization directions, and R2 is the re-
sistance of the junction after the application of electromagnetic energy and 
the resultant reversal of at least one of the magnetization directions. 
The district court further found that the asserted claims cover “resistance changes 
beyond 120% and up to infinity.” Thus, the specification at the time of filing must 
teach one of ordinary skill in the art to fully perform this method across that entire 
scope. 
The record shows that MagSil advocated for a broad construction of this claim 
term. Its expert Dr. Murdock testified that this term covers tunnel junctions with 
resistive changes of 100% or more. Dr. Moodera, a named inventor, also testified 
that a 1000% change falls within the scope of the claims, despite that he had never 
made such a tunnel junction. 
The specification—the disclosure available to show the full scope of enable-
ment—teaches that the inventors’ best efforts achieved a maximum change in re-
sistance of only 11.8% at room temperature. As the district court noted, MagSil has 
“not disclaimed the asserted claims’ infinite scope in the area of resistive change.” 
Accordingly, this record and specification show that the district court correctly dis-
cerned that the asserted claims are not enabled. The ’922 patent application was 
filed in March 1995. Hitachi has shown with clear and convincing evidence that one 
skilled in the art could not have taken the disclosure in the specification regarding 
“change in the resistance by at least 10% at room temperature” and achieved a 
change in resistance in the full scope of that term without undue experimentation. 
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The specification must contain sufficient disclosure to enable an ordinarily 
skilled artisan to make and use the entire scope of the claimed invention at the time 
of filing. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 1000. Here, the specification teaches that the funda-
mental science of the tunneling junction was known “for many years,” but past ef-
forts did not produce effective use of the phenomenon. The specification discloses a 
1975 publication by Michel Julliere that predicted an ideal tunnel junction could 
yield around a 24% change in resistance. Yet, the specification teaches that twenty 
years later, when the application was filed, the best achievement was an 11.8% 
change. Named inventor Dr. Meservey also testified that before the application was 
filed, he did not know how to achieve a tunnel junction with greater than 20% 
change in resistance. 
During prosecution of the ’922 patent, MagSil stated that it had achieved resis-
tive changes of 18% at this time after the date of filing. During prosecution MagSil 
also predicted still higher resistive changes because no clear theoretical limit pre-
vented achieving the highest possible value of 100%. The inventors’ understanding 
during prosecution that a 100% resistive change was an upper limit is inconsistent 
with MagSil’s position at the time of this case. During this litigation, MagSil’s expert 
Dr. Murdock testified that a person of ordinary skill in the art could work from the 
’922 patent and make tunneling junctions with a resistive change between 100% and 
120% without undue experimentation. 
Dr. Murdock’s aggressive view of the scope of this invention, however, runs 
counter to his own testimony that the first junction with this level of resistive change 
was not developed until 2006 or 2007. It also does not explain why it took some 
twelve years after the ’922 patent application was filed to achieve these results. Dr. 
Murdock also testified that experimentation on electrode metals and tunnel barrier 
insulator materials, as well as on the processes to make them, was needed to achieve 
these results. He further acknowledged that even someone of extraordinary skill in 
the art in 1995 could not have predicted the exact process and materials needed for 
the 120% resistive change achieved over ten years later. 
Even if Dr. Murdock’s testimony could somehow overcome the requirement 
that the enabling disclosure must appear in the specification at the time of filing, his 
assertions also fail to reach the modern dimensions of this field of invention. His 
testimony (suggesting a resistive change between 100% and 120%) only reaches a 
lower-end of the claimed scope. The invention claims resistive changes from at least 
10% up to infinity. Dr. Murdock admitted that resistive change of 604% has now 
been achieved by others, and the claim scope extends well beyond that value as well. 
The ’922 patent specification does not disclose working examples of tunnel junc-
tions with resistive changes of 20%, 120%, 604%, or 1000%. The named inventors 
were not able to achieve even a 20% change a year after filing the application in 
1995, and 604% junctions were not achieved until 2008. 
In sum, this field of art has advanced vastly after the filing of the claimed inven-
tion. The specification containing these broad claims, however, does not contain 
sufficient disclosure to present even a remote possibility that an ordinarily skilled 
artisan could have achieved the modern dimensions of this art. Thus, the specifica-
tion enabled a marginal advance over the prior art, but did not enable at the time of 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  81 
filing a tunnel junction of resistive changes reaching even up to 20%, let alone the 
more recent achievements above 600%. 
The trial court’s finding of an enablement deficiency falls squarely within this 
court’s precedent. See Fisher, 427 F.2d 833. In Fisher, the patent application was 
directed to a system for production of substances containing adrenocorticotropic 
hormone (ACTH) that were suitable for injection into humans for adrenal gland 
stimulation. 427 F.2d at 834. The claims recited a potency of “at least 1 Inter-
national Unit of ACTH per milligram,” and the specification disclosed that previous 
experiments yielded compounds with a maximum potency of 50% or 0.5 Inter-
national Units (“IUs”). Id. The patent application, however, only disclosed com-
pounds with ACTH potencies of between 111% and 230%, or 1.11 and 2.3 IUs per 
milligram. Id. The issue presented was 
whether an inventor who is the first to achieve a potency of greater than 
1.0 for certain types of compositions, which potency was long desired be-
cause of its beneficial effect on humans, should be allowed to dominate all 
such compositions having potencies greater than 1.0, including future 
compositions having potencies far in excess of those obtainable from his 
teachings plus ordinary skill. 
Id. at 839. The claims were not patentable because the specification did not enable 
ACTH potencies much greater than 2.3 IUs, when “at least 1” was claimed. Id. at 
839. 
Here, the claim term “change in the resistance by at least 10%” is very similar to 
the “open-ended” term in Fisher because it has a lower threshold, but not an upper 
limit. The asserted claims of the ’922 patent cover resistive changes from 10% up to 
infinity, while the ’922 patent specification only discloses enough information to 
achieve an 11.8% resistive change. The specification discloses that artisans hoped to 
achieve values of around 24%, but had not done so. During prosecution MagSil be-
lieved that the highest possible resistive change was 100%. Yet, the claims covered 
changes far above 20% or 100% even when the inventors could not explain any way 
to achieve these levels. As MagSil’s expert Dr. Murdock testified, since 1995 when 
the specification was filed, resistive changes now stretch up to above 600%. 
The open claim language chosen by the inventors does not grant them any for-
giveness on the scope of required enablement. Open claim language, such as the 
word “comprising” as a transition from the preamble to the body of a claim, “sig-
nals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.” Gillette Co. v. Energizer 
Holdings, Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “The transition ‘comprising’ 
creates a presumption that the recited elements are only a part of the device, that the 
claim does not exclude additional, unrecited elements.” Crystal Semiconductor Corp. 
v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Mag-
Sil seeks some easing of the enablement requirement by using this language in the 
asserted claims. To support its argument, MagSil refers to this court’s decision in 
Gillette. 
In Gillette, the patentee claimed “[a] safety razor blade unit comprising *** a 
group of first, second, and third blades.” 405 F.3d at 1369. In that preliminary in-
junction case, this court noted that the claim used “the ‘open’ claim terms ‘compris-
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ing’ and ‘group of,’ in addition to other language, to encompass subject matter be-
yond a razor with only three blades.” Id. at 1371. This court looked to the claim 
language, specification, and prosecution history to find that the claim covered a  
razor with four blades. Id. at 1371-72. This court also noted that the open language 
of the claim “embraces technology that may add features to devices otherwise within 
the claim definition.” Id. at 1371. 
MagSil contends that its open-ended threshold recitation of “at least 10%,” 
which when construed does not have an upper limit, is equivalent to Gillette’s open-
language “comprising” recitation. Therefore, MagSil argues, if the “at least 10%” 
recitation is construed to not have an upper limit, then the “comprising” recitation 
as found in Gillette should also be construed to include every conceivable number of 
blades, up to infinity, which would not have been enabled. In the first place,  
enablement was not an issue in Gillette. Moreover, the safety razor technology and 
the very fact-specific distinctions in that case do not apply in this technology or case. 
In Gillette, for example, the open claim language entailed more than the “com-
prising” term and the construction was aided by the specification and prosecution 
history. In fact, the issue concerned whether the claim language covered an embod-
iment with more than one blade labeled as a “second blade,” where the terms “first, 
second, and third” did not specify the number of blades but specific characteristics 
of blades in those categories. Id. at 1372-73. Thus, the Gillette invention did not 
claim an infinite number of blades but blades with three separate categories of char-
acteristics. Therefore, this case’s claim limitation extending to an open-ended range 
of values, which must be present for infringement, is different from a preamble reci-
tation “comprising,” which does not exclude additional features to devices otherwise 
within the narrower claim definition. See id. 
The ’922 patent specification only enables an ordinarily skilled artisan to 
achieve a small subset of the claimed range. The record contains no showing that 
the knowledge of that artisan would permit, at the time of filing, achievement of the 
modern values above 600% without undue experimentation, indeed without the 
nearly twelve years of experimentation necessary to actually reach those values. The 
enablement doctrine’s prevention of over broad claims ensures that the patent sys-
tem preserves necessary incentives for follow-on or improvement inventions. In this 
case, for instance, many additional inventions and advances were necessary to take 
this technology from a 20% resistance change to the over 600% change in present 
data storage systems. Moreover this technology area will continue to profit from in-
ventive contributions. Enablement operates to ensure fulsome protection and thus 
“enable” these upcoming advances. 
MagSil’s difficulty in enabling the asserted claims is a problem of its own mak-
ing. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have its claims in-
clude a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it then had to show that such 
a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”) This court holds that the 
asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement because their broad scope is not 
reasonably supported by the scope of enablement in the specification. See Fisher, 427 
F.2d at 839. MagSil did not fully enable its broad claim scope. Therefore, it cannot 
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claim an exclusive right to exclude later tri-layer tunnel junctions that greatly exceed 
a 10% resistive change. Id. 
III. 
The district court entered summary judgment of noninfringement of the assert-
ed claims after finding them invalid for lack of enablement. Hitachi’s disk drive 
products do not infringe the asserted claims because “[t]here can be no infringe-
ment of claims deemed to be invalid.” Marrin v. Griffin, 599 F.3d 1290, 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). 
…  
Written Description 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 143-172 
Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int’l, Inc. 
835 F.2d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
Newman, Judge: 
Kennecott Corporation appeals [a] final judgment … in which the district court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants Kyocera International and Kyoto  
Ceramic Co., Ltd. (together “Kyocera”), holding that United States Patent No. 
4,179,299 is invalid in terms of the “on sale” bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Kenne-
cott’s claim of patent infringement was dismissed. We reverse. 
The Controlling Question 
The judgment of invalidity turned on the sole question of whether the claims of 
the ’299 patent are entitled, as a matter of law, to the benefit of the filing date of its 
parent patent application which eventually issued as U.S. Patent No. 4,312,954, 
filed on June 5, 1975. If so entitled, the sales events in 1977 cannot effect an inva-
lidity bar. If not so entitled, Kennecott admits that its sales activities occurred more 
than one year before May 1, 1978, the filing date of the continuation-in-part appli-
cation that issued as the ’299 patent. 
Background 
On summary judgment all facts material to the result must be either undisputed 
or, if disputed, must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. 
The question of the sufficiency of the disclosure of the ’954 application to support 
the ’299 claims is a matter of law based on underlying facts. All facts material to the 
issue are here deemed undisputed, based on admissions by Kyocera for the purpose 
of its motion for summary judgment. 
Kyocera states in its brief on appeal that it did not concede or admit all the facts 
that Kennecott says it did. The district court found, however, that: 
Finding 11. For the purposes of this Motion only, the material facts set 
forth in all of the affidavits and in all of the exhibits submitted by plaintiff 
in opposition to Defendants’ Motion, are undisputed by defendants. 
Kyocera has not assigned error to this finding, and it is bound thereby. 
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The continuation-in-part ’299 application contains a substantial part of the dis-
closure of the ’954 parent application, plus a description of and photomicrographs 
showing the equiaxed microstructure.2 [The photomicrographs from the ’299  
patent are provided at the end of this opinion.] It is not disputed that the photo-
micrographs were of the product made and described in the ’954 application, and 
produced in the original examples. 
The ’299 patent claims contain the words “equiaxed microstructure” that were 
not present in the ’954 specification and claims. This is the only difference at issue. 
’299 patent claim 1 is representative: 
1. A sintered ceramic body consisting essentially of: 
(a) from about 91 to about 99.85% by weight silicon carbide, wherein at 
least 95% by weight of the silicon carbide is of the alpha phase; 
(b) up to about 5.0% by weight carbonized organic material; 
(c) from about 0.15 to about 3.0% by weight boron; and 
(d) up to about 1.0% by weight additional carbon; 
and having a predominantly equiaxed microstructure. 
Pertinent undisputed or conceded facts include the following: 
• the high (over 95%) alpha silicon carbide ceramic body that is described 
in the ’954 application has an equiaxed microstructure; 
• the ’954 application does not mention the equiaxed microstructure of 
the high-alpha silicon carbide ceramic body, nor state the requirements for 
forming such microstructure; 
• the inventors knew that the high-alpha silicon carbide ceramic body had 
an equiaxed microstructure, and it was known that ceramics from high-
alpha silicon carbide could have this structure; 
• examples 1-30 in the ’954 application, all the examples using high-alpha 
silicon carbide, all produce a ceramic body having an equiaxed microstruc-
ture; 
• the method set forth in the ’954 application using the high-alpha silicon 
carbide invariably produces a ceramic product having an equiaxed micro-
structure. 
Kennecott asserts that the equiaxed microstructure is inherent in the structure 
produced in the ’954 application, and that the ’299 claims, which specifically name 
the equiaxed structure, therefore enjoy the benefit of the earlier filing date. 
Kennecott also asserts, and Kyocera denies, that Kyocera conceded the question of 
inherency in the course of conceding all disputed facts on its motion for summary 
judgment. 
                                                
2 “Equiaxed microstructure” is the crystal structure of the silicon carbide in submi-
cron size grains that are not highly elongated and that do not have exaggerated 
grain growth. As defined in the ’299 patent the ratio of the maximum dimension of 
the grains to the minimum dimension is less than 3:1. 
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It is apparent that Kyocera conceded the factual premises3 of inherency by con-
ceding that examples 1-30 produced, without undue experimentation, a product 
having an equiaxed microstructure. What is disputed is the legal implication of this 
inherent production of an equiaxed product. 
The district court concluded that for the ’954 specification to meet the written 
description requirement, one reading the specification must know from the “four 
corners” of the document, without recourse to information outside the specifica-
tion, that the ceramic product has an equiaxed microstructure. The district court 
held that the specification of the ’954 application met the enablement requirement 
of § 112 but not the written description requirement, and thus that it was immateri-
al that the product disclosed in the ’954 application was the same as that claimed in 
the ’299 patent. 
Discussion 
For the ’299 claims to receive the benefit of the ’954 application’s filing date, 
35 U.S.C. § 120 requires, inter alia, that the invention of the claims be disclosed in 
the ’954 specification in the manner required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1[.] 
The purpose of § 112, ¶ 1, is to ensure that there is an adequate disclosure of 
the invention for which patent rights are sought. The purpose of the description re-
quirement of this paragraph is to state what is needed to fulfill the enablement  
criteria. These requirements may be viewed separately, but they are intertwined. 
The incorporation of the requirements of § 112 into § 120 ensures that the in-
ventor had possession of the later-claimed invention on the filing date of the earlier 
application. In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351 (CCPA 1978). The written de-
scription must communicate that which is needed to enable the skilled artisan to 
make and use the claimed invention. A description that does not meet this require-
ment is legally insufficient. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
It was undisputed that the only written description in the ’299 application that 
was not present in the original ’954 disclosure was the description and pictures of 
the product’s microstructure. Kennecott points to authority that the added descrip-
tion of a property of a previously disclosed product does not deprive claims to that 
product of the benefit of a prior disclosure of the product. Kyocera responds that 
because the ’954 specification is silent as to the microstructure of the product, and 
because one would not know whether the product had an equiaxed microstructure 
merely by reading the specification, the specification is inadequate in law to support 
claims that require an equiaxed microstructure. Kyocera also asserts that the equi-
axed microstructure is not obtained without physical manipulation of the process of 
the ’954 application, and that any concession it may have made as to production of 
an equiaxed product is limited to the specific conditions used in examples 1-30 of 
the ’954 specification. 
                                                
3 Kyocera raises on this appeal factual issues that appear to contradict its concessions 
before the district court, including issues related to Kennecott’s representations to 
the patent examiner in prosecuting the ’299 application. However, it is too late in 
the proceeding for Kyocera to retreat from its blanket concession of the factual is-
sues. 
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Taking the last contention first, it was admitted that the products of examples 
1-30 have the equiaxed microstructure, and that one skilled in this art could readily 
determine the microstructure of the product. Kyocera’s arguments on appeal as to 
the need for manipulation of conditions are contravened in the affidavit evidence 
referred to in Finding of Fact 11. We conclude that it was established before the dis-
trict court that the high-alpha products of the ’954 application have the equiaxed 
microstructure. 
On the issue of sufficiency of the earlier disclosure, the body of precedent 
teaches that the legal conclusion depends on the particular facts. In In re Edwards 
the court considered a chemical compound that was not described in the earlier ap-
plication, and stated that the earlier and later applications need not use the identical 
words, if the earlier application shows the subject matter that is claimed in the later 
application, with adequate direction as to how to obtain it. The court observed that 
the chemical reactions described in the earlier filing “will inherently produce, as the 
predominant component, the [later claimed] compound.” 568 F.2d at 1352. The 
facts in Edwards are strongly analogous to those herein, for Kennecott’s ’954 exam-
ples 1-30 all produce a ceramic that has an equiaxed structure. 
The facts before us … are analogous to those discussed in In re Reynolds, 443 
F.2d 384 (CCPA 1971). In Reynolds the question was whether words describing a 
function that was inherent in the claimed product could be added to the specifica-
tion by amendment, or whether such description was “new matter” [prohibited by 
35 U.S.C. § 132(a)†]. The court cited with approval the holding in Technicon In-
struments Corp. v. Coleman Instruments, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 630, 640-41 (N.D. Ill. 
1966), aff’d, 385 F.2d 391, (7th Cir. 1967), that 
[b]y disclosing in a patent application a device that inherently performs a 
function, operates according to a theory, or has an advantage, a patent ap-
plicant necessarily discloses that function, theory, or advantage even 
though he says nothing concerning it. 
Quoted [in Reynolds,] 443 F.2d at 389. It was concluded that the express descrip-
tion of the inherent property, since not “new matter,” could be added to the specifi-
cation with effect as of the original filing date. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has long recognized that an inven-
tion may be described in different ways and still be the same invention. In In re 
Kirchner, 305 F.2d 897, 904 (CCPA 1962), the court held that compliance with 
§ 120 “does not require that the invention be described in the same way, or comply 
with § 112 in the same way, in both applications.” Id. In Kirchner the court author-
ized the addition to the specification of descriptive matter concerning the use of the 
compounds without loss of the parent application’s filing date. In the ’299 patent, 
by contrast, the additional material was added not only to the specification, but to 
the claims. Thus Kyocera argues that it is immaterial that the product in the ’299 
claims is inherently the same as that produced in the ’954 application, because un-
like Kirchner the ’299 claims include the new descriptive matter. 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note: According to the last sentence of § 132(a), “No amendment shall in-
troduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.” ] 
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The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals did not adopt the position that is 
now urged by Kyocera. In In re Nathan, 328 F.2d 1005, 1008-09 (CCPA 1964), 
the court held that the later-added limitation to the claims of the compound’s alpha 
orientation was “an inherent characteristic” of the claimed subject matter, and re-
versed a new matter rejection. …  
… 
In this case, the invention of the ’299 claims is a ceramic product. That product 
is the same as the product in the ’954 application, and has the same structure. It was 
conceded that anyone with a microscope would see the microstructure of the prod-
uct of the ’954 application. The disclosure in a subsequent patent application of an 
inherent property of a product does not deprive that product of the benefit of an 
earlier filing date. Nor does the inclusion of a description of that property in later-
filed claims change this reasonable result. 
We conclude that the district court erred in holding that the ’299 claims were 
not entitled to the ’954 filing date. 
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New Railhead Mfg. v. Vermeer Mfg. 
298 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
Michel, Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellant New Railhead Manufacturing (“New Railhead”) owns Unit-
ed States Patent No[]. 5,899,283 … drawn to a drill bit for horizontal directional 
drilling of rock formations … . New Railhead sued Vermeer Manufacturing Compa-
ny (“Vermeer”) and Earth Tool Company (“Earth Tool”), for infringement … 
based upon their manufacture and distribution, respectively, of a competing drill bit. 
Both patents-in-suit were invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). … New Railhead 
appeals. We affirm. 
I 
Horizontal (or lateral) directional drilling is necessary, for example, when in-
stalling utilities around immovable objects such as roadways, rivers, or lakes. David 
Cox, co-owner of New Railhead, invented the drill bit … claimed in the ’283 [pa-
tent] to overcome prior art problems with horizontal drilling through hard rock 
formations. The boring system disclosed by the Cox patent[] uses a drill bit with a 
body that contains fixed and semi-floating cutting points and one or more fluid 
channels to lubricate and disperse formations that have been cut or fractured, with-
out using jetting fluids that are traditionally used to steer such drilling apparati. 
Claim 1 of the ’283 patent is representative of the seven product claims (emphasis 
on pertinent claim limitation): 
An asymmetric drill bit for horizontal directional drilling in rock, compris-
ing: 
a bit body attached to an end of a sonde housing; 
the unitary bit body being angled with respect to the sonde housing the bit 
body being nonmovable with respect to the sonde housing in drilling op-
eration; and 
the bit body being mounted with a plurality of substantially forward-facing 
end studs extending from a front face of the bit body. 
… 
The [’283 patent was] filed as [a] continuation-in-part application[] that 
claimed the priority date of a provisional application filed by New Railhead on Feb-
ruary 5, 1997. That provisional discloses a “directional earth boring tool” wherein 
“the heel-down method of attachment [of the bit] to the drill body helps to create 
the random elliptical orbital motion that causes the high impact fracturing tech-
nique.” Under headings labeled “Operational assumptions” and “Theory of Opera-
tion,” the provisional application further alludes to the “high included angle offsets 
for directional steering,” and the enhanced performance that results from “multiply-
ing the fracturing effect through leverage on the main drilling points.” The pro-
visional concludes with two drawings that show the bit and the sonde housing that 
holds the bit during operation; however, both drawings show the drill bit in an “ex-
ploded” view, i.e., the bit is not shown attached to the drill bit housing. Moreover, 
nowhere in the provisional application is the bit body expressly described as being 
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“angled with respect to the sonde housing” as recited in claim 1 of the ’283 patent. 
(As noted by the district court, Cox testified that the claim language “angled with 
respect to the sonde housing” meant that the drill bit had a toe (front portion) and 
a heel (rear portion), and that the toe-to-heel ratio was “the amount above and the 
amount below [the] outer circumference of the sonde housing.”) 
The ’283 patent issued on May 4, 1999, and New Railhead filed this lawsuit 
the following day. … 
At the close of discovery, Earth Tool moved for partial summary judgment of 
invalidity of the ’283 patent based on the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The 
parties did not dispute that commercial embodiments of the patented drill bit were 
sold during the spring and summer of 1996—more than one year before the No-
vember 1997 filing date of the non-provisional application, but not more than one 
year before the filing date of the February 1997 provisional application to which it 
claimed priority. Earth Tool argued, however, that the utility application was not 
entitled to the priority date of the provisional because the disclosure in the pro-
visional specification failed to adequately describe the invention claimed in the ’283 
patent as required by 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1). The district court agreed, concluding 
“nothing in this [provisional specification] language states that the drill bit is ‘angled 
with respect to the sonde housing’ or otherwise describes the toe, the heel, or the 
toe-to-heel ratio.” The court further found that Cox had admitted as much in his 
deposition, and that his later contrary declaration submitted in opposition to partial 
summary judgment could not, as a matter of law, create a genuine issue of material 
fact on this point. Thus, because the ’283 patent was not entitled to claim the pri-
ority date of the provisional, New Railhead’s mid-1996 commercial sales constituted 
a § 102(b) bar. 
… 
III 
Because the parties do not dispute that the patented drill bit was the subject of 
a commercial offer for sale more than one year before the utility application was 
filed, the ’283 patent is invalid if it is not afforded the priority date of the provisional 
application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
As a part of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, the Patent Statute was 
amended to allow applicants for United States patents to file provisional applications 
that could provide the priority date for a non-provisional utility application filed 
within one year of the provisional. See 35 U.S.C. § 111(b). Such a provisional appli-
cation need only include a specification conforming to the requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, and at least one drawing filed under § 113; no claims are re-
quired. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(b)(1), (2). However, for the non-provisional utility appli-
cation to be afforded the priority date of the provisional application, the two appli-
cations must share at least one common inventor and the written description of the 
provisional must adequately support the claims of the non-provisional application: 
An application for patent filed under section 111(a) … of this title for an 
invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 
112 of this title in a provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this 
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title, by an inventor or inventors named in the provisional application, shall 
have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of 
the provisional application filed under section 111(b) of this title, if the ap-
plication for patent filed under section 111(a) … of this title is filed not 
later than 12 months after the date on which the provisional application 
was filed and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to 
the provisional application. 
35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (emphasis added). In other words, the specification of the 
provisional must “contain a written description of the invention and the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms,”  
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to practice the invention 
claimed in the non-provisional application. 
New Railhead argues that the district court erred by concluding that the speci-
fication of the provisional did not support the claims of the ’283 patent. In particu-
lar, New Railhead asserts that Cox was always in possession of the asymmetrical 
heel-toe structure and that the district court went astray by focusing on whether the 
provisional application disclosed the “importance” of the angled structure rather 
than whether it disclosed the angled structure at all. In its view, one of ordinary skill 
would readily understand from the “totality of the disclosure,” i.e., the drawings 
together with the provisional written description, that the drill bit was angled with 
respect to the sonde housing. 
We discern no error in the district court’s conclusion that this claim limitation 
was not adequately supported by the provisional, as the factual bases girding its con-
clusion are so solid that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. The district court 
relied in particular on the admissions in the deposition testimony of Cox himself, in 
which he explained that he knew the drawings contained the heel-toe angle because 
he understood the configuration of the device, not necessarily because the drawings 
showed such a configuration. In addition to Cox’s testimony, the district court had 
before it the testimony of Joseph Steele, the New Railhead employee responsible for 
the company’s research and development (and the person aside from Cox most fa-
miliar with the patented drill bit), who averred that he could not tell from the draw-
ings in the provisional whether the heel and toe of the drill bit extended beyond the 
sonde housing. Randy Runquist, a designer and engineer for Vermeer testified that 
he, too, was unaware of the angled features of the drill bit from the provisional 
drawings. 
Cox’s later declaration, submitted in opposition to the motion for partial sum-
mary judgment, was at best an equivocal attempt to refine his deposition testimony. 
But even when viewed in a light most favorable to New Railhead, one is left with no 
clear indication that the provisional application adequately describes to one of ordi-
nary skill in the art the “heel-toe” angle between the bit and the housing: 
To my eye the drawings which were submitted with the provisional applica-
tion clearly show a heel portion and a toe portion, each of the portions  
extending respectively above and below the outer circumference of the 
sonde housing. Although the drawings show the two pieces in exploded 
configuration, I believe that because they are accurately scaled drawings of 
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the actual tool, one of ordinary skill could actually construct the tool itself 
from these drawings and if that were done, the heel and toe portions would be 
present. 
(Emphases added). This averment not only fails to create a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding whether the written description has been satisfied, but it also conflates 
the concepts of written description and enablement in the process. “The purpose of 
the written description requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make 
and use’; the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in 
the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the inven-
tion.” Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). That 
is, the disclosure must show he had invented each feature that is included as a claim 
limitation. The adequacy of the written description (i.e., the disclosure) is measured 
from the face of the application; the requirement is not satisfied if one of ordinary 
skill in the art must first make the patented invention before he can ascertain the 
claimed features of that invention. Cf. Martin v. Mayer, 823 F.2d 500, 505 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987) (“It is not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be able to 
construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the disclosure [but] whether 
the application necessarily discloses that particular device.”) (quoting Jepson v. Cole-
man, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)). 
New Railhead’s repeated assertions that Cox was at all times in possession of 
the claimed invention are somewhat misdirected. Although we have recently noted 
the particular usefulness of the “possession” inquiry when a patentee claims an earli-
er filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 119, we have at the same time cautioned that the 
written description requirement is not subsumed by the “possession” inquiry. Iden-
tity of description is not necessary. See, e.g., Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia 
Inc., 289 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he disclosure as originally filed 
does not have to provide in haec verba support for the claimed subject matter at is-
sue.”). Identity of that which is described, however, is necessary: “What is claimed by 
the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification *** 
.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002); 
accord Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
The description in the provisional fails to meet this standard. 
Undeterred, New Railhead argues that the testimony credited by the district 
court demonstrates at most that the provisional drawings alone do not satisfy the 
written description requirement, but that—read in conjunction with the rest of the 
specification—the adequate support requirement of § 112, ¶ 1, has been met. In 
particular, it assails the district court for having allegedly focused only on the ab-
stract of the specification, and urges that the following excerpt from the provisional, 
with particular emphasis placed by New Railhead, discloses to one of ordinary skill 
the angled structure: 
Theory of operation— 
* * * 
3. The new Asymmetrical Directional Drilling point for Rock and Hard 
Earth Formations combines the techniques of point contact fracturing for 
rock with a high angle of attack for hard earth as well as soft formations. 
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Fracturing is accomplished with the application of hard carbide points on 
random elliptical torque vectors created as the asymmetrical geometry of 
the bit forms eccentric rotational paths by the combination of rotation and 
thrust moments. Drilling of rock like shales that are typically considered to 
be compressed and extremely dense and dry clays are also enhanced by the 
aggressively pointed geometry of the drill bit. 
4. The asymmetrical geometry enhances the performance of the drill rack by 
multiplying the fracturing effect through leverage on the main drilling points. 
As the bit rotates the offset drill points randomly fracture and engage as cen-
ter points of rotation and multiply transverse moments 3 to 8 times the ac-
tual transverse moments that can be produced at the same diameter in a 
symmetrically formed fixed diameter drill bit. 
5. Bore hole size is defined and controlled by stabilizing the forward cut-
ting points on a trailing shoe that contains replaceable, semi-permanent 
carbide buttons that will fracture off irregular surfaces and help smooth the 
borehole as well as reduce the abrasive wear on the body of the bit. 
We are not moved. Nothing in this disclosure even intimates to one of ordinary 
skill in the art the specific angled relationship between the bit and its housing. Con-
tra ’283 patent, col. 2, ll. 49-57 (“[T]he specially-configured asymmetric drill bit 
for horizontal directional drilling in rock includes a bit body attached to an end of a 
sonde housing. The bit body is angled with respect to the sonde housing, as best 
shown in Fig. 4, with the angle displacement from collinear alignment being rela-
tively slight, that is, on the order of about 15 degrees.”). Notably, while the patent 
discloses verbatim the language from the provisional “theory of operation” quoted 
by New Railhead, see id. col. 3, l. 49 – col. 4, l. 5, the provisional never states that 
the drill bit is angled with respect to the sonde housing, does not mention or de-
scribe the toe or the heel, and does not mention or define the heel-toe ratio. The 
passing references to a “high angle of attack” and “high included angle offsets” in 
the provisional, divorced from any discussion whatsoever of the bit-housing combi-
nation, do not convey to one of ordinary skill that Cox was in possession of the bit-
housing angle that is a limitation of the invention claimed in the ’283 patent. 
New Railhead has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court’s holding 
that the disclosure of the provisional application does not adequately support the 
invention claimed in the ’283 patent as to the angle limitation. As a result, the ’283 
patent is not entitled to the filing date of the provisional application. 35 U.S.C. § 
119(e)(1). Accordingly, because the utility application that issued as the ’283 patent 
was filed on November 12, 1997, more than one year after the admitted mid-1996 
commercial offers for sale, the district court properly granted Vermeer’s motion for 
partial summary judgment of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
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PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. 
522 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
Moore, Judge: 
PowerOasis, Inc. and PowerOasis Networks, LLC (PowerOasis) appeal the … 
grant of summary judgment that claims 15, 18, 31, 35, 38, 40, and 49 (asserted 
claims) of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,466,658 and 6,721,400 are invalid as anticipated un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). In reaching its decision, the district court concluded that 
none of the asserted claims of the two patents were entitled, under 35 U.S.C. § 120, 
to the benefit of the filing date of PowerOasis’s original application because the ear-
lier application did not provide a written description of the invention claimed in the 
asserted patents, as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112. We affirm the grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity with respect to all asserted claims. 
Background 
The two PowerOasis patents at issue, the ’658 patent and the ’400 patent 
(PowerOasis patents), are directed to vending machines that sell telecommunica-
tions access. The PowerOasis patents contain virtually identical specifications. The 
stated purpose of the PowerOasis patents is to provide a “vending machine” that 
enables a customer to connect a laptop to a telecommunications channel. The ’658 
and ’400 patents list filing dates of November 6, 2001 and October 15, 2002, re-
spectively. The ’658 and ’400 patents stem from a series of continuation and con-
tinuation-in-part applications. The first application in the patent chain (Original Ap-
plication) was filed on February 6, 1997 and ultimately issued as U.S. Patent No. 
5,812,643. PowerOasis does not assert the ’643 patent in this litigation. 
PowerOasis filed a continuation application on September 18, 1998 (which was 
later abandoned), and on June 15, 2000, it filed a continuation-in-part application 
(2000 CIP Application), which issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,314,169. The ’169  
patent is not asserted by PowerOasis in this litigation. The 2000 CIP Application 
added considerable new language to the specification, which the district court char-
acterized as “substantial new matter.” 
PowerOasis subsequently filed the two applications that led directly to the two 
patents asserted in this suit: first the ’658 patent, then the ’400 patent. PowerOasis 
sued T-Mobile for patent infringement alleging that T-Mobile’s wireless “HotSpot 
Network”1 infringes claims 15, 18, 31, 35, 38, 40, and 49 of both PowerOasis pa-
tents. Each of the asserted claims depends from independent claim 1, which is not 
asserted by PowerOasis. Except for minor variations in the language of the inde-
pendent claims that do not relate to the issues on appeal, the language of the assert-
ed claims is identical in both PowerOasis patents. Independent claim 1 recites: 
                                                
1 The relevant features of the T–Mobile HotSpot Network are undisputed. Unlike a 
stand-alone vending machine that vends telecommunications access, the T–Mobile 
HotSpot Network consists of several main components that are geographically dis-
tributed throughout the United States. These components work together to enable 
users to access Internet services. Multiple users can simultaneously access the T–
Mobile HotSpot Network. 
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1. A vending machine for vending telecommunications channel access to a 
customer, said vending machine comprising: 
a payment mechanism for obtaining information from the customer to ini-
tiate a vending transaction; 
a customer interface for indicating the status of said vending machine; 
an electronic circuit for determining when the vending transaction is com-
pleted; 
a telecommunications channel access circuit … ; 
a telecommunications channel access connector … ; and 
a control unit having a device for receiving payment information from the 
customer and for controlling said electronic circuit and said telecommuni-
cations channel access circuit. 
The parties had agreed that “customer interface” is “an interface that enables 
information to be passed between a human user and hardware or software compo-
nents of a system,” but disagreed about the location of the customer interface. 
PowerOasis argued that the “customer interface” may occur on a customer’s laptop. 
T-Mobile argued that the customer interface must be located on the vending ma-
chine itself. Relying entirely on new language added to the 2000 CIP application, 
the district court adopted PowerOasis’s proposed construction that the claim term 
“customer interface” encompasses an interface that is located on the customer’s lap-
top. 
In light of the district court’s construction of “customer interface,” T-Mobile 
filed a motion for summary judgment that the asserted claims were anticipated by 
the MobileStar Network. It is undisputed that prior to June 15, 1999, MobileStar 
Networks, Inc. (a company acquired by T-Mobile in 2002) developed, deployed, 
publicly used, and offered for sale the MobileStar Network, which was a high-speed 
wireless data network that connected users to the Internet. It is also undisputed that 
prior to June 15, 1999, the MobileStar Network contained all of the same features 
that form the basis of PowerOasis’s allegation that the T-Mobile HotSpot Network 
infringes its patents. T-Mobile argued, therefore, that this public use, sale, and offer 
for sale more than one year prior to the June 15, 2000 filing date of the 2000 CIP 
Application2 constituted § 102(b) prior art which anticipated the PowerOasis pa-
tents. PowerOasis responded by claiming its asserted claims should have the benefit 
of priority going all the way back to the filing date of its Original Application (Feb-
ruary 6, 1997) which would antedate the MobileStar Network. 
On summary judgment, the district court determined that the asserted claims 
were not entitled to the priority date of the Original Application because the written 
description of the Original Application did not support the later issued claims. The 
district court noted that, to arrive at the broad construction it accorded the “cus-
tomer interface,” it relied “exclusively” on the new matter that was added to the 
2000 CIP Application. Because the district court concluded that the ’658 and ’400 
                                                
2 T–Mobile does not dispute that the ’658 and ’400 patents are at least entitled to 
the effective filing date of the 2000 CIP Application, June 15, 2000. 
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patents are not entitled to the effective filing date of the Original Application, the 




PowerOasis appeals two aspects of the district court’s summary judgment de-
termination. First, PowerOasis argues that the district court erred when it placed the 
burden of proof on PowerOasis to show that it is entitled to the priority date of the 
Original Application. Second, PowerOasis argues that the district court erred in 
concluding that the disclosure of the Original Application does not provide a writ-
ten description adequate to support the asserted claims of the ’658 and ’400 pa-
tents. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1. PowerOasis contends that, at a minimum, there is a 
genuine issue of material fact which prevents summary judgment of invalidity. We 
consider each issue in turn. 
I. Burden of Proof 
It is well established that a patent is presumed valid, and “the burden of persua-
sion to the contrary is and remains on the party asserting invalidity.” Ralston Purina 
Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The district court 
acknowledged a challenged patent is entitled to a presumption of validity, but ques-
tioned whether the presumption of validity extends to the question of priority. The 
district court concluded that “when a dispute arises concerning whether a CIP pa-
tent is entitled to priority to the date of the original application and the Patent Of-
fice has not addressed the issue, the burden of proof ordinarily should rest with the 
party claiming priority to the date of the original application.” Accordingly, the dis-
trict court held that PowerOasis had the burden of proving that it is entitled to 
claim priority to the filing date of the Original Application. 
PowerOasis contends that the party asserting invalidity must always bear the 
burden of proof as to whether claims in a patent application are entitled to the prior-
ity date of a parent application. PowerOasis relies on this court’s decision in Ralston 
for support of its position that the party attacking validity bears the burden to show 
that claims stemming from a CIP application are not entitled to an earlier filing date. 
In short, PowerOasis argues the presumption of validity should include a presump-
tion that claims in a CIP are all entitled to the earliest effective filing date.3 … Ral-
ston involved an appeal related to U.S. Patent No. 3,940,495, which issued from a 
continuation of application Serial No. 600,471, filed December 9, 1966 (1966 CIP 
application), which was a continuation-in-part of application Serial No. 381,853, 
filed July 10, 1964. In Ralston, the 1966 CIP application had been the subject of an 
                                                
3 A “CIP” application is a continuation-in-part application containing a portion or 
all of the disclosure of an earlier application together with added matter not present 
in that earlier application. Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38 
F.3d 551, 555 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing MPEP § 201.08). While the PTO has noted 
that the expressions “continuation,” “divisional,” and “continuation-in-part” are 
merely terms used for administrative convenience, the quintessential difference be-
tween a continuation and a continuation-in-part is the addition of new matter. 
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interference, which awarded the inventor the benefit of his earliest application in a 
detailed opinion by the Board. The district court in Ralston properly accorded  
deference to the Board’s decision on priority. 
Additionally, the § 102(a) prior art on which the defendant in Ralston relied 
was brought to the attention of the examiner during prosecution. “When an attack-
er simply goes over the same ground traveled by the PTO, part of the burden is to 
show that the PTO was wrong in its decision to grant the patent.” Am. Hoist & 
Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in 
original). This court has explained that: 
When no prior art other than that which was considered by the PTO ex-
aminer is relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of overcoming 
the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to 
have properly done its job, which includes one or more examiners who are 
assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be 
familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art and whose duty it 
is to issue only valid patents. 
Id. at 1359. In Ralston, accordingly, the defendant had the added burden of over-
coming the deference due to the PTO. 
In contrast to Ralston, in this case, the PTO did not, at any point, make any de-
termination with regard to the priority date of the various claims of the asserted  
patents. There was no interference in this case related to the asserted patents or the 
2000 CIP Application that awarded PowerOasis the benefit of priority for its Origi-
nal Application nor was there any determination of priority during prosecution inci-
dent to a rejection. The MobileStar Network prior art was never considered by the 
examiner. In fact, in this case the PTO did not make a determination regarding the 
priority date for the asserted claims with respect to any reference. 
In the absence of an interference or rejection which would require the PTO to 
make a determination of priority, the PTO does not make such findings as a matter 
of course in prosecution.4 The PTO’s own procedures indicate that examiners do 
not make priority determinations except where necessary: 
Unless the filing date of the earlier nonprovisional application is actually 
needed, for example, in the case of an interference or to overcome a refer-
                                                
4 Determining the effective filing date each claim in a CIP application is entitled to 
can be quite complex. Since CIPs generally add new matter, the claims may be fully 
supported by the parent application or they may rely on the new matter for support. 
See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim 
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 Geo. L.J. 1947, 2012 
n. 24 (2005) (noting “[u]nder the new matter doctrine, revisions to the written de-
scription that occur after an application is filed may jeopardize the priority date de-
rived from that application”). In fact, a CIP could contain different claims entitled 
to receive different effective filing dates in the same patent. There would be no 
reason for the PTO to undertake what could be a very time consuming written de-
scription analysis simply to pronounce the effective filing date of each claim, absent 
some dispute over it during prosecution. 
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ence, there is no need for the Office to make a determination as to whether 
the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 120, that the earlier nonprovisional appli-
cation discloses the invention of the second application in the manner pro-
vided by the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, is met and whether a sub-
stantial portion for all of the earlier nonprovisional application is repeated 
in the second application in a continuation-in-part. 
M.P.E.P. (7th ed. July 1998) at § 201.08. When neither the PTO nor the Board 
has previously considered priority, there is simply no reason to presume that claims 
in a CIP application are entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed applica-
tion. Since the PTO did not make a determination regarding priority, there is no 
finding for the district court to defer to. 
Of course, the fact that the MobileStar Network prior art was never before the 
PTO does not change the presumption of validity or who has the burden of proof 
with respect to the prima facie case of invalidity. See Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
T-Mobile, the party asserting invalidity, must still show by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the asserted patent is invalid. Once it has established a prima facie case of 
invalidity and its burden is met, “the party relying on validity is then obligated to 
come forward with evidence to the contrary.” Ralston, 772 F.2d at 1573. 
T-Mobile established its prima facie case of invalidity with respect to the assert-
ed claims. It is undisputed that the MobileStar Network was in public use more than 
one year prior to the June 15, 2000 filing date of the CIP Application. PowerOasis 
conceded that the MobileStar Network would infringe the claims of the ’658 and 
’400 patents if it were in operation today. “[T]hat which would literally infringe if 
later in time anticipates if earlier.” Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 
1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, PowerOasis 
has conceded that unless the asserted claims are accorded an earlier filing date than 
the 2000 CIP Application, the MobileStar Network is § 102(b) prior art. Once T-
Mobile established by clear and convincing evidence that the MobileStar Network 
was § 102(b) prior art to the asserted claims of the ’658 and ’400 patents, the bur-
den was on PowerOasis to come forward with evidence to the contrary. The district 
court therefore correctly placed the burden on PowerOasis to come forward with 
evidence to prove entitlement to claim priority to an earlier filing date. 
II. Written Description Requirement 
Application of the written description requirement is central to the resolution of 
this appeal. “It is elementary patent law that a patent application is entitled to the 
benefit of the filing date of an earlier filed application only if the disclosure of the 
earlier application provides support for the claims of the later application, as required 
by 35 U.S.C. § 112.” In re Chu, 66 F.3d 292, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Augus-
tine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“Different claims of [a CIP] application may therefore receive different effective 
filing dates. *** Subject matter that arises for the first time in [a] CIP application 
does not receive the benefit of the filing date of the parent application.”). 
To satisfy the written description requirement the disclosure of the prior appli-
cation must “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the 
filing date sought, [the inventor] was in possession of the invention.” Vas-Cath Inc. 
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v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
While a prior application need not contain precisely the same words as are found in 
the asserted claims, see Eiselstein v. Frank, 52 F.3d 1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 
Purdue Pharma LP v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the disclosure does not have to provide in haec verba support in order to 
satisfy the written description requirement), the prior application must indicate to a 
person skilled in the art that the inventor was “in possession” of the invention as 
later claimed. Ralston, 772 F.2d at 1575. “Entitlement to a filing date does not ex-
tend to subject matter which is not disclosed, but would be obvious over what is 
expressly disclosed.” In re Huston, 308 F.3d 1267, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). In 
Lockwood, we held: 
While the meaning of terms, phrases, or diagrams in a disclosure is to be 
explained or interpreted from the vantage point of one skilled in the art, all 
the limitations must appear in the specification. The question is not wheth-
er a claimed invention is an obvious variant of that which is disclosed in the 
specification. Rather, a prior application itself must describe an invention, 
and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude 
that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date 
sought. 
107 F.3d at 1572. We have explained that to satisfy the written description require-
ment, “the missing descriptive matter must necessarily be present in the [original] 
application’s specification such that one skilled in the art would recognize such a 
disclosure.” Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 
Martin v. Mayer, 823 F.2d 500, 505 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the written de-
scription requirement is “not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be 
able to construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the disclosure. ***  
Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular 
device.”) (emphasis in original). This requires that the written description actually or 
inherently disclose the claim element. See TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Tur-
bomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111, 1118-20 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(holding that to comply with the written description requirement the location of the 
spring must be actually or inherently disclosed; that the location may be obvious 
from the disclosure is not enough); Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1159 (holding a claim inva-
lid for failure to satisfy the written description requirement when the specification 
did not disclose all cup shapes literally or “inherently”). Compliance with the writ-
ten description requirement is a question of fact but is amenable to summary judg-
ment in cases where no reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the nonmov-
ing party. See Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1072-73 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
Entitlement to the filing date of the Original Application would allow 
PowerOasis to antedate MobileStar Network, thereby removing it as a reference 
against the claims. The only evidence PowerOasis came forward with to antedate the 
MobileStar Network was the Original Application and the declaration of its expert 
witness. The district court analyzed both the Original Application and the declara-
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  99 
tion of PowerOasis’s expert witness, and held that the asserted claims of the ’658 
and ’400 patents are only entitled to the filing date of the 2000 CIP Application 
because PowerOasis did not prove it was “in possession” of the claimed invention 
when it filed its Original Application. 
In this case, the district court’s determination that the Original Application 
does not provide a written description of “customer interface” as set forth in the 
asserted claims is correct. The Original Application described a vending machine 
with a “display” or “user interface” as part of the vending machine, rather than a 
vending machine with a “customer interface” located on a customer’s electronic de-
vice. The 2000 CIP Application added language describing a vending machine with 
a user interface located remotely from the vending machine, such as on a user’s lap-
top, as shown by the relevant new specification language underlined in the passages 
below: 
The microprocessor also communicates with the customer via a user inter-
face to provide details on the progress of the transaction. The user interface 
is not particularly limited and need not even include a visual display on the 
vending machine. ’169 patent, col. 2, l. 66 – col. 3, l.3. 
Once attached and initiated, the customer can monitor the state of the 
vending machine and the transaction via the user interface. The user inter-
face may be a visual display or some other type of progress indicator such as an 
auditory signal. For example, the vending machine could instruct or inform 
the user via an audio speaker. Alternatively, the user interface can be present 
inside or uploaded to the user’s laptop or other device thereby obviating the 
need for an interface within the vending machine unit. Similarly, the use of a 
card access system which prevents usage by ejecting the user’s card would also 
obviate the need for a visual or aural interface. Id. at col. 6, ll. 7-19. 
Another object of this invention is portability. Using an internal power 
source and wireless telecommunications channels, this invention is not  
limited to a fixed location. In this configuration, the invention could be 
used at fairs, outdoor concerts and similar sites where permanent installa-
tions are not cost effective. In these cases, it might be more cost effective to 
have one control unit operating multiple vending machines. These multiple 
vending machines may be arranged in the form of a kiosk to allow multiple 
customers access to the vending machine at the same time. Similarly, almost 
any combination of functional components of the vending machine could be 
moved to a location remote from the machine. This could be accomplished, for 
example, by networking a cluster of machines to a server either on site or at a 
remote location. Id. at col. 4, ll. 17-31. 
The 2000 CIP Application also substituted the term “customer interface” for 
the claim term “display” in claim 1 and added several independent claims disclosing 
a “vending machine” with component parts “located remote from said vending ma-
chine.” 
The district court stated that it “cannot find a single reference in the written de-
scription which suggests that PowerOasis understood its invention to include the 
new matter that it claimed for the first time in the CIP Application.” We agree. All 
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of the references from the Original Application that PowerOasis identifies as alleged-
ly providing written description support for the later-issued claims are to a “user in-
terface” that is part of a unitary vending machine. 
All of the Original Application’s embodiments that include the user interface 
describe a physical display that is a part of the vending machine. As shown in Figure 
2, “[t]he customer sees an operating panel 101 with a user interface 110 comprising 
two lights referred to as READY and AVAILABLE.” ’643 patent, col. 6, ll. 27-29. 
“[I]n the preferred embodiment of 
Fig. 2, the user interface [110] consists of 
two lights which turn on and off in particu-
lar patterns to inform the customer as to 
how the transaction is processing.” Id. at 
col. 6, ll. 59-63. The only depiction of the 
user interface 110 is depicted as part of the 
vending machine. “When the customer first 
approaches the vending machine 100, the 
READY light is on.” Id. at col. 6, ll. 35-36 
(emphasis added). 
PowerOasis argues that the user inter-
face “could take any number of possible 
forms.” To be sure, the specification describes other embodiments for the user inter-
face. For example, “these lights may be replaced or augmented by a video display 
unit (VDU) which provides more detailed instruction to the customer on vending 
machine operation and detailed information on the progress of the transaction in-
cluding accumulated charges.” The VDU “could be combined with a keyboard or 
other push-buttons that would allow the customer to set the language for the dis-
play, the connectors to be activated and, optionally, when to terminate the transac-
tion.” In other embodiments, “the user interface includes a printer or similar device 
to provide the customer with a receipt for the transaction.” While the Original Ap-
plication discloses multiple embodiments of the “user interface,” all such embodi-
ments make the user interface part of the unitary vending machine apparatus. There 
is simply no disclosure in the Original Application of a user interface that is either 
located on a customer’s laptop or even separate from the vending machine itself. 
Indeed, although Figure 5 of the Original Application depicts a laptop hooked 
up to the vending machine, the figure shows that the user interface is clearly located 
on the vending machine and not the laptop. In Figure 5 of the Original Application 
[shown below], a laptop computer is connected to the operating panel of the vend-
ing machine (501), which is mounted on the wall. The “user interface” is represent-
ed by the video display unit (510), which is located on the operating panel of the 
vending machine (502) and not on the laptop. Therefore, we agree with the district 
court that the Original Application did not contain support for a “customer inter-
face” located on the customer’s laptop, which was the claim construction urged by 
PowerOasis and adopted by the district court. 
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This broad construction is 
supported only by the material 
added in the 2000 CIP Applica-
tion. In fact, PowerOasis cited 
only to language first introduced 
in the 2000 CIP Application to 
support this broad construction 
… . Because none of this support 
was present in the Original Appli-
cation and because the Original 
Application did not disclose a cus-
tomer interface apart from the 
vending machine, the asserted 
claims are only entitled to the 
2000 CIP Application filing date of June 15, 2000. Since it is undisputed that the 
MobileStar Network was in public use more than one year prior to this date, the 
asserted claims are invalid. 
Further, we agree with the district court that PowerOasis’s conclusory expert 
declaration was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
whether the Original Application disclosed to one skilled in the art a customer inter-
face located on a customer laptop. The district court determined, and we agree, that 
Mr. Morley does not cite in a persuasive way any supporting references in the Origi-
nal Application. He does not demonstrate how, at the time of the filing date of the 
Original Application, PowerOasis was in possession of the claimed invention, which 
uses a customer’s electronic device (e.g., a laptop) to achieve the customer interface. 
He does not show anywhere in the Original Application where a customer interface 
is located on a customer’s laptop either expressly or inherently. His declaration 
points to figures and discussions of the user interface in the Original Application, 
each of which is to a user interface on the vending machine. He goes on to say it is 
“well known to those of ordinary skill as of February 6, 1997, that the functionality 
of providing information to a customer via a user interface can be provided by dis-
playing information on a computer screen, such as on a portable computer of the 
type referred to in the ’643 patent when that computer is connected to a network of 
other components and compu-ters.” This is not a claim that use of a customer lap-
top as the customer interface is necessarily disclosed by the Original Application. At 
best, this is a statement that it would be obvious to substitute a customer laptop for 
the user interface disclosed on the vending machine. Obviousness simply is not 
enough; the subject matter must be disclosed to establish possession. See TurboCare, 
264 F.3d at 1119; Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1159; Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571-72. 
Therefore, the declaration by PowerOasis’s expert does not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact over whether the Original Application established that the inventor 
possessed the invention as later claimed, which includes a customer interface located 
on a customer laptop apart from the vending machine. 
Finally, despite the fact that the district court adopted the very construction 
urged by PowerOasis for “customer interface” on appeal, PowerOasis argues that a 
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different construction ought to be used for validity purposes. PowerOasis’s argu-
ment boils down to a claim that PowerOasis is entitled to a broad claim construction 
for purposes of infringement and a different narrower claim construction for purpos-
es of validity. See Oral Argument at 6:56-8:01, available at http://www.cafc. 
uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/2007-1265.mp3; Appellant Brief at 18-24. 
PowerOasis contends that as long as the claim term “customer interface” was sup-
ported by the Original Application then the claims are entitled to the effective filing 
date of the Original Application. However, the construction of “customer interface” 
that must be supported by the written description of the Original Application is the 
construction given by the district court for the term as used in the ’658 and ’400 
patents. That the Original Application may support a narrower construction of “cus-
tomer interface” as a display on the vending machine does not mean that the Origi-
nal Application supports the broader construction of a “customer interface” as an 
interface located on the customer’s laptop (remote from the vending machine). 
“[T]he invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is 
now claimed.” Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1564 (emphasis in original). Since the Origi-
nal Application does not support a “customer interface” on a customer laptop, the 
asserted claims are not entitled to the effective filing date of the Original Applica-
tion. Because the asserted claims are limited to the filing date of the CIP Applica-
tion, June 15, 2000, they are anticipated by the MobileStar Network. 
…  
Editor’s Note 
In Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 870-71 (Fed. Cir. 
2010), the Federal Circuit extended the burden-of-proof reasoning from PowerOasis 
to a case involving the written-description support for claims in a continuation ap-
plication, i.e., an application in which the claim language had changed but the sup-
porting written disclosure had not. 
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Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal Kinetics, Inc. 
734 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
O’Malley, Judge: 
Synthes USA, LLC and DePuy Synthes Products, LLC (collectively “Synthes”) 
appeal from a jury verdict finding that Spinal Kinetics, Inc. (“SK”) did not infringe 
claims 29-31 (“asserted claims”) of U.S. Patent No. 7,429,270 and that the claims 
were invalid for lack of written description. … For the reasons below, we affirm the 
jury verdict of invalidity for lack of written description … . 
I. Background 
A. The ’270 Patent and Accused Devices 
Synthes filed this action alleging that SK’s M6-C and M6-L intervertebral im-
plants infringed claims 29-31 of the ’270 patent. The ’270 patent originated from a 
German language PCT application filed on April 14, 2003. The asserted claims were 
added by amendment on February 19, 2008. The ’270 patent is directed to an “In-
tervertebral Implant,” which is a prosthetic device designed to replace a diseased or 
degenerated disc located between adjacent vertebrae of the human spine: 
A healthy disc (depicted below) has a fibrous, outer band called the annulus fi-
brosus, which surrounds a central, gel-like substance called the nucleus pulposus: 
A natural disc provides shock-
absorbing functions and helps maintain proper spacing, stability, and motion within 
the spine. Artificial discs attempt to replace some or all of these functions. Claim 29, 
the independent claim from which claims 30 and 31 depend, provides: 
29. An intervertebral implant for implantation between an upper and lower 
vertebrae, the implant having a central axis, the implant comprising: 
a first substantially rigid bone contacting plate having an external surface 
extending generally transversely to the central axis for contacting at least a 
portion of the upper vertebra; 
a second substantially rigid bone contacting plate having an external sur-
face extending generally transversely to the central axis for contacting at 
least a portion of the lower vertebra; 
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a third plate operatively coupled to the first bone contacting plate, the 
third plate including a plurality of openings; 
a fourth plate operatively coupled to the second bone contacting plate, the 
fourth plate including a plurality of openings; 
a central part substantially located between the third and fourth plates, the 
central part including a flexible core and a fiber system, wherein the core is 
substantially cylindrical and includes a top surface and a bottom surface, 
the top surface of the core being in contact with the third plate and the 
bottom surface of the core being in contact with the fourth plate, and 
wherein the fiber system at least partially surrounds the core, and is at least 
partially received within the plurality of openings formed in the third and 
fourth plates so that the fiber system is joined to the third and fourth 
plates; and 
an elastic sheathing body at least partially surrounding the fiber system and 
the core, and connected to the third and fourth plates. 
’270 patent, col. 8, ll. 19-48. 
Claim 30 requires that the first and second bone contacting plates recited in 
claim 29 be made from titanium or titanium alloy. Claim 31 requires the fiber sys-
tem recited in claim 29 to be constructed of an “ultra high molecular weight poly-
ethylene material.” According to Synthes, claims 30 and 31 stand or fall with claim 
29. The main features of claim 29 are depicted in Figures 3 and 4 of the ‘270 pa-
tent: 
  
SK manufactures the M6-C (cervical) and M6-L (lumbar) discs in California 
and sells them abroad. The United States Food and Drug Administration has not 
approved the M6 devices for sale in this country. The M6-C and M6-L are depicted 
below: 
M6-C  
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M6-L  
Except for the shape of the cores, the M6-C and M6-L are identical for pur-
poses of this litigation. 
B. Proceedings Below 
During the course of the litigation, the district court construed a number of 
terms contained in claim 29 of the ’270 patent. Of particular relevance to the cur-
rent appeal is the court’s construction of the phrase “the third plate including a  
plurality of openings.” SK argued that “plurality of openings” should be limited to 
grooves on the circumference of the claimed cover plates. SK’s argument was predi-
cated on its contention that the written description of the ’270 patent does not de-
scribe a structure with holes or slots in the cover plates, but only describes grooves 
on the circumference of the cover plate that radially penetrate into the lateral surface 
of the plate. Those grooves are depicted as element 18 in Figure 2 of the ’270  
patent: 
 
Synthes, on the other hand, contended that the claim was not so limited, and 
urged the court for a broader construction: “a third plate including two or more 
openings.” While the district court did not adopt Synthes’ construction wholesale, it 
did side with Synthes regarding the breadth of the phrase and construed it as “the 
third plate including two or more openings to allow the fiber system to be joined or 
anchored to that plate.” The court concluded that claim 29 requires openings in the 
cover plates, or third and fourth plates, which make it possible for the claimed fiber 
system to be joined or anchored to the plates. 
The importance of the “plurality of openings” limitation to Synthes’ infringe-
ment case is evident when viewed in light of the accused devices. SK devices do not 
employ peripheral grooves, but instead use slots, or openings, on the cover plates. 
The M6 lumbar device uses trapezoidal slots, while the cervical device uses elongat-
ed circle slots: 
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According to SK, Synthes amended the application that led to the ’270 patent dur-
ing prosecution to add claims 29-31 only after the M6 devices were on the market 
and Synthes was advised that SK’s M6 devices were a significant improvement in the 
technology. 
After the court construed the disputed terms of the patent, it entertained mo-
tions for summary judgment. The district court … denied Synthes’ motion to dis-
miss SK’s written description … defense[]. The parties proceeded to trial on the re-
maining issues. After hearing all of the evidence, followed by four days of delibera-
tion, the jury concluded that SK’s M6 devices did not infringe the asserted claims of 
the ’270 patent and that SK proved by clear and convincing evidence that claim 29, 




The district court found substantial evidence supported the jury verdict that the 
term “plate including a plurality of openings” lacked written description support, 
rendering the asserted claims invalid. … We agree with the district court … . 
…  
The district court, at Synthes’ urging, broadly construed the phrase “third plate 
including a plurality of openings,” which appears in claim 29. The relevant claims, 
moreover, include broad language added during prosecution. Synthes amended the 
application that became the ’270 patent to add the concept of “openings” in claim 
29 almost five years after the application was originally filed, and after SK’s M6 de-
vices were already on the market. The original disclosure claimed and disclosed a 
plurality of grooves and a plurality of channels, but did not describe “openings” 
generally. While broadening claims during prosecution to capture a competitor’s 
products is not improper, the written description must support the broadened 
claims. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (“[I]t is not improper for an applicant to broaden his claims during prosecu-
tion in order to encompass a competitor’s products, as long as the disclosure sup-
ports the broadened claims.”) (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, 
Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). After hearing the testimony of SK’s ex-
pert, Dr. Lee, and its research and development manager, Mr. Koske, indicating that 
the as-filed disclosure did not demonstrate possession of an intervertebral implant 
that employed any sort of openings anywhere on the cover plates, the jury deter-
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mined that the ’270 patent was invalid under § 112, paragraph 1. As the district 
court did before us, we find that substantial evidence supports that conclusion. 
Section 112 requires a patentee to provide a written description that allows a 
person of skill in the art to recognize that the patentee invented what is claimed.3 See 
Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 
1991)). “[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied 
upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor ha[d] posses-
sion of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Id. Determination of 
whether a patent satisfies the written description requirement is a question of fact. 
Id. (citing Capon v. Eshar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The “level 
of detail required to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on 
the nature and scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the 
relevant technology.” Id. 
Synthes contends that the jury’s verdict of invalidity for a lack of adequate writ-
ten description was not supported by substantial evidence. Synthes asserts that the 
’270 patent’s written description does not limit the claimed “plurality of openings” 
to peripheral grooves. Synthes next argues that the testimony and evidence present-
ed by SK via its expert and fact witnesses regarding the “plurality of openings” limi-
tation did not support the jury’s verdict. Synthes also disputes the district court’s 
post-trial conclusion that SK produced evidence demonstrating that the field of in-
tervertebral implants was sufficiently unpredictable such that a disclosure of one spe-
cies of openings would not be enough to claim the entire genus. We disagree on all 
counts. 
The ’270 patent’s written description, filed on April 14, 2003, discloses that 
the fiber system may be anchored by various means. The written description then 
discloses a series of examples of how the fiber system may be anchored on the cover 
plates, i.e., third and fourth plates. All of these examples employ “grooves,” not slots 
or openings on the plates. Claims 29-31 recite a “plurality of openings” used to 
“join” or “anchor” the fiber system to the cover plates, which Synthes contends 
supports any type of openings located anywhere on the plates. The written descrip-
tion, however, never discloses anything broader than using grooves to anchor the 
fiber system to the cover plates. 
The parties appear to agree that “grooves” are a species of “opening,” but do 
not agree that “grooves” constitute an adequate disclosure to claim all openings that 
may be used in the cover plates to anchor the fiber system. In other words, the jury 
was asked to determine whether the written description disclosure of “grooves” 
“reasonably convey[ed] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of 
[an intervertebral implant that could utilize any sort of opening located anywhere on 
the cover plates to anchor the fiber system] as of the filing date.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
                                                
3 Congress recently changed the language and structure of 35 U.S.C. § 112. See 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29. Those amendments made 
no changes of relevance to this appeal. 
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1351. The jury did not believe so and, when all reasonable inferences are drawn in 
favor of the jury verdict, we must affirm that decision. 
SK presented testimony regarding the plurality of openings limitation via its ex-
pert, Dr. Lee, and its research and development manager, Mr. Koske. Dr. Lee testi-
fied, based on his experience in designing total disc replacements, that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not believe that Synthes had possession of an interver-
tebral implant utilizing openings located anywhere on the cover plates based on the 
disclosure of peripheral grooves in the written description. In particular, Dr. Lee 
testified that: (1) based on his reading of the written description, the disclosure of 
peripheral grooves would not disclose openings located anywhere on the plates; (2) 
there are significant biomechanical property differences between using peripheral 
grooves and interior slots; and (3) when the fiber system is attached via peripheral 
grooves, the distance of the fibers to the central axis is limited, but when openings 
are used anywhere on the cover plates, the fibers are not so limited in proximity to 
the central axis of the device. 
Mr. Koske buttressed Dr. Lee’s testimony that, based on his direct experience 
developing the accused products, the process of moving from peripheral grooves to 
internal slots is not a simple substitution, but a careful and timeconsuming task. Mr. 
Koske, for example, testified that SK rejected early prototypes that used peripheral 
grooves on the cover plates. Mr. Koske was presented with a photograph of various 
SK devices, which he described as a “design time line” of M6 devices. Mr. Koske 
then testified that the “early prototypes” with peripheral grooves were repeatedly 
rejected. Mr. Koske’s testimony and attendant trial exhibits demonstrated that SK’s 
development process from the peripheral grooves to the commercial products took 
months of work. 
Mr. Koske also testified that SK had to overcome technical hurdles through its 
development process, one of which was to reduce wear on the device. Because the 
devices may be used on people in their 20s and 30s and would be required to last a 
lifetime, wear was an important consideration in design choice. In particular, Mr. 
Koske stated that the shape of the slots on the cover plates played a role in wear re-
duction. Mr. Koske explained that, because the metal cover plates are very thin, if 
the slots were too large, it would increase the risk of the cover plates breaking. SK, 
therefore, had to determine the precise size and location of the slots to ensure that 
the cover plates used as little metal as possible, reduced fiber wear, and still per-
formed all of the necessary functions of the device. 
Taken together, Mr. Koske’s testimony is at least circumstantial evidence that it 
would not be evident that peripheral grooves on the cover plates would disclose to 
skilled artisans that internal slots would serve the same function. Mr. Koske’s testi-
mony and the exhibits used during it, coupled with Dr. Lee’s testimony, provided 
ample evidence for the jury to conclude that the written description did not support 
the broad claim limitations in the asserted claims. 
Synthes contends that the difference Dr. Lee identified is “specious.” Rather 
than provide contrary evidence, however, Synthes points to a very curt cross-
examination wherein Dr. Lee agreed with Synthes’ counsel that deeper grooves—or 
grooves cut deeper into the cover plates—might reduce the distance of the fibers 
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from the central axis. Synthes’ cross-examination, however, does not address any of 
Dr. Lee’s other points. And, even if Synthes’ cross-examination of Dr. Lee would 
allow us to draw a different conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supported 
the jury’s verdict, we must affirm its decision. 
Synthes also attempts to minimize the relevance of Mr. Koske’s testimony by 
contending that his testimony was not directed to differences between using periph-
eral grooves and internal slots. Mr. Koske, however, testified that the shape and size 
of the slots, and the optimization of those slots, were important design considera-
tions. And, while Synthes is correct that Mr. Koske did not use “magic words” to 
explain why SK chose internal slots instead of peripheral grooves, the jury was free 
to draw its own conclusions from Mr. Koske’s testimony. Coupled with Dr. Lee’s 
expert testimony on the “plurality of openings” limitation, the jury’s verdict that a 
person skilled in the art would not understand that a disclosure of peripheral 
grooves would teach that any and all openings on the cover plates are disclosed is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
The jury was entitled to rely on the above testimony and evidence to conclude 
that the ’270 patent’s written description does not support the broad plurality of 
openings limitation. Written description is a factual question, and whether the re-
quirement is met “varies depending on the nature and scope of the claims and on 
the complexity and predictability of the relevant technology.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
1351. While the predictability of the “aspect at issue” is not the dispositive factor in 
determining whether the written description requirement is satisfied, the district 
court relied on it, and Synthes strenuously disputes the district court’s conclusion. 
We, thus, briefly address it. Id. 
Synthes frames the “aspect at issue” as “the shape and locations of openings 
used to join or anchor a fiber system to a plate.” As chronicled above, Dr. Lee testi-
fied that the difference between peripheral grooves and internal slots would present 
significant engineering and design choices and maintained that the differences be-
tween the two designs would present substantial biomechanical differences. Mr. 
Koske also explained that SK itself began its development process with peripheral 
grooves and ended with internal slots. Mr. Koske’s testimony also indicated that the 
shape of the internal slots was an important design choice that required testing to 
account for wear on the fiber system. All of this testimony was unrebutted. 
Based on this evidence, the jury was free to conclude that, because the ’270  
patent’s written description does not disclose anything other than peripheral 
grooves, there would be significant biomechanical differences between using periph-
eral grooves and internal slots. The jury was also free to determine that SK’s skilled 
artisans made a specific design choice to change its first prototype with peripheral 
grooves to specifically shaped and located internal slots. And, the jury was free to 
conclude, based on the evidence, that the use of internal slots for these devices was 
not predictable. 
SK is correct that a “disclosure of a species may be sufficient written description 
support for a later claimed genus including that species.” Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 
386 F.3d 1116, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). But, as we stated in 
Bilstad: 
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[i]f the difference between members of [a species] is such that [a] person 
skilled in the art would not readily discern that other [species] of the genus 
would perform similarly to the disclosed members, i.e., if the art is unpre-
dictable, then disclosure of more species is necessary to adequately show 
possession of the entire genus. 
Id. at 1125. In other words, predictability is a factual issue judged on a case-by-case 
basis. Here, SK presented its case to the jury, and the jury inferred that, in the field 
of intervertebral implants, the disclosure of peripheral grooves does not adequately 
demonstrate possession of the entire genus of possible openings. Because the jury’s 
verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must defer to that finding. 
Synthes contends that, because we remarked in Bilstad that the “mechanical 
world” is a “fairly predictable field,” SK had to satisfy a heightened burden to 
demonstrate unpredictability. See Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1126. First, SK had no higher 
burden than providing clear and convincing evidence that the ’270 patent does not 
satisfy the written description requirement on the “plurality of openings” limitation. 
Second, while we did state in Bilstad that the mechanical field was “fairly predict-
able,” we did not hold that all inventions that may be characterized as “mechanical” 
allow claiming a genus based on disclosure of a single species. 
As we noted in Ariad, there are no “bright-line rules governing, for example, 
the number of species that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this num-
ber necessarily changes with each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.” 
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. Indeed, factual inquiries will, at times, create confounding 
results. But, whatever inconsistencies may appear “to exist in the application of the 
law, those inconsistencies rest not with the legal standard but with the different facts 
and arguments presented to the courts.” Id. at 1352. That is precisely the situation 
here. After hearing all of the testimony and evidence, the jury resolved the facts in 
favor of SK and determined that it had met its burden of proving by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the ’270 patent did not satisfy the written description re-
quirement. Again, we are not entitled to disturb that finding when there was sub-
stantial evidence to support it. 
… 
Taranto, Judge, dissenting: 
In my view, Spinal Kinetics failed as a matter of law to show, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that asserted claims 29-31 of Patent No. 7,429,270 are invalid for 
inadequacy of the written description. In particular, Spinal Kinetics offered no clear 
and convincing proof that the difference between the “openings” of the claims and 
the grooves of the written description is one that (in the eyes of skilled artisans) has 
any effect, let alone an effect that is difficult to predict, on fulfillment of the identi-
fied purposes of the claims at issue. … I therefore respectfully dissent from the ma-
jority’s affirmance of the judgment that the patent claims are invalid. 
… 
A 
The written-description challenge in this case is to structural claim language 
that is broader than the specific embodiments disclosed in the written description. 
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This is not a case—such as some cases involving genetic or chemical inventions—in 
which the claim language at issue is functional rather than an identifier of structure. 
See, e.g., Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349-50 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Regents of University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 
1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Nor is it a case in which the claim language includes 
details that do not appear in the written description. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. 
Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The written-description 
question here is the familiar one involving whether the claim language is simply too 
broad given the disclosure—notwithstanding that claim language may be and com-
monly is broader than described embodiments, as it identifies what aspects of the 
disclosed embodiments matter. See In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1215 (CCPA 
1981) (“[T]hat a claim may be broader than the specific embodiment disclosed in a 
specification is in itself of no moment.”); Ronald Slusky, Invention Analysis and 
Claiming: A Patent Lawyer’s Guide at 32-33 (2007) (discussing claim drafting pro-
cess of identifying what features of embodiment matter). 
In a case like this one, the written-description requirement must focus on 
whether the way in which the (broader) claim term differs from the (narrower) dis-
closure is pertinent to fulfilling the identified purposes of the claims at issue. More 
specifically, for a challenger to prove insufficiency of the written description to sup-
port the claim language, the challenger must identify the respect in which the claim 
language differs from the disclosed embodiments. At a minimum, the challenger 
must then demonstrate that, in the eyes of a relevant skilled artisan, that particular 
difference has a material effect on whether the product or process would achieve the 
aims of the claims at issue, with materiality of the effect not the same as non-
obviousness but related to predictability (this case requiring no further definition of 
that relation).1 
It is commonly true, of course, that a skilled artisan has to make some judg-
ments when seeking to implement the patent, whether it is the described embodi-
ments or an undescribed embodiment of the broader claim that the artisan is pro-
ceeding to make and use. If those judgments are sufficiently unguided by the writ-
ten description, unknown to a skilled artisan, or uncertain (requiring undue experi-
mentation), at least an enablement problem may arise—though there is no enable-
ment challenge here. What is critical for present written-description purposes is this: 
if there is materially the same range of implementation judgments for the described 
embodiments and the broader claim—such as, here, how many openings/grooves to 
have, their shape, how close to the center and far from the periphery they would 
locate the fibers passing through—the need for such judgments is irrelevant to the 
written-description question. What matters is only the particular difference between 
the narrower embodiments and broader claims. 
                                                
1 A patent’s written description may describe more than one purpose or problem to 
be solved, and a particular claim may not address all of them. See, e.g., Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The written-
description analysis of a particular claim must focus on the purposes and problems 
relevant to that particular claim. 
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Recognizing the burden of proof carried by the challenger, this approach im-
plements the Ariad formulations: whether the inventor “possessed the claimed in-
vention,” or “actually invented the invention claimed.” 598 F.3d at 1351, 1355-56. 
If the challenger does not make the showing identified above, the relevant skilled 
artisan will understand that, by expressly describing certain embodiments, the inven-
tor possessed the more broadly claimed invention, because the differences are imma-
terial to what the inventor invented. See In re Peters, 723 F.2d 891, 893 (CCPA 
1983) (reversing claim rejections that were based on a difference between the 
broader claim terms and the narrower disclosure, because “[m]ost importantly, one 
skilled in the art would readily understand that in practicing the invention [the dif-
ference] is unimportant”). If the challenger has made the identified showing, the 
relevant skilled artisan will understand that the inventor had not (based on the dis-
closure) addressed issues of consequence to fulfilling the invention’s purpose, and so 
did not possess in full the broadly claimed invention. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 
(“Requiring a written description of the invention limits patent protection to those 
who actually perform the difficult work of ‘invention’—that is, conceive of the com-
plete and final invention with all its claimed limitations.”). 
At the same time, this approach aligns with a critical role of the written-
description requirement in a case involving a question of breadth. In such a case, the 
requirement serves to prevent an inventor from acquiring exclusivity rights over po-
tential products or processes that present problems in achieving the invention’s aims 
that he or she has not solved. See Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (“attempt[s] to preempt the future before it has arrived” are “not in compli-
ance with the description requirement”). It thus confines patents to the problems 
the inventor solved and leaves to other people the solutions they identify that the 
inventor did not. 
B 
In this case, Spinal Kinetics failed to present the proof required to show an in-
sufficient written description. The difference between the claimed “openings” and 
the disclosed “grooves” is simply that, for a groove, the space remains open at the 
perimeter whereas, for an “opening,” it need not be: “opening” covers slots wholly 
interior to the outer boundary of the plate. But Spinal Kinetics did not prove that 
that difference—potential closure at the perimeter—had any effect on the ability of 
the invented implants to fulfill their purpose. 
The evident role of the grooves is to prevent sideways movement of the fibers, 
along the perimeter of the plate, as they hold the components of the implant to-
gether. See ’270 patent at col. 3, ll. 27-30 (“By guiding the fibres in the grooves the 
fibre system can be so anchored on the cover plates, that in the case of tensile forces 
acting on the fibres no slipping of the fibres on the lateral sides is possible.”) (emphasis 
added). Nothing in Spinal Kinetics’s proof showed that closing the space at the  
perimeter affects that function (let alone in an unpredictable way). More generally, 
nothing in Spinal Kinetics’s proof showed that the difference between grooves and 
interior openings was material to the working of the claimed device. The two wit-
nesses on which Spinal Kinetics relies for its written-description challenge are its ex-
pert, Dr. Lee, and its Research and Development Manager, Mr. Koske. Neither 
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they, nor the documents on which they relied, showed (by clear and convincing evi-
dence) how the way in which “openings” differ from “grooves” makes any material 
difference to the working of the claimed device. 
Dr. Lee’s key testimony was his statement that “the stress or strain on the  
fibers” is affected by whether the fibers pass through the plate near the center or 
near the perimeter. But, decisively, the distance from the center (or perimeter) is not 
the respect in which “openings” differ from “grooves.” Whether the space at the 
perimeter remains open (as with grooves) or closed (as with openings) plays no role 
in determining how far from (or near to) the center the fibers pass through the 
plate: if a groove extends deep toward the center, the fibers will pass through the 
plate there, just as they will if openings are placed at that location. Dr. Lee’s testi-
mony, not addressing the difference between openings and grooves, is irrelevant to 
the analysis. 
Nothing else Dr. Lee said makes up for the irrelevance of the foregoing testi-
mony. He testified that he could not find the word “openings” in the specification, 
but that is itself of no importance: the written-description requirement is about sup-
port in substance, not about labels. Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 441 F.3d 963, 
967-68 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Dr. Lee also stated that there was a “significant difference 
*** in biomechanical properties” between the broader claim term and the narrower 
disclosure. But without the eventual identification of what difference in properties 
he meant, that sentence is entirely a conclusory opinion, which is insufficient to 
meet a burden of proving facts by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Active 
Video Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Comm’ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1327, 1330-31 
(Fed. Cir. 2012); Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co., 667 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 294 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). It was only the distance-from-center testimony discussed just 
above that gave any concrete factual content to the otherwise-conclusory assertion, 
but that basis, as shown, is irrelevant to the required analysis. 
Mr. Koske likewise did not present the required proof, either through his testi-
mony or through the exhibits about which he testified. That evidence established 
that, at one point, Spinal Kinetics had one or more prototypes with grooves (and 
many other features) and that it eventually settled on a design that had interior 
openings (and many other features). But nowhere did Mr. Koske testify, and no-
where do the exhibits show, that the earlier prototypes were rejected because they 
had grooves as opposed to interior openings or that the Spinal Kinetics product de-
velopment process focused on that difference. The evidence identifies “technical 
hurdles” involving whether to use fibers or adhesive to anchor the fiber system to 
the cover plates, and concerns about what shape the interior openings should be to 
preserve disc strength, but none of the evidence addresses the differences between 
grooves and interior openings in relation to those or any other issues. In none of the 
testimony of Mr. Koske or the documents cited by Spinal Kinetics, or the evidence 
cited by the majority opinion is there any indication about how much if any experi-
mentation or study Spinal Kinetics did to choose between interior openings and 
grooves or about any material challenges encountered when considering use of in-
terior openings versus grooves (there can be a plurality of either, and each can cause 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
114 
the fiber location to be almost anywhere in the plate). In my view, this is not clear 
and convincing evidence. 
Spinal Kinetics thus failed to establish the importance of the openings/grooves 
difference. And that conclusion is reinforced indirectly by the patent itself—
specifically, by the fact that the written description is not actually limited to using 
grooves for the fibers. The majority states that the specification “discloses a series of 
examples of how the fiber system may be anchored on the cover plates” and that 
“[a]ll of these examples employ ‘grooves,’ not slots or openings on the plates.” But 
the specification, while reciting grooves in some of the examples it gives for how 
“anchoring of the fibres on the cover plates can be carried out,” includes other  
examples that are described without any mention of grooves at all. One separately 
stated example simply calls for “adhering the fibre system on the cover plates,” while 
another calls for join the plates “in a form-locking manner.” Thus, grooves are not 
part of all of the anchoring embodiments disclosed in the ’270 patent. 
... 
AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc. 
759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Lourie, Judge: 
AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. [and others] appeal from the final judg-
ment[] … in a patent infringement action … . In the infringement action, patent 
owner AbbVie sued Janssen Biotech, Inc. and Centocor Biologics, LLC (collectively 
“Centocor”) for infringement of … U.S. Patent No. 6,914,128 … and … U.S. 
Patent No. 7,504,485. …  
After a trial on validity in the infringement action, the jury determined that all 
of the asserted claims were invalid on the grounds of written description, enable-
ment, and obviousness. The district court denied AbbVie’s post-trial motions … .  
… 
We conclude that … record evidence sufficiently supported the jury verdict that 
the asserted claims lacked adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 
(2006). … Because all of the asserted claims are invalid for failing to satisfy the writ-
ten description requirement, we need not address AbbVie’s validity arguments con-
cerning enablement or its procedural challenges to the district court’s obviousness 
judgments. …  
Background 
The technology in these appeals involves antibodies that are useful for treating 
diseases. An antibody is a protein that binds to a foreign substance, called an anti-
gen, to facilitate its removal from the body. The portion of the antigen that binds to 
the antibody is called the epitope. Each antibody consists of four chains of amino 
acids, two identical heavy chains and two identical light chains, which are folded in-
to a three-dimensional structure. Each of the heavy and light chains consists of a 
constant region and a variable region. The variable region is the portion of the anti-
body in its three-dimensional structure that binds to the antigen and each variable 
region has three complementarity determining regions (“CDRs”) that interact close-
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ly with the epitope of the antigen. Among human antibodies, the variable region of 
the heavy chains can be divided into seven families, VH1 to VH7; and the variable 
region of the light chains can be divided into two classes: Kappa and Lambda. The 
binding affinity of an antibody to an antigen can be measured by koff, the rate at 
which the antigen dissociates from the antibody after binding, wherein a smaller koff 
value represents a tighter binding. 
AbbVie owns the ’128 and ’485 patents, directed to fully human antibodies 
that bind to and neutralize the activity of human interleukin 12 (“IL-12”). IL-12 is 
a signaling protein secreted by the human body, the over-production of which can 
cause psoriasis and rheumatoid arthritis. Because the human body does not typically 
make antibodies to neutralize its own proteins, it does not produce IL-12 antibodies 
naturally. Antibodies from a non-human species often lack the desirable safety pro-
file of a drug because non-human antibodies can cause adverse immune reactions in 
human patients. Researchers therefore sought to genetically engineer fully human 
IL-12 antibodies that are derived from human DNA and thus less likely to trigger an 
immune response. 
The techniques that could be used to develop a fully human IL-12 antibody 
have included phage display and transgenic mice. AbbVie developed its IL-12 anti-
bodies using phage display, which involved creating a large library of human DNA 
fragments and screening for those fragments that encoded an antibody fragment 
with IL-12 binding affinity. AbbVie identified a lead, through screening, that it 
named “Joe-9,” which had the ability to bind to and neutralize the activity of IL-12, 
albeit with low affinity. In order to improve IL-12 affinity, AbbVie introduced mu-
tations to the CDRs of Joe-9 and identified an improved antibody that it named 
“Y61.” AbbVie then used site-directed mutagenesis to alter individual amino acids 
at selected positions in Y61 and generated additional antibodies, among which an 
antibody that it named “J695” showed a significant increase in IL-12 binding and 
neutralizing activity.  
The ’128 and ’485 patents share the same written description and both claim 
priority from a provisional application filed in 1999. The patents describe the amino 
acid sequence of about 300 antibodies having a range of IL-12 binding affinities. 
Joe-9, the initial lead, has VH3 type heavy chains and Lambda type light chains. Be-
cause the IL-12 antibodies described in the patents were all derived from Joe-9, they 
all have VH3 type heavy chains and Lambda type light chains. The described anti-
bodies share a 90% or more amino acid sequence similarity in the variable regions. 
And over 200 of those antibodies were generated by site-directed mutagenesis of 
Y61 and thus differ from Y61 by only one amino acid and share a 99.5% sequence 
similarity in the variable regions. 
The ’128 and ’485 patents also teach that “the amino acid sequence identity 
within the entire VH3 family is high,” which “results in certain amino acid residues 
being present at key sites in the CDR and framework regions of the VH chain,” and 
thus that “other VH3 family members could also be used to generate antibodies that 
bind to human IL-12.” ’128 patent, col. 41, ll. 15-17, 27-31, 54-57. The patents 
similarly teach that “other V 1 [Lambda 1] family members may also be used to 
generate antibodies that bind to human IL-12.” Col. 42, ll. 5-8. The patents, how-
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ever, do not describe any IL-12 antibody having heavy chains outside of the VH3 
family or light chains outside of the Lambda family. 
The claims of the ’128 and ’485 patents at issue in these appeals define the 
claimed antibodies by their function, i.e., IL-12 binding and neutralizing character-
istics, rather than by structure. Claim 29 of the ’128 patent is representative and 
reads as follows: 
29. A neutralizing isolated human antibody, or antigen-binding portion 
thereof that binds to human IL-12 and dissociates from human IL-12 with 
a koff rate constant of 1 × 10-2 s-1 or less, as determined by surface plasmon 
resonance. 
Claims 30 and 32 likewise require the koff rates to be 1 × 10-4 s-1 or less and 1 × 10-3 
s-1 or less, respectively. Claim 64 is directed to a pharmaceutical composition com-
prising the functionally claimed antibody. Claim 11 of the ’485 patent similarly de-
fines the claimed antibody by its IL-12 binding profile. 
Centocor developed its human IL-12 neutralizing antibody drug marketed un-
der the brand name “Stelara” using the transgenic mice technology, which involved 
mice that are genetically modified with human antibody genes and capable of pro-
ducing human antibodies when exposed to an antigen such as IL-12. Stelara has 
VH5 type heavy chains, not VH3; and Kappa type light chains, not Lambda; and 
about 50% sequence similarity in the variable regions as compared to the Joe-9 anti-
bodies described in the ’128 and ’485 patents, which is significantly lower than the 
90% sequence similarity shared among the Joe-9 antibodies. The [FDA] approved 
Stelara [for sale] in 2009. 
…  
On August 10, 2009, AbbVie filed an infringement action against Centocor … 
asserting that Stelara infringed the ’128 and ’485 patents. …  
…  
After construing the claims, the court entered summary judgment that Cento-
cor infringed claims 29, 32, and 64 of the ’128 patent and claim 11 of the ’485 pa-
tent. The parties then stipulated that claim 30 of the ’128 patent was also infringed. 
…  
The validity of the asserted claims was tried before a jury in the infringement ac-
tion. …  
Centocor raised four invalidity defenses on the bases of written description, en-
ablement, obviousness, and antici-
pation by prior invention. To sup-
port its invalidity challenges under 
§ 112, Centocor presented evi-
dence seeking to establish that the 
antibodies described in AbbVie’s 
patents were not representative of 
other members of the functionally 
claimed genus, which included 
Stelara. Centocor presented expert 
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testimony that the antibodies described in the patents were structurally similar, but 
that they differed from Stelara in many respects, set out [above]. 
Among the five structural distinctions, the distinction on epitope binding sites 
was based in part on a crystal structure of J695 binding to IL-12, which was ob-
tained from AbbVie during discovery. Centocor informed the jury that the PTO did 
not have that information when it issued the patents. 
…  
The jury … determined that each of the asserted claims was invalid for lack of 
an adequate written description …  
Discussion 
…  
Whether a patent claim is supported by an adequate written description is a 
question of fact, and we review a jury’s factual determination relating to compliance 
with the written description requirement for substantial evidence. Ariad Pharm., 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Further-
more, patents are presumed to be valid, and overcoming this presumption requires 
clear and convincing evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. 
Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011). 
AbbVie argues that each of the asserted claims is limited to a small genus of  
antibodies that are rare and difficult to obtain and that its patents describe a repre-
sentative number of antibodies commensurate with the scope of the claims. AbbVie 
maintains that the disclosed antibodies reflect the variation of the entire genus be-
cause they cover the full range of the claimed feature, the koff rate. AbbVie also as-
serts that it disclosed the amino acid sequence of all known species covered by the 
claims except for Stelara and that its patents were not required to provide individual 
written description of an infringing product. AbbVie argues that Centocor incor-
rectly seeks to distinguish Stelara on the basis of unclaimed structural features that 
are legally irrelevant and have no correlation to the claimed koff rate. AbbVie main-
tains that even if the structural variations are relevant at all, AbbVie’s patents disclose 
a variety of amino acid sequences of the CDRs of its antibodies. 
Centocor responds that the jury verdict of invalidity for inadequate written de-
scription is supported by substantial evidence. Centocor maintains that AbbVie’s 
patent disclosure is limited to a family of closely related, structurally similar anti-
bodies that are all derived from Joe-9, whereas AbbVie’s functionally defined claims 
cover antibodies having widely varying structures including Stelara. Centocor there-
fore argues that the antibodies disclosed in AbbVie’s patents are not representative 
of the entire genus. Centocor also responds that AbbVie’s argument that structural 
differences are legally irrelevant is contrary to the law of written description. Cen-
tocor contends that the functional requirement of the claims, i.e., the koff rate, is de-
pendent on the structure of the antibody and that AbbVie’s evidence purporting to 
show the disclosure of representative species is irrelevant. 
We agree with Centocor that substantial evidence supports the jury verdict that 
the asserted claims are invalid for lack of an adequate written description. The writ-
ten description requirement has long been part of our patent law. It is provided for 
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in the statute, and drafters of patent applications know that they must describe their 
inventions as well as disclose how to enable their use. This court en banc held in  
Ariad that the written description requirement is separate from the enablement re-
quirement. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344. We also explained that the requirement for an 
adequate written description serves a different purpose from that of the claims. Id. at 
1347 (“Claims define and circumscribe, the written description discloses and teach-
es.”). 
The essence of the written description requirement is that a patent applicant, as 
part of the bargain with the public, must describe his or her invention so that the 
public will know what it is and that he or she has truly made the claimed invention. 
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) 
(“The[] requirements must be satisfied before issuance of the patent, for exclusive 
patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public. What 
is claimed by the patent application must be the same as what is disclosed in the 
specification *** .”); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120-21 (1853) (“The evil is the 
same if he claims more than he has invented, although no other person has invented 
it before him. He prevents others from attempting to improve upon the manner and 
process which he has described in his specification and may deter the public from 
using it.”). 
We have explained that “requiring a written description of the invention plays a 
vital role in curtailing claims *** that have not been invented, and thus cannot be 
described.” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. “[T]he purpose of the written description re-
quirement is to ‘ensure that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the 
claims, does not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of art 
as described in the patent specification.’” Id. at 1353-54 (quoting Univ. of Rochester 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We have held that the 
written description requirement with respect to particularly claimed subject matter is 
met if the specification shows that the stated inventor has in fact invented what is 
claimed, that he had possession of it. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 
1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We have stated that possession is shown by disclosure in 
the patent. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he hallmark of written description is dis-
closure *** the test requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specifi-
cation from the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”). 
One particular question regarding the written description requirement has been 
raised when a genus is claimed but the specification only describes a part of that ge-
nus that is insufficient to constitute a description of the genus. In Regents of the 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 
we held that a genus of mammalian insulin DNA was not supported by a description 
of rat insulin DNA. Without doubt, rats are different from other mammals, includ-
ing humans. A description of one does not describe or show that one has invented 
the whole genus of mammals. Whether the written description requirement for a 
genus is met by a particular disclosure depends upon the facts. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 
1351. This case presents such a question. The jury found that the requirement was 
not met, and we agree. 
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“For generic claims, we have set forth a number of factors for evaluating the 
adequacy of the disclosure, including ‘the existing knowledge in the particular field, 
the extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, 
[and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.’” Id. (quoting Capon v. Eshhar, 418 
F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). When a patent claims a genus using functional 
language to define a desired result, “the specification must demonstrate that the ap-
plicant has made a generic invention that achieves the claimed result and do so by 
showing that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to the 
functionally-defined genus.” Id. at 1349. We have held that “a sufficient description 
of a genus *** requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species 
falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common to the members 
of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members 
of the genus.” Id. at 1350 (quoting Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568-69). 
Here, the claimed invention is a class of fully human antibodies that are defined 
by their high affinity and neutralizing activity to human IL-12, a known antigen. 
AbbVie’s expert conceded that the ’128 and ’485 patents do not disclose structural 
features common to the members of the claimed genus. The question therefore is 
whether the patents sufficiently otherwise describe representative species to support 
the entire genus. 
One factor in considering the question is how large a genus is involved and 
what species of the genus are described in the patent. If the genus is not large or, 
even if it is, the specification discloses species representing the genus throughout its 
scope, the requirement may be met. On the other hand, analogizing the genus to a 
plot of land, if the disclosed species only abide in a corner of the genus, one has not 
described the genus sufficiently to show that the inventor invented, or had posses-
sion of, the genus. He only described a portion of it. That is the case here. 
It is important not to take the analogy of a plot of land too far in thinking of 
written description issues because, even if one builds a house only in one corner of 
the plot, one may still own the whole plot. One describes a plot of land by its fur-
thest coordinates, in effect drawing a perimeter fence around it. That may be akin to 
the function of patent claims to particularly point out and distinctly circumscribe the 
outer boundaries of a claimed invention. With the written description of a genus, 
however, merely drawing a fence around a perceived genus is not a description of 
the genus. One needs to show that one has truly invented the genus, i.e., that one 
has conceived and described sufficient representative species encompassing the 
breadth of the genus. Otherwise, one has only a research plan, leaving it to others to 
explore the unknown contours of the claimed genus. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353 
(The written description requirement guards against claims that “merely recite a de-
scription of the problem to be solved while claiming all solutions to it and *** cover 
any compound later actually invented and determined to fall within the claim’s func-
tional boundaries.”). 
Here, the jury heard ample evidence that AbbVie’s patents only describe one 
type of structurally similar antibodies and that those antibodies are not representa-
tive of the full variety or scope of the genus. All of the antibodies described in 
AbbVie’s patents were derived from Joe-9 and have VH3 type heavy chains and 
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Lambda type light chains. Although the described antibodies have different amino 
acid sequences at the CDRs, they share 90% or more sequence similarity in the vari-
able regions and over 200 of those antibodies differ from Y61 by only one amino 
acid. The patents describe that other VH3/Lambda antibodies may be modified to 
attain IL-12 binding affinity. However, the patents do not describe any example, or 
even the possibility, of fully human IL-12 antibodies having heavy and light chains 
other than the VH3 and Lambda types. 
In contrast, Centocor’s Stelara, which falls within the scope of the claimed ge-
nus, differs considerably from the Joe-9 antibodies described in AbbVie’s patents. 
Stelara has VH5 type heavy chains and Kappa type light chains. The variable regions 
of Stelara only share a 50% sequence similarity with the Joe-9 antibodies, which is far 
lower than the 90% sequence similarity shared among the Joe-9 antibodies described 
in AbbVie’s patents. Centocor’s expert testified that antibodies with 80% sequence 
similarity to J695 could bind to completely different antigens, thus illustrating the 
significant structural differences between Stelara and the Joe-9 antibodies and the 
unpredictability of the field of invention. Centocor also presented evidence of other 
differences between Stelara and the Joe-9 antibodies, such as CDR length and 
epitope binding site. 
Because each of the asserted claims encompasses both the Joe-9 antibodies and 
the allegedly infringing Stelara, the claimed genus covers structurally diverse anti-
bodies. The ’128 and ’485 patents, however, only describe species of structurally 
similar antibodies that were derived from Joe-9. Although the number of the de-
scribed species appears high quantitatively, the described species are all of the similar 
type and do not qualitatively represent other types of antibodies encompassed by the 
genus. See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[No] bright-line rules govern[] the number 
of species that must be disclosed to describe a genus claim, as this number necessari-
ly changes with each invention, and it changes with progress in a field.”). 
It is true that AbbVie’s patents need not describe the allegedly infringing 
Stelara in exact terms. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568 (“[E]very species in a genus need 
not be described in order that a genus meet the written description requirement.”). 
However, the patents must at least describe some species representative of anti-
bodies that are structurally similar to Stelara. On review of the record, there is no 
evidence to show any described antibody to be structurally similar to, and thus rep-
resentative of, Stelara. There is also no evidence to show whether one of skill in the 
art could make predictable changes to the described antibodies to arrive at other 
types of antibodies such as Stelara. 
Instead, AbbVie argues that structural differences are legally irrelevant and in-
appositely attempts to rely on the koff rates to show representativeness. The koff rate is 
merely a desired result, rather than the actual means for achieving that result. The 
asserted claims are directed to new compositions, i.e., fully human antibodies having 
desired IL-12 binding characteristics. It is undisputed that the structure of the anti-
body determines its antigen binding characteristic. In order to demonstrate that it 
has invented what is claimed, AbbVie’s patents must adequately describe representa-
tive antibodies to reflect the structural diversity of the claimed genus. See Eli Lilly, 
119 F.3d at 1568 (“[N]aming a type of material generally known to exist, in the 
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absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that 
material.”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Claiming all 
DNA[s] that achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in com-
pliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to preempt the future be-
fore it has arrived.”). 
Functionally defined genus claims can be inherently vulnerable to invalidity 
challenge for lack of written description support, especially in technology fields that 
are highly unpredictable, where it is difficult to establish a correlation between struc-
ture and function for the whole genus or to predict what would be covered by the 
functionally claimed genus. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he level of detail required 
to satisfy the written description requirement varies depending on the nature and 
scope of the claims and on the complexity and predictability of the relevant tech-
nology.”); see also Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 1341, 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting the technical challenges in developing fully human anti-
bodies of a known human protein). It is true that functionally defined claims can 
meet the written description requirement if a reasonable structure-function cor-
relation is established, whether by the inventor as described in the specification or 
known in the art at the time of the filing date. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 
323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, the record here does not indicate 
such an established correlation. Instead, AbbVie used a trial and error approach to 
modify individual amino acids in order to improve the IL-12 binding affinity. 
Moreover, the ’128 and ’485 patents do not describe any common structural fea-
tures of the claimed antibodies. The asserted claims attempt to claim every fully hu-
man IL-12 antibody that would achieve a desired result, i.e., high binding affinity 
and neutralizing activity, and cover an antibody as different as Stelara, whereas the 
patents do not describe representative examples to support the full scope of the 
claims. 
We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury verdict of in-
validity for lack of an adequate written description of the claimed genus and affirm 
the district court’s denial of JMOL on that issue. Consequently, we need not ad-
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Chapter 4: Utility 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 321-341 
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2107 
9th Ed., March 2014 
§ 2107. Guidelines for Examination of Applications for 
Compliance with the Utility Requirement 
I.   Introduction 
The following Guidelines establish the policies and procedures to be followed 
by Office personnel in the evaluation of any patent application for compliance with 
the utility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), or pre-AIA 
35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1. These Guidelines have been promulgated to assist Office per-
sonnel in their review of applications for compliance with the utility requirement. 
The Guidelines do not alter the substantive requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 
35 U.S.C. § 112, nor are they designed to obviate the examiner’s review of applica-
tions for compliance with all other statutory requirements for patentability. The 
Guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and hence do not have the 
force and effect of law. Rejections will be based upon the substantive law, and it is 
these rejections which are appealable. Consequently, any perceived failure by Office 
personnel to follow these Guidelines is neither appealable nor petitionable. 
II. Examination Guidelines for the Utility Requirement 
Office personnel are to adhere to the following procedures when reviewing pa-
tent applications for compliance with the “useful invention” (“utility”) requirement 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1. 
(A) Read the claims and the supporting written description. 
(1) Determine what the applicant has claimed, noting any specific embod-
iments of the invention. 
(2) Ensure that the claims define statutory subject matter (i.e., a process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof). 
(3) If at any time during the examination, it becomes readily apparent that 
the claimed invention has a well-established utility, do not impose a rejection 
based on lack of utility. An invention has a well-established utility if 
(i) a person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately appreciate 
why the invention is useful based on the characteristics of the invention 
(e.g., properties or applications of a product or process), and 
(ii) the utility is specific, substantial, and credible. 
(B) Review the claims and the supporting written description to determine if 
the applicant has asserted for the claimed invention any specific and substantial utili-
ty that is credible: 
(1) If the applicant has asserted that the claimed invention is useful for any 
particular practical purpose (i.e., it has a “specific and substantial utility”) and 
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the assertion would be considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the 
art, do not impose a rejection based on lack of utility. 
(i) A claimed invention must have a specific and substantial utility. 
This requirement excludes “throw-away,” “insubstantial,” or “nonspecific” 
utilities, such as the use of a complex invention as landfill, as a way of satis-
fying the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
(ii) Credibility is assessed from the perspective of one of ordinary skill 
in the art in view of the disclosure and any other evidence of record (e.g., 
test data, affidavits or declarations from experts in the art, patents or print-
ed publications) that is probative of the applicant’s assertions. An applicant 
need only provide one credible assertion of specific and substantial utility 
for each claimed invention to satisfy the utility requirement. 
(2) If no assertion of specific and substantial utility for the claimed inven-
tion made by the applicant is credible, and the claimed invention does not have 
a readily apparent well-established utility, reject the claim(s) under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 on the grounds that the invention as claimed lacks utility. Also reject the 
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, on the basis 
that the disclosure fails to teach how to use the invention as claimed. The 35 
U.S.C. § 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, rejection imposed in con-
junction with a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection should incorporate by reference the 
grounds of the corresponding 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection. 
(3) If the applicant has not asserted any specific and substantial utility for 
the claimed invention and it does not have a readily apparent well-established 
utility, impose a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101, emphasizing that the appli-
cant has not disclosed a specific and substantial utility for the invention. Also 
impose a separate rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 
§ 112, ¶ 1, on the basis that the applicant has not disclosed how to use the in-
vention due to the lack of a specific and substantial utility. The … rejections 
shift the burden of coming forward with evidence to the applicant to: 
(i) Explicitly identify a specific and substantial utility for the claimed 
invention; and 
(ii) Provide evidence that one of ordinary skill in the art would have 
recognized that the identified specific and substantial utility was well-
established at the time of filing. The examiner should review any subse-
quently submitted evidence of utility using the criteria outlined above. The 
examiner should also ensure that there is an adequate nexus between the 
evidence and the properties of the now claimed subject matter as disclosed 
in the application as filed. That is, the applicant has the burden to establish 
a probative relation between the submitted evidence and the originally dis-
closed properties of the claimed invention. 
(C) Any rejection based on lack of utility should include a detailed explanation 
why the claimed invention has no specific and substantial credible utility. Whenever 
possible, the examiner should provide documentary evidence regardless of publica-
tion date (e.g., scientific or technical journals, excerpts from treatises or books, or 
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U.S. or foreign patents) to support the factual basis for the prima facie showing of 
no specific and substantial credible utility. If documentary evidence is not available, 
the examiner should specifically explain the scientific basis for his or her factual con-
clusions. 
(1) Where the asserted utility is not specific or substantial, a prima facie 
showing must establish that it is more likely than not that a person of ordinary 
skill in the art would not consider that any utility asserted by the applicant 
would be specific and substantial. The prima facie showing must contain the 
following elements: 
(i) An explanation that clearly sets forth the reasoning used in con-
cluding that the asserted utility for the claimed invention is not both spe-
cific and substantial nor well-established; 
(ii) Support for factual findings relied upon in reaching this con-
clusion; and 
(iii) An evaluation of all relevant evidence of record, including utilities 
taught in the closest prior art. 
(2) Where the asserted specific and substantial utility is not credible, a  
prima facie showing of no specific and substantial credible utility must establish 
that it is more likely than not that a person skilled in the art would not consider 
credible any specific and substantial utility asserted by the applicant for the 
claimed invention. The prima facie showing must contain the following ele-
ments: 
(i) An explanation that clearly sets forth the reasoning used in con-
cluding that the asserted specific and substantial utility is not credible; 
(ii) Support for factual findings relied upon in reaching this con-
clusion; and 
(iii) An evaluation of all relevant evidence of record, including utilities 
taught in the closest prior art. 
(3) Where no specific and substantial utility is disclosed or is well-
established, a prima facie showing of no specific and substantial utility need  
only establish that applicant has not asserted a utility and that, on the record 
before the examiner, there is no known well-established utility. 
(D) A rejection based on lack of utility should not be maintained if an asserted 
utility for the claimed invention would be considered specific, substantial, and cred-
ible by a person of ordinary skill in the art in view of all evidence of record. 
Office personnel are reminded that they must treat as true a statement of fact 
made by an applicant in relation to an asserted utility, unless countervailing evidence 
can be provided that shows that one of ordinary skill in the art would have a legiti-
mate basis to doubt the credibility of such a statement. Similarly, Office personnel 
must accept an opinion from a qualified expert that is based upon relevant facts 
whose accuracy is not being questioned; it is improper to disregard the opinion sole-
ly because of a disagreement over the significance or meaning of the facts offered. 
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Once a prima facie showing of no specific and substantial credible utility has 
been properly established, the applicant bears the burden of rebutting it. The appli-
cant can do this by amending the claims, by providing reasoning or arguments, or 
by providing evidence in the form of a declaration under 37 CFR § 1.132 or a  
patent or a printed publication that rebuts the basis or logic of the prima facie 
showing. If the applicant responds to the prima facie rejection, the Office personnel 
should review the original disclosure, any evidence relied upon in establishing the 
prima facie showing, any claim amendments, and any new reasoning or evidence 
provided by the applicant in support of an asserted specific and substantial credible 
utility. It is essential for Office personnel to recognize, fully consider and respond to 
each substantive element of any response to a rejection based on lack of utility. Only 
where the totality of the record continues to show that the asserted utility is not 
specific, substantial, and credible should a rejection based on lack of utility be main-
tained. 
If the applicant satisfactorily rebuts a prima facie rejection based on lack of utili-
ty under 35 U.S.C. § 101, withdraw the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection and the corre-
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Chapter 5: Novelty & Loss of Right 
One cannot patent that which is old. One can patent only that which is new. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has made this precept a constitutional constraint on the 
Patent Act: “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to 
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to ma-
terials already available.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
That’s the easy part. 
The hard part? Defining, for Patent Act purposes, what’s “old” and what’s 
“new.” There are three key dimensions in play: (a) the measuring date(s) one can 
use to prove that a claimed invention is old, (b) the materials one can use to prove 
that a claimed invention is old, and (c) the person(s) whose activities one can use to 
prove that a claimed invention is old. A further complication: the 1952 Patent Act 
(and minor amendments thereto) gives one batch of settings for those three dimen-
sions, and the 2011 America Invents Act gives a dramatically different batch of set-
tings for some of those three dimensions. In other 
words, this is tough legal terrain for a lawyer new to 
patent law. So, recall what the tortoise taught the 
hare and stick to it, slow and steady. 
And one last distinction, to set up the first case 
below—We may want to set different rigors of dis-
closure, for the claimed invention C, when we estab-
lish, on the one hand, how much written-description 
disclosure by oneself is required to entitle one to 
claim C in one’s own patent (under § 112), versus 
when we establish, on the other hand, how much 
prior-art disclosure from another forecloses one from 
claiming C in one’s patent (under § 102). Which of 
the two, if either, should be more demanding, and 
why? 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 173-175, 188-197 
In re Hafner 
410 F.2d 1403 (CCPA 1969) 
Rich, Judge: 
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming 
the rejection of claims 1, 3, and 4 of application serial No. 384,782, filed July 23, 
1964, entitled “New Aldehydes of the Fulvene Series and New Processes of Prepar-
ing the Same.” No claim has been allowed. 
This case comes to us with the following somewhat involved but important 
background. On August 17, 1959, appellant filed two German applications, one 
relating to certain fulvene derivatives and the other to certain cyclopentadiene deriv-
atives. By appellant’s admission, neither German application contained any disclo-
sure of utility, such disclosure having been unnecessary in Germany. On August 1, 
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1960, within one year of the German filings, appellant filed a U.S. application (the 
“parent” of the instant application) combining the two German disclosures. A claim 
of priority was made and the necessary certified copies of the German applications 
were filed. Although the parent application alleged that the claimed compounds are 
useful as intermediates for preparing certain artificial resins and indicated a manner 
in which such resins can be prepared, all claims were finally rejected under  
35 U.S.C. § 112 because of an alleged failure of the specification to disclose how 
those resins might be put to use. 
On April 27, 1961, during the pendency of the parent application, one of ap-
pellant’s two German applications (hereinafter referred to as “Hafner”) was pub-
lished. More than one year thereafter, on July 24, 1964, the instant continuation-in-
part application was filed. It contains a reference to the parent application, and a 
claim for priority going back to the German application was made at the time of  
filing. The instant application contains an amplified disclosure of utility and “how to 
use,” the adequacy of which, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 112 respectively, has not 
been questioned. 
All the appealed claims stand rejected as being “fully met (35 USC § 102)” by 
both Hafner and an article published in May 1960 by one Arnold. Assuming that 
these two references are valid § 102 references and considering their respective dates 
and the filing dates of appellant’s two German and two U.S. applications, the instant 
application must be entitled to the parent application’s U.S. filing date to overcome 
Hafner and the convention filing date of the German applications to overcome Ar-
nold. 
Until his brief before this court, appellant conceded that 
*** the claims are met by *** Hafner and *** Arnold *** if the present 
application is not entitled to rely upon the filing date of the parent applica-
tion *** and through it to *** [Hafner]. 
Now, however, appellant urges that these references do not qualify as “en-
abling” disclosures [and thus are not proper prior art references] because they alleg-
edly do not “teach the public ‘how to use’ the invention ***.” Appellant also main-
tains that 
*** the Patent Office is at once inconsistent and unfair in holding that the 
Arnold disclosure and the Hafner disclosure *** “fully meet” the appealed 
claims, and that the disclosure in the parent application which is even bet-
ter than that in the Hafner reference fails to support the claims on appeal. 
In essence, appellant is contending that a double standard should not be ap-
plied in determining the adequacy of a disclosure to anticipate under § 102, on the 
one hand, and to support the patentability of a claim under § 112 on the other. He 
feels that a disclosure adequate for the one purpose is necessarily adequate for the 
other but, unhappily for him, this is not so. As we shall develop, a disclosure lacking 
a teaching of how to use a fully disclosed compound5 for a specific, substantial utility 
                                                
5 By ‘fully disclosed compound’ is meant a compound for which a process of making 
is also disclosed or is obvious. 
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or of how to use for such purpose a compound produced by a fully disclosed process 
is, under the present state of the law, entirely adequate to anticipate a claim to either 
the product or the process and, at the same time, entirely inadequate to support the 
allowance of such a claim. This is so because of the requirements of law engrafted on 
sections 101 and 112 by the decision of the Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson, 
383 U.S. 519 (1966), with respect to the meaning to be given to the words “use-
ful” and “use” in those sections. In construing them, we must of course, give them 
the meaning demanded by the Supreme Court.7 
Standing alone, appellant’s argument against a double standard is a plausible 
proposition. However, when considered in light of the specific provisions of § 102, 
and § 112 as it has been interpreted, it is seen to be untenable—§ 112 provides that 
the specification must enable one skilled in the art to “use” the invention whereas 
§ 102 makes no such requirement as to an anticipatory disclosure. The disclosure of 
how to use must relate to a use of the kind considered by the Supreme Court in 
Brenner v. Manson to be a sufficient utility. The majority of this court has spoken in 
Kirk and Joly as to its construction of the Manson requirement. Thus, the double 
standard which appellant criticizes is now, implicitly if not explicitly, required by 
law, at least in situations such as we have here, although the “invention” per se 
claimed is fully disclosed and though the manner of “making,” as distinguished from 
“using,” the invention is also fully disclosed or is obvious. 
Returning now to the question of appellant’s right to his claims of priority, the 
examiner held appellant not entitled to the filing date of either his German applica-
tions or his parent U.S. application because the latter allegedly did not comply with 
§ 112 (as required by § 120) in that the “how to use” requirement of § 112 was not 
met. 
The only “how to use” disclosure in the parent application reads: 
The new products are valuable intermediate products especially for prepar-
ing artificial resins and plastic masses such as unsaturated linear or cross-
linked long-chained acetal resins or mixed acetal-polyester resins which 
may be copolymerized with monomeric vinyl compounds such as styrene 
or diallylphthalate. 
The examiner and board were of the view that, although persons skilled in the 
art might well have no difficulty preparing acetal resins from the compounds of ap-
pellant’s invention, the parent application disclosure was still inadequate under 
§ 112 because there is no express disclosure of a specific use to which the resulting 
resins can be put, and appellant has not shown that such a use would be obvious. 
                                                
7 The writer of the present opinion on behalf of the court writes, of course, on the 
basis of the law as it is, notwithstanding his personal views that it should be other-
wise for reasons fully expressed in In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (CCPA 1960), and in 
his dissenting opinion in In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (CCPA 1967), augmented by 
the late Judge Smith’s dissenting opinion in the companion case of In re Joly, 376 
F.2d 906 (CCPA 1967). 
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After carefully reviewing the record and appellant’s arguments and in view of 
the law as established by Brenner v. Manson, Kirk, and Joly, the decision below ap-
pears to be correct.8  
While arguing that his parent application did in fact comply with the first para-
graph of § 112, appellant also maintains that § 1209 only requires that a “previously 
filed” U.S. application disclose the “invention” as required by § 112 and does not 
require that it also disclose “the manner and process of making and using it.” Appel-
lant correctly points out that the utility of an invention is distinct from “the inven-
tion” per se and from this argues that only “the invention” need be disclosed. If 
§ 120 spoke only of an “invention disclosed in an application previously filed in the 
United States,” which it does not, appellant’s interpretation might well be unassail-
able.11 This section, however, also makes specific reference to the first paragraph of 
§ 112. From this we think it clear that § 120 means that, to be entitled to the bene-
fits provided by that section, the invention disclosed in the “previously filed” appli-
cation must be described therein in such a manner as to satisfy all the requirements 
of the first paragraph of § 112 as the courts have construed it, including that which 
requires the description to be sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to use the 
same for a legally adequate utility. We therefore find appellant not entitled to the 
benefit of the parent filing date. 
Finally, appellant argues that the instant application is entitled to the filing date 
of the German applications even though we find it is not entitled to the date of the 
parent U.S. application. We have carefully considered appellant’s extensive argu-
                                                
8 But for these decisions and their stringent requirements as to the kind of ‘utility’ 
which must be disclosed in compliance with the ‘how to use’ requirement of the 
first paragraph of § 112, the writer personally would agree with appellant herein that 
the disclosure of how to use in his parent application, quoted above, complies with 
the statutory requirements, which would entitle the present continuation-in-part 
application to the parent’s filing date. But the writer’s personal views are not the 
law. 
9 “Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States—An application for patent for an 
invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of 
this title in an application previously filed in the United States by the same inventor 
shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the 
prior application ***.” 
11 Compare the wording of 35 U.S.C. § 119. [ Ed. Note: At the time, § 119 pro-
vided that “[a]n application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any 
person who has … previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same 
invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applica-
tions filed in the United States … shall have the same effect as the same application 
would have if filed in this country on the date on which the application for patent 
for the same invention was first filed in such foreign country, if the application in 
this country is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such  
foreign application was filed … .” This portion is now in § 119(a), and the textual 
difference from § 120 remains. ] 
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ments but hold that the express language of §§ 119 and 120 requires the contrary 
conclusion for the reasons stated above. Appellant has argued that his failure to dis-
close adequately the utility of his invention is a mere “technical” defect which he 
could have cured by an amendment of his parent U.S. application (35 U.S.C. 
§ 132), instead of by the continuation-in-part application which he chose. We have 
to disagree. As we said in … In re Nelson,  
Of course, if the application had been fatally defective *** such a defect 
could not have been cured by an amendment the object of which was to 
put into the specification something required to be there when it was filed. 
Here the parent application is found to be fatally defective. … What was added 
in the continuation-in-part to render it adequate under the law was clearly “new 
matter” under 35 U.S.C. § 132. 
Because of the primary ground of our decision—inability to obtain the benefit 
of the filing date of the U. S. parent application—it follows that appellant does not 
get the benefit of the filing date of the German applications on which it was based. 
The decision of the board is affirmed. 
Inherent Anticipation 
Mueller’s Patent Law 175-188  
In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation 
301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
Prost, Judge: 
Brassica Protection Products LLC and Johns Hopkins University (collectively 
“Brassica”) appeal from the decision … granting summary judgment that U.S. 
Patent Nos. 5,725,895; 5,968,567; and 5,968,505 are invalid as anticipated by the 
prior art. We affirm the district court’s ruling. 
Background 
The three patents-in-suit relate to growing and eating sprouts to reduce the 
level of carcinogens in animals, thereby reducing the risk of developing cancer. Spe-
cifically, the patents describe methods of preparing food products that contain high 
levels of substances that induce Phase 2 enzymes. These enzymes are part of the 
human body’s mechanism for detoxifying potential carcinogens. Thus, they have a 
chemoprotective effect against cancer. Foods that are rich in glucosinolates, such as 
certain cruciferous sprouts, have high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential. The in-
ventors of the patents-in-suit recognized that the Phase 2 enzyme-inducing agents 
(or their glucosinolate precursors) are far more concentrated in certain sprouts (such 
as broccoli and cauliflower but not cabbage, cress, mustard or radish) that are har-
vested before the two-leaf stage than in corresponding adult plants. However, glu-
cosinolate levels in cruciferous plants can be highly variable. According to the inven-
tors, it is therefore desirable to select the seeds of those cruciferous plants which, 
when germinated and harvested before the two-leaf stage, produce sprouts that con-
tain high levels of the desired enzyme-inducing potential. 
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The ’895 patent was filed on September 15, 1995, and claims, inter alia, “A 
method of preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates, comprising germinating 
cruciferous seeds, with the exception of cabbage, cress, mustard and radish seeds, 
and harvesting sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising a 
plurality of sprouts.” ’895 patent, claim 1. The ’567 patent is a continuation of the 
’895 application and it claims a “method of preparing a human food product” from 
sprouts. ’567 patent, claims 1 and 9. The ’505 patent is a divisional of the ’895 ap-
plication and it claims a “method of increasing the chemoprotective amount of 
Phase 2 enzymes in a mammal,” as well as a “method of reducing the level of car-
cinogens in a mammal,” by creating a “food product” from sprouts and then “ad-
ministering said food product” to a mammal. ’505 patent, claims 1 and 16. 
The three patents-in-suit are owned by Johns Hopkins University and exclu-
sively licensed to Brassica Protection Products LLC. Johns Hopkins and Brassica 
sued Sunrise Farms, Becky Crikelair, Frank Crikelair, Edrich Farms, Inc., Edward B. 
Stanfield, III, Edward F. Stanfield, Jr., Richard Stanfield, Sally F. Stanfield, Banner 
Mountain Sprouts, Banner Mountain Sprouts, Inc., Lawrence Ravitz, Harmony 
Farms, International Specialty Supply, Greg Lynn, Lorna Lynn and Robert L. Rust 
in various district courts. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Mul-
tidistrict Litigation consolidated the various cases in the District of Maryland for 
pretrial proceedings. On June 7, 2001, the defendants filed a joint motion for partial 
summary judgment of invalidity, arguing that the patents were anticipated by prior 
art references disclosing growing and eating sprouts. Brassica filed a cross-motion 
for summary judgment that the patents are not invalid. … 
On August 10, 2001, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment of invalidity and denied Brassica’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 
According to the district court, “[t]he record before the Court makes it abundantly 
clear that, prior to the issuance of the patents-in-suit, one skilled in the art could, by 
following the teachings of the prior art, germinate broccoli seeds, harvest the 
sprouts, and sell them as a food product.” While recognizing that the inventors of 
the patents-in-suit may have discovered a new and significant property of certain 
types of cruciferous sprouts, the district court concluded that “merely describing 
unexpected beneficial results of a known process does not entitle Plaintiffs to patent 
that process.” Thus, a “plant (broccoli sprouts), long well known in nature and cul-
tivated and eaten by humans for decades, [cannot] be patented merely on the basis 
of a recent realization that the plant has always had some heretofore unknown but 
naturally occurring beneficial feature.” … 
Discussion 
… Anticipation is a question of fact, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Nintendo Co., 179 F.3d 
1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999), and is determined by first construing the claims and 
then comparing the properly construed claims to the prior art, Gechter v. Davidson, 
116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997). … 
I. 
Brassica contends that the district court erroneously construed the claims by 
failing to treat the preamble of claim 1 of the ’895 patent as a limitation of the 
claims. In addition, Brassica argues that the district court failed to construe the limi-
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tations “rich in glucosinolates” (appearing in claims 1 and 9 of the ’895 patent) and 
“high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential” (appearing in claim 1 of the ’567 patent 
and claims 1 and 16 of the ’505 patent). 
No litmus test defines when a preamble limits claim scope. Corning Glass Works 
v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Whether to 
treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination “resolved only on review of the 
entirety of the patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually in-
vented and intended to encompass by the claim.” Id.; Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In general, a preamble 
limits the claimed invention if it recites essential structure or steps, or if it is “neces-
sary to give life, meaning, and vitality” to the claim. Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 
808. Clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed 
invention from the prior art may indicate that the preamble is a claim limitation be-
cause the preamble is used to define the claimed invention. Catalina Mktg., 289 
F.3d at 808. 
In this case, both the specification and prosecution history indicate that the 
phrase “rich in glucosinolates” helps to define the claimed invention and is, there-
fore, a limitation of claim 1 of the ’895 patent. The specification, for example, states 
that “this invention relates to the production and consumption of foods which are 
rich in cancer chemoprotective compounds.” ’895 patent, col. 1, ll. 18-19. A stated 
object of the invention is “to provide food products and food additives that are rich 
in cancer chemoprotective compounds.” Id. at col. 2, ll. 38-39. The specification 
therefore indicates that the inventors believed their invention to be making food 
products that are rich in chemoprotective compounds, or, in other words, food 
products “rich in glucosinolates.”1 In addition, during reexamination of the ’895 
patent the patentee argued as follows: 
Claim 1 of the patent, for example, is directed to “[a] method of preparing 
a food product rich in glucosinolates, *** and harvesting sprouts prior to 
the 2-leaf stage, to form a food product comprising a plurality of sprouts.” 
*** Although “rich in glucosinolates” is recited in the preamble of the 
claim, the pertinent case law holds that the preamble is given weight if it 
breathes life and meaning into the claim. *** Accordingly, the cited prior 
art does not anticipate the claims because it does not explicitly teach a 
method of preparing a food product comprising cruciferous sprouts that 
are rich in glucosinolates or contain high levels of Phase 2 inducer activity. 
This language shows a clear reliance by the patentee on the preamble to persuade 
the Patent Office that the claimed invention is not anticipated by the prior art. As 
such, the preamble is a limitation of the claims. 
                                                
1 Phase 2 enzymes are part of the human body’s mechanism for detoxifying poten-
tial carcinogens. These enzymes therefore have a chemoprotective effect against can-
cer. According to the ’895 patent, “most of the [Phase 2 enzyme] inducer potential 
of crucifer plants is due to their content of isothiocyanates and their biogenic pre-
cursors, glucosinolates.” ’895 patent, col. 8, ll. 14–16. 
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Brassica also asks this court to construe the phrases “rich in glucosinolates” and 
“high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential” to require “at least 200,000 units per 
gram fresh weight of Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential at 3-days following incuba-
tion under conditions in which cruciferous seeds germinate and grow.” ’895 patent, 
col. 7, ll. 47-53. 
“[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and accustomed 
meaning, unless it appears from the specification or the file history that they were 
used differently by the inventor.” Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 
F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1993). However, “limitations appearing in the specifica-
tion will not be read into claims, and *** interpreting what is meant by a word in a 
claim ‘is not to be confused with adding an extraneous limitation appearing in the 
specification, which is improper.’” Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 
1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Brassica’s proposed construction violates this rule by 
improperly importing limitations from the specification into the claims. True, the 
specification states that “[s]uitable sprouts will have at least 200,000 units per gram 
of fresh weight of Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential following 3-days incubation of 
seeds under conditions in which the seeds germinate and grow.” ’895 patent, col. 
10, l. 66 – col. 11, l. 2. The specification does not, however, indicate that the 
phrases “rich in glucosinolates” or “high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential” are 
limited to these precise conditions. Rather, the specification uses the term “high” in 
its ordinary, comparative sense to mean “not low.”… Likewise, the term “rich” is 
not specifically defined or limited by the specification, but instead is used in its ordi-
nary, relative sense.  
Brassica’s proposed construction is also inconsistent with the language of the 
dependent claims. Claim 19 of the ’567 patent recites: “The method according to 
claim 1, wherein said seeds produce cruciferous sprouts containing at least 200,000 
units per gram fresh weight of Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential measured after 3 
days of growth.” Brassica’s proposed construction would render this claim meaning-
less. See Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (finding a violation of the doctrine of claim differentiation when a pro-
posed construction would render another claim superfluous). We therefore reject 
Brassica’s proposed claim construction for the phrases “rich in glucosinolates” and 
“high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential.” 
II. 
Having construed the claim limitations at issue, we now compare the claims to 
the prior art to determine if the prior art anticipates those claims. In order to prove 
that a claim is anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), defendants must present clear 
and convincing evidence that a single prior art reference discloses, either expressly or 
inherently, each limitation of the claim. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & 
Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
Brassica argues that the prior art does not expressly or inherently disclose the 
claim limitations of “preparing a food product rich in glucosinolates” (claims 1 and 
9 of the ’895 patent), or “identifying seeds which produce cruciferous sprouts *** 
containing high Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential” (claims 1 and 16 of the ’505 
patent, claim 1 of the ’567 patent). According to Brassica, the prior art merely dis-
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cusses growing and eating sprouts without mention of any glucosinolates or Phase 2 
enzyme-inducing potential, and without specifying that particular sprouts having 
these beneficial characteristics should be assembled into a “food product.”3 More-
over, Brassica argues, the prior art does not inherently disclose these limitations be-
cause “at most, one following the prior art would have a possibility or probability of 
producing a food product high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential” and the “fact 
that one following the prior art might have selected seeds meeting the limitations of 
the claims is not sufficient to establish inherent anticipation.” 
It is well settled that a prior art reference may anticipate when the claim limita-
tions not expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it. See, e.g., 
Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Titanium Metals 
Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985). “Under the principles of inheren-
cy, if the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed 
limitations, it anticipates.” MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1362, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding anticipation of a method of hair depilation by an 
article teaching a method of skin treatment but recognizing the disruption of hair 
follicles, citing In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). “Inherency is 
not necessarily coterminous with the knowledge of those of ordinary skill in the art. 
Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or function-
ing of the prior art.” MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 1365; Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 
1347. 
Brassica does not claim to have invented a new kind of sprout, or a new way of 
growing or harvesting sprouts. Rather, Brassica recognized that some sprouts are 
rich in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing activity while other 
sprouts are not. See ’895 patent, col. 10, ll. 28-42 (“Sprouts suitable as sources of 
cancer chemoprotectants are generally cruciferous sprouts, with the exception of 
cabbage, cress, mustard, and radish sprouts.”). But the glucosinolate content and 
Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of sprouts necessarily have existed as long as 
sprouts themselves, which is certainly more than one year before the date of applica-
tion at issue here. See, e.g., Karen Cross Whyte, The Complete Sprouting Cookbook 4 
(1973) (noting that in “2939 B.C., the Emperor of China recorded the use of 
health giving sprouts”). Stated differently, a sprout’s glucosinolate content and 
Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential are inherent characteristics of the sprout. Cf. 
Brian R. Clement, Hippocrates Health Program 8 (1989) (referring to “[i]nherent 
enzyme inhibitors, phytates (natural insecticides), oxalates, etc., present in every 
seed”). It matters not that those of ordinary skill heretofore may not have recog-
nized these inherent characteristics of the sprouts. MEHL/Biophile, 192 F.3d at 
1365. 
Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner is particularly instructive in this regard. In that 
case, the claim at issue recited: 
                                                
3 “A food product is any ingestible preparation containing the sprouts of the  
instant invention, or extracts or preparations made from these sprouts *** .” ’895 
patent, col. 6, ll. 26–28. 
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A titanium base alloy consisting essentially by weight of about 0.6% to 
0.9% nickel, 0.2% to 0.4% molybdenum, up to 0.2% maximum iron, bal-
ance titanium, said alloy being characterized by good corrosion resistance 
in hot brine environments. 
Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d at 776. The prior art disclosed a titanium base alloy hav-
ing the recited components of the claim, but the prior art did not disclose that such 
an alloy was “characterized by good corrosion resistance in hot brine environ-
ments.” We nevertheless held that the claim was anticipated by the prior art, because 
“it is immaterial, on the issue of their novelty, what inherent properties the alloys 
have or whether these applicants discovered certain inherent properties.” Id. at 782. 
Titanium Metals explained the rationale behind this common sense conclusion: 
 The basic provision of Title 35 applicable here is § 101, providing in 
relevant part: “Whoever invents or discovers any new *** composition of 
matter, or any new *** improvement thereof, may obtain a patent there-
for, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
 *** 
 *** [C]ounsel never came to grips with the real issues: (1) what do the 
claims cover and (2) is what they cover new? Under the laws Congress 
wrote, they must be considered. Congress has not seen fit to permit the  
patenting of an old alloy, known to others through a printed publication, 
by one who has discovered its corrosion resistance or other useful proper-
ties, or has found out to what extent one can modify the composition of 
the alloy without losing such properties. 
Id. at 780, 782. Brassica has done nothing more than recognize properties inherent 
in certain prior art sprouts, just like the corrosion resistance properties inherent to 
the prior art alloy in Titanium Metals.4 While Brassica may have recognized some-
thing quite interesting about those sprouts, it simply has not invented anything new. 
Brassica nevertheless argues that its claims are not anticipated because the prior 
art does not disclose selecting the particular seeds that will germinate as sprouts rich 
in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential (as opposed to se-
lecting other kinds of seeds to sprout) in order to form a food product. We disagree. 
The prior art teaches sprouting and harvesting the very same seeds that the patents 
recognize as producing sprouts rich in glucosinolates and having high Phase 2 en-
zyme-inducing potential. According to the patents, examples of suitable sprouts are 
typically from the family Cruciferea, of the tribe Brassiceae, and of the sub-
tribe Brassicinae. Preferably the sprouts are Brassica oleracea selected from 
the group of varieties consisting of acephala (kale, collards, wild cabbage, 
                                                
4 Most of the claims at issue are method claims, not composition or product claims. 
Nevertheless, the principles of Titanium Metals still apply. See, e.g., MEHL/Biophile, 
192 F.3d at 1366–67 (finding anticipation by inherency of a method of hair depila-
tion); Bristol–Myers, 246 F.3d at 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “[n]ewly dis-
covered results of known processes directed to the same purpose are not patentable 
because such results are inherent”). 
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curly kale), medullosa (marrowstem kale), ramosa (thousand head kale), 
alboglabra (Chinese kale), botrytis (cauliflower, sprouting broccoli), cos-
tata (Portugese kale), gemmifera (Brussels sprouts), gongylodes (kohlrabi), 
italica (broccoli), palmifolia (Jersey kale), sabauda (savoy cabbage), sabelli-
ca (collards), and selensia (borecole), among others. 
’895 patent, col. 10, ll. 32-42. Numerous prior art references identify these same 
sprouts as suitable for eating. See, e.g., Stephen Facciola, Cornucopia: A Source Book 
of Edible Plants 47 (1990) (listing “Brassica oleracea Botrytis Group Cauliflower … 
Sprouted seeds are eaten”), Esther Munroe, Sprouts to Grow and Eat 9-14 (1974) 
(identifying “Broccoli, Brussels sprouts, Cabbage, Cauliflower, Collards and Kale”). 
These references therefore meet the claim limitation of identifying seeds to use in 
order to have sprouts with the inherent properties of glucosinolates and high Phase 
2 enzyme-inducing activity. Despite the patents’ admissions about the suitability of 
particular plant species found in these prior art references, Brassica argues that only 
specific cultivars of these plant species are rich in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 
enzyme-inducing activity. Thus, according to Brassica, the prior art fails to meet the 
“identifying” steps of the claims because it does not specify which cultivars should 
be sprouted. However, all of the appropriate cultivars that are identified in Brassica’s 
patent are in the public domain. ’895 patent, col. 10, ll. 43-65. Brassica cannot 
credibly maintain that no one has heretofore grown and eaten one of the many suit-
able cultivars identified by its patents. It is unnecessary for purposes of anticipation 
for the persons sprouting these particular cultivars to have realized that they were 
sprouting something rich in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing 
potential. Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1348 (“The public remains free to make, use, 
or sell prior art compositions or processes, regardless of whether or not they under-
stand their complete makeup of the underlying scientific principles which allow 
them to operate.”). 
The prior art also discloses the remaining limitations of the claims. The Munroe 
reference, for example, recommends that sprouts be harvested between “3 to 5 days 
for a sprouted length of ½ to 1 inch.” Munroe at 9. Photographs of these sprouts 
show that they have not yet reached the two-leaf stage of development. Id. at 10-13. 
Thus, this reference discloses the claim limitations of germinating the appropriate 
cruciferous seeds and harvesting the resulting sprouts prior to the 2-leaf stage. See 
’895 patent, claims 1 and 9; ’567 patent, claims 1 and 2; ’505 patent, claims 1 and 
16. Munroe also discloses that these particular sprouts can be used in food products 
such as “soups, salads and main dishes,” id. at p. 14, thereby meeting the claim limi-
tation of forming a food product comprising a plurality of the sprouts (’895 patent 
claims 1 and 9; ’567 patent, claims 1 and 8; ’505 patent, claims 1 and 16) and the 
claim limitation of administering (eating) the food product (’505 patent, claims 1 
and 16). The Munroe reference therefore discloses each and every limitation of the-
se claims of the patents. 
In summary, the prior art inherently contains the claim limitations that Brassica 
relies upon to distinguish its claims from the prior art. While Brassica may have rec-
ognized something about sprouts that was not known before, Brassica’s claims do 
not describe a new method. 
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Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment that 
the claims at issue are anticipated by the prior art. The prior art indisputably includes 
growing, harvesting and eating particular sprouts which Brassica has recognized as 
being rich in glucosinolates and high in Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential. But the 
glucosinolate content and Phase 2 enzyme-inducing potential of these sprouts are 
inherent properties of the sprouts put there by nature, not by Brassica. Brassica 
simply has not claimed anything that is new and its claims are therefore invalid. 
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
Rader, Judge: 
On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey determined that claims 1 and 3 of U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 are in-
valid. Because the district court correctly found that U.S. Patent No. 4,282,233 in-
herently anticipates claims 1 and 3 of the ’716 patent, this court affirms. 
I. 
Schering Corporation (Schering) owns the ’233 and ’716 patents on antihis-
tamines. Antihistamines inhibit the histamines that cause allergic symptoms. 
The prior art ’233 patent covers the antihistamine loratadine, the active com-
ponent of a pharmaceutical that Schering markets as CLARITIN. Unlike conven-
tional antihistamines when CLARITIN was launched, loratadine does not cause 
drowsiness. 
The more recent ’716 patent at issue in this case covers a metabolite of lorata-
dine called descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL). A metabolite is the compound formed 
in the patient’s body upon ingestion of a pharmaceutical. The ingested pharmaceuti-
cal undergoes a chemical conversion in the digestion process to form a new metabo-
lite compound. The metabolite DCL is also a non-drowsy antihistamine. The ’716 
patent issued in April 1987 and will expire in April 2004 (the ’233 patent issued in 
1981 and has since expired). 
… 
The ’233 patent issued on August 4, 1981, over one year before the earliest 
priority date of the ’716 patent, February 15, 1984. The ’233 patent is thus prior 
art to the ’716 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The ’233 patent discloses a class of 
compounds including loratadine (disclosed in Example 1B). The ’233 patent claims 
loratadine in claim 7. The ’233 patent claims four other compounds in claims 8-11. 
Examples 6-7 are prophetic examples1 of pharmaceutical compositions (a syrup and 
a tablet), each containing an unidentified “active compound.” The ’233 patent does 
not expressly disclose DCL and does not refer to metabolites of loratadine. 
                                                
1 Prophetic examples are set forth in the present tense to indicate that they were not 
carried out. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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The numerous defendants-appellees sought to market generic versions of  
loratadine once the ’233 patent expired. Seeking regulatory approval, each appellee 
submitted an application to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Because 
Schering included the ’716 patent in the Orange Book listing for loratadine, the ap-
plications also contained a certification that the ’716 patent was invalid. The appel-
lees notified Schering of the FDA filings. 
After receiving notice of the FDA filings, Schering filed suit for infringement. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on the validity issue. The district court construed claims 1 and 3 
of the ’716 patent to cover DCL in all its forms, including “metabolized within the 
human body” and “synthetically produced in a purified and isolated form.” The par-
ties agreed to that construction. Applying that claim construction, the district court 
found that the ’233 patent did not expressly disclose DCL. Nonetheless, the district 
court also found that DCL was necessarily formed as a metabolite by carrying out 
the process disclosed in the ’233 patent. The district court concluded that the ’233 
patent anticipated claims 1 and 3 of the ’716 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The 





A patent is invalid for anticipation if a single prior art reference discloses each 
and every limitation of the claimed invention. Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 
827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Moreover, a prior art reference may anticipate 
without disclosing a feature of the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is 
necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference. Continental 
Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
At the outset, this court rejects the contention that inherent anticipation re-
quires recognition in the prior art. … [P]recedents of this court have held that in-
herent anticipation does not require that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time would have recognized the inherent disclosure. E.g., In re Cruciferous Sprout 
Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); MEHL/Biophile Int’l Corp. v. Mil-
graum, 192 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Where *** the result is a necessary 
consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no import that the article’s 
authors did not appreciate the results.”); Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1348-49 (“Be-
cause ‘sufficient aeration’ was inherent in the prior art, it is irrelevant that the prior 
art did not recognize the key aspect of [the] invention. *** An inherent structure, 
composition, or function is not necessarily known.”). Thus, recognition by a person 
of ordinary skill in the art before the critical date of the ’716 patent is not required 
to show anticipation by inherency. The district court therefore did not err in allow-
ing for later recognition of the inherent characteristics of the prior art ’233 patent. 
… 
Cases dealing with “accidental, unwitting, and unappreciated” anticipation … 
do not show that inherency requires recognition. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & 
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Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880). 
In contrast to the present case, the record in Eibel and Tilghman did not show that 
the prior art produced the claimed subject matter. The patent at issue in Tilghman 
claimed a method of forming free fatty acids and glycerine by heating fats with water 
at high pressure. In Tilghman, the record did not show conclusively that the claimed 
process occurred in the prior art. In reviewing the prior art, the Court referred  
hypothetically to possible disclosure of the claimed process. For example, the Court 
stated “[w]e do not regard the accidental formation of fat acid in Perkins’s steam 
cylinder *** (if the scum which rose on the water issuing from the ejection pipe was 
fat acid) as of any consequence in this inquiry.” Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711. In 
Eibel, the Court found no evidence of the claimed subject matter in the prior art. 
Eibel, 261 U.S. at 66 (“[W]e find no evidence that any pitch of the wire *** had 
brought about such a result *** and *** if it had done so under unusual conditions, 
accidental results, not intended and not appreciated, do not constitute anticipa-
tion.”). 
Applying an inherency principle in the context of an on sale bar under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b), this court has distinguished Eibel and Tilghman. See Abbott Labs. 
v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If a product that 
is offered for sale inherently possesses each of the limitations of the claims, then the 
invention is on sale, whether or not the parties to the transaction recognize that the 
product possesses the claimed characteristics.”); Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 
269 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppreciation of the invention is not a 
requirement to trigger the statutory [on sale] bar.”). In those cases, the product 
sold or offered for sale had an inherent, but unrecognized, feature that was a limita-
tion of the asserted claims. …  
… DCL is not formed accidentally or under unusual conditions when lorata-
dine is ingested. The record shows that DCL necessarily and inevitably forms from 
loratadine under normal conditions. DCL is a necessary consequence of administer-
ing loratadine to patients. The record also shows that DCL provides a useful result, 
because it serves as an active non-drowsy antihistamine. In sum, this court’s prece-
dent does not require a skilled artisan to recognize the inherent characteristic in the 
prior art that anticipates the claimed invention. 
B. 
This court recognizes that this may be a case of first impression, because the 
prior art supplies no express description of any part of the claimed subject matter. 
The prior art ’233 patent does not disclose any compound that is identifiable as 
DCL. In this court’s prior inherency cases, a single prior art reference generally con-
tained … a partial description missing certain aspects. Inherency supplied the miss-
ing aspect of the description. Upon proof that the missing description is inherent in 
the prior art, that single prior art reference placed the claimed subject matter in the 
public domain. This case does not present the issue of a missing feature of the 
claimed invention. Rather, the new structure in this case, DCL, is not described by 
the prior ’233 patent. 
… 
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Because inherency places subject matter in the public domain as well as an ex-
press disclosure, the inherent disclosure of the entire claimed subject matter antici-
pates as well as inherent disclosure of a single feature of the claimed subject matter. 
The extent of the inherent disclosure does not limit its anticipatory effect. In gen-
eral, a limitation or the entire invention is inherent and in the public domain if it is 
the “natural result flowing from” the explicit disclosure of the prior art. See Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also In re Kratz, 
592 F.2d 1169, 1174 (CCPA 1979) (suggesting inherent anticipation of a com-
pound even though the compound’s existence was not known). 
In reaching this conclusion, this court is aware of In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 
(CCPA 1964). In that case, this court’s predecessor considered claims drawn to an 
isotope of americium made by nuclear reaction in light of a prior art patent dis-
closing a similar nuclear reaction process but with no disclosure of the claimed iso-
tope. The court reversed a [PTO] rejection of the claims for lack of novelty. This 
court’s predecessor found that the prior art process did not anticipate the claims be-
cause the process would have produced at most one billionth of a gram of the iso-
tope in forty tons of radioactive material, i.e., the isotope would have been unde-
tectable. Id. at 998-99 (“[T]he claimed product, if it was produced in the Fermi 
process, was produced in such minuscule amounts and under such conditions that 
its presence was undetectable.”). In this case, DCL forms in readily detectable 
amounts as shown by the extensive record evidence of testing done on humans to 
verify the formation of DCL upon ingestion of loratadine. 
This court sees no reason to modify the general rule for inherent anticipation in 
a case where inherency supplies the entire anticipatory subject matter. The patent 
law principle “that which would literally infringe if later in time anticipates if earli-
er,” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001), bolsters this conclusion. Similarly, “if granting patent protection on the 
disputed claim would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the 
prior art, then that claim is anticipated.” Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d at 1346. “The 
public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or processes, regard-
less of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or the underlying 
scientific principles which allow them to operate. The doctrine of anticipation by 
inherency, among other doctrines, enforces that basic principle.” Id. at 1348. Thus, 
inherency operates to anticipate entire inventions as well as single limitations within 
an invention. 
Turning to this case, the use of loratadine would infringe claims 1 and 3 of the 
’716 patent covering the metabolite DCL. This court has recognized that a person 
may infringe a claim to a metabolite if the person ingests a compound that metabo-
lizes to form the metabolite. See Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. v. Lehman, 109 F.3d 
756, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he right to exclude may arise from the fact that 
when administered, [the accused product] metabolizes into another product *** 
which Hoechst has claimed.”); see also Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
19 F.3d 1418, 1421-22 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that a compound claim could  
cover a compound formed upon ingestion). An identical metabolite must then an-
ticipate if earlier in time than the claimed compound. 
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The record shows that the metabolite of the prior art loratadine is the same 
compound as the claimed invention. Claims 1 and 3 are compound claims … . DCL 
is within the scope of claims 1 and 3. Because the prior art metabolite inherently 
disclosed DCL, claims 1 and 3 are anticipated and invalid. In other words, the rec-
ord shows that a patient ingesting loratadine would necessarily metabolize that 
compound to DCL. That later act would thus infringe claims 1 and 3. Thus, a prior 
art reference showing administration of loratadine to a patient anticipates claims 1 
and 3. 
C. 
This court next examines whether Schering’s secret tests of loratadine before 
the critical date placed DCL in the public domain. Before the critical date, Schering 
only tested loratadine in secret. Thus, according to Schering, “DCL was not publicly 
used, or described in any printed publication, until after February 15, 1983, the crit-
ical date for the ’716 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” Schering thus argues that 
DCL did not “exist” in the public domain such that DCL could be prior art against 
the ’716 patent. 
Anticipation does not require the actual creation or reduction to practice of the 
prior art subject matter; anticipation requires only an enabling disclosure. In re 
Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, actual administration of lo-
ratadine to patients before the critical date of the ’716 patent is irrelevant. The ’233 
patent suffices as an anticipatory prior art reference if it discloses in an enabling 
manner the administration of loratadine to patients. 
Thus, this court examines whether the ’233 patent contains an enabling disclo-
sure of DCL. A reference may enable one of skill in the art to make and use a com-
pound even if the author or inventor did not actually make or reduce to practice 
that subject matter. Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1379; see also In re Donohue, 766 
F.2d at 533 (sustaining an anticipation rejection over a reference disclosing a com-
pound and other references disclosing sufficient information to make that com-
pound). Indeed, information arising after the critical date may show that the claimed 
subject matter, as disclosed in a prior art reference, “was in the public’s possession.” 
Bristol-Myers, 246 F.3d at 1379 (citing In re Donohue, 766 F.2d at 534). 
An anticipatory reference need only enable subject matter that falls within the 
scope of the claims at issue, nothing more. To qualify as an enabled reference, the 
’233 patent need not describe how to make DCL in its isolated form. The ’233  
patent need only describe how to make DCL in any form encompassed by a com-
pound claim covering DCL, e.g., DCL as a metabolite in a patient’s body. The ’233 
patent discloses administering loratadine to a patient. A person of ordinary skill in 
the art could practice the ’233 patent without undue experimentation. The inherent 
result of administering loratadine to a patient is the formation of DCL. The ’233 
patent thus provides an enabling disclosure for making DCL. 
D. 
Finally, this court’s conclusion on inherent anticipation in this case does not 
preclude patent protection for metabolites of known drugs. With proper claiming, 
patent protection is available for metabolites of known drugs. Cf. In re Kratz, 592 
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F.2d 1169, 1174 (CCPA 1979) (stating that a naturally occurring strawberry con-
stituent compound does not anticipate claims to the substantially pure compound); 
In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (CCPA 1970) (stating that a material oc-
curring in nature in less pure form does not anticipate claims to the pure material). 
But those metabolites may not receive protection via compound claims. In this 
case, for instance, claims 1 and 3 broadly encompass compounds defined by struc-
ture only. Such bare compound claims include within their scope the recited com-
pounds as chemical species in any surroundings, including within the human body as 
metabolites of a drug. As this case holds, these broad compound claims are inher-
ently anticipated by a prior art disclosure of a drug that metabolizes into the claimed 
compound. 
A skilled patent drafter, however, might fashion a claim to cover the metabolite 
in a way that avoids anticipation. For example, the metabolite may be claimed in its 
pure and isolated form, as in Kratz and Bergstrom, or as a pharmaceutical compo-
sition (e.g., with a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier). The patent drafter could also 
claim a method of administering the metabolite or the corresponding pharmaceuti-
cal composition. The ’233 patent would not provide an enabling disclosure to an-
ticipate such claims because, for instance, the ’233 patent does not disclose isolation 
of DCL. 
The ’716 patent contains claims 5-13 covering pharmaceutical compositions 
and claims 14-16 covering methods of treating allergic reactions by administering 
compounds that include DCL. These claims were not found anticipated by the ’233 
patent. 
III. 
The district court found that “there is no genuine issue that the consumption 
of loratadine by humans, with a wide variety of health statuses, necessarily results in 
the natural production in the human body of the DCL metabolite.” This court must 
also examine the record for any genuine issue of material fact about whether inges-
tion of loratadine necessarily produces DCL. The record does, for instance, contain 
expert testimony, including a proposed metabolic scheme and animal data, that 
questions whether ingestion of loratadine always forms DCL. 
… In this case, the evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion is exten-
sive. In thirteen clinical studies that Schering ran before May 1, 1987, all 144  
patients involved had measurable amounts of DCL in their systems after ingesting 
loratadine. The district court found “no reports in any of the studies of any individ-
ual who did not metabolically produce DCL following the administration of lorata-
dine.” The appellees reported twenty-one clinical studies in which loratadine was 
administered to a total of 864 patients, all of whom formed measurable amounts of 
DCL in their systems. In addition, the record shows that since 1985 Schering’s 
technical articles and [SEC] filings referred to DCL as the metabolite of loratadine. 
Also the Food and Drug Administration, the corresponding European agency, the 
Physician’s Desk Reference, and Schering’s CLARITIN package insert referred to 
DCL as the major metabolite of loratadine. 
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The record presents no data on humans to show that a genuine factual dispute 
exists about the formation of DCL after ingesting loratadine. Indeed Schering’s own 
expert testified that no human has been found that does not metabolize loratadine 
to DCL, and that “[t]here is no scientific data in the published literature that says 
that DCL is not formed from loratadine in humans.” Based on this record, no  
reasonable jury could find that DCL is not produced when a human ingests lorata-
dine. This court therefore discerns no genuine issue of material fact. 
…  
In re Ngai 
367 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
Per Curiam 
Petitioners John Ngai and David Lin (collectively “Ngai”) appeal from the de-
cision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) rejecting claim 
19 of the petitioner’s patent application No. 09/597,608 as being anticipated by 
prior art. We find that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and 
accordingly affirm. 
I. Background 
The study of nucleic acids, including ribonucleic acids (“RNA”), has a wide va-
riety of applications in the field of biological sciences. Unfortunately, oftentimes the 
amount of RNA that experimenters can extract from the cells can be quite small. 
Experimenters must duplicate the material many times over to assemble a quantity 
sufficient for experimentation. This process is called “amplification.” Additionally, 
some RNA strands may be difficult to detect in cells. A process called “normaliza-
tion” enhances experimenters’ ability to detect the RNA that is expressed at low lev-
els. 
Ngai invented a new method for amplifying and normalizing RNA. He submit-
ted the ’608 application to patent this invention. The ’608 application contained 
[19 relevant] claims. Claims 1-18 are drawn to a method of amplifying RNA. …  
Claim 19 is drawn to a kit designed to perform the method recited in Claim 1. 
Claim 19 reads: 
A kit for normalizing and amplifying an RNA population, said kit com-
prising instructions describing the method of claim 1 and a premeasured 
portion of a reagent selected from the group consisting of: oligo dT bio-
tinylated primer, T7 RNA polymerase, annealed biotinylated primers, 
streptavidin beads, polyadenyl transferase, reverse transcriptase, RNase H, 
DNA pol I, buffers and nucleotides. 
(Emphasis added). 
Ngai does not dispute that prior art teaches a kit comprising instructions and a 
10X buffer.1 
                                                
1 Ngai also does not dispute that a 10X buffer is a type of buffer mentioned in pro-
posed claim 19. 
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Proceedings Below 
The Examiner allowed claims 1-18 but rejected claim[] 19 … under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) … . 
The Board agreed with the Examiner that prior art anticipates claim 19 because 
it teaches each and every limitation of the claim including instructions and a buffer 
agent. The Board concluded that the only difference between the prior art and claim 
19 is the content of the instructions. Finding that the content of the instructions 
was not “functionally related” to the kit, the Board concluded that claim 19 should 
be rejected as anticipated by prior art. 
Ngai appealed the Board’s decision to this Court. The only issue presented by 
this appeal is whether claim 19 should have been allowed. …  
II. Standard of Review 
Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997). We review PTO’s factual findings for substantial evidence. In re Gart-
side, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
III. Discussion 
Ngai argues that the addition of new printed matter to a known product makes 
the product patentable. He rests his argument on the fact that claim 19 is limited to 
kits containing instructions teaching the method described in claim 1. Ngai argues 
that because prior art does not teach a limitation of “instructions describing the 
method of claim 1,” combined with an amplification kit, the petitioner’s claim can-
not be anticipated. Ngai relies on the language of In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 1983): “[The d]ifference between an invention and the prior art cited 
against it cannot be ignored merely because those differences reside in the content 
of the printed matter.” Id. at 1385.[*] 
The PTO argues that Ngai’s claim merely teaches a new use for an existing 
product. Thus, according to the PTO, Ngai can claim the new use as a method, but 
he cannot claim the existing product itself. The PTO relies on a different passage of 
Gulack and argues that in order to qualify under Gulack, the printed matter[†] must 
be functionally related to the underlying object. “The critical question is whether 
there exists any new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed mat-
ter and the substrate.” Id. at 1386. 
The dispute between Ngai and PTO reduces to the question of the proper 
meaning of Gulack. The PTO has the better argument. In Gulack, the Board reject-
ed a claim directed to a circular band designed for mathematical and educational 
purposes. The invention consisted of “(1) a band, ring, or set of concentric rings; 
                                                
* [ Ed. Note — The application on appeal in Gulack ultimately issued as U.S. Patent 
No. 4,416,633. ] 
† [ Ed. Note — As Mueller’s Patent Law explains, at 384 n.202, “[t]he printed mat-
ter rejection originated with pre-1952 Act decisions of the CCPA, which declared 
that ‘the mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper does not 
constitute patentable subject matter’ In re Sterling, 720 F.2d 910, 912 (CCPA 
1934).” ] 
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(2) a plurality of individual digits imprinted on the band or ring at regularly spaced 
intervals; and (3) an algorithm by which the appropriate digits are developed.” Id. at 
1387. The rejection was premised upon the fact that a circular band with items 
printed upon it was well known in the art. See id. at 1384. We reversed, finding that 
the numbers printed on the band had a functional relationship to the band itself. 
The Court stated: “[t]he[] digits are related to the band in two ways: (1) the band 
supports the digits; and (2) there is an endless sequence of digits—each digit re-
siding in a unique position with respect to every other digit in an endless loop. 
Thus, the digits exploit the endless nature of the band.” Id. at 1386-87. Although 
the prior art disclosed a band with printed matter, the Court concluded that the pri-
or art neither “disclose[d] nor suggest[ed] either feature” of Gulack’s invention. Id. 
at 1387. 
This case, however, is dissimilar from Gulack. There the printed matter and the 
circularity of the band were interrelated, so as to produce a new product useful for 
“educational and recreational mathematical” purposes. Here, addition of a new set 
of instructions into a known kit does not interrelate with the kit in the same way as 
the numbers interrelated with the band. In Gulack, the printed matter would not 
achieve its educational purposes without the band, and the band without the printed 
matter would similarly be unable to produce the desired result. Here, the printed 
matter in no way depends on the kit, and the kit does not depend on the printed 
matter. All that the printed matter does is teach a new use for an existing product. 
As the Gulack court pointed out, “[w]here the printed matter is not functionally 
related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from 
the prior art in terms of patentability.” Id. If we were to adopt Ngai’s position, any-
one could continue patenting a product indefinitely provided that they add a new 
instruction sheet to the product. This was not envisioned by Gulack. Ngai is entitled 
to patent his invention of a new RNA extraction method, and the claims covering 
that invention were properly allowed. He is not, however, entitled to patent a 
known product by simply attaching a set of instructions to that product. 
… 
King Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eon Labs, Inc. 
616 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
Gajarsa, Judge: 
King Pharmaceuticals … appeal[s] the … grant of Eon Labs, Inc.’s motion for 
summary judgment that all claims of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,407,128 and 6,683,102  
are invalid. In granting Eon’s motion, the district court held … [some of the claims] 
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102.  
… 
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of invalidity. … 
Background 
King markets and sells a name brand version of metaxalone called Skelaxin. 
Metaxalone is a muscle relaxant that is used to treat “discomforts associated with 
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acute, painful musculosketal conditions.” ’128 patent, col. 1, ll. 21-23. Metaxalone 
was first discovered in the 1960s, and the first patent claiming the method of pro-
ducing the compound, U.S. Patent No. 3,062,827, issued in 1962 to A.H. Robins 
Company. A.H. Robins began selling metaxalone under the brand name Skelaxin in 
1962. Elan eventually acquired the rights to Skelaxin and sold those rights in 2003 
to King, which now markets and sells Skelaxin. 
On August 31, 2004, Eon filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“AN-
DA”) for a generic 800 mg metaxalone tablet. Eon filed with the ANDA a patent 
certification … which alleged that none of the claims of the ’128 patent would be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of Eon’s generic 800 mg metaxalone tab-
let, and that all the claims of the ’128 patent are invalid. In response … King filed 
suit against Eon under the Hatch-Waxman Act. The complaint accused Eon of in-
fringing the ’128 and ’102 patents. King’s action was consolidated with an earlier, 
related action … that Elan filed in 2001 against Eon after Eon filed an ANDA for a 
generic 400 mg metaxalone tablet. Elan asserted the ’128 patent in the 400 mg  
Action, but the case was dismissed after Eon withdrew its 400 mg ANDA. … 
The ’128 patent, titled “Method for Increasing the Bioavailability of Me-
taxalone,” issued on June 18, 2002 and was initially assigned to Elan. Elan subse-
quently assigned the ’128 patent to King in 2003. The patent discloses a method of 
“increasing the bioavailability of metaxalone by administration of an oral dosage 
form with food.” The claimed invention is the result of “the unexpected finding that 
administration of metaxalone with food increases both the rate and extent of absorp-
tion via the oral dosage form in human subjects.” 
The ’128 patent has three independent claims, claims 1, 9, and 17. Claim 1 
claims “a method of increasing the oral bioavailability of metaxalone” by “adminis-
tering to the patient a therapeutically effective amount of metaxalone in a pharma-
ceutical composition with food.” Claim 9 claims a method for increasing “the rate 
and extent of absorption *** of metaxalone *** in the blood stream” by “adminis-
tering to the patient a therapeutically effective amount of metaxalone in a pharma-
ceutical composition with food.” Claim 17 claims a method similar to claim 1, but 
limits the effective amount of metaxalone to between 400 and 800 mg and defines 
an increase in bioavailability as “an increase in the maximal plasma concentration 
(Cmax) and extent of absorption (AUC(last)) of metaxalone compared to admin-
istration without food.” 
Dependent claims 2, 3, 10, and 11 specify that the “therapeutically effective 
amount” of metaxalone is “200 mg to 900 mg” (claims 2 and 10) or “400 mg to 
800 mg” (claims 3 and 11). Dependent claims 4-6, 12-14, and 18-20 specify spe-
cific times for administering the metaxalone relative to the consumption of food, 
either thirty minutes prior to two hours after consumption of food (claims 4, 12 and 
18), “substantially at the same time” as consumption of food (claims 5, 13 and 19), 
or up to one hour after consumption of food (claims 6, 14 and 20). Dependent 
claims 7 and 15 limit the dosage to a tablet form, and dependent claims 8 and 16 
limit the dosage to a “unit dosage form.” Dependent claim 21 claims the method of 
claim 1 with the additional limitation of “informing” the patient that taking me-
taxalone with food will increase the drug’s bioavailability, and dependent claim 22 
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claims the method of claim 1 with the additional limitation that “the metaxalone is 
from a container with printed labeling advising” that taking metaxalone with food 
will increase the drug’s bioavailability. 
The ’102 patent issued on January 27, 2004 and is titled “Methods of Using 
Metaxalone in the Treatment of Musculoskeletal Conditions.” Elan assigned the 
application that resulted in the ’102 patent to King in 2003. Like the ’128 patent, 
the ’102 patent discloses a method of “increasing the bioavailability of metaxalone 
by administration of an oral dosage form with food.” Independent claim 1 claims a 
method for using metaxalone in the treatment of musculosketal conditions compris-
ing both “providing” a patient with a “therapeutically effective amount of me-
taxalone” and “informing” the patient that taking metaxalone with food increases 
the bioavailability of the drug. Claims 2 through 5 depend from claim 1 and either 
specify the “therapeutically effective amount” as 200 mg to 900 mg (claim 2) or 
400 mg to 800 mg (claim 3), or limit the dosage to a tablet form (claim 4) or a 
“unit dosage form” (claim 5). 
Independent claim 6 claims a “method of using metaxalone in the treatment of 
musculosketal conditions” consisting of “informing a patient” that taking me-
taxalone with food increases the bioavailability of the drug compared to taking me-
taxalone without food. Independent claim 7 claims a “method of using metaxalone 
in the treatment of musculosketal conditions” by “obtaining metaxalone from a 
container providing information that administration of metaxalone with food” in-
creases the drug’s bioavailability and “ingesting the metaxalone with food.” 
Independent claim 8 claims a “method of using metaxalone in the treatment of 
musculosketal conditions” comprising both administering metaxalone with food and 
informing the patient that such administration increases the bioavailability of the 
drug. Dependent claims 9 through 11 limit claim 8 to metaxalone from a container 
with printed information concerning the increased bioavailability of the drug (claim 
9), metaxalone in a tablet form (claim 10), and 400 mg of metaxalone (claim 11). 
Claims 12, 13, and 14 depend from claim 9 and limit the printed label to stating 
certain percentage increases in the bioavailability of metaxalone. Finally, claim 15 
depends from claim 8 and limits the metaxalone to a 400 mg tablet with a printed 
label that states certain percent-age increases in the bioavailability of the metaxalone. 
Before the district court, Eon presented six prior art references it contended in-
validated the ’128 and ’102 patents. In granting Eon’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court relied only upon three references: Kazem Fathie, Musculo-
skeletal Disorders and Their Management with a New Relaxant, Clinical Medicine 
678 (April 1965) (“Fathie II”); Joseph A. Albanese, Nurses’ Drug Reference 427 
(2d ed. 1982) (“Albanese”); and Anne C. Abrams, Clinical Drug Therapy 145 
(1995) (“Abrams”). 
Fathie II describes a clinical study in which patients were given 800 mg of me-
taxalone to be taken three to five times a day. The article notes that several patients 
complained of nausea and that “[n]ausea might have been less prominent if the 
medication had been taken with food.” 
Albanese is a reference guide for registered nurses. The guide discloses that 
metaxalone is available in 400 mg tablets and recommends a dosage range of 800 
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mg three to four times daily. The guide also notes that “[a]dministration with meals 
will help reduce gastric upset.” 
Abrams is another reference guide for registered nurses. The reference guide 
discloses providing patients with 800 mg of metaxalone three or four times daily for 
not more than ten consecutive days. The reference guide also instructs nurses to give 
metaxalone “with milk or food” in order to “decrease gastrointestinal distress.” 
Eon moved for summary judgment of invalidity. Eon’s motion asserted that all 
claims of the ’128 and ’102 patents were either anticipated by or obvious in light of 
the prior art. The district court granted Eon’s motion. 
… 
Discussion 
A. Legal Standards 
… 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 a claim is anticipated “if each and every limitation is 
found either expressly or inherently in a single prior art reference.” Celeritas Techs. 
Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[A]nticipation 
by inherent disclosure is appropriate only when the reference discloses prior art that 
must necessarily include the unstated limitation.” Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood 
Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). …  
B. Analysis 
The district court considered and invalidated all thirty-seven claims of the ’128 
and ’102 patents, and King appeals thirty-six of those findings. We begin, as the dis-
trict court did, with the ’128 patent and then turn to the ’102 patent. 
I. The ’128 Patent 
a. Claim 1 
Claim 1 is an independent claim requiring the administration of “a therapeu-
tically effective amount of metaxalone in a pharmaceutical composition with food.” 
Claim 1 contains a preamble, which King argues is the claim’s source of novelty. 
The preamble reads, “[a] method of increasing the bioavailability of metaxalone to a 
patient receiving metaxalone therapy.” According to King, while the prior art may 
disclose taking metaxalone with food, it does not disclose increasing the bioavailabil-
ity of the drug. 
In its summary judgment opinion, the district court rejected King’s argument 
and found claim 1’s preamble inherently anticipated. According to the district court, 
an increase in the bioavailability of metaxalone is an inherent property of taking 
metaxalone with food, which is disclosed in each of Fathie II, Albanese, and 
Abrams. 
On appeal, King argues the district court erred because Eon did not provide 
any evidence or expert testimony that the prior art would necessarily result in an in-
crease in metaxalone’s bioavailability. King argues that the prior art’s disclosure  
(taking metaxalone with food to reduce gastric discomfort) is vague as to the con-
ditions under which the food was administered such that it was improper for the 
district court to assume that an increase in bioavailability was necessarily disclosed. 
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Specifically, King contrasts the precise conditions on food consumption disclosed in 
the ’128 patent with the vague conditions disclosed in Fathie II, Albanese, and 
Abrams.2 For further support, King cites its own expert reports which conclude that 
“even a disclosure of taking metaxalone with food would not inherently disclose in-
creasing the bioavailability of metaxalone.” 
As an initial matter, King’s attempt to link an increase in metaxalone’s bioavail-
ability to specific food conditions is untenable. While the ’128 patent’s written de-
scription discloses specific conditions for food consumption, its claims only recite 
taking metaxalone “with food.” It would be improper to limit the broad terms used 
in the ’128 patent’s claims to the specific food conditions disclosed in the written 
description. See Kara Tech. Inc. v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“The claims, not specification embodiments, define the scope of patent pro-
tection. The patentee is entitled to the full scope of his claims, and we will not limit 
him to his preferred embodiment or import a limitation from the specification into 
the claims.”). Moreover, the written description in no way suggests that the specific 
food conditions disclosed were necessary for increasing metaxalone’s bioavailability. 
Rather, the written description teaches that the claimed increase in metaxalone’s  
bioavailability can be achieved through the consumption of “a meal, such as break-
fast, lunch or dinner.” ’128 patent, col. 2, ll. 37-38. The district court was therefore 
correct in finding that “the ’128 patent does not identify any additional conditions 
that must be present for the food effect to occur. Rather, it occurs naturally in most 
people when they take metaxalone with food.” [S]ee also Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Un-
ion Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding reliance on 
non-claimed distinction between prior art method and claimed method “inappropri-
ate” and insufficient to save the claim from inherent anticipation). 
As for the merits of King’s argument, we first note that Fathie II, Albanese, and 
Abrams each disclose administering metaxalone “with food” or “with meals” to 
treat musculosketal conditions. Fathie II, published thirty-six years prior to the filing 
of the ’128 patent, teaches administering metaxalone “with food” to reduce nausea. 
Albanese, published nineteen years prior to the filing of the ’128 patent, teaches 
administering metaxalone “with meals” to “reduce gastric upset.” And, Abrams, 
published six years prior to the filing of the ’128 patent, teaches administering me-
taxalone “with milk or food” to “decrease gastrointestinal distress.” 
We have held that “[i]t is a general rule that merely discovering and claiming a 
new benefit of an old process cannot render the process again patentable.” In re 
Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Such newly discovered benefits 
are not patentable because they are inherent in the prior art. See Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001). While inherent 
anticipation “may not be established by probabilities or possibilities,” In re Oelrich, 
666 F.2d 578, 581 (CCPA 1981), if “the [prior art’s] disclosure is sufficient to 
                                                
2 Participants in the study were given fifteen minutes to eat the following before 
administration of the metaxalone: 2 eggs (fried in butter), 2 strips of bacon, 2 slices 
of toast with butter, 4 oz. of hash brown potatoes, and one glass whole milk (8 oz.). 
See ’128 patent, col. 3, ll. 14–25. 
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show that the natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the 
performance of the questioned function, it seems to be well-settled that the disclo-
sure should be regarded as sufficient,” id. (alterations added). 
According to the ’128 patent, the natural result of taking metaxalone with food 
is an increase in the bioavailability of the drug. The prior art discloses taking me-
taxalone with food, but not the natural result of this process. However, because the 
prior art methods in their “normal and usual operation *** perform the function 
which [King] claims in [the ’128 patent], then such [patent] will be considered, to 
have been anticipated by the [prior art].” In re Ackenbach, 45 F.2d 437, 439 
(CCPA 1930) (alterations added). As taught by the ’128 patent, the only steps re-
quired to increase metaxalone’s bioavailability are (1) ingesting metaxalone (2) with 
food. These steps are undeniably disclosed by the prior art. An increase in me-
taxalone’s bioavailability is, therefore, an inherent aspect of the prior art. In other 
words, the increase in metaxalone’s bioavailability is the “‘natural result’ flowing 
from the [prior art’s] explicitly explicated limitations.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (alterations added); see also MEHL/Bio-
phile Int’l Corp. v. Milgraum, 192 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[T]o the 
extent the embodiment in the patent achieves [the limitation], so does the [prior 
art].”) (alterations added). Accordingly, claim 1’s preamble is inherently anticipated. 
King’s experts’ opinions that “even a disclosure of taking metaxalone with food 
would not inherently disclose increasing the bioavailability of metaxalone,” do not 
undermine our analysis. To anticipate, the prior art need only meet the inherently 
disclosed limitation to the extent the patented method does. See Hewlett-Packard 
Co. v. Mustek Systems, Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] prior art 
product that sometimes, but not always, embodies a claimed method nonetheless 
teaches that aspect of the invention.”). Because the ’128 patent discloses no more 
than taking metaxalone with food, to the extent such a method increases the bio-
availability of metaxalone, the identical prior art method does as well. As the district 
court aptly stated, “to inherently anticipate, the prior art need only give the same 
results as the patent, not better.” 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s inherent anticipation analysis was 
proper. The preamble to claim 1 is inherently anticipated. To hold otherwise would 
remove from the public a method of treating muscle pain that has been performed 
for decades. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (“The public remains free to make, use, or sell prior art compositions or pro-
cesses, regardless of whether or not they understand their complete makeup or the 
underlying scientific principles which allow them to operate. The doctrine of antici-
pation by inherency, among other doctrines, enforces that basic principle.”). Ac-
cordingly, the district court’s finding that claim 1 is anticipated is affirmed. 
Because we reject King’s argument that claim 1’s preamble is novel, we also af-
firm the district court’s findings of invalidity as to claims 2, 3, 8-11, and 15-17. For 
these claims, King’s sole argument on appeal was that their incorporation of claim 
1’s preamble (claims 2, 3, 7, and 8) or their recitation of a similar preamble (claims 
9-11 and 15-17) made the claims novel. Like claim 1, these claims are anticipated 
because their sole source of novelty is inherently disclosed by the prior art. 
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b. Claims 4-6, 12-14, and 18-20 
Claims 4-6 depend from claim 1. The claims limit the time frame in which the 
patient must ingest the metaxalone in relation to consuming food. Claim 4 limits 
the time frame to “30 minutes prior to 2 hours after consumption of the food,” 
claim 5 limits it to “substantially at the same time,” and claim 6 limits it to “im-
mediately after the consumption of food up to 1 hour after.” Fathie II, Albanese, 
and Abrams respectively disclose administering metaxalone “with food,” “with 
meals,” and “with food or milk.” 
On appeal, King argues that none of the claims’ specific timeframe require-
ments is disclosed in Fathie II, Albanese, or Abrams. Yet, according to King’s own 
experts, “with food” could mean taking metaxalone “1 hour prior to up to about 2 
hours after eating.” (Decl. of Dr. Elia). Under this common-sense definition of 
“with food,” the prior art discloses a timeframe for ingesting metaxalone in relation 
to consuming food that falls within the timeframes claimed by claims 4-6. The dis-
trict court’s finding that claims 4-6 are anticipated is therefore affirmed. See Titani-
um Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[It is] 
an elementary principle of patent law that when, as by a recitation of ranges or oth-
erwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is ‘anticipated’ if one of them 
is in the prior art.”); Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1298 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
Claims 12-14 and 18-20 contain identical timeframe requirements. The district 
court invalidated these claims for the same reasons it invalidated claims 4-6. We 
therefore affirm … . 
c. Claim 21 
Claim 21 depends from claim 1 and adds the limitation “informing the patient 
that administration of a therapeutically effective amount of metaxalone in a pharma-
ceutical composition with food results in an increase in the maximal plasma concen-
tration (Cmax) and extent of absorption (AUC(last)) of metaxalone compared to 
administration without food.” The district court invalidated claim 21 … . 
… 
Because we have already determined that independent claim 1 is anticipated, 
dependent claim 21’s sole potential source of novelty is the “informing” limitation. 
King argues that the district court committed legal error because it never found the 
“informing” limitation disclosed in the prior art, which it was required to do. See 
Atofina v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 441 F.3d 991, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Antici-
pation requires a showing that each limitation of a claim is found in a single refer-
ence, either expressly or inherently.”). Eon tacitly concedes that the district court 
never expressly found the “informing” limitation disclosed in the prior art, but con-
tends such a finding was unnecessary because the nonpatentable “informing” limita-
tion cannot breathe novelty into an otherwise anticipated method. 
The specific question before us is whether an otherwise anticipated method 
claim becomes patentable because it includes a step of “informing” someone about 
the existence of an inherent property of that method. We hold it does not. The “in-
forming” limitation adds no novelty to the method, which is otherwise anticipated 
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by the prior art. In other words, in light of our holding that the method of taking 
metaxalone with food to increase the drug’s bioavailability, as recited in claim 1, is 
not patentable, it readily follows that claim 21, which recites the same method with 
the sole additional step of informing the patient about this increase in bioavailability, 
is not patentable. 
In an analogous context, we have held that “[w]here the printed matter is not 
functionally related to the substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the in-
vention from the prior art in terms of patentability.” In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 
1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (alterations added). In such cases, we have recognized that 
the printed matter is not independently patentable, but have cautioned that the limi-
tation must not be excised from the claim. See id. at 1385 (“[T]he board cannot 
dissect a claim, excise the printed matter from it, and declare the remaining portion 
of the mutilated claim to be unpatentable. The claim must be read as a whole.”) (al-
terations added). Instead, the relevant question is whether “there exists any new and 
unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.” Id. 
at 1386 (citing In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969)). The rationale 
behind this line of cases is preventing the indefinite patenting of known products by 
the simple inclusion of novel, yet functionally unrelated limitations. See In re Ngai, 
367 F.3d [1336,] 1339 [(Fed. Cir. 2004)]. 
Although these “printed matter” cases involved the addition of printed matter, 
such as written instructions, to a known product, we see no principled reason for 
limiting their reasoning to that specific factual context. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 
1338-39; In re Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1385-87. Rather, we believe that the rationale 
underlying these cases extends to the situation presented in this case, wherein an 
instructional limitation is added to a method, as opposed to a product, known in the 
art. Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether the additional instructional limitation 
of claim 21 has a “new and unobvious functional relationship” with the known 
method of administering metaxalone with food. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1338 
(quoting In re Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386). 
King contends that there is a functional relationship between the “informing” 
limitation and the method. Specifically, at oral argument, King’s counsel argued that 
the “informing” limitation increases the likelihood that the patient will take me-
taxalone with food, thereby increasing the efficiency of the method. See Oral Arg. at 
7:30-8:26. This relationship, however, is not functional. Informing a patient about 
the benefits of a drug in no way transforms the process of taking the drug with food. 
Irrespective of whether the patient is informed about the benefits, the actual meth-
od, taking metaxalone with food, is the same. In other words, the “informing” limi-
tation “in no way depends on the [method], and the [method] does not depend on 
the [‘informing’ limitation].” In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339 (alterations added). “It 
is not invention to perceive that the product which others had discovered had quali-
ties they failed to detect.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 
242, 249 (1945). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that claim 21 is 
invalid, but on the alternative ground that the claim is anticipated by the prior art. 
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d. Claim 22 
Claim 22 is closely related to claim 21. Claim 22 depends from claim 1 and  
limits claim 1’s method to situations “wherein the metaxalone is from a container 
with printed labeling advising that administration with food results in an increase in 
the maximal plasma concentration (Cmax) and extent of absorption (AUC(last)) of 
metaxalone compared to administration without food.” The district court, relying 
on this court’s printed matter precedent as articulated in In re Ngai, found the claim 
anticipated by Fathie II, Albanese, and Abrams. 
Because it depends from claim 1, the printed label limitation is claim 22’s only 
potential source of novelty. However, as the district court correctly found, the print-
ed label limitation falls squarely within our printed matter cases discussed above with 
respect to claim 21. While ostensibly a method claim, the potentially novel aspect of 
claim 22 concerns a printed label on a product. Like claim 21’s “informing” limita-
tion, the printed label is not functionally related to either the product within the 
method claim or the method claim as a whole. Therefore, the district court was cor-
rect in finding the claim anticipated. See In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339. 
King attempts to avoid In re Ngai by limiting that case to product claims. Ac-
cording to King, because claim 22 is a method claim, In re Ngai, which addressed a 
product claim, is not applicable. During our discussion of claim 21, we rejected the 
notion that In re Ngai’s holding should be limited solely to product claims. Accord-
ingly, we reject King’s argument and affirm the district court’s finding that claim 22 
is anticipated. 
We also affirm the district court’s invalidation of claims 7, 9, and 12-15 of the 
’102 patent, which are nearly identical to claim 22 of the ‘128 patent. The district 
court invalidated these claims for the same reasons it invalidated claim 22. On ap-
peal, King argues claims 7, 9, and 12-15 of ’102 patent are novel for the same  
reasons claim 22 was allegedly novel, i.e., their incorporation of a printed label limi-
tation. For the reasons discussed above, we reject this argument and affirm the dis-
trict court’s invalidation of claims 7, 9, and 12-15 of ‘102 patent. 
II. The ’102 Patent 
a. Claim 1 
Claim 1 of the ’102 patent is an independent claim, which claims a “method of 
using metaxalone in the treatment of musculoskeletal conditions” comprising both 
“providing the patient with a therapeutically effective amount of metaxalone” and 
“informing the patient that administration with food results in an increase in the 
maximal plasma concentration (Cmax) and extent of absorption (AUC(last)) of 
metaxalone compared to administration without food.” …  
As we discussed with respect to claim 21 of the ’128 patent, … claim 1’s sole 
source of novelty is the “informing” limitation. Because this limitation is not func-
tionally related to the otherwise anticipated method, the claim is anticipated. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that claim 1 is invalid … on the al-
ternative ground that the claim is anticipated by the prior art. 
Because we reject King’s argument that claim 1’s “informing” limitation is nov-
el, we also affirm the district court’s finding of invalidity as to dependent claims 2 
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through 4 and independent claim 8 and its dependent claims 10 and 11. For these 
claims, King argued on appeal that their incorporation of the “informing” limitation 
(claims 2-4) or their recitation of a similar limitation (claims 8, 10, and 11) made 
the claims novel. For the reasons discussed above, we reject King’s argument … . 
…  
Statutory Bars 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 197-211 
Pronova BioPharma Norge v. Teva Pharm. 
549 Fed. Appx. 934 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
O’Malley, Judge: 
This patent infringement suit arises from Abbreviated New Drug Applications 
(“ANDAs”) filed by Teva Pharmaceuticals and Par Pharmaceutical. Through their 
ANDAs, Appellants seek to market generic versions of Lovaza, a pharmaceutical 
product marketed by Plaintiff Pronova BioPharma Norge. Following a bench trial, 
the [court] entered final judgment for Pronova, holding that U.S. Patent No[.] 
5,656,667 w[as] infringed, not proven invalid as … anticipated under § 102(b) by 
prior public use … . Teva and Par appeal those four rulings. Because we find that 
Pronova’s predecessor, Norsk Hydro, made the inventions claimed in the ’667  
patent publicly accessible before the statutory bar date, constituting an invalidating 
public use pursuant to § 102(b), we reverse. This ruling renders moot all remaining 
issues regarding the ’667 patent. …  
I. Background 
A. Claimed Technology 
Pronova is the holder of approved New Drug Application (“NDA”) No. 
121654 for Lovaza and is the owner by assignment of the patents-in-suit. The  
patents-in-suit are listed in the [FDA’s] Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations for Lovaza. Lovaza is the first and only fish-oil derived pre-
scription drug approved by the FDA. It contains fish-oil components in concentrat-
ed amounts. The drug is indicated to reduce triglyceride levels in adult 
patients with severe hypertriglyceridemia, i.e., high levels of triglycerides. Since its 
entry into the market in 2005, Pronova has sold large amounts of Lovaza in the 
U.S. market, with U.S. sales amounting to over $2.3 billion as of August 2010. 
Starting in the 1970s, medical studies established the medical benefits of fish oil 
for treating heart disease. A 1972 Danish study reported that Greenland Eskimos, 
whose diet is high in fish (and thus high in fat), had very low rates of heart disease. 
The study postulated that the fish fat in their diet, which has a high concentration of 
polyunsaturated fatty acyl components, had beneficial properties. Subsequent re-
search in the 1980s concluded that two components, eicosapentaenoic acid (“EPA”) 
and docosahexaenoic acid (“DHA”), two omega-3 fatty acids, were the active agents 
giving fish oil its beneficial properties. Thus, starting in the 1980s, fish oil capsules 
containing, among other components, EPA and DHA, have been used to treat hy-
pertriglyceridemia. 
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… The asserted claims are drawn to pharmaceutical compositions or methods of 
using such compositions. The claims recite specific concentrations of five fish-oil 
derived components: EPA, DHA, heneicosapentaenoic acid (“HPA”), docopenta-
enoic acid (“DPA”), and arachidonic acid (“AA”). All except AA are omega-3 fatty 
acids; AA is an omega-6 fatty acid. The claimed compositions have high concentra-
tions of EPA and DHA, the active ingredients in the formulation (“the major com-
ponents”), and low concentrations of the other three fatty acid components, AA, 
HPA, and DPA (“the minor components”). 
B. Lower Court Proceedings 
Teva and Par separately filed an ANDA seeking to market a generic version of 
Lovaza … . Their ANDAs contained paragraph IV certifications indicating that the 
’667 [patent was] not infringed or w[as] invalid. In response, Pronova filed lawsuits 
against Teva and Par … . The district court held a bench trial for the consolidated 
cases from March 30 to April 6, 2011. After post-trial briefing, it held that Pronova 
proved that Teva’s and Par’s ANDA products will infringe all the asserted claims and 
Teva and Par failed to establish invalidity of the asserted claims … . 
Specifically, Appellants asserted, among other things, that the asserted claims of 
the ’667 patent were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for public use prior to the 
statutory bar date. The parties agreed that, on September 8, 1987, Norsk Hydro, 
Pronova’s predecessor, sent Dr. Victor Skrinska (“Skrinska”) of St. Vincent Charity 
Hospital liquid vials of its “K-80” ethyl ester composition. Those samples, Pronova 
concedes, were produced by Norsk Hydro in a batch numbered 222 (“Batch 222”), 
which met all the limitations of the asserted claims of the ’667 patent. Appellants 
argued to the district court that Norsk Hydro, by providing Skrinska samples and 
disclosing their content, made an invalidating public use of the claimed invention. 
They also argued that Skrinska himself made invalidating public uses of the samples 
when he tested them to confirm their content, discussed them with colleagues, and 
administered capsules to himself and others. 
… 
… The court pointed to testimony and documents indicating that Norsk Hydro 
sent Skrinska two 100 mL liquid samples of Batch 222, and Skrinska’s testimony 
that he believes Norsk Hydro subsequently sent him 500 to 1000 capsules of con-
centrated fish oil. Regarding the first shipment, the district court acknowledged that 
Skrinska tested the two samples to confirm (and did confirm) their content, but, the 
court concluded that, beyond this, “Appellants do not point to any particular ‘use’ 
[by Skrinska] of the two Batch 222 liquid vials.” Again, while no conclusion of law 
expressly says so, the court apparently agreed with Pronova that an invalidating use 
of a pharmaceutical compound must be for the purposes identified in the patents-in-
suit—to treat hypertriglyceridemia. Regarding the second shipment (i.e., the cap-
sules), the district court noted that Skrinska had trouble remembering details sur-
rounding the shipment, such as whether anyone other than Norsk Hydro sent him 
fish oil capsules or specific data from assays performed on the capsules. The lower 
court also recounted Skrinska’s testimony in which he detailed the use of the cap-
sules in a six-person, two week study, but it noted that no corroborating documen-
tary evidence of this study was adduced at trial. The district court ultimately discred-
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ited Skrinska’s testimony regarding use of the capsules and rejected Appellants pub-
lic use defense. 
C. Arguments on Appeal 
On appeal, Teva asserts the testing which Skrinska performed constitutes an in-
validating public use because, in its view, any use of a claimed invention can be in-
validating. An invalidating public use need not be the intended use of the invention 
disclosed or claimed in the patent as long as the invention is fully disclosed without 
restriction. It was thus unnecessary for Skrinska to use the samples to treat high lev-
els of triglycerides, Teva maintains. Teva also discounts the district court’s credibility 
finding regarding Skrinska’s testimony, arguing that finding did not pertain to the 
testing of the vials (but only to the testing and use of the capsules) and, that the vial 
testing was corroborated by various forms of documentary and circumstantial evi-
dence. 
…  
Pronova responds that, to be invalidating under § 102(b), an invention must be 
used by someone other than the inventor for its intended purpose. Merely sending 
samples is insufficient, Pronova believes, since making shipments is not the use in-
tended in the patents. And, even if the invention is put to a commercial use, such 
use can only be invalidating, Pronova asserts, if it is for the invention’s intended 
purpose. Thus, Pronova claims that, because no one other than Skrinska claimed to 
have used the samples they received to treat hypertriglyceridemia, and that aspect of 
Skrinska’s testimony was discredited, there can be no invalidating public use; in Pro-
nova’s view disclosing its products to others and “analytical testing” of those  
products can never constitute a public use of the inventions disclosed in the ’667 
[patent].5  
We take these arguments up below, and ultimately agree with Appellants, find-
ing Pronova’s view of what constitutes public use under § 102(b) too narrow. 
II. Legal Standard 
…  
Whether a patent is invalid due to public use under [the 1952 Act version of] 
§ 102(b) is a question of law based on underlying questions of fact. Netscape 
Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We review the 
lower court’s ultimate legal determination de novo, Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, 
Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007), but, following a bench trial, we review 
its underlying findings of fact for clear error, Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 
1276, 1287-88 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 “[T]he policies underlying the public use bar inform its scope and *** one 
such policy is discouraging the removal, from the public domain, of inventions that 
                                                
5 While Pronova contends in its briefing here that Skrinska’s testimony regarding 
analytical testing of the liquid vial batches was uncorroborated and, thus, should be 
disregarded, it does not appear Pronova made this argument at trial. In any event, 
we read the trial court’s factual findings to credit this aspect of Skrinska’s testimony 
and find that conclusion well-supported by the evidence at trial. 
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the public reasonably has come to believe are freely available.” Dey, L.P. v. Sunovion 
Pharm., 715 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “A bar under § 102(b) arises 
where, before the critical date, the invention is in public use and ready for patent-
ing.” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
Regarding the first requirement for the public use bar to attach, we explained in 
Invitrogen that either public accessibility or commercial exploitation would qualify 
as “public use:” 
The proper test for the public use prong of the § 102(b) statutory bar is 
whether the purported use: (1) was accessible to the public; or (2) was 
commercially exploited. Commercial exploitation is a clear indication of 
public use, but it likely requires more than, for example, a secret offer for 
sale. Thus, the test for the public use prong includes the consideration of 
evidence relevant to experimentation, as well as, inter alia, the nature of 
the activity that occurred in public; public access to the use; confidentiality 
obligations imposed on members of the public who observed the use; and 
commercial exploitation. 
Id. at 1380. 
The Supreme Court explained the “ready for patenting” requirement, in the 
context of the § 102(b) on sale bar, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 
67-68 (1998). “That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of re-
duction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date 
the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were 
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention.” 
525 U.S. at 67-68. Our court subsequently held that this requirement applies equal-
ly to the public use bar of § 102(b). Invitrogen, 424 F.3d at 1379. 
III. Analysis 
In this case, there is no dispute regarding the “ready for patenting” require-
ment—the parties agree that Norsk Hydro sent samples to Skrinska meeting the lim-
itation of the asserted claims of the ’667 patent.7 That is, the invention was reduced 
to practice. The dispute on appeal concerns the first requirement of the statutory 
bar, whether the invention was in “public use.” We hold that Norsk Hydro provided 
public access to its invention when it sent samples to Skrinska with no confidentiality 
restrictions; the Appellants proved by clear and convincing evidence that the inven-
tion was in “public use.” 
A. Public Accessibility Inquiry 
“Our cases have provided considerable guidance as to what it means to be ‘ac-
cessible to the public.’” Dey, 715 F.3d at 1355. Thus, “public use may occur when 
‘a completed invention is used in public, without restriction.’” Id. (quoting Allied 
                                                
7 Because ultimately we hold that Norsk Hydro made an invalidating use of the in-
ventions described in the asserted claims of the ’667 patent when it sent at least two 
liquid samples to Skrinska, we focus on only that use—the shipment and testing of 
the liquid vials—in our analysis. It is unnecessary for us to reach the other purport-
edly invalidating uses which Appellants assert. 
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Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “[A]n 
agreement of confidentiality, or circumstances creating a similar expectation of se-
crecy, may negate a ‘public use’ where there is not commercial exploitation.” Invi-
trogen, 424 F.3d at 1382. Similarly, a disclosure of some aspects of an invention, but 
not all, will likely preclude a finding of public use. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. 
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reversing § 102(b) invalida-
tion, in part, because “looking at the machine in operation does not reveal whether 
it is stretching, and, if so, at what speed. Nor *** whether the crystallinity and tem-
perature elements of the invention set forth in the claims are involved.”). 
1. Restrictions on Use 
In the seminal case Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881), the Su-
preme Court articulated the principal inquiry regarding public use: Was the inven-
tion’s use public in the sense that it was made available to others with no limitation 
or restriction? Specifically in Egbert, an inventor made several embodiments of his 
invention, springs to be used with[in] a women’s corset, and gave them to a friend 
who wore them under her clothes for several years. Egbert, 104 U.S. at 335. Despite 
the essentially concealed nature of the friend’s use, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the patent: 
If an inventor, having made his device, gives or sells it to another, to be 
used by the donee or vendee, without limitation or restriction, or injunc-
tion of secrecy, and it is so used, such use is public, even though the use 
and knowledge of the use may be confined to one person. 
Id. at 336. The inquiry is not whether the third person to whom an invention is dis-
closed makes an open and obvious use of it, but whether the inventor himself has 
made a use of his invention which is “public” because it was given to a member of 
the public without restriction. Given the nature of the inquiry, our case law under-
standably focuses on the limitations, restrictions, or secrecy obligations associated 
with a purported public use. See, e.g., Dey, 715 F.3d at 1355; Netscape, 295 F.3d at 
1321. We have explained that “whether an invention is accessible to the public or 
reasonably believed to be freely available depends, at least in part, on the degree of 
confidentiality surrounding its use.” Dey, 715 F.3d at 1355. The degree of confi-
dentiality necessary to avoid a finding of public use naturally depends on the circum-
stances. Id. 
To analyze the degree of confidentiality surrounding a purported public use, we 
have also focused on the amount of control which the discloser retains over the in-
vention during the uses in question. For example, in Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 
F.3d 1113, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1996), we invalidated a patent despite an inventor’s ar-
gument that the uses were experimental, because he had given the invention—seals 
for boat motors—to several friends who, in turn, installed and tested one on a boat, 
which they later sold. After the sale, neither the inventor nor the friends “knew what 
happened with either the prototype or the demonstration boat after the boat was 
sold,” so the inventor “did not maintain any supervision and control over the seals 
during the alleged testing.” Id. Similarly, in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005), we found that a demonstration of the 
invention to “two Sun Microsystems employees without confidentiality agreements” 
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was an invalidating public use under § 102(b), even though there was no evidence 
that those employees personally “used” the invention. And, in Beachcombers Int’l, 
Inc. v. Wildewood Creative Prods., 31 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 1994), we af-
firmed a jury verdict finding public use of a patented device under § 102(b) based 
on evidence that the designer and developer demonstrated a prototype at a party for 
her guests to view. On the other hand, in Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 
793 F.2d 1261, 1263-67 (Fed. Cir. 1986), we upheld a patent even though the in-
ventor had showed prototypes of the invention, a threedimensional puzzle, to sever-
al friends and his employer over the course of five years. We upheld the lower 
court’s findings that the inventor “at all times retained control over the puzzle’s use 
and the distribution of information concerning it,” and he “retained control even 
though he and [the employer] had not entered into any express confidentiality 
agreement.” Id. at 1266. 
Also among the circumstances of the disclosure upon which we have focused is 
the sophistication of those to whom disclosure was made. As we recently explained 
in Dey, while a public use might not arise where disclosure is limited to a small 
number of uninformed observers, “even limited disclosure to those who are skilled 
enough to know, understand, and ‘easily demonstrate the invention to others,’ may 
mean that there was no reasonable expectation of secrecy and that the invention was 
therefore in public use.” Dey, 715 F.3d at 1356 (citing Netscape, 295 F.3d at 1321). 
2. Scope of Disclosure 
Even where a disclosure is unrestricted, it will not be an invalidating public use, 
unless the patent challenger establishes that all claimed aspects of the invention were 
made public. See, e.g., Dey, 715 F.3d at 1357. Two of our recent cases illustrate this 
point. In Dey, for example, we held that the alleged infringer was not entitled to 
summary judgment of invalidity due to prior public use. Id. The purported public 
use was the defendant’s own clinical trial of the allegedly infringing product. Id. Be-
cause only the clinical trial administrator, not the subjects taking the medication, 
was made aware of the invention’s claimed formulation and stability characteristics, 
and the administrator had signed a pledge of confidentiality, we held that “a finder 
of fact could conclude that the study was conducted with a reasonable expectation 
of confidentiality as to the nature of the formulations being tested, [such that] sum-
mary judgment on the public use issue was inappropriate.” Id. (emphasis added). A 
fact finder could so conclude even though the subjects did not likewise sign a confi-
dentiality pledge because “they were given incomplete descriptions of the treatment 
formulation.” Id. 
Likewise, in Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 1376, 1385 
(Fed. Cir. 2007), we reversed a lower court judgment invalidating a patent where 
certain disclosures did not reveal all aspects of the claimed invention, and another 
disclosure, which did so, was subject to a non-disclosure agreement. Specifically, the 
invention was an ergonomic keyboard and the claims required that the device 
transmit information. See U.S. Patent No. 5,178,477, col. 7, ll. 46-48 (“An ergo-
nomic keyboard input device for the transmission of information by a human opera-
tor to an electronic system coupled with said device *** ”); U.S. Patent No. 
5,332,322, col. 8, ll. 16-31 (“A handheld device for entering information into an 
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electronic system via a keyboard *** whereby information is entered into an elec-
tronic system.”). The inventor had shown a prototype of the invention to potential 
investors, but the prototype was not plugged into a computer during these displays. 
Id. at 1379. He also made the invention available to a third-party to perform test-
ing, which did involve the transmission of information, but that third party had 
signed a confidentiality agreement. Id. We found no public use from either disclo-
sure: 
All disclosures, except for the one-time typing test, only provided a visual 
view of the new keyboard design without any disclosure of the [proto-
type’s] ability to translate finger movements into actuation of keys to 
transmit data. In essence, these disclosures visually displayed the keyboard 
design without putting it into use. In short, the [prototype] was not in 
public use as the term is used in § 102(b) because the device, although vis-
ually disclosed and only tested one time with a NDA signed by the 
typing tester, was never connected to be used in the normal course of 
business to enter data into a system. 
Id. Our precedent thus establishes firmly that all aspects of the claimed invention 
must be disclosed for the § 102(b) public use bar to apply. See also Janssen Pharma-
ceutica, N.V. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 134 Fed. Appx. 425, 431 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Janssen correctly argues, however, that because the composition of F12 (including 
the beads and the size of the cores contained in the capsule) was never released to 
the doctors or the subjects of the trials, this fact weighs in favor of a finding that the 
use was not public.”); W.L. Gore & Assocs., 721 F.2d at 1549 (reversing lower court 
judgment invalidating method claims under § 102(b) because there was “no evi-
dence that a viewer of [a] machine could thereby learn anything of which process, 
among all possible processes, the machine is being used to practice”). 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the allegedly invalidating use at issue 
here. Because we find that Norsk Hydro sent samples of the invention claimed in 
the ’667 patent to Skrinska at St. Vincent Charity Hospital without restriction and 
Skrinska thereafter tested the samples, we hold that Norsk Hydro put its invention 
to an invalidating public use. 
B. Norsk Hydro’s Actions 
Sometime in 1987, Norsk Hydro visited Skrinska while he was employed at the 
Cleveland Research Institute and described to him its fish oil products in the hopes 
of interesting him in conducting studies of or promoting them. On May 15, 1987, 
Skrinska wrote Norsk Hydro expressing interest in its “purified individual acids,” 
i.e., omega-3 fatty acids, and in “clinical studies using the mixtures you described in 
your visit.” In a letter dated November 25, 1986, Sigurd Gulbrandsen of Norsk 
Hydro informed others within the company of Skrinska’s interest, and the benefits 
of providing product to Skrinska, who was by then working at St. Vincent Charity 
Hospital. A consultant had advised Norsk Hydro to “explore the possibility of par-
ticipating in the St. Vincent Charity diabetes trials” because “St. Vincent Charity 
Hospital has had a reputation for advanced cardiovascular research” and “certainly 
represent[s] the most intensive, concentrated—and professionally credible—omega-
3 clinic research potential anywhere in the world.” The consultant also believed that 
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Skrinska “was among the most omega-3-knowledgeable researchers interviewed by 
[it], with definite interest in the ethyl-esterified triglycerides forms of the Norsk  
Hydro oils.” 
Norsk Hydro followed its consultant’s advice and provided Skrinska with its 
concentrated fish oil products. In fact, Pronova admits that it “sent Dr. Skrinska a 
small (100 mL) liquid sample of a K80 product from Batch 163 and a liquid sample 
of 30% cholesterol-free triglyceride concentrate in July 1987, and then sent him in 
September 1987 two 100 mL liquid samples of K80 from Batch 222 to replace the 
first sample.” Br. of Appellee 25. The record contains Norsk Hydro’s correspond-
ence documenting these shipments, including a certificate of analysis for Batch 222, 
which shows that the product meets the limitations of the asserted claims. Notably, 
that correspondence makes no mention of any confidentiality restrictions, and Pro-
nova does not argue that any were either requested or given. There was also no 
agreement restricting use of batches to clinical trials or experiments; Pronova con-
cedes experimental use is not at issue. Skrinska’s testimony on the shipments con-
firms these events. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Norsk Hydro provided Skrinska the 
invention of the ’667 patent with no secrecy obligation or limitation for his unfet-
tered use. This access began, at the latest, in September of 1987, when Norsk 
shipped to Skrinska samples from Batch 222. The shipment made public all aspects 
of the claimed inventions, since it included a certificate of analysis revealing the 
composition of the supplied products. The documentary evidence regarding this 
shipment is unrefuted. Skrinska had access to all aspects of the asserted claims of the 
’667 patent. Indeed, he confirmed the disclosed formulation by his own analytical 
testing. 
The use involved here—Norsk Hydro’s shipment of the samples and Skrinska’s 
analytical testing thereof—is similar to uses we have found invalidating in the past. 
As in Lough and Beachcombers, described above, Norsk Hydro provided the inven-
tion to others under no confidentiality restrictions and kept no track of the third-
party’s use. 86 F.3d at 1116; 31 F.3d at 1159-60. Pronova does not even know 
what Skrinska did with the samples after he received them. 
Unlike the cases we cite above where no invalidating public use was found, the 
public use involved here disclosed all aspects of the claimed invention with no ex-
pectation of secrecy. In Dey and Motionless Keyboard, those made aware of all aspects 
of the claimed invention were under confidentiality restrictions and other disclosures 
did not reveal all aspects of the claims. See Dey, 715 F.3d at 1357; Motionless Key-
board, 486 F.3d 1379. Here, on the other hand, Norsk Hydro provided a certificate 
of analysis revealing all the claimed elements without any confidentiality agreement 
or understanding. As in Netscape, moreover, the disclosure here was made to one 
highly skilled in the art, with the full ability to know, understand, and fully disclose 
the invention to others. Indeed, the district court pointed to documents in the  
record confirming Skrinska’s testimony that he shared information regarding the 
samples sent to him with other members of the medical community in Cleveland 
and did not treat that information as confidential. 
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We are not persuaded by Pronova’s argument that “use” of a pharmaceutical 
formulation cannot occur until it is used to treat the condition it is intended to 
counteract, or at least physically ingested. Certainly, where only a partial demonstra-
tion of a system’s (or formulation’s) capabilities occurs—as in Motionless Keyboard—
or where unsophisticated users are provided a compound with no detail regarding its 
formulation—as in Dey—there will be no public use. Where, as here, however, a 
compound is provided without restriction to one highly skilled in the art, that com-
pound’s formulation is disclosed in detail, and the formulation is subject to confirm-
atory testing, no other activity is needed to render that use an invalidating one. 
Once the formulation was disclosed in full to Skrinska, without any restriction on its 
use, it had been released into the “public domain” for purposes of § 102(b). 
Accordingly, we hold that Norsk Hydro put the invention in the asserted claims 
of the ‘667 patent to public use. We reverse the district court ruling to the contrary 
and hold that the asserted claims of the ’667 patents are invalid under § 102(b).8  
…  
Hamilton Beach Brands v. Sunbeam Prods. 
726 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
O’Malley, Judge: 
Hamilton Beach Brands appeals from the … granting in part of Sunbeam Prod-
ucts’ motion for summary judgment finding claims 1 and 3-7 of U.S. Patent No. 
7,947,928 invalid as anticipated. … For the reasons below, we affirm the district 
court’s ruling that the asserted claims are invalid under the on-sale bar. 
I. Background 
Hamilton Beach and Sunbeam are direct competitors in the small kitchen appli-
ance industry. Both Hamilton Beach and Sunbeam sell competing versions of “slow 
cookers,” which are electrically heated lidded pots that are used to cook food at low 
temperatures for long periods. Hamilton Beach is the assignee of the ’928 patent, 
which is directed to a particular type of portable slow cooker. 
The ’928 patent, filed June 4, 2010, is a continuation of U.S. Patent Applica-
tion No. 12/255,188, which, in turn, is a continuation of U.S. Patent Application 
No. 11/365,222. The ’222 application was filed on March 1, 2006 and issued on 
February 3, 2009, as U.S. Patent No. 7,485,831. In other words, the ’928 patent 
directly at issue in this case is the “grandchild” of the ’831 patent. The ’831 patent 
disclosed a “portable” slow cooker. The claimed slow cooker included clips used to 
seal the detachable lid of the device on the housing of the cooker. The sealing action 
provided by the clips is intended to limit leaking during transport. The ’831 patent 
provides an image of a preferred embodiment[.] 
                                                
8 Because our decision does not depend on Skrinska’s testimony that he used K-80 
capsules in a clinical trial, we need not and do not disturb the district court’s credi-
bility finding on that point. That Skrinska received vials, that the formulation of K-
80 was fully disclosed, and that Skrinska tested the composition of the vials was fully 
corroborated and the trial court did not find to the contrary. 
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The written description pro-
vides that at least one “clip” (ele-
ment 22) is used, among other el-
ements, to seal the lid onto the 
body of the slow cooker. 
Hamilton Beach’s commercial 
embodiment of its patented inven-
tion is the Stay or Go slow cooker. 
According to Hamilton Beach, the 
Stay or Go slow cooker was a tre-
mendous commercial success and 
increased Hamilton Beach’s market share by over 30 percent. In response to Hamil-
ton Beach’s success, Sunbeam, the previous market leader, developed a competing 
slow cooker called the Cook & Carry. Sunbeam attempted to design around the 
’831 patent claims by mounting sealing clips on the lid of the slow cooker rather 
than on the body. 
Hamilton Beach responded to Sunbeam’s introduction of its slow cooker by  
filing a continuation of the ’222 application, which eventually matured into the ’928 
patent. As could be predicted, the ’928 patent claimed a slow cooker with sealing 
clips on the lid of the slow cooker. During prosecution of the ’928 patent, Hamil-
ton Beach argued that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that  
placing the clips on the lid was wholly consistent with the original disclosure in the 
’222 application. The patent office agreed, and the ’928 patent issued on May 24, 
2011. That same day, Hamilton Beach filed suit alleging that Sunbeam’s Cook & 
Carry slow cooker infringed the ’928 patent. 
Hamilton Beach alleged that Sunbeam’s Cook & Carry slow cooker infringed 
claims 1 and 3-7 of the ’928 patent (“asserted claims”). Claim 1 is representative 
and provides: 
1. A slow cooker for heating of food stuffs, the slow cooker comprising: 
a housing having a base and a side wall extending therefrom to define a 
heating cavity within the housing, the housing further having a housing 
rim at a first, free edge of the side wall defining an opening to the heating 
cavity; 
a heating element disposed within the housing sufficiently proximate the 
heating cavity to heat the heating cavity; 
a container having a generally hollow interior and a container rim defining 
an opening for accessing the interior thereof, the interior being capable of 
retaining the food stuffs therein, the container being shaped and sized to 
fit within the heating cavity of the housing for heating thereof by the heat-
ing element; 
a lid sized and shaped to at least partially cover the opening of the contain-
er when placed on the container rim, the lid having a gasket around an 
outer edge thereof for sealing engagement with the container rim; and 
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at least one clip mounted between the lid and the side wall of the housing, 
the at least one clip being an over-the-center clip having a hook and a 
catch, one of the hook and catch being mounted on one of the lid and side 
wall of the housing and the other of the hook and catch being mounted on 
the other of the lid and side wall of the housing, the at least one clip being 
selectively engageable with the lid and side wall of the housing to selective-
ly retain the lid in sealing engagement with the container rim to inhibit 
leakage of the food stuffs from the interior of the container, wherein the 
housing and lid have a vertical height, the at least one clip being disposed 
entirely within the vertical height of the housing and lid to facilitate stor-
age and transport of the slow cooker when the at least one clip is engaged 
with the lid and side wall of the housing. 
’928 patent, col. 8, ll. 16-49. 
Two days after filing suit, Hamilton Beach moved for a preliminary injunction, 
which the district court denied. A few months later, the district court construed a 
number of claim terms and then entertained the parties’ motions for summary 
judgment. 
Sunbeam moved the court for summary judgment, contending that its Cook & 
Carry slow cooker did not infringe the asserted claims. Sunbeam also argued that 
the asserted claims of the ’928 patent were invalid because Hamilton Beach could 
not claim priority to the ’831 patent as it introduced new matter into the ’928 writ-
ten description, which rendered the ’928 patent’s claims anticipated under 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102(a) and (b). Sunbeam further claimed that Hamilton Beach offered 
for sale and publicly used the Stay or Go slow cooker, the commercial embodiment 
of the ’831 patent, more than one year prior to the earliest possible filing date, i.e., 
one year prior to the ’831 patent’s application date—March 1, 2006 (the ’831  
patent’s application date and the earliest possible filing date), rendering the ’928 
patent claims invalid. …  
… The district court … concluded that the ’928 patent was invalid because it 
was not entitled to an earlier filing date than the one listed on its face because Ham-
ilton Beach added new matter when it filed its continuation; therefore, the sales of 
the Stay or Go slow cooker more than one year before that date served as invalidat-
ing sales and uses of the ’928 patent under the on-sale and public use bars of 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b). And, the district court found that, even if the ’928 patent was en-
titled to an earlier priority date coincident with the ’222 application, there were in-
validating commercial offers to sell the Stay or Go slow cooker prior to the critical 
date. …  
II. Discussion 
The district court found that Hamilton Beach’s purchase order with its foreign 
supplier for the Stay or Go amounted to an invalidating commercial offer for sale 
under the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). We agree with the district court that 
Hamilton Beach’s transaction with its foreign supplier in early 2005 was an offer for 
sale of a product that anticipated the asserted claims and that the invention was 
ready for patenting prior to the critical date. As discussed below, therefore, we hold 
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the asserted claims of the ’928 patent invalid under § 102(b). Consequently, we find 
the remaining issues on appeal moot. 
A. Legal Standard 
…  
The on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical 
date: (1) the claimed invention must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale; 
and (2) the invention must be ready for patenting. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 
U.S. 55, 67 (1998). An actual sale is not required for the activity to be an invali-
dating commercial offer for sale. Atlanta Attachment Co. v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 
516 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008). An attempt to sell is sufficient so long as it 
is “sufficiently definite that another party could make a binding contract by simple 
acceptance.” Id. (citing Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). “In determining such definiteness, we review the language of the 
proposal in accordance with the principles of general contract law.” Id. 
An invention is “ready for patenting” when prior to the critical date: (1) the in-
vention is reduced to practice; or (2) the invention is depicted in drawings or de-
scribed in writings of sufficient nature to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the invention. Id. The on-sale bar is a question of law based on underly-
ing factual findings. See Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 
1045-46 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 678 
F.3d 1300, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Whether a patent is invalid for a public use or 
sale is a question of law, reviewed de novo, based on underlying facts, reviewed for 
substantial evidence following a jury verdict.”); Electromotive Division of General 
Motors Corp. v. Transportation Systems Division of General Electric Co., 417 F.3d 
1203, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Whether an invention was on sale within the 
meaning of § 102(b) is a question of law that we review de novo based upon under-
lying facts, which we review for clear error.”). 
B. Analysis 
Sunbeam contended that Hamilton Beach’s foreign supplier offered to sell the 
Stay or Go slow cooker, a commercial embodiment of the ’831 and ’928 patents, to 
Hamilton Beach prior to the relevant critical date of March 1, 2005. The district 
court agreed and found that the claimed invention in the ’831 and ’928 patents was 
offered for sale and was ready for patenting before the critical date. 
At the outset, there are three important points to note. First, while the trial 
court found that the relevant critical date for the ’928 patent was June 4, 2009, be-
cause the patent included new matter—a finding which would clearly invalidate that 
patent under § 102(b)—it alternatively found that the on-sale bar applied even if the 
’928 patent was entitled to the ’831 patent’s critical date, i.e., March 1, 2005. Be-
cause we do not address the trial court’s new matter finding, we employ the earlier 
critical date in our § 102(b) analysis, a date more favorable to Hamilton Beach.  
Second, there is no “supplier exception” to the on-sale bar. See Special Devices, Inc. 
v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Thus, it is of no consequence 
that the “commercial offer for sale” at issue in this case was made by Hamilton 
Beach’s own supplier and was made to Hamilton Beach itself. Finally, a commercial 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  167 
offer for sale made by a foreign entity that is directed to a United States customer at 
its place of business in the United States may serve as an invaliding activity. In re 
Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676-77 (Fed. Cir. 1985). It is undisputed that Hamilton’s 
Beach’s foreign supplier directed its activity to Hamilton Beach within the United 
States. 
1. Commercial Offer for Sale 
The district court found that Hamilton Beach’s interaction with its supplier was 
dispositive regarding whether the patented invention was the subject of a commer-
cial offer for sale. We agree, albeit on slightly different grounds. 
On February 8, 2005, Hamilton Beach issued a purchase order to its supplier 
for manufacture of its Stay or Go slow cookers. Hamilton Beach listed on the pur-
chase order its facility in Tennessee as the shipping address and its office in Virginia 
as the billing address. Hamilton Beach also listed the specific quantity—almost 2000 
units, part number, unit price, and requested delivery date for the slow cookers. On 
February 25, 2005, the supplier, via email, confirmed that it had received the pur-
chase order and noted that it would begin production of the slow cookers after re-
ceiving Hamilton Beach’s release. 
As noted by the district court, in the small kitchen appliance industry, such a 
purchase order is a typical transaction. The transaction involves a manufacturer 
transmitting a purchase order to a vendor or supplier, with the supplier fulfilling that 
order by manufacturing the requested items. In that scenario, the manufacturer 
makes the initial contact, which is an offer to buy. The district court, relying on Lin-
ear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2001), found that an 
offer to buy a patented invention prior to the critical date amounts to an invalidating 
sale under § 102(b) as long as the offer is accepted and a binding contract to sell is 
formed. Id. at 1052. 
In Linear Tech., Linear Technology Corporation (“LTC”) created the LT1070 
chip, which was “a functioning version of the [claimed] invention.” Id. at 1043-44. 
Prior to the critical date and release of the chip, LTC’s European distributors sub-
mitted purchase orders, or offers to buy, the LT1070. Id. at 1044-45, 1052. Upon 
receipt of these offers to buy, LTC would create dummy accounts in its sales soft-
ware until the chip was ready for release, but did not otherwise respond to the buy-
ers’ offers. Id. Once the chip was officially released, LTC customer service represen-
tatives would convert the dummy orders into normal orders which it would then 
accept. Id. The buyers were never required to take any action beyond their initial 
offers to buy. Id. 
Based on those facts, this court stated that “[t]he question is whether LTC ac-
cepted [the foreign distributors’ offers to buy] before [the critical date], because if 
so, then it entered into a binding contract to sell the LT1070 that invalidates the 
[patent-in-suit].” This court found that, because LTC never communicated ac-
ceptance of the distributors’ offers to buy prior to the critical date, there was no 
completed sale, and, thus, no invalidating sale. Id. at 1052-1054. 
Relying on Linear Tech., the district court in this case stated that, if the transac-
tions and communications between Hamilton Beach and its supplier formed a bind-
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ing contract, Pfaff’s first prong would be met. The district court then analyzed the 
communications between Hamilton Beach and its supplier and found that the sup-
plier’s response email in February 2005—prior to the March 1, 2005 critical date—
was an objective manifestation of assent that created a binding contract between the 
parties for sale of the patented product. The parties spend much of their briefing on 
appeal debating the propriety of this conclusion. While the district court’s conclu-
sion that the claims of the ’928 patent are invalid under § 102(b) was correct, there 
was no need for the district court to require a binding contract on these facts; Line-
ar Tech. is factually distinguishable, making the lower court’s and parties’ reliance on 
it misplaced. 
After Hamilton Beach sent the February 8, 2005, purchase order to its supplier, 
the supplier responded that it had received the order and was ready to fulfill it upon 
Hamilton Beach’s “release.” The email also listed specific details of what the order 
would entail. These circumstances are notably different than those in Linear Tech., 
because LTC never responded to the foreign distributors’ offers to buy until after 
the critical date. The significance of this second communication is important, but 
not for the precise reason the district court found. As this court has repeatedly  
stated, a commercial offer for sale under § 102(b) is “one which the other party 
could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance.” Group One Ltd., 254 
F.3d at 1048; see also Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components, USA, Inc., 
322 F.3d 1335, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 279 
F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
Hamilton Beach takes aim at the district court’s reliance on the supplier’s re-
sponse email requesting a “release” before it could begin production of the slow 
cookers. Hamilton Beach points to the parties’ corporate purchase agreement which 
allegedly required Hamilton Beach to give a certified review and approval of a final 
product to its supplier before shipment of any product. Hamilton Beach con-
sequently argues that, because it did not provide that “release” until after the critical 
date, there was no binding pre-critical date contract, as it says Linear Tech requires. 
Even accepting all of Hamilton Beach’s factual contentions as true, they are not de-
terminative of whether the communications with its supplier amounted to a com-
mercial offer for sale. 
Hamilton Beach’s supplier responded prior to the critical date that it was ready 
to fulfill the order. In other words, the supplier made an offer to sell the slow cook-
ers to Hamilton Beach. At that point, the commercial offer for sale was made and, 
under the governing corporate purchase agreement, Hamilton Beach could accept 
the offer when it so pleased. And, Hamilton Beach concedes, as it must, that, had it 
provided a “release” any time after it received that email, a binding contract would 
have been formed. As such, even if the parties had not entered into a binding con-
tract when the supplier responded to the purchase order, the response, nevertheless, 
was a commercial offer for sale that Hamilton Beach could have made into a binding 
contract by simple acceptance. This was enough to satisfy Pfaff’s first prong without 
the need for a binding contract. Grp. One Ltd., 254 F.3d at 1046; see also Lacks In-
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dustries, Inc., 322 F.3d at 1348; Dana Corp., 279 F.3d at 1377. To the extent the 
parties and the district court read Linear Tech to require more, they were wrong.2 
2. Ready for Patenting 
A product is “ready for patenting” for purposes of the on-sale bar under 
§ 102(b) if the claimed invention is: (1) reduced to practice; or (2) depicted in 
drawings or other descriptions “that were sufficiently specific to enable a person 
skilled in the art to practice the invention.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68; see also Weath-
erchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 163 F.3d 1326, 1332-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding 
that drawings depicting and samples of the claimed invention were sufficiently defi-
nite to enable a person of skill in the art to practice the invention). The district court 
explained that Hamilton Beach held precritical date meetings with many of its retail 
customers’ buying agents and presented detailed descriptions and depictions of the 
Stay or Go slow cooker. At these meetings and presentations, Hamilton Beach 
showed and distributed Computer Aided Design (“CAD”) drawings depicting the 
Stay or Go slow cooker. The district court found that these detailed drawings and 
descriptions from Hamilton Beach’s meetings, coupled with the communications 
with its supplier, demonstrated that the invention was ready for patenting. 
Hamilton Beach contends that the district court erred in finding that the pro-
duct that was the subject of the purchase order was ready for patenting because the 
district court failed to conduct an element-by-element analysis of the precise product 
that was the subject of the purchase order. Hamilton Beach’s argument is misplaced. 
First, the Stay or Go slow cooker is a commercial embodiment of the ’928  
patent, a fact that Hamilton Beach does not, and cannot, dispute. And, the Stay or 
Go slow cooker is the same product that Hamilton Beach both ordered from its  
foreign supplier and marketed to its retail customers before the critical date. This 
marketing included presentations that depicted and described the patentable features 
of the invention, such as the side clips and lid gasket used to keep the lid in place 
and seal the food inside. The district court found as much. 
Hamilton Beach argues, however, that the district court was required to do an 
element-by-element analysis on the prototypes and product samples on which it was 
working prior to the critical date. Hamilton Beach contends that such an analysis 
would show that the samples it marketed, and the specifications upon which it 
premised its own purchase order, did not meet an important limitation in the assert-
ed claims: that the lid be retained in a “sealing engagement with the container rim 
                                                
2 The dissent does not dispute that a firm offer for sale occurred in this case or that 
the offer for sale was for almost 2000 units of the Stay or Go slow cooker. Instead, it 
argues that no “commercial” sale occurred because the offer pertained to items that 
were to be purchased for “experimental use.” No experimental use defense has been 
asserted by Hamilton Beach in this case, however—neither at the trial court level 
nor before this court. “Experimental use” is simply not at issue. There is, thus, no 
threat that this decision will have any impact on that defense; it certainly will not 
“eviscerate” that defense as the dissent fears. Given the dissent’s citation to Pfaff, it 
appears that the dissent is confusing the concept of experimental use with whether 
an invention is ready for patenting at the time a sale or offer for sale occurs. …  
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to inhibit leakage of the food stuffs from the interior of the container.” ’928 patent, 
col. 8, ll. 42-44. Hamilton Beach alleges that neither its own engineers nor its sup-
plier were able to perfect a slow cooker that met that limitation until “months” after 
the critical date. 
After review of the district court’s analysis and the facts in this record, we per-
ceive no error in the district court’s conclusion that the product was ready for  
patenting prior to the critical date. Sunbeam proffered what the district court de-
scribed as a “veritable tome” of evidence from Hamilton Beach’s meeting with its 
retail customers that provided specific descriptions of the Stay or Go slow cooker, as 
well as CAD drawings depicting the Stay or Go, that contained all the limitations of 
the ’831 and ’928 patents. Under the “ready for patenting” prong, so long as the 
descriptions and depictions of the slow cooker are sufficiently precise to enable a 
person of ordinary skill to build the invention, the district court properly concluded 
that the invention was “ready for patenting.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68. 
The CAD drawings and descriptions from these presentations—containing the 
same specifications provided to Hamilton Beach’s supplier—are more than enough 
to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention. 
Many of the presentations disclosed that the Stay or Go slow cooker used clips and a 
gasket to hold the lid in place. A person of skill in the art, viewing these presenta-
tions, would understand that, if the lid is held in place by a gasket, it would be re-
tained in such a way to prevent food from leaking from the container. Given the rel-
ative simplicity of the invention, the descriptions and drawings Hamilton Beach 
showed to its retail customers and the specifications provided to its supplier are suf-
ficiently enabling and, as an admitted commercial embodiment of the patent-in-suit, 
would meet every limitation of the asserted claims. No reasonable juror could con-
clude otherwise. 
Aside from the drawings and descriptions, Hamilton Beach also concedes that, 
by February 2005, it possessed at least one product sample that worked as intended, 
i.e., the lid sealed in such a way to inhibit food from leaking out of the container. 
See Oral Argument at 7:15-8:30. The record reveals that, at about the same time as, 
and prior to the critical date, Hamilton Beach engineers also created a working pro-
totype that was subjected to testing and was successful. In other words, Hamilton 
Beach possessed working prototypes, or at least one prototype, of the Stay or Go 
slow cooker, which it concedes met all the limitations of the asserted patent claims. 
Hamilton Beach’s argument that some of the prototypes did not work as intended is 
of no moment, moreover, because “fine-tuning” of an invention after the critical 
date does not mean that the invention was not ready for patenting. See Weatherchem 
Corp., 163 F.3d at 1332-34. As such, the district court did not err in concluding 
that the Stay or Go slow cooker was a commercial embodiment of the asserted 
claims and necessarily met all the claim limitations, and, consequently, concluding 
that the slow cooker was ready for patenting. 
In sum, the district court’s conclusion that there was no genuine dispute of ma-
terial fact that the patent-in-suit was invalid under § 102(b) was correct. Hamilton 
Beach received a commercial offer for sale from its foreign supplier, and the patent-
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ed invention was ready for patenting at the time of the sale—as supported by the 
working prototypes and detailed drawings and descriptions. 
…  
Reyna, Judge, dissenting: 
The Supreme Court has instructed that an on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) shall arise, if at all, only when the patented invention is the subject of a 
commercial offer for sale and the invention is ready for patenting more than one 
year before the patent’s filing date. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Yet 
the majority concludes that Hamilton Beach’s purchase order sent to its foreign 
supplier, which asked the supplier to build a set of slow cookers pursuant to Hamil-
ton Beach’s specifications, resulted in an offer to sell a patented invention that antic-
ipates the claims of Hamilton Beach’s patent. In order to reach this conclusion, the 
majority is quick to note that there is no “supplier exception” to otherwise anticipa-
tory offers for sale under § 102(b), while at the same time it overlooks the Supreme 
Court’s requirement that the offer be a “commercial” one. Because the majority’s 
oversight portends grave consequences for innovation and experimental use, I re-
spectfully dissent. 
When the Supreme Court decided Pfaff, it explicitly rejected this court’s multi-
factor, “totality of the circumstances” test we had previously used to determine 
whether there was an on-sale bar. 525 U.S. at 66 & n.11. In its place, the Court 
substituted a two-pronged test, having a first prong that requires a commercial offer 
for sale. Id. at 67. This requirement makes sense: “An inventor can both understand 
and control the timing of the first commercial marketing of his invention.” Id. In-
deed, the Court was careful to distinguish between a “sale [that] was commercial 
rather than experimental in character.” Id. In my view, an overly-broad application 
of the no-supplier-exception rule would all but abolish this distinction and render 
the experimental-use exception useless for a significant class of innovators. 
After Pfaff was decided, this court began fashioning the no-supplier-exception 
rule in Brasseler. The patentee, Brasseler, U.S.A., had its exclusive manufacturer 
produce 3,000 surgical saws embodying the invention set forth in its patent’s claims. 
Noting that the saws were ordered “in large quantity for resale,” this court con-
cluded that “[t]he transaction at issue undisputedly was a ‘sale’ in a commercial law 
sense.” Indeed, it was “not a case in which an individual inventor takes a design to a 
fabricator and pays the fabricator for its services in fabricating a few sample products. 
*** [Instead, the manufacturer] made a large number of the agreed-upon product 
for general marketing by Brasseler.” Only after concluding that the sale was com-
mercial in nature did this court reject the assertion that the relationship between the 
supplier and the patentee somehow prevented the sale from triggering the on-sale 
bar. 
Shortly thereafter, in Special Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001), this court applied the no-supplier-exception after concluding that the 
offer was commercial in nature. The patentee, OEA, Inc., contracted with its suppli-
er to provide it with 20,000 patented embodiments of its “all-glass header” for use 
in automobile airbags. In addition, the patentee agreed to supply the supplier with 
millions of the patented headers annually. Unsurprisingly, OEA “conceded that 
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these transactions were ‘commercial,’ not experimental” given that it was unrebut-
ted that OEA “had purchased [the headers] for commercial purposes.” Thus, the 
only two instances where this court has deployed the no-supplier-exception rule in-
volved offers or sales that unquestionably met the Supreme Court’s requirement 
that the offer be part of a “commercial” offer or sale. 
With no review of whether the offer was commercial in nature, the majority in 
this case has extended the no-supplier-exception rule to a case without considering 
whether the purchase order was placed for purely experimental purposes. Yet the 
circumstances indicate that it was.2 The purchase order “was not the result of cus-
tomer demand or projections,” and, at the time the order was placed, Hamilton 
Beach was repeatedly changing the product specification due to a series of design 
failures, most notably, foodstuffs leaking through the lid. The design remained un-
stable for nearly three months after the purchase order was placed. Just as the  
Supreme Court applied the experimental-use exception when Mr. Nicholson, the 
patentee in City of Elizabeth, tested and perfected his pavement on a busy toll road 
in Boston—inspecting and tapping it with his cane almost daily—for more than six 
years before filing for a patent, 97 U.S. at 133-37, Hamilton Beach was similarly 
entitled to test and perfect its slow cooker under the experimental-use exception.3 
See Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 64 (“[A]n inventor who seeks to perfect his discovery may 
conduct extensive testing without losing his right to obtain a patent for his inven-
tion—even if such testing occurs in the public eye.”). … 
My greatest concerns involve the implications this case will have for future in-
novators, most notably small enterprises and individual inventors who lack in-house 
prototyping and fabricating capabilities. Whenever the development process requires 
those entities to manufacture working prototypes or pre-mass-production samples, 
                                                
2 The majority states that the “experimental use defense has [not] been asserted by 
Hamilton Beach in this case.” While Hamilton Beach did not use the phrase “exper-
imental use,” it argued at length that its offer for sale was non-commercial and that 
its engineers were attempting to overcome serious shortcomings when the offer was 
made. The majority chooses to ignore the interplay between the requirement for a 
commercial offer for sale and experimental use. I find that the issues addressed by 
the parties and, indeed the majority, lay a sufficient framework under which to ana-
lyze all the issues in this case. 
3 The majority contends that the use intended by Hamilton Beach in this case was 
not experimental because it ordered almost 2,000 (actually 1,952) slow cookers. 
This sort of quantitative analysis was previously accepted under the “totality of the 
circumstances” test—a test rejected by the Supreme Court in Pfaff. Here, Hamilton 
Beach was not “stockpil[ing] commercial embodiments of their patented invention” 
as was occurring in Brasseler and Special Devices. Special Devices, 270 F.3d at 1354. 
It would make no sense for Hamilton Beach to stockpile slow cookers for future 
sales when its slow cookers were leaking at the time. Rather, the circumstances sug-
gest that Hamilton Beach was in the midst of testing and perfecting its slow cookers 
under the experimental use exception when the offer was made. This is true—and 
can be true—even if the invention was ready for patenting at that time. 
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they often have no choice but to reach out to third-party suppliers. Under the ma-
jority’s holding in this case, a single offer to buy for purely experimental purposes 
may trigger the on-sale bar, and the experimental-use exception will offer them no 
salvation. It is from this evisceration of the experimental-use exception that I  
respectfully dissent.  
Steven C. Carlson & Leeron G. Kalay,  
Old World Fix for a New Patent Problem?,  
IP Law & Business, Apr/May 2009 
Outsourcing the synthesis of chemical compounds is a growing practice in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Increasingly, drug researchers order novel compounds 
from third-party vendors, then subject them to many rounds of study. Years may 
pass before a patent application is filed on a particular compound. 
A potential problem with this approach lies in patent law’s “on-sale bar,” which 
prohibits filing patents on inventions more than one year after they are ready for pa-
tenting and subject to a commercial offer for sale. Although the sale of newly syn-
thesized compounds from outsourcers back to pharmaceutical companies may ad-
here to underlying policies and objectives in patent law, it may still qualify as a bar-
ring event. The nineteenth-century doctrine of bailment may provide a solution. 
Historically applied to the creation of such goods as wine and cheese, this common-
law structure has been revived, including in the life sciences field. 
…  
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a sale occurs only where title passes to a 
buyer. A bailment by definition is not a sale because it allows for the transfer of 
goods without the passing of title. A bailment requires the creation of a trust, in 
which a bailor authorizes the recipient to hold, and if need be to modify, the object 
of that trust—leaving your car at the garage for repairs, for example. … 
… 
B.A. Ballou & Co. v. Citytrust 
591 A.2d 126 (Conn. 1991) 
Covello, Justice:  
This is an action in conversion. The plaintiff, B.A. Ballou & Co., alleges that 
the defendant, Citytrust, wrongfully appropriated the plaintiff’s scrap metal while it 
was in the possession of a third party, Bridgeport Rolling Mills Company. The issues 
on appeal are: (1) who has the burden of proving whether a bailment exists; [and] 
(2) whether under the circumstances presented a bailment existed … . We conclude 
that (1) the burden of proving a bailment lies with the party whose claim to owner-
ship relies upon such a relationship, and (2) no bailment existed here. 
The parties stipulated as follows: the plaintiff Ballou manufactures jewelry. 
Bridgeport Rolling Mills, Inc. (Brimco), was a metal fabricator. Brimco supplied 
Ballou with sheets of stock brass, an alloy that Ballou used to manufacture jewelry. 
Ballou shipped its leftover brass back to Brimco, which commingled it with scrap 
brass received from other companies. Brimco then shipped the accumulated scrap to 
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a processing mill, which added new base metal as required and reconstituted it into 
finished brass that Brimco thereafter kept in its inventory available for subsequent 
orders. The type of brass needed by a given customer varied from time to time and 
therefore the new brass returned to the customer by Brimco could have an entirely 
different composition than the scrap sent by the customer. For example, Brimco 
might receive brass scrap composed of 70 % copper and 30 % zinc and return brass 
composed of 85 % copper and 15 % zinc. The only record of the brass sent by Ballou 
to Brimco was a “toll metal account” that listed the weight of each base metal in a 
given customer’s account. Because Brimco commingled the scrap metal and had it 
remanufactured by a third party who mixed it with new metal as needed, there was 
no way of determining whether any of the same scrap sent to Brimco by Ballou ever 
returned to Ballou as finished brass. 
On May 22, 1981, Brimco entered into a security agreement with the defend-
ant Citytrust for a revolving line of credit. The loan was secured by an interest in 
“[a]ll inventory of the Borrower, now owned or hereafter acquired. *** All goods 
*** or other property *** in which Borrower has an interest *** or come[s] into 
possession.” Unknown to Ballou, Brimco consistently represented to Citytrust that 
it owned all the scrap metal in its possession. In June, 1987, Citytrust, as a secured 
creditor, took possession of Brimco’s assets pursuant to the security agreement, in-
cluding all metal on site. 
Ballou thereafter brought an action against Citytrust for its alleged conversion 
of Ballou’s scrap metal and for violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices 
Act. The trial court concluded that Ballou had retained title to the scrap and that a 
bailment therefore existed. It accordingly rendered judgment for Ballou in the 
amount of $114,575. Citytrust appealed, claiming that the trial court (1) incorrectly 
concluded that a bailment existed [and] (2) improperly shifted the burden of proof 
to Citytrust to prove that a bailment did not exist … . 
Citytrust first claims that the trial court improperly placed the burden of prov-
ing a necessary element of Ballou’s case upon Citytrust. In order for Ballou to pre-
vail on its conversion claim, it must demonstrate that it continued to own the scrap. 
Gilbert v. Walker, 64 Conn. 390, 394 (1890). Since Brimco had possession, Ballou 
was required to prove the existence of a bailment. It is an “‘elementary rule that 
whenever the existence of any fact is necessary in order that a party may make out 
his case *** the burden is on such party to show the existence of such fact.’” Ni-
kitiuk v. Pishtey, 153 Conn. 545, 552 (1966); Eichman v. J & J Building Co., 216 
Conn. 443, 451 (1990). This rule holds true for bailment cases as well. See Wells v. 
Active Automobile Exchange, Inc., 99 Conn. 523, 527 (1923). While the trial court 
arguably assigned the burden of proof of this issue to Citytrust we need not take up 
Citytrust’s claim in this regard because we find that, under the facts as stipulated, a 
bailment could not have existed. 
Ballou claims that the toll metal account between itself and Brimco constituted 
a bailment. Ballou argues that, as a bailor, it retained title to the scrap metal in 
Brimco’s possession and that Citytrust therefore became liable to it in conversion for 
seizing its scrap. 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  175 
A bailment “‘involves a delivery of the thing bailed into the possession of the 
bailee, under a contract to return it to the owner according to the terms of the 
agreement.’” Seedman v. Jaffer, 104 Conn. 222, 226 (1926), quoting Murray v. 
Paramount Petroleum & Products Co., 101 Conn. 238, 242 (1924).2 “A relation-
ship of bailor-bailee arises when the owner, while retaining general title, delivers per-
sonal property to another for some particular purpose upon an express or implied 
contract to redeliver the goods when the purpose has been fulfilled, or to otherwise 
deal with the goods according to the bailor’s directions.” Maulding v. United States, 
257 F.2d 56, 60 (9th Cir. 1958). “In bailment, the owner or bailor has a general 
property [interest] in the goods bailed *** .” McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Walsh, 
132 Conn. 158, 162 (1945). The bailee, on the other hand, has mere possession of 
items left in its care pursuant to the bailment. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 312, 330 
(1893).[†] 
The trial court found that scrap from Ballou had been commingled with scrap 
from other sources and concluded that “[t]he fact that the property of the plaintiff is 
commingled with like property of another *** does not necessarily force the conclu-
sion that the transaction is not a bailment.”3 We agree that the commingling of fun-
                                                
2 According to Blackstone, and others, a bailment “is a delivery of goods in trust, 
upon a contract, expressed or implied, that the trust shall be faithfully executed on 
the part of the bailee.” 2 Blackstone’s Commentaries 452; see I. Edwards, A Treatise 
on the Law of Bailments 33; Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.). At one time we also 
adhered to this definition. Zeterstrom v. Thomas, 92 Conn. 702, 704 (1918); Samel-
son v. Harper’s Furs, Inc., 20 Conn. Sup. 37, 39 (1955), aff’d, 144 Conn. 368 
(1957). In a trust, however, the trustee has legal title to the res of the trust. G. 
Bogert, Trusts § 1 (5th ed.). In a bailment, on the other hand, the bailee does not 
have legal title to the thing bailed, but mere possession. Sturm v. Boker, 150 U.S. 
312, 330 (1893); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Walsh, 132 Conn. 158, 162 (1945). 
We prefer, therefore, the definition established in Seedman v. Jaffer, 104 Conn. 222, 
226 (1926). See generally 1 Restatement 2d of Trusts § 5; A. Dobie, Handbook on the 
Law of Bailments & Carriers § 1. 
† [ Ed. Note — In Sturm, a pre-Erie bailment case, the Supreme Court stated as fol-
lows: “The recognized distinction between bailment and sale is that when the identi-
cal article is to be returned in the same or in some altered form, the contract is one of 
bailment, and the title to the property is not changed. On the other hand, when there 
is no obligation to return the specific article, and the receiver is at liberty to return 
another thing of value, he becomes a debtor to make the return, and the title to the 
property is changed; the transaction is a sale.” 150 U.S. at 329-30 (emphasis add-
ed). ] 
3 The trial court relied primarily upon Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. FPC, 371 
F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1967). In PSE&G, a company arranged to have gas transported 
through a pipeline. The court found that a bailment existed even though the com-
pany was by no means entitled to have the identical gas delivered back to it. Id. at 4. 
Because the gas was only transported, and not altered in any form, that case is dis-
tinguishable from the type of bailment alleged here. 
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gible goods alone does not defeat a bailment when the bailor specifically intended to 
retain ownership of a known share of the commingled goods. Public Service Electric 
& Gas Co. v. FPC, 371 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1967); Slaughter v. Green, 22 Va. 3, 9 
(1821). 
A different rule, however, applies where the purpose of the bailment is to alter 
or remanufacture goods surrendered to the alleged bailee. The bailment in such an 
instance is termed “a bailment *** locatio operis faciendi [i.e.] a bailment where 
work and labor *** are to be performed upon the thing delivered to the bailee. The 
parties to a bailment of this character—one for their mutual benefit—enter into a 
contract, express or implied, or both, by which the bailee engages to perform the 
agreed services and return the thing bailed in its altered *** form, and the bailor in 
return for the services of the bailee agrees to pay him the agreed-upon compensa-
tion.” Douglass v. Hart, 103 Conn. 685, 688 (1925). 
In a bailment of this type, “the question of [whether a transaction constitutes a] 
bailment or not is determined by whether the identical article delivered to the manu-
facturer is to be returned to the party making the advance. Thus, where logs are de-
livered to be sawed into boards, or leather to be made into shoes, rags into paper, 
olives into oil, grapes into wine, wheat into flour, if the product of the identical ar-
ticles delivered is to be returned to the original owner in a new form, it is said to be 
a bailment, and the title never vests in the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the 
manufacturer is not bound to return the same wheat or flour or paper, but may de-
liver any other of equal value, it is said [not to be a bailment] *** .” Powder Co. v. 
Burkhardt, 97 U.S. 110, 116 (1877) (emphasis added); see Clark v. Rosen, 126 
Conn. 707, 708-10 (1940); Douglass v. Hart, 103 Conn. at 687-88; Johnson v. Al-
len, 70 Conn. 738, 744-45 (1898). 
                                                                                                                                
The trial court also cited In re Sitkin Smelting & Refining, 639 F.2d 1216 (5th 
Cir. 1981). In Sitkin, the court found that a bailment existed when Kodak delivered 
film waste to Sitkin for waste processing and to extract the silver. Id. at 1217. The 
court emphasized the facts that: (1) Sitkin did not carry the film as inventory; (2) 
the film was clearly imprinted with Kodak’s name; and (3) the film was stored in its 
original cartons and kept separate from other products. Id. Sitkin, therefore, is dis-
tinguishable from the present case because there was no evidence of commingling. 
The trial court also relied upon General Motors Corp. v. Bristol, 690 F.2d 26, 
30-31 (2d Cir. 1982), in which Judge Mansfield, in a concurring opinion, found 
that a bailment existed when GM shipped scrap metal to a manufacturer for pro-
cessing into alloy strips under a “tolling arrangement.” In Bristol, however, the writ-
ten agreement clearly stated that GM retained title to the scrap in the manufactur-
er’s possession until it was remanufactured into alloy. Id. at 27. In addition, the 
bailee was required to return the identical scrap to GM if not processed into alloy 
strips. Judge Mansfield, concurring in Bristol, stated that a bailment may exist when 
goods are commingled and remanufactured. As support for this statement, however, 
he cites PSE&G and 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments § 51. As noted above, PSE&G stands 
only for the proposition that commingling alone does not defeat a bailment. 
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In order for the instant transaction to constitute a bailment, therefore, it is  
necessary that the final product be composed of the identical property originally de-
livered.4 The trial court found that the scrap was commingled, that the brass re-
turned to Ballou need not have been of the same type of alloy and that “there was 
no understanding or agreement that the precise thing bailed would be returned to 
the plaintiff.” The trial court further found that if any of the original scrap metal 
found its way back to Ballou, “this would be solely by chance.” Because there was 
no evidence that the property returned was the product of the property delivered, 
except “solely by chance,” we conclude that the arrangement between Ballou and 
Brimco could not constitute a bailment. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded with di-
rection to render judgment for the defendant. 
Metallizing Eng’g v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts 
153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) 
L. Hand, Judge: 
The defendants appeal from the usual decree holding valid and infringed all but 
three of the claims of a reissued patent, issued to the plaintiff’s assignor, Meduna; 
the original patent issued on May 25, 1943, upon an application filed on August 6, 
1942. The patent is for the process of “so conditioning a metal surface that the same 
is, as a rule, capable of bonding thereto applied spray metal to a higher degree than 
is normally procurable with hitherto known practices.” It is primarily useful for 
building up the worn metal parts of a machine. The art had for many years done this 
by what the patent calls “spray metal,” which means metal sprayed in molten form 
upon the surface which it is desired to build up. This process is called “metalizing,” 
and it had been known for nearly thirty years before Meduna’s invention; but about 
fifteen or twenty years ago it was found that, to secure a satisfactory bond between 
the “spray metal” and the surface, the surface must be roughened so that there 
would be fine undercut areas in it upon which the sprayed surface could take hold; 
and of course the surface must itself be clean. …  
…  
                                                
4 A change in the character or nature of personalty can affect a right of ownership. 
Under the doctrine of accession, if the labor of one person is combined with ma-
terial belonging to another, the owner of the original raw material can retain title to, 
and ownership of, the finished product. Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. 188, 
192-93 (1936); Mather v. Chapman, 40 Conn. 382, 397 (1873). If, however, the 
identity of the item has been destroyed, its nature substantially changed, or value 
greatly enhanced, as between the manufacturer and the original owner, the owner 
loses his right of ownership and retains only an action for the value of the goods 
lost. Atlas Ins. Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. at 192-93. Similarly, in a bailment locatio 
operis faciendi, changes in the nature of the property bailed have the potential to 
affect the property interest of the bailor. The law of bailments has responded, in a 
manner similar to the law of property, by finding that a bailment will still exist if, as 
noted above, the identity of the item has not been destroyed. 
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The only question which we find necessary to decide is as to Meduna’s public 
use of the patented process more than one year before August 6, 1942. The district 
judge made findings about this, which are supported by the testimony and which we 
accept. … The kernel of them is the following: “the inventor’s main purpose in his 
use of the process prior to August 6, 1941, and especially in respect to all jobs for 
owners not known to him, was commercial, and *** an experimental purpose in 
connection with such use was subordinate only.” Upon this finding he concluded as 
matter of law that, since the use before the critical date—August 6, 1941—was not 
primarily for the purposes of experiment, the use was not excused for that reason. 
Smith & Griggs Manufacturing Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 256; Aerovox Corp. v. 
Polymet Manufacturing Corp., 2 Cir., 67 F.2d 860, 862. Moreover, he also con-
cluded that the use was not public but secret, and for that reason that its predomi-
nantly commercial character did prevent it from invalidating the patent. For the last 
he relied upon our decisions in Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 29 F.2d 646, 
and Gillman v. Stern, 114 F.2d 28. We think that his analysis of Peerless Roll Leaf 
Co. v. Griffin & Sons was altogether correct, and that he had no alternative but to 
follow that decision; on the other hand, we now think that we were then wrong and 
that the decision must be overruled for reasons we shall state. Gillman v. Stern, was, 
however, rightly decided. 
Section one of the first and second Patent Acts, 1 Stat. 109 and 318, declared 
that the petition for a patent must state that the subject matter had not been “be-
fore known or used.” Section six of the Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117, changed this by 
providing in addition that the invention must not at the time of the application for a 
patent have been “in public use or on sale” with the inventor’s “consent or allow-
ance”; and § 7 of the Act of 1839, 5 Stat. 353, provided that “no patent shall be 
held to be invalid by reason of such purchase, sale, or use prior to the application for 
a patent *** except on proof of abandonment of such invention to the public; or 
that such purchase, sale, or prior use has been for more than two years prior to such 
application ***.” Section 4886 of the Revised Statutes made it a condition upon 
patentability that the invention shall not have been “in public use or on sale for 
more than two years prior to his application,” and that it shall not have been 
“proved to have been abandoned.” This is in substance the same as the Act of 1839, 
and is precisely the same as § 31 of Title 35, U.S.C., except that the prior use is now 
limited to the United States, and to one year before the application.  
[¶] So far as we can find, the first case which dealt with the effect of prior use 
by the patentee was Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 4, in which the invention had 
been completed in 1811, and the patent granted in 1818 for a process of making 
hose by which the sections were joined together in such a way that the joints resist-
ed pressure as well as the other parts [did]. It did not appear that the joints in any 
way disclosed the process; but the patentee, between the discovery of the invention 
and the grant of the patent, had sold 13,000 feet of hose; and as to this the judge 
charged: “If the public, with the knowledge and tacit consent of the inventor, be 
permitted to use the invention, without opposition, it is a fraud on the public after-
wards to take out a patent.” The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the de-
fendant, on the ground that the invention had been “known or used before the ap-
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plication.” “If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of 
the public the secrets of his invention; if he should *** make and sell his invention 
publicly, and thus gather the whole profits, *** it would materially retard the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts” to allow him fourteen years of legal monopoly 
“when the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive right” 2 
Pet. at page 19. In Shaw v. Cooper, 7 Pet. 292, the public use was not by the inven-
tor, but he had neglected to prevent it after he had learned of it, and this defeated 
the patent. “Whatever may be the intention of the inventor, if he suffers his inven-
tion to go into public use, through any means whatsoever, without an immediate 
assertion of his right, he is not entitled to a patent” 7 Pet. at page 323. In Kendall v. 
Winsor, 21 How. 322, the inventor had kept the machine secret, but had sold the 
harness which it produced, so that the facts presented the same situation as here. 
Since the jury brought in a verdict for the defendant on the issue of abandonment, 
the case adds nothing except for the dicta on page 328 of 21 How., 16 L.Ed. 165: 
“the inventor who designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and ex-
clusively for his own profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not 
within the policy or objects of the Constitution or acts of Congress.” In Egbert v. 
Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, although the patent was for the product which was sold, 
nothing could be learned about it without taking it apart, yet it was a public use 
within the statute. In Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, the situation was the same. 
In the lower courts we may begin with the often cited decision in Macbeth-
Evans Glass Co. v. General Electric Co., 6 Cir., 246 F. 695, which concerned a pro-
cess patent for making illuminating glass. The patentee had kept the process as  
secret as possible, but for ten years had sold the glass, although this did not, so far as 
appears, disclose the process. The court held the patent invalid for two reasons, as 
we understand them: the first was that the delay either indicated an intention to 
abandon, or was of itself a forfeiture, because of the inconsistency of a practical  
monopoly by means of secrecy and of a later legal monopoly by means of a patent. 
So far, it was not an interpretation of “prior use” in the statute; but, beginning on 
page 702 of 246 F. 695, Judge Warrington seems to have been construing that 
phrase and to hold that the sales were such a use. In Allinson Manufacturing Co. v. 
Ideal Filter Co., 8 Cir., 21 F.2d 22, the patent was for a machine for purifying gaso-
line: the machine was kept secret, but the gasoline had been sold for a period of six 
years before the application was filed. As in Macbeth-Evans Glass Co. v. General Elec-
tric Co., the [Allinson] court apparently invalidated the patent on two grounds: one 
was that the inventor had abandoned the right to a patent, or had forfeited it by his 
long delay. We are disposed however to read the latter part—pages 27 and 28 of 21 
F.2d—as holding that the sale of gasoline was a “prior use” of the machine, not-
withstanding its concealment. …  
Coming now to our own decisions (the opinions in all of which I wrote), the 
first was Grasselli Chemical Co. v. National Aniline & Chemical Co., 2 Cir., 26 F.2d 
305, in which the patent was for a process which had been kept secret, but the 
product had been sold upon the market for more than two years. We held that, al-
though the process could not have been discovered from the product, the sales con-
stituted a “prior use,” relying upon Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, and Hall v. 
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Macneale, 107 U.S. 90. There was nothing in this inconsistent with what we are 
now holding. But in Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 2 Cir., 29 F.2d 646, 
where the patent was for a machine, which had been kept secret, but whose output 
had been freely sold on the market, we sustained the patent on the ground that “the 
sale of the product was irrelevant, since no knowledge could possibly be acquired of 
the machine in that way. In this respect the machine differs from a process *** or 
from any other invention necessarily contained in a product.” 29 F.2d at 649. So far 
as we can now find, there is nothing to support this distinction in the authorities, 
and we shall try to show that we misapprehended the theory on which the prior use 
by an inventor forfeits his right to a patent. In Aerovox Corp. v. Polymet Mfg., 2 Cir., 
67 F.2d 860, the patent was also for a process, the use of which we held not to have 
been experimental, though not secret. Thus our decision sustaining the patent was 
right; but apparently we were by implication reverting to the doctrine of the Peerless 
case when we added that it was doubtful whether the process could be detected 
from the product … . In Gillman v. Stern, 2 Cir., 114 F.2d 28, it was not the inven-
tor, but a third person who used the machine secretly and sold the product openly, 
and there was therefore no question either of abandonment or forfeiture by the in-
ventor. The only issue was whether a prior use which did not disclose the invention 
to the art was within the statute; and it is well settled that it is not. As in the case of 
any other anticipation, the issue of invention must then be determined by how 
much the inventor has contributed any new information to the art. Gayler v. Wilder, 
10 How. 477, 496, 497; Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711. 
From the foregoing it appears that in Peerless Roll Leaf Co. v. Griffin & Sons, 
we confused two separate doctrines: (1) The effect upon his right to a patent of the 
inventor’s competitive exploitation of his machine or of his process; (2) the contri-
bution which a prior use by another person makes to the art. Both do indeed come 
within the phrase, “prior use”; but the first is a defence for quite different reasons 
from the second. It had its origin—at least in this country—in the passage we have 
quoted from Pennock v. Dialogue, i.e., that it is a condition upon an inventor’s right 
to a patent that he shall not exploit his discovery competitively after it is ready for 
patenting; he must content himself with either secrecy, or legal monopoly. It is true 
that for the limited period of two years he was allowed to do so, possibly in order to 
give him time to prepare an application; and even that has been recently cut down 
by half. But if he goes beyond that period of probation, he forfeits his right regard-
less of how little the public may have learned about the invention; just as he can for-
feit it by too long concealment, even without exploiting the invention at all. Such a 
forfeiture has nothing to do with abandonment, which presupposes a deliberate, 
though not necessarily an express, surrender of any right to a patent. Although the 
evidence of both may at times overlap, each comes from a quite different legal 
source: one, from the fact that by renouncing the right the inventor irrevocably sur-
renders it; the other, from the fiat of Congress that it is part of the consideration for 
a patent that the public shall as soon as possible begin to enjoy the disclosure. 
It is indeed true that an inventor may continue for more than a year to practice 
his invention for his private purposes or his own enjoyment and later patent it. But 
that is, properly considered, not an exception to the doctrine, for he is not then 
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making use of his secret to gain a competitive advantage over others; he does not 
thereby extend the period of his monopoly. Besides, as we have seen, even that 
privilege has its limits, for he may conceal it so long that he will lose his right to a 
patent even though he does not use it at all. With that question we have not how-
ever any concern here. 
Judgment reversed; complaint dismissed. 
D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp. 
714 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
Markey, Chief Judge: 
…  
On October 15, 1981, the D.L. Auld Company (Auld) sued Chroma Graphics 
Corp. (Chroma) in the Eastern District of Tennessee for infringement of Patent No. 
4,100,010 (the Waugh patent) issued on a continuing application filed July 2, 1976 
of an original application filed June 12, 1974. The patent claims are drawn to a 
method of forming foil-backed inserts in the form of cast decorative emblems. 
… 
Chroma took a discovery deposition of the inventor, Robert E. Waugh, who 
was also Vice President for Research and Development of Auld, the assignee of the 
patent. Submitting portions of that deposition and documents from Auld’s files, 
Chroma moved for summary judgment on the ground that the invention had been 
“on sale” for more than one year before June 12, 1974. 
… 
On October 22, 1982, the magistrate entered an order granting the motion, 
accompanied by a memorandum opinion. 
…  
Waugh’s invention is a method. The parties cite numerous cases involving “on 
sale” considerations in respect of product inventions under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The 
focus of inquiry here, however, is on the method. If Auld produced an emblem by 
the method of the invention and offered that emblem for sale before the critical 
date, the right to a patent on the method must be declared forfeited. Metallizing 
Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2nd Cir. 
1946). The “forfeiture” theory expressed in Metallizing parallels the statutory 
scheme of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the intent of which is to preclude attempts by the 
inventor or his assignee to profit from commercial use of an invention for more than 
a year before an application for patent is filed. The record includes testimonial and 
documentary evidence establishing that the claimed method was employed in pre-
paring a number of sample emblems and that Auld attempted to profit from use of 
that method by offering some of those samples for sale to a number of potential 
buyers well before the critical date. Those facts operate to create a forfeiture of any 
right to the grant of a valid patent on the method to Auld. 
Where a method is kept secret, and remains secret after a sale of the product of 
the method, that sale will not, of course, bar another inventor from the grant of a 
patent on that method. The situation is different where, as here, that sale is made by 
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the applicant for patent or his assignee. Though the magistrate referred to § 102(b), 
he did so in recognizing that the “activity” of Auld here was that which the statute 
“attempts to limit to one year.” In so doing, the magistrate correctly applied the 
concept explicated in Metallizing, i.e., that a party’s placing of the product of a 
method invention on sale more than a year before that party’s application filing date 
must act as a forfeiture of any right to the grant of a valid patent on the method to 
that party if circumvention of the policy animating § 102(b) is to be avoided in re-
spect of patents on method inventions. 
… 
The involved emblems include a layer of clear plastic having a curved outer sur-
face formed on a decoration-bearing base. Since 1965, Auld sold that type of em-
blem to the auto industry. The early emblems were made by the “Vitrolux” method, 
in which the base is a shallow cavity designed to receive a measured amount of  
liquid plastic, while the base was held horizontal. The quantity of plastic was greater 
than that required to fill the cavity, producing a curved upper surface. The plastic 
did not overflow the cavity walls because of its surface tension. 
In about 1968, Waugh began work on a variation of the Vitrolux process. That 
work resulted in the Vitrofoil method, the subject of patent 4,100,010. The Vitro-
foil method employs a flat sheet of metal as the base on which a metered amount of 
liquid plastic is deposited while the base is held horizontal. The plastic flows to the 
edge of the sheet without overflowing; its surface tension causing it to stop at the 
sheet’s edge to form a curved upper surface. 
Waugh testified in his deposition that as early as 1969, Auld was producing 
samples in accordance with the claimed method by hand, and that between 1969 
and June 1973, Auld “showed these samples to people and said we [Auld] could do 
this, and we [Auld] could not generate any interest for the product.” Attempts to 
market those emblems were conducted by an outside manufacturer’s representative 
and Auld’s sales staff. The emblem produced by the Vitrofoil method initially would 
not sell and Auld for a period “shelved” the emblem produced by the Vitrofoil 
method. 
Sample emblems were submitted to prospective customers, such as Cadillac, 
General Motors, Buick, Ford, Chrysler, and the National Hockey League and the 
National Football League, through a company called International Crest. Waugh 
said that the established sales practice in the automotive industry was to present 
samples to prospective customers, that Auld would not “tool up” without a pur-
chase order, and that the submission of sample emblems produced by the Vitrofoil 
method followed Auld’s established sales procedure. 
Waugh testified that sample emblems submitted to prospective customers be-
fore the critical date were made in the laboratory following each of the steps set 
forth in Claim 1 of the patent in suit. He further said that the claimed method was 
not followed on some samples and a “postforming” operation was required on those 
particular emblems because they curled. 
Waugh testified that of the samples submitted before June 1973 by the Auld 
sales department to International Crest, to interest them in the product for the  
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National Football and Hockey Leagues, some were not made by the claimed meth-
od, but that others were. Auld quoted pricing and delivery dates in writing, for an 
order of more than 150,000 emblems, to International Crest. 
Thus the record evidence includes corporate documents and testimony estab-
lishing that some sample emblems were produced by hand, following the steps of 
the method, and that those hand-produced emblems were offered for sale before 
June 12, 1973. Against that evidence, Auld makes numerous arguments and asser-
tions respecting other samples and other parts of the record, insisting that there are 
conflicts in testimony improperly resolved on a motion for summary judgment. On 
careful review of each such argument and assertion and after viewing all evidence 
and inferences in a light most favorable to Auld, we are convinced that no material 
conflicts or credibility questions were or needed to be resolved by the magistrate 
and that no issue of material fact requiring a trial to resolve is present on this record. 
…  
Auld admits that emblems were made between 1969 and 1972 and that at least 
one was supplied, with prices quoted, to International Crest in “late 1972—early 
1973.” It says, however, that those emblems were made by a “laboratory” method; 
that a material issue exists on whether the offers fell within the “experimental” ex-
ception to the “on sale” bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); that whether the offers were for 
experimental purposes is a matter of Auld’s intent and thus ill-suited to resolution 
by summary judgment; that the magistrate improperly shifted the burden of proof 
by requiring Auld to show that the offer for sale was for experimental purposes; that 
no sale was made to International Crest; that some samples were not made by the 
claimed method; that it was error to grant summary judgment without receiving the 
proffered testimony of Auld salesmen; that the claimed method was for a manufac-
turing process involving a series of emblems, while in the “laboratory” method em-
blems were made one by one and that method was not demonstrated to be practical 
or readily reproducible; that affidavits of Waugh, Tanner, and David Auld, filed to 
correct and clarify “ambiguities and inconsistencies” in Waugh’s deposition, raise a 
material issue on whether the claimed method had been reduced to practice before 
June, 1973; and that those affidavits show that emblems provided Chrysler were not 
made by the patented method because they were not made in a manufacturing pro-
cess involving a series of emblems, were not held flat, and had to be postformed. 
Labeling the method employed in making the sample for International Crest as 
a “laboratory” method raises no material fact issue. The method was that of Claim 1 
and was successfully performed to produce an emblem offered for sale, or resale, by 
International Crest. That is all the law requires. Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan 
Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358 (1928); Breen v. Miller, 347 F.2d 623 (CCPA 
1965). Waugh’s testimony establishes unequivocally that the “laboratory” method 
involved each step of the claimed method, and that each such step was performed in 
producing some early samples for International Crest. When carefully read, the 
“clarifying” affidavits do not contradict those facts. Portions of those affidavits  
quoted by Auld relate to different samples, to portions of the patent specification 
(not the claims), to commercial production, and to other customers. Even then, the 
only asserted differences between the patented method and the “laboratory” meth-
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od are the use of adhesive and holding the foil shapes flat. Waugh’s testimony was 
unequivocal that those very steps were employed in making some samples by the 
“laboratory” method, and nothing in the affidavits contradicts that testimony. 
Auld’s attempt to establish a material issue of fact respecting the “experimental” 
exception to 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is misdirected. First, each of Auld’s citations to 
evidence in the record relates to later experimentation on mass production by ma-
chine for commercialization in quantity, not to any experimentation on the earlier 
performed method itself. Second, Auld’s reliance on the labeling of the sample em-
blems as “lab samples” submitted to customers for “evaluation” is irrelevant. The 
claim is for a method, not a product. That the method would produce the product 
was known. Submission of the emblems for sale if the customer liked them is not 
experimentation on the method. 
Similarly, Auld’s reliance on intent of the patent holder must fail. Mr. David 
Auld said International Crest was told that the samples were experimental. As above 
indicated, however, the question is whether the method had been successfully per-
formed in making the samples, not whether the samples were themselves “experi-
mental.” The record establishes that the claimed method was successfully per-
formed, albeit by hand, that it produced an emblem, and that the emblem was of-
fered for sale. The corporate documents of Auld make plain its intent to sell the em-
blems produced by the “laboratory” method, which is the same as the claimed 
method. That Auld might have to tool up for mass production if a customer gave a 
large order bears no relation to whether experimentation was required on the 
claimed method itself. Moreover, if a mere allegation of experimental intent were 
sufficient, there would rarely if ever be room for summary judgment based on a true 
“on sale” defense under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
Nor did the magistrate effectively shift the burden to Auld on the experimenta-
tion issue. Once evidence that an invention was on sale or, as here, that the product 
of a method invention was on sale, is presented, countervailing evidence establishing 
an experimental purpose must necessarily come from the patentee. To defeat a mo-
tion for summary judgment, a patentee need not prove an experimental purpose, 
but must submit facts indicating an ability to come forward with evidence that such 
proof is possible. … Chroma having established a prima facie case, it fell to Auld to 
submit evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, setting forth specific facts raising a genu-
ine issue for trial. First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 
(1968). 
Nothing in the submissions of Auld to the magistrate indicated any possibility 
that the performance by hand of the method in producing some of the International 
Crest samples was itself in any manner experimental. As above indicated, that Auld 
may have experimented, after the critical date, with means to achieve tooling for 
mass production bears no relation to whether the method of the claim had earlier 
been used and the product of that earlier use offered for sale. 
That no sale was actually made to International Crest is irrelevant. An offer to 
sell is sufficient under the policy animating the statute, which proscribes not a sale, 
but a placing “on sale.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b); General Electric Co. v. U.S., 654 F.2d 
55 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
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Similarly, submission of evidence that some samples offered for sale were not 
made by the claimed method cannot raise a material issue of fact, and thus preclude 
summary judgment, in the face of uncontradicted evidence that other samples had 
been made by the claimed method and offered for sale before the critical date. 
…  
In a further effort to distinguish what it calls its “laboratory” method from the 
claimed method, Auld says the Waugh patent is limited to “a manufacturing pro-
cess, involving a series of foil shapes.” Its difficulty here is twofold. First, the claim is 
for “[a] method of forming foil backed inserts.” It is not for a method of manufac-
turing or mass producing inserts, and the word “series” does not make it such.  
Second, Waugh testified unequivocally that a series of foil shapes were produced by 
hand (the “laboratory” method), following each step of the claimed method. If the 
“laboratory” method did involve the making of emblems one-by-one, that fact 
would merely mean a greater time interval between individual emblems in a series. 
There is nothing of record to indicate that the “laboratory” method was itself im-
practical or not readily reproducible as a method. 
The affidavits filed in an effort to “clarify” Waugh’s deposition fail to contradict 
his crucial testimony that every step of the claimed method was followed in pro-
ducing emblems offered to International Crest. The Wanner and David Auld affida-
vits assert that the claimed method was “not reduced to practice” until August, 
1973. Not only is that assertion a legal conclusion, it relates to the manufacturing of 
an order for Chrysler, and does not contradict Waugh’s testimony establishing re-
duction to practice of the claimed method to produce the samples offered earlier to 
International Crest. Waugh’s affidavit, being similarly directed to other samples and 
to a method “as performed in May 1973,” does not contradict his unequivocal tes-
timony that every step of the claimed method was successfully performed earlier in 
producing emblems offered to International Crest. 
The effort here to staunch the fatal wound inflicted upon Auld’s suit by 
Waugh’s deposition testimony is not new to the law. In International Harvester Co. 
v. Deere & Co., 478 F. Supp. 411 (C.D. Ill. 1979), vacated on jurisdictional 
grounds, 623 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1980), the court held that no genuine issue of 
material fact was created by affidavits contradicting admissions of the patent owner 
and inventors. In the present case, Auld’s affidavits do not contradict the crucial tes-
timony of the inventor and are thus even less capable of creating a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
…  
In sum, the magistrate did not err in determining: (1) that no genuine material 
issue of fact was present; (2) that the uncontradicted facts of record establish that 
the claimed method invention had been commercially exploited more than a year 
before the crucial date; (3) that no possibility of proving an experimental purpose 
was present; and (4) that Patent No. 4,100,010 was, therefore, invalid within the 
intent of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
…  
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________________________________ 
The readings in Chapter 1, about the reality of invention that precedes the legal 
process of patenting, introduced ideas that pertain both to the originality (anti-
derivation) requirement of § 102(f) and the “first to invent” priority regime estab-
lished in § 102(g). This remainder of the cases here take us back into § 102 more 
thoroughly, to explore the two remaining subsections that one must master in 
patent law—(e) and (g). And a full understanding of those two parts of § 102 re-
quires that we also consider international frameworks for pursuing patent protection 
on one invention in multiple foreign states as well as one’s home country. 
§ 102(e) 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 215-218, 659-672, 675-678 
Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co. 
270 U.S. 390 (1926) 
Holmes, Justice: 
This is a suit for the infringement of the plaintiff’s patent for an improvement in 
welding and cutting apparatus alleged to have been the invention of one Whitford. 
The suit embraced other matters but this is the only one material here. The defense 
is that Whitford was not the first inventor of the thing patented, and the answer 
gives notice that to prove the invalidity of the patent evidence will be offered that 
one Clifford invented the thing, his patent being referred to and identified. The ap-
plication for the plaintiff’s patent was filed on March 4, 1911, and the patent was 
issued June 4, 1912. There was no evidence carrying Whitford’s invention further 
back. Clifford’s application was filed on January 31, 1911, before Whitford’s, and 
his patent was issued on February 6, 1912. It is not disputed that this application 
gave a complete and adequate description of the thing patented to Whitford, but it 
did not claim it. The District Court gave the plaintiff a decree, holding that, while 
Clifford might have added this claim to his application, yet as he did not, he was not 
a prior inventor. The decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. There is a 
conflict between this decision and those of other Circuit Courts of Appeals … . 
Therefore a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. 
The patent law authorizes a person who has invented an improvement like the 
present, ‘not known or used by others in this country, before his invention,’ &c., to 
obtain a patent for it. Rev. Sts. § 4886, amended, March 3, 1897, c. 391, § 1, 29 
Stat. 692. Among the defences to a suit for infringement the fourth specified by the 
statute is that the patentee ‘was not the original and first inventor or discoverer of 
any material and substantial part of the thing patented.’ Rev. Sts. § 4920, amended, 
March 3, 1897, c. 391, § 2, 29 Stat. 692. Taking these words in their natural sense 
as they would be read by the common man, obviously one is not the first inventor if, 
as was the case here, somebody else has made a complete and adequate description 
of the thing claimed before the earliest moment to which the alleged inventor can 
carry his invention back. But the words cannot be taken quite so simply. In view of 
the gain to the public that the patent laws mean to secure we assume for purposes of 
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decision that it would have been no bar to Whitford’s patent if Clifford had written 
out his prior description and kept it in his portfolio uncommunicated to anyone. 
More than that … it is said, at all events for many years, the Patent Office has made 
no search among abandoned patent applications, and by the words of the statute a 
previous foreign invention does not invalidate a patent granted here if it has not 
been patented or described in a printed publication. Rev. Sts. § 4923. These analo-
gies prevailed in the minds of the Courts below. 
On the other hand, publication in a periodical is a bar. This as it seems to us is 
more than an arbitrary enactment, and illustrates, as does the rule concerning pre-
vious public use, the principle that, subject to the exceptions mentioned, one really 
must be the first inventor in order to be entitled to a patent. Coffin v. Ogden, 18 
Wall. 120. We understand the Circuit Court of Appeals to admit that if Whitford 
had not applied for his patent until after the issue to Clifford, the disclosure by the 
latter would have had the same effect as the publication of the same words in a peri-
odical, although not made the basis of a claim. The invention is made public proper-
ty as much in the one case as in the other. But if this be true, as we think that it is, it 
seems to us that a sound distinction cannot be taken between that case and a patent 
applied for before but not granted until after a second patent is sought. The delays 
of the patent office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been done. The 
description shows that Whitford was not the first inventor. Clifford had done all that 
he could do to make his description public. He had taken steps that would make it 
public as soon at the Patent Office did its work, although, of course, amendments 
might be required of him before the end could be reached. We see no reason in the 
words or policy of the law for allowing Whitford to profit by the delay and make 
himself out to be the first inventor when he was not so in fact, when Clifford had 
shown knowledge inconsistent with the allowance of Whitford’s claim and when 
otherwise the publication of his patent would abandon the thing described to the 
public unless it already was old. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424; Under-
wood v. Gerber, 149 U.S. 224, 230. 
The question is not whether Clifford showed himself by the description to be 
the first inventor. By putting it in that form it is comparatively easy to take the next 
step and say that he is not an inventor in the sense of the statute unless he makes a 
claim. The question is whether Clifford’s disclosure made it impossible for Whitford 
to claim the invention at a later date. The disclosure would have had the same effect 
as at present if Clifford had added to his description a statement that he did not 
claim the thing described because he abandoned it or because he believed it to be 
old. It is not necessary to show who did invent the thing in order to show that 
Whitford did not. 
…  
As to the analogies relied upon below, the disregard of abandoned patent appli-
cations, however explained, cannot be taken to establish a principle beyond the rule 
as actually applied. As an empirical rule it no doubt is convenient if not necessary to 
the Patent Office, and we are not disposed to disturb it, although we infer that  
originally the practice of the Office was different. The policy of the statute as to for-
eign inventions obviously stands on its own footing and cannot be applied to  
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domestic affairs. The fundamental rule we repeat is that the patentee must be the 
first inventor. The qualifications in aid of a wish to encourage improvements or to 
avoid laborious investigations do not prevent the rule from applying here. 
Decree reversed. 
1952 Patent Act – 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless … (e) the invention was de-
scribed in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in 
the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent[.] 
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner 
382 U.S. 252 (1965) 
Black, Justice: 
The sole question presented here is whether an application for patent pending 
in the Patent Office at the time a second application is filed constitutes part of the 
“prior art” as that term is used in 35 U.S.C. § 103 which reads in part: 
A patent may not be obtained *** if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art *** . 
The question arose in this way. On December 23, 1957, petitioner Robert 
Regis filed an application for a patent on a new and useful improvement on a mi-
crowave switch. On June 24, 1959, the Patent Examiner denied Regis’ application 
on the ground that the invention was not one which was new or unobvious in light 
of the prior art and thus did not meet the standards set forth in § 103. The Exam-
iner said that the invention was unpatentable because of the joint effect of the dis-
closures made by patents previously issued, one to Carlson (No. 2,491,644) and one 
to Wallace (No. 2,822,526). The Carlson patent had been issued on December 20, 
1949, over eight years prior to Regis’ application, and that patent is admittedly a 
part of the prior art insofar as Regis’ invention is concerned. The Wallace patent, 
however, was pending in the Patent Office when the Regis application was filed. The 
Wallace application had been pending since March 24, 1954, nearly three years and 
nine months before Regis filed his application and the Wallace patent was issued on 
February 4, 1958, 43 days after Regis filed his application.1  
After the Patent Examiner refused to issue the patent, Regis appealed to the  
Patent Office Board of Appeals on the ground that the Wallace patent could not be 
properly considered a part of the prior art because it had been a “co-pending pa-
tent” and its disclosures were secret and not known to the public. The Board of Ap-
peals rejected this argument and affirmed the decision of the Patent Examiner. Regis 
and Hazeltine, which had an interest as assignee, then instituted the present action 
                                                
1 It is not disputed that Regis’ alleged invention, as well as his application, was made 
after Wallace’s application was filed. There is, therefore, no question of priority of 
invention before us. 
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in the District Court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 to compel the Commissioner to 
issue the patent. The District Court agreed with the Patent Office that the co-
pending Wallace application was a part of the prior art and directed that the com-
plaint be dismissed. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam. We grant-
ed certiorari to decide the question of whether a co-pending application is included 
in the prior art, as that term is used in 35 U. S. C. § 103. 
Petitioners’ primary contention is that the term “prior art,” as used in § 103, 
really means only art previously publicly known. In support of this position they re-
fer to a statement in the legislative history which indicates that prior art means 
“what was known before as described in section 102.”2 They contend that the use of 
the word “known” indicates that Congress intended prior art to include only inven-
tions or discoveries which were already publicly known at the time an invention was 
made. 
If petitioners are correct in their interpretation of “prior art,” then the Wallace 
invention, which was not publicly known at the time the Regis application was filed, 
would not be prior art with regard to Regis’ invention. This is true because at the 
time Regis filed his application the Wallace invention, although pending in the  
Patent Office, had never been made public and the Patent Office was forbidden by 
statute from disclosing to the public, except in special circumstances, anything con-
tained in the application.3 
The Commissioner, relying chiefly on Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-
Bournonville Co., 270 U. S. 390, contends that when a patent is issued, the disclo-
sures contained in the patent become a part of the prior art as of the time the appli-
cation was filed, not, as petitioners contend, at the time the patent is issued. In that 
case a patent was held invalid because, at the time it was applied for, there was al-
ready pending an application which completely and adequately described the inven-
tion. …  
In its revision of the patent laws in 1952, Congress showed its approval of the 
holding in Milburn by adopting 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) … . Petitioners suggest, how-
ever, that the question in this case is not answered by mere reference to § 102(e), 
because in Milburn, which gave rise to that section, the co-pending applications de-
scribed the same identical invention. But here the Regis invention is not precisely 
the same as that contained in the Wallace patent, but is only made obvious by the 
Wallace patent in light of the Carlson patent. We agree with the Commissioner that 
this distinction is without significance here. While we think petitioners’ argument 
with regard to § 102(e) is interesting, it provides no reason to depart from the plain 
holding and reasoning in the Milburn case. The basic reasoning upon which the 
Court decided the Milburn case applies equally well here. When Wallace filed his 
                                                
2 H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1952). 
3 35 U.S.C. § 122 states: “Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the 
Patent Office and no information concerning the same given without authority of 
the applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of 
Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the Commis-
sioner.” 
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application, he had done what he could to add his disclosures to the prior art. The 
rest was up to the Patent Office. Had the Patent Office acted faster, had it issued 
Wallace’s patent two months earlier, there would have been no question here. As 
Justice Holmes said in Milburn, “[t]he delays of the patent office ought not to cut 
down the effect of what has been done.” 
To adopt the result contended for by petitioners would create an area where pa-
tents are awarded for unpatentable advances in the art. We see no reason to read 
into § 103 a restricted definition of “prior art” which would lower standards of pa-
tentability to such an extent that there might exist two patents where the Congress 
has plainly directed that there should be only one. 
Affirmed. 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 672-675 
In re Hilmer 
359 F.2d 859 (CCPA 1966) 
Rich, Judge: 
The sole issue is whether a majority of the Patent Office Board of Appeals erred 
in overturning a consistent administrative practice and interpretation of the law of 
nearly forty years standing by giving a United States patent effect as prior art as of a 
foreign filing date to which the patentee of the reference was entitled under 35 
U.S.C. § 119. 
Because [the board] held that a U.S. patent, cited as a prior art reference under 
35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and § 103, is effective [as a prior art reference] as of its foreign 
“convention” filing date, relying on 35 U.S.C. § 119, the board affirmed the rejec-
tion of claims 10, 16, and 17 of application serial No. 750,887, filed July 25, 1958, 
for certain sulfonyl ureas. 
This opinion develops the issue, considers the precedents, and explains why, on 
the basis of legislative history, we hold that § 119 does not modify the express pro-
vision of § 102(e) that a reference patent is effective as of the date the application 
for it was “filed in the United States.” 
The two “references” relied on are: 
• Habicht 2,962,530 Nov. 29, 1960 (filed in the United States January 
23, 1958, found to be entitled to priority as of the date of filing in Switzer-
land on January 24, 1957) 
• Wagner et al. 2,975,212 March 14, 1961 (filed in the United States May 
1, 1957) 
The rejection here is the aftermath of an interference (No. 90,218) between 
appellants and Habicht, a priority dispute in which Habicht was the winning party 
on a single count. He won because appellants conceded priority of the invention of 
the count to him. The earliest date asserted by appellants for their invention is their 
German filing date, July 31, 1957, which, we note, is a few months later than  
Habicht’s priority date of January 24, 1957. 
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After termination of the interference and the return of this application to the 
examiner for further ex parte prosecution, the examiner rejected the appealed claims 
on Habicht, as a primary reference, in view of Wagner et al., as a secondary refer-
ence, holding the claimed compounds to be “unpatentable over the primary refer-
ence in view of the secondary reference which renders them obvious to one of ordi-
nary skill in the art.” 
…  
The board, one member dissenting with an opinion, affirmed the rejection. …  
… There is in [the board’s opinion] an implicit assumption that if the patent is 
“entitled to the date of a prior foreign application,” it is entitled to it, and that is 
that. But one must examine closely into what is meant by the word “entitled.” In 
essence, that is the problem in this appeal and we wish to point to it at the outset to 
dispel any mistaken assumptions. A patent may be “entitled” to a foreign filing date 
for some purposes and not for others, just as a patent may be “used” in two ways. A 
patent owner uses his patent as a legal right to exclude others, granted to him under 
35 U.S.C. § 154. Others, wholly unrelated to the patentee, use a patent, not as a 
legal right, but simply as evidence of prior invention or prior art, i.e., as a “refer-
ence.” This is not an exercise of the patent right. This is how the Patent Office is 
“using” the Habicht patent. These are totally different things, governed by different 
law, founded on different theories, and developed through different histories. 
We have seen that 35 U.S.C. § 119 is involved with respect to the so-called 
“priority date” of the Habicht reference patent. The other statutory provision in-
volved in this case, applicable to both of the references, is 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Sec-
tion 102 has been aptly described as containing “patent defeating provisions.” They 
fall into two classes, events prior to an applicant’s date of invention and events prior 
to filing his U.S. application, related respectively to the requirement of novelty and 
to provisions for loss of right through delay in filing after certain events have made 
the invention public. Subsection (e) is one of the novelty provisions, one of the 
“conditions for patentability,” and if the facts of an applicant’s case bring him within 
it, his right to a patent is defeated. … 
Thus, though both references here were patents copending with appellants’ ap-
plication, issuing after it was filed, 102(e) makes them available as of their U.S. filing 
dates which are earlier than appellants’ U.S. filing date. However, since 102(e) refers 
to the applicant’s date of invention, not to his filing date, he is entitled to an oppor-
tunity to establish his date of invention to show that his invention possessed statu-
tory novelty when he made it. In this case appellants did this by showing that they 
filed a German application earlier than the U.S. filing dates of the references, speci-
fied in 102(e), and that they were entitled to its date for “priority” under section 
119. This right is not in question. The board ruled: 
Appellants have overcome the U.S. filing date of Habicht by claiming the 
benefit under 35 USC 119 of an application filed in Germany on July 31, 
1957. The specification of this German application has been examined and 
is found to contain a full disclosure of the subject matter of the claims, and 
the U.S. filing date of Habicht is considered overcome. 
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We can now summarize the issue and simultaneously state the board’s decision. 
Continuing the above quotation, the board said: 
The Examiner insists, however, that the effective date of the Habicht pa-
tent is January 24, 1957, the date of an application filed in Switzerland 
which is claimed by Habicht under 35 USC 119. Appellants have not over-
come this earlier date of Habicht. The issue is hence presented of whether 
the foreign priority date of a United States patent can be used as the effec-
tive filing date of the patent when it is used as a reference. 
*** 
Our conclusion is that the priority date governs ***. 
This is the decision alleged to be in error. We think it was error. 
Background of the Issue as to the Availability of Habicht as a Reference 
The issue in this case involves a question of statutory interpretation basic to the 
operation of the patent system. This issue has arisen because after decades of a uni-
form practice, and interpretation of law which has existed in part since 1903 and in 
whole since 1926, the Patent Office has made an abrupt about-face; having refused 
for at least 30 years, after expressly ruling on the question, to apply U.S. patents as 
references as of foreign “priority” dates, it has changed its practice as made manifest 
in an unknown number of board decisions. One of them is here on appeal. …  
There has been a spate of writing on the question of law here involved, all of 
which we have read. The same ground has been plowed and replowed by authors as 
well as different panels of the Patent Office Board of Appeals. …  
…  
… We find it indeed strange that it has suddenly become imperative to reinter-
pret a statute which was enacted in 1903, later construed in the light of a Supreme 
Court decision of 1926, and to invert a practice under which a generation of lawyers 
since the latter date has obtained for clients close to two million United States  
patents, counting for their validity on a construction of the statutory law not only 
followed but promulgated by the Patent Office. Furthermore, in 1952 this law, al-
ready a quarter of a century old in toto, was carried forward by Congressional action 
without change, insofar as it was already statutory, and insofar as it was case law it 
was codified without change, the particulars of which will be dealt with later. This 
change in long and continuous administrative practice has also been made without 
any advance notice, hearing, or stated basis in policy, economics, or international 
relations. While it may be that the world is shrinking and the very concept of “for-
eign” should be abolished for the good of mankind, this is not a constitution we are 
expounding but specific statutes enacted to accomplish specific purposes, the mean-
ing of which should stay put, absent intervening Congressional modifications, for 
well-understood reasons. 
Turning from the general to the specific, we will now consider our specific  
reasons for construing the applicable statutes as they have for so long been con-
strued, contrary to the recent innovation of the Patent Office. 
…  
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The board’s construction is based on the idea that the language of the statute is 
plain, that it means what it says, and that what it says [in § 119] is that the applica-
tion filed abroad is to have the same effect as though it were filed here—for all pur-
poses. We can reverse the statement to say that the actual U.S. application is to have 
the same effect as though it were filed in the U.S. on the day when the foreign ap-
plication was filed, the whole thing being a question of effective date. We take it ei-
ther way because it makes no difference here. 
Before getting into history, we note first that there is in the very words of the 
statute a refutation of this literalism. It says “shall have the same effect” and it then 
says “but” for several situations it shall not have the same effect, namely, it does not 
enjoy the foreign date with respect to any of the patent-defeating provisions based 
on publication or patenting anywhere in the world or public use or being on sale in 
this country more than one year before the date of actual filing in this country.5 
As to the other statute involved, we point out that the words of § 102(e), 
which the board “simply” reads together with § 119, also seem plain. Perhaps they 
mean precisely what they say in specifying, as an express patent-defeating provision, 
an application by another describing the invention but only as of the date it is “filed 
in the United States.” 
The great logical flaw we see in the board’s reasoning is in its premise (or is it 
an a priori conclusion?) that “these two provisions must be read together.” Doing 
so, it says § 119 in effect destroys the plain meaning of § 102(e) but the board will 
not indulge the reverse construction in which the plain words of § 102(e) limit the 
apparent meaning of § 119. We see no reason for reading these two provisions to-
gether and the board has stated none. We believe, with the dissenting board mem-
ber, that § 119 and § 102(e) deal with unrelated concepts and further that the his-
torical origins of the two sections show neither was intended to affect the other, 
wherefore they should not be read together in violation of the most basic rule of 
statutory construction, the “master rule,” of carrying out the legislative intent. Ad-
ditionally, we have a long and consistent administrative practice in applying an in-
terpretation contrary to the new view of the board, confirmed by legislation ratifica-
tion in 1952. We will consider these matters separately. 
Section 119 
We shall now take up the history and purpose of § 119. The board opinion de-
votes the equivalent of four pages in the printed record to a scholarly and detailed 
review of the history of § 119 with all of which we agree, except for the interwoven 
conclusions as to its meaning as it bears on the effective date of a U. S. patent used 
as a reference. 
The board shows that the predecessor statute (R.S. 4887), containing the 
words “shall have the same force and effect,” was enacted March 3, 1903 (32 Stat. 
1225). Theodore Roosevelt signed it into law. The bill was drafted and proposed by 
a Commission created by Act of Congress in 1898 (30 Stat. 431) to study the effect 
                                                
5 These patent-defeating … time-bars are also contained in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and 
have always been included in § 119 to assure that it would not have the “same ef-
fect” if giving effect to a priority date would avoid these time-bars. 
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of the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of 20th March 
1883, which was under revision at Brussels even as the Commission deliberated, the 
revision being adopted at Brussels on 14th December 1900. (It was last revised at 
Lisbon on 31st October 1958.) The Commission made a report November 27, 
1900, printed in 1902, entitled Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the 
Laws Relating to Patents, Trademarks, and Trade Names, with Reference to  
Existing Conventions and Treaties, which is fairly descriptive of its purpose. …  
Under the heading “Priority Under the Convention,” it says (p. 12): 
The second provision of the Convention to be noticed, and one which may 
be of very great advantage to those of our citizens who desire to secure pa-
tents in foreign countries for their inventions, is that contained in article 4, 
and relates to the so called “delay of priority,” or “period of priority.” 
It then explained that in most countries no valid patent can be obtained if before 
the application is filed, the invention has been described in a printed publication, 
either in the country of application or even, as in the case of France and six other 
countries, in any country; that the same was true as to public use of the invention; 
and that the convention gives applicants in member countries a period (then 7 
months, soon extended to 12) in which they can file applications in other countries 
after the filing in their own country and obtain valid patents notwithstanding pub-
lication or use in the interval and before the filing of the foreign application. This, it 
explained, is the “delay of priority.” In plain English, it was the right of an applicant 
to have the foreign application treated at law as prior to the intervening publication 
or public use, though in fact it was not, by giving a right to that applicant to delay 
filing in the foreign country, instead of filing simultaneously with the home applica-
tion, yet have it treated as though filed on the date of the home application. This is 
what today we call simply “Convention priority,” or just “priority.” The foreign  
filing date is the “convention date” or the “priority date.” 
This priority right was a protection to one who was trying to obtain patents in 
foreign countries, the protection being against patent-defeating provisions of  
national laws based on events intervening between the time of filing at home and 
filing abroad. Under the heading “Recapitulation of Advantages Secured by the 
Convention,” the Commission said, so far as relevant here (pp. 14-15): 
The advantages to our citizens in the matter of patents directly afforded by 
the convention may be thus recapitulated. 
First. The enjoyment in foreign countries of equal rights with subjects or 
citizens of those countries. 
Second. The “delay of priority” of seven months within which to file appli-
cations abroad after filing in this country. 
Third. The privilege of introducing articles embodying the invention man-
ufactured in this country into foreign countries to a certain extent without 
thereby causing the forfeiture of the patents taken out there. 
Note the emphasis repeatedly placed in the Commission Report on advantages to 
United States citizens. It was felt we should do what was necessary to comply with 
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the reciprocity provisions to enjoy the benefits of the convention for our own citi-
zens. …  
Specific to the question here, the Commission Report says (p. 24): 
We are, therefore, of the opinion that an amendment to the law should be 
made, providing that the foreign application shall have, in case an applica-
tion is filed in this country by the applicant abroad within the specified  
period, the same effect as if filed here on the day it was filed abroad. 
… 
For the foregoing reasons, we are clearly of the opinion that § 119 is not to be 
read as anything more than it was originally intended to be by its drafters, the 
Commission appointed under the 1898 Act of Congress, namely, a revision of our 
statutes to provide for a right of priority in conformity with the International Con-
vention, for the benefit of United States citizens, by creating the necessary reciproci-
ty with foreign members of the then Paris Union. 
…  
Section 102(e) 
We have … pointed out that [this section] is a patent-defeating section, by con-
trast with § 119 which gives affirmative “priority” rights to applicants notwith-
standing it is drafted in terms of “An application.” The priority right is to save the 
applicant (or his application if one prefers to say it that way) from patent-defeating 
provisions such as § 102(e); and of course it has the same effect in guarding the  
validity of the patent when issued. 
Section 102(e), on the other hand, is one of the provisions which defeats appli-
cants and invalidates patents and is closely related in fact and in history to the re-
quirement of § 102(a) … .  
In fact, § 102(e) springs straight from § 102(a)’s predecessor, R.S. 4886, by 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1926. It was pure case law until 
1952 when, having become firmly established, that law was codified by incorp-
orating it in the statute. 
… 
We need not go into the reasoning of the Milburn case, which has its weakness-
es, because all that matters is the rule of law it established: That a complete descrip-
tion of an invention in a U.S. patent application, filed before the date of invention 
of another, if it matures into a patent, may be used to show that that other was not 
the first inventor. This was a patent-defeating, judge-made rule and now is § 102(e). 
The rule has been expanded somewhat subsequent to 1926 so that the reference 
patent may be used as of its U.S. filing date as a general prior art reference, as shown 
by … the December 8, 1965 Supreme Court decision in Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. 
Brenner, 382 U.S. 252. 
What has always been pointed out in attacks on the Milburn rule, or in at-
tempts to limit it, is that it uses, as prior knowledge, information which was secret at 
the time as of which it is used—the contents of U.S. patent applications which are 
preserved in secrecy, generally speaking, 35 U.S.C. § 122. This is true, and we think 
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there is some validity to the argument that that which is secret should be in a differ-
ent category from knowledge which is public. Nevertheless we have the rule. How-
ever, we are not disposed to extend that rule, which applies to the date of filing ap-
plications in the United States, the actual filing date when the disclosure is on de-
posit in the U.S. Patent Office and on its way, in due course, to publication in an 
issued patent. 
The board’s new view, as expressed in this case and in the Zemla and Rapala 
decisions … , has the practical potential effect of pushing back the date of the un-
published, secret disclosures, which ultimately have effect as prior art references in 
the form of U.S. patents, by the full one-year priority period of § 119. We think the 
Milburn rule, as codified in § 102(e), goes far enough in that direction. We see no 
valid reason to go further, certainly no compelling reason. 
We have seen that § 119 originated in 1903 and that its purpose was to grant 
protective priority rights so that the United States might be a participating member 
in the International Convention by giving reciprocal priority rights to foreign ap-
plicants with respect to the obtaining of patents. We have also seen that § 102(e) 
was the codification of a court-developed patent-defeating rule based on a statutory 
requirement that an applicant’s invention must not have been previously known by 
others in this country. We see no such relation between these two rules of law as 
requires them to be read together and it is our view that § 119 should not be so 
read with § 102(e) as to modify the express limitation of the latter to applications 
“filed in the United States.” 
…  
In re Giacomini 
612 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
Rader, Chief Judge: 
Peter Joseph Giacomini, Walter Michael Pitio, Hector Francisco Rodriguez, 
and Donald David Shugard (collectively, “Giacomini”) appeal from a decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejecting certain claims of U.S. 
Patent Application No. 09/725,737 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102. Giaco-
mini argues that the anticipatory reference—U.S. Patent No. 7,039,683, the Tran 
patent—does not qualify as prior art because Giacomini’s filing date antedates the 
Tran patent’s filing date. Because the Tran patent has a patent-defeating effect as of 
the filing date of the provisional application to which it claims priority and which 
was filed before Giacomini’s application, this court affirms. 
I. 
Giacomini’s application—“Method and Apparatus for Economical Cache Pop-
ulation”—was filed on November 29, 2000. The application claims a technique for 
selectively storing electronic data in a readily accessible memory called a “cache.” 
When a system retrieves requested data from a source, it stores the data in its cache 
so that it can retrieve the data more quickly next time. Because the cache has a lim-
ited space, the system must selectively store data. Giacomini’s technique populates 
the cache with data only when the system receives a certain number of requests for 
that data. Claim 1 is representative: 
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A method comprising: 
populating a cache with a resource only when at least i requests for said  
resource have been received; 
wherein i is an integer and is at least occasionally greater than one. 
This cache does not normally include infrequently requested data because it “at least 
occasionally” stores data for which multiple requests have been made. Claims 1, 2, 
8, 11, 12, 15, 22-24, 27, 28, 31, and 32 of Giacomini’s application are at issue on 
appeal. 
II. 
The Board rejected certain claims of Giacomini’s application as anticipated un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 102 by the Tran patent, and, in the alternative, by U.S. Patent No. 
6,463,509 (“the Teoman patent”). 
The Tran patent—“Electronic Information Caching”—describes a caching 
technique based on an anticipated demand for data. Its “anticipating module” con-
siders “past requests for access to the same or related electronic information by ac-
cess requesters.” Tran patent, col. 1, ll. 49-52. Such “past requests for information 
may be measured by the frequency or volume of access requests.” Id. col. 3, ll. 25-
28. The Board found, and Giacomini does not dispute, that the Tran patent teaches 
all of the claimed features in Giacomini’s application. 
The central issue at the Board was the eligibility of the Tran patent to serve as 
prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). The Tran patent’s filing date is December 29, 
2000, exactly a month after Giacomini filed his application. However, the Tran  
patent claims priority to a provisional application (“the Tran provisional”) filed on 
September 25, 2000, which antedates Giacomini’s filing date. Therefore, the Board 
held that the Tran patent has a patent-defeating effect as of the filing date of the 
Tran provisional. 
Giacomini appeals the Board’s decision that the Tran patent and the Teoman 
patent each anticipates his application. …  
III. 
This court reviews the Board’s legal conclusions, including statutory interpre-
tation, without deference. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). Anticipation is a question of fact. In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). This court reviews the Board’s factual determinations for substan-
tial evidence. Id. 
IV. 
Section 102 governs the conditions of patentability. The statute, in pertinent 
part, states: 
[A] person shall be entitled to a patent unless *** the invention was de-
scribed in *** (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another 
filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for  
patent[.] 
35 U.S.C. § 102(e)(2) (emphasis added). An application that a patent was “granted 
on” is the first U.S. application to disclose the invention claimed in the patent. In re 
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Klesper, 397 F.2d 882, 885-86 (CCPA 1968). Title 35 further clarifies that “[t]he 
provisions of this title relating to applications for patent shall apply to provisional 
applications for patent, except as otherwise provided, and except *** [in] sections 
115, 131, 135, and 157 of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(8). Under this encom-
passing rule, “applications for patent” under § 102 includes both provisional and 
non-provisional patent applications. Therefore, an applicant is not entitled to a  
patent if another’s patent discloses the same invention, which was carried forward 
from an earlier U.S. provisional application or U.S. non-provisional application. 
As noted, Giacomini does not dispute that the Tran patent describes the inven-
tion claimed in Giacomini’s application. Also, the Tran provisional, which antedates 
Giacomini’s filing date, was the first U.S. application to describe the invention. The 
Board found that “[t]he Provisional Application No. 60/234,996, from which Tran 
claims priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e), discloses that ‘[a]nticipating requests for 
electronic information *** is generally performed based on one or more criteria, 
e.g., past requests for information.’” Section 119(e) treats a nonprovisional applica-
tion as though filed on the date of its corresponding provisional application. Section 
119 recites: 
(e)(1) An application for patent filed under section 111(a) or section 363 
of this title for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by the first 
paragraph of section 112 of this title in a provisional application filed under 
section 111(b) of this title, by an inventor or inventors named in the provi-
sional application, shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as 
though filed on the date of the provisional application filed under section 
111(b) of this title, if the application for patent filed under section 111(a) 
or section 363 of this title is filed not later than 12 months after the date 
on which the provisional application was filed and if it contains or is 
amended to contain a specific reference to the provisional application. *** 
35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1) (emphases added). 
An important limitation is that the provisional application must provide written 
description support for the claimed invention. Because Giacomini never argued be-
fore the Board that the Tran provisional failed to provide written description sup-
port for the claimed subject matter in accordance with § 119(e), Giacomini waived 
the argument by failing to raise it below. See In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (declining to consider arguments that the applicant failed to con-
test before the Board); In re Berger, 279 F.3d 975, 984 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (same). 
Therefore, the Tran patent “shall have the same effect,” including a patent-defeating 
effect, as to the claimed invention as though it was filed on the date of the Tran 
provisional. Accordingly, Giacomini, who filed his application after Tran filed his 
provisional application, cannot receive a patent covering the same subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). 
This conclusion is consistent with “[t]he fundamental rule *** that the pat-
entee must be the first inventor.” Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 
270 U.S. 390, 402 (1926). In Milburn, the Supreme Court held that a patent ap-
plied for before but not granted until after a second patent is sought bars the issu-
ance of the second patent. Id. at 400-01. The rule stems from the principle that, 
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subject to certain exceptions, “one really must be the first inventor in order to be 
entitled to a patent.” Id. at 400. Although Milburn concerned a nonprovisional ap-
plication, a provisional application similarly shows that someone else was the first to 
invent. See id. at 400 (“[O]bviously one is not the first inventor if *** somebody 
else has made a complete and adequate description of the thing claimed before the 
earliest moment to which the alleged inventor can carry his invention back.”). The 
Tran provisional evinces that Tran, and not Giacomini, was the first to invent the 
claimed subject matter. Allowing Giacomini’s application would create an anom-
alous result where someone who was not the first to invent in the United States re-
ceives a patent. 
Giacomini argues that 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) shifts a patent’s priority date but not 
its effective reference date to the filing date of an earlier provisional application. In 
other words, Giacomini contends that although the Tran patent claims the benefit 
of priority to the Tran provisional, the Tran patent does not have a patent-defeating 
effect as of the Tran provisional’s filing date. 
Giacomini’s distinction between priority date and effective reference date large-
ly stems from In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (1966). The issue in Hilmer was whether 
a U.S. patent, cited as a § 102(e) prior art reference, was effective as of its foreign 
filing date under § 119. Id. at 862. This court’s predecessor rejected the Board’s 
conclusion that “the foreign priority date of a U.S. patent is its effective date as a 
reference.” Id. at 870. The court instead held that “§ 119 only deals with ‘right of 
priority.’ The section does not provide for the use of a U.S. patent as an anticipatory 
reference as of its foreign filing date.” Id. at 862. Thus, Hilmer distinguished a  
patent’s priority date under § 119 and effective reference date under § 102(e) in 
cases involving an earlier foreign application. Giacomini equates a U.S. provisional 
application to a foreign patent application to argue that the Tran provisional’s filing 
date is not the Tran patent’s effective date as a prior art reference. 
But at the time this court’s predecessor decided Hilmer, § 119 only governed 
the benefit of claiming priority to an earlier filing date in foreign countries. Id. at 
862. Congress added § 119(e) along with the enactment of provisional applications 
in 1994. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 
(1994). Therefore, broad language in Hilmer concerning § 119 is not applicable to 
provisional applications. Also, Giacomini misses an important distinction between 
Hilmer and the present case. Hilmer involved an earlier foreign application while the 
present case deals with an earlier U.S. provisional application. See Klesper, 397 F.2d 
at 885 (Hilmer clarified that “domestic and foreign filing dates stand on entirely 
different footings.”). 
Section 102(e) codified the “history of treating the disclosure of a U.S. patent 
as prior art as of the filing date of the earliest U.S. application to which the patent is 
entitled, provided the disclosure was contained in substance in the said earliest appli-
cation.” Id. (emphasis added). According to Hilmer, an earlier foreign application 
does not shift a corresponding patent’s effective reference date because § 102(e) ex-
plicitly requires the earlier application to be “filed in the United States.” Hilmer, 
359 F.2d at 862 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)). This court’s predecessor warned 
that § 119 cannot be read with § 102(e) to modify the express domestic limitation. 
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Id. In contrast, an earlier provisional application is an application “filed in the  
United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). Treating a provisional application’s filing date 
as both the patent’s priority date and its effective reference date does not raise the 
alleged tension between §§ 102(e) and 119. Given the “clear distinction between 
acts abroad and acts here,” Hilmer, 359 F.2d at 879, Giacomini’s reliance on 
Hilmer is misplaced. Id. 
Accordingly, the Tran patent has a patent-defeating effect as of the filing date 
of the Tran provisional, or September 25, 2000. Giacomini did not file his appli-
cation until months after Tran filed his provisional application. Giacomini is not the 
first to invent in the United States and thus is not entitled to a patent. Because this 
court affirms the Board’s finding of anticipation based on the Tran patent, this court 
will not review the Board’s finding with respect to the Teoman patent. 
… 
§ 102(g) 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 223-232, 683-689 
Litchfield v. Eigen 
535 F.2d 72 (CCPA 1976) 
Rich, Judge: 
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of 
Patent Interferences awarding priority to the senior party-patentee Eigen1 against 
the junior party-applicants Litchfield and Vely2 as to both counts in interference on 
the ground that Litchfield and Vely, although having been first to conceive, failed to 
show reasonable diligence from just prior to Eigen’s conception to their reduction 
to practice. We affirm. 
The Contested Subject Matter 
The invention in interference is an oral composition, useful for the prevention 
of dental caries and calculus. The counts are: 
1. An oral composition comprising an effective amount up to 6.25% of a 
nontoxic, non-volatile material selected from the group consisting of the 
aliphatic aldehyde glutaraldehyde and the aliphatic aldehyde oxyderivative 
glyoxylic acid and a dental vehicle. 
2. An oral composition in accordance with count 1, wherein the aldehyde 
ingredient constitutes .05-6.25% by weight of the composition. 
                                                
1 Eigen is a party on the basis of his U. S. Patent No. 3,497,590, entitled “Oral 
Compositions Containing Non-Toxic, Non-Volatile Aliphatic Aldehyde,” the appli-
cation for which was filed August 24, 1967. The patent is assigned to Colgate-
Palmolive Company. 
2 Application serial No. 35,246, entitled “Anticaries Confectioneries and Oral 
Health Products,” filed May 6, 1970, but accorded the January 10, 1969, filing date 
of copending application serial No. 790,314, now abandoned. The application is 
assigned to Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company. 
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Both parties claim to have made the invention in the course of research of 
somewhat broader scope. Their invention histories, as set out in the board’s findings 
of fact, are helpful to an understanding of the issues. 
A. Litchfield and Vely 
Litchfield and Vely were employees of the Battelle Memorial Institute at  
Columbus, Ohio. In February 1962, the L. A. Dreyfus Co., a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of their assignee Wrigley, engaged the services of Battelle to search for anticaries 
agents that were nontoxic, “non-pharmaceutical” (non-prescription?) and suitable 
for incorporation into chewing gum. Litchfield, Vely and Arthur C. Peters com-
prised the Battelle research team for the project. They selected candidate anticaries 
agents and tested them in vitro by microbiological assay. If a candidate anti-caries 
agent showed a significant level of activity in vitro, it was considered for further test-
ing in vivo. During 1962 and 1963, the research team determined that various  
water-soluble aldehydes should be investigated. On April 3, 1964, Vely and his assis-
tant, Powell, tested a solution of glutaraldehyde in vitro in concentrations of 0.1%, 
0.05%, and 0.025% against Streptococcus faecalis strain FA-1. No later than April 
14, 1964, Vely and Powell further tested glutaraldehyde in vitro against Lactobacil-
lus casei ATCC 4646. As a result of these tests, Litchfield and Vely concluded that 
glutaraldehyde showed significant activity. There was no further activity with respect 
to glutaraldehyde until the period September 8, 1965, through December 8, 1965, 
when, under Peters’ supervision, a 1% solution of glutaraldehyde was tested in vivo 
in rats. On April 13, 1966, a report, signed by Litchfield, was issued by Battelle to 
Wrigley classifying glutaraldehyde in the “1-plus” category, which Peters explained 
meant that the test results showed about a 25% reduction in caries incidence in vivo. 
B. Eigen 
Eigen was section head of biochemistry at Colgate-Palmolive Company. Begin-
ning about May 1964, Don N. Harris, a biochemist at Colgate, came under Eigen’s 
supervision and was assigned a project of determining whether aldehydes were effec-
tive in inhibiting dental calculus. Eigen claims to have suggested using glutaral-
dehyde as an anti-calculus agent to Harris early in 1964; Harris, however, was un-
able to recall when testifying many years later, who specifically suggested the testing 
of glutaraldehyde. In any event, Harris entered aldehydes as possible anti-calculus 
agents in his notebook on April 23, 1964. On May 22, 1964, using an in vitro pro-
cedure, he tested glutaraldehyde in concentrations of 1.25%, 2.5%, and 6.25%. 
Based on these tests, Harris concluded that glutaraldehyde appeared to be a poten-
tial anticalculus agent. Harris discussed his conclusions from the in vitro tests with 
Eigen, and it was decided that glutaraldehyde should be tested in vivo. On June 25, 
1964, Harris completed an in vivo test of glutaraldehyde in rats. Based on this test, 
Harris concluded that a 2.5% solution of glutaraldehyde produced a statistically sig-
nificant reduction of calculus. 
The Board’s Opinion 
The board noted that at final hearing Eigen admitted that Litchfield and Vely 
had established conception in April 1964; the board stated that the specific date was 
April 3, 1964, when Vely and Powell tested glutaraldehyde solutions in vitro against 
Streptococcus faecalis strain FA-1. As to an actual reduction to practice by Litchfield 
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and Vely, the board found that a glutaraldehyde composition falling within the 
scope of the counts was composed on behalf of Litchfield and Vely during the  
period September-December 1965 for the purpose of testing glutaraldehyde in vivo 
as an anticaries agent and that the utility of the composition was demonstrated when 
it was determined that the composition had an anti-caries activity in the “1-plus” 
category, i.e., when it was demonstrated that the composition decreased caries by 
about 25% as compared with control animals. Even though the in vivo test was 
completed in December 1965, the board did not accord Litchfield and Vely that 
date for a reduction to practice; rather, it accorded them the date of the April 13, 
1966, report by Battelle to Wrigley, wherein “the first contemporaneous recog-
nition of a 1-plus activity for glutaraldehyde by Litchfield appears *** .” 
As to Eigen, the board stated that it believed “on the basis of the record before 
us, that Eigen conceived of the use of glutaraldehyde as an anti-calculus agent and 
that Harris tested glutaraldehyde in vitro on behalf of Eigen.” The board accorded 
Eigen a conception date no earlier than May 22, 1964, since “the first corroborated 
documentary evidence relating to Eigen’s conception appears in Harris’ notebook 
dated May 22, 1964 *** .” That entry sets out Harris’ in vitro test of glutaral-
dehyde. The board found an actual reduction to practice by Eigen on June 25, 
1964, when “Harris—on behalf of Eigen—completed an in vivo test using a 2.5% 
solution of glutaraldehyde in rats and concluded from the test that glutaraldehyde 
produced a significant reduction of calculus,” since the solution fell within the 
counts and a practical utility was demonstrated therefor. 
Despite the earlier April 3, 1964, conception date accorded Litchfield and Vely, 
the board awarded priority to Eigen because Litchfield and Vely had not met their 
“affirmative burden of showing reasonable diligence” in that they had “not shown 
any affirmative action toward an actual reduction to practice *** from May 21, 
1964 [the day prior to Eigen’s conception] *** to September 8, 1965 *** when in 
vivo tests were begun,” nor had they shown an acceptable excuse or reason for their 
failure to take affirmative action during that period. The board was not persuaded by 
the assertion of Litchfield and Vely that the record excused their failure to take af-
firmative action during the critical period because it established that they were test-
ing many other compounds according to “the regular procedure for testing com-
pounds in order, within budgetary limits as animals became available ***.” The 
board stated that Litchfield and Vely had not offered “a detailed explanation point-
ing out when compounds were selected and tested.” 
Appellants’ Arguments 
Litchfield and Vely argue that Eigen did not establish conception and reduction 
to practice by corroborated evidence because neither Harris’ oral testimony nor the 
documentary evidence presented establish conception by Eigen. Specifically, they 
state that Harris’ testimony did not corroborate conception by Eigen because Harris 
was unable to recall who suggested that he test glutaraldehyde. Litchfield and Vely 
also state that there is no indication in any document of record that Eigen was re-
sponsible for the selection of glutaraldehyde for testing. They point to Harris’ labor-
atory notebook and state that Eigen’s name appears only as that of a witness to the 
in vitro test of glutaraldehyde. 
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Although Litchfield and Vely state that the above argument, if accepted, would 
moot the issue of diligence, they also argue that they have shown diligence or an 
excuse for the lack thereof, stating that the board erroneously ignored their exhibits 
9-12 and 18 and Peters’ testimony, which they maintain show continuous activity 
during the critical period. The exhibits are semiannual reports from Battelle to 
Wrigley summarizing the in vivo work completed during the period January 1, 1964 
– February 28, 1967. Litchfield and Vely admit that glutaraldehyde was not tested 
in vivo between the date established for the last in vitro test, April 14, 1964, and the 
beginning of the in vivo test on September 8, 1965. They maintain, however, that 
the summary reports, corroborated by Peters’ testimony, demonstrate their con-
tinuous activity “directed to the project,” meaning the research project as a whole, 
which involved many compounds in addition to glutaraldehyde. Litchfield and Vely 
explain their delay in testing glutaraldehyde in vivo as being due to “budgetary limi-
tations” and the “availability of animals” for in vivo testing which resulted in a 
“backlog of compounds successfully tested in vitro which were awaiting available 
animals for in vivo testing.” 
Opinion 
The board did not err in according Eigen a conception date of May 22, 1964. 
To argue that Eigen has not established conception because Harris could not recall 
who placed glutaraldehyde on the list of aldehydes which he tested in vitro is to ig-
nore the other facts of record which do establish his conception. Those facts appear 
in documents of record, contrary to the contention of Litchfield and Vely. Para-
mount among these is the documentary evidence of the in vitro test of glutaral-
dehyde by Harris. Litchfield and Vely do not contest that this test was conducted as 
described in Harris’ notebook, nor do they contest the results of that test as set out 
therein. The notebook shows that glutaraldehyde was among several aldehydes test-
ed in vitro by Harris, and Harris corroborated Eigen in testifying that Eigen as-
signed him the project of testing aldehydes for their effect on dental calculus. Eigen 
testified that he originated the concept of using aldehydes as anti-calculus agents; 
Harris’ notebook corroborates Eigen’s testimony. In Harris’ notebook the following 
entry appears for April 23, 1964: 
 “In vitro” Calculus Prevention 
 *** 
Discussion—Aldehydes have long been known to react with amino groups 
*** and has [sic] been used in the tanning industry for the tanning of col-
lagen leathers. The ground substance of most mineralization sites has been 
shown to be collagen (bone, enamel etc.). Other workers have shown that 
if the amino groups are blocked, then calcification is prevented. We hoped 
that such a mechanism would apply in the search for a potential antical-
culus agent. 
Since it is clear that Eigen assigned the testing of aldehydes to Harris, it is  
reasonable to infer that the rationale set out in the notebook is the one Eigen gave 
Harris when he made the assignment. Thus, the notebook entry corroborates Eig-
en’s testimony that his conception of aldehydes as anti-calculus agents was based on 
earlier work showing that removal of amino groups from an organic matrix with  
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nitrous acid resulted in a matrix that did not calcify. The foregoing shows that, at 
least by April 23, 1964, Eigen had conceived the idea that at least some aldehydes 
might be useful in the prevention of dental calculus because of their ability to block 
amino groups. It remained only to “test this theory out,” as Eigen put it, by testing 
various aldehydes; this seems to be the only reason for testing any of the aldehydes 
which were tested, including glutaraldehyde. The record shows that Harris tested 
glutaraldehyde along with several other aldehydes; his notebook entry of May 22, 
1964, discussing the results of those tests, states: “From these results, it appears as if 
aldehydes are combining with amino groups in the ground substance and preventing 
calcification.” Thus, not only did Harris’ tests show glutaraldehyde to prevent cal-
cification in vitro, they showed that the mechanism by which it did so was precisely 
that postulated by Eigen, for whom the tests were conducted. We conclude that 
these tests, conducted to test Eigen’s theory, redounded to the benefit of Eigen 
when they confirmed it, and thus, when Harris obtained the test results confirming 
Eigen’s theory as to glutaraldehyde on May 22, 1964, it was the same as if Eigen 
had personally made the tests. As of that date, then, we hold that Eigen had a con-
ception of the potential of glutaraldehyde as an anti-calculus agent. 
We find no error in the board’s conclusion that Litchfield and Vely failed to ex-
ercise reasonable diligence in reducing their invention to practice. They admit that 
from their own conception in April 1964 to September 8, 1965, they did not test 
glutaraldehyde in vivo; in other words, during that period, none of their activity was 
directed to reducing their invention to practice. It is of no avail to them that their 
activities were continuously “directed to the project” of testing numerous com-
pounds for anti-caries activity, for this is no explanation at all of why the in vivo test-
ing of glutaraldehyde was delayed. Indeed, the fact that their summary reports for 
this period show continuous in vivo testing of other compounds indicates that 
throughout the period in question they possessed the capability of conducting such 
a test. To state that the delay was due to “budgetary limits established by the spon-
sor and the availability of animals” for in vivo testing is not enough. Litchfield and 
Vely have an affirmative duty to show what “budgetary limits” they were operating 
under and what the “availability of animals” was in order for any tribunal to have 
the opportunity to determine whether the delay was reasonable in light of these fac-
tors. The reasonableness of the delay in light of the facts adduced is essential to ex-
cusing non-diligence. Litchfield and Vely have pointed to nothing in the record 
which shows what budgetary limitations they were working under, nor have they 
demonstrated how these limitations resulted in the delay in testing glutaraldehyde in 
vivo. The only evidence pointed to with respect to the availability of animals relates 
to the time (“several months”) it took from February 1962 to grow the rats neces-
sary for the in vivo testing then being considered. This delay, coming long before 
the in vitro test of glutaraldehyde by them, is obviously irrelevant. The only backlog 
pointed to in the record relates to “a backlog of in vivo tests they were going to 
reach in hamsters.” There is nothing in this testimony as to what this backlog was 
due to, nor could the witness testify as to whether glutaraldehyde was in that back-
log. Litchfield and Vely have not shown what caused the delay in testing glutaral-
dehyde in vivo, much less that such delay was reasonable. Given the fact, in addi-
tion, that Eigen was able to conduct an in vivo test within days of his in vitro test, 
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the delay of Litchfield and Vely must be viewed as an extraordinary delay, and the 
lack of explanation thereof is fatal to their assertion of diligence. 
… 
Peeler v. Miller 
535 F.2d 647 (CCPA 1976) 
Rich, Judge: 
The senior party, Peeler, Godfrey, and Furby (Peeler),1 appeals from the de-
cision of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Board of Patent Interferences 
(board), one member dissenting, awarding priority of invention in five counts to the 
junior party, Miller.2 We reverse. 
The Subject Matter 
Counts 6 and 8 adequately describe the subject matter: 
6. A power transmission fluid consisting essentially of a major portion of a 
phosphate ester having a tendency to cause cavitation erosion damage, and 
as an additive effective in reducing such damage, from 0.01 to 10% by 
weight of a halocarbon containing only halogen atoms and at least one 
carbon atom having a boiling point below 75°C, wherein the halogen sub-
stituents on said halocarbon are chlorine, bromine or fluorine or combi-
nations thereof. 
8. A method of inhibiting cavitation damage to a hydraulic system utilizing 
a hydraulic fluid consisting essentially of a major portion of a phosphate es-
ter, which method comprises maintaining in said hydraulic fluid by ad-
dition 0.01 to 10% by weight of a halocarbon containing only halogen  
atoms and at least one carbon atom having a boiling point below 75°C, 
wherein the halogen substituents on said halocarbon are chlorine, bromine 
or fluorine or combinations thereof. 
The Evidence 
Peeler took no testimony and relied on his filing date. Miller submitted testi-
mony in the form of affidavits (by stipulation) from himself, various Monsanto col-
leagues, and William Black, the Monsanto patent attorney who prepared and filed 
Miller’s application. Miller’s efforts, culminating in this invention, began in the fall 
of 1964 when he became aware of serious hydraulic valve leakage in British  
“Trident” aircraft using Monsanto’s SKYDROL 500A brand hydraulic fluid. He 
                                                
1 Involved on U.S. Patent No. 3,591,506, entitled “Functional Fluids Containing 
Halocarbons for Preventing Cavitation Damage,” issued July 6, 1971, on an appli-
cation filed January 4, 1968. The patent is assigned to Chevron Research Company. 
2 Involved on application serial No. 32,344, filed April 27, 1970, entitled “Func-
tional Fluid Compositions Containing Fluro Alkanes,” which is assigned to Monsan-
to Company. 
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concluded that cavitation3 was responsible for the problem and began the search for 
a fluid additive to overcome the problem. 
In 1965, in ultrasonic vibrating probe tests, in which a soft metal tip is vibrated 
at high frequency in a beaker containing SKYDROL 500A and the additive under 
test and the loss of metal from the tip measured, it was found that water as an ad-
ditive would reduce cavitation damage substantially. This laboratory finding was 
confirmed in use in the Trident aircraft. In March 1966 Miller thought of using 
Freon 11 (the DuPont trademark for trichloromonofluoromethane) as the additive 
and also other halocarbons, which are fire-resistant and, like water, have high vola-
tility in relation to the base fluid, as anti-cavitation additives. On March 8 Miller in-
structed a colleague (Stainbrook) to conduct ultrasonic vibrating probe tests using 
Freon 11 as the additive. Stainbrook performed one control run and one run with 
Freon 11 as the additive on that day. Stainbrook’s affidavit and Miller’s March 14 
notebook page indicate that Freon 11 significantly reduced erosion of the probe tip 
in the experiment. In his notebook entry Miller indicated, “To better assess such 
additives, we are setting up hermetically sealed sample containers.” The record does 
not show that hermetically sealed containers were subsequently used by Miller. 
On April 5, 1966, Miller submitted a “preliminary disclosure of invention,” 
which his superiors in the Research Department of Monsanto’s Organic Chemicals 
Division rated “A (Ready [to file])” on April 18, 1966. Presumably, this disclosure 
was forwarded to Monsanto’s patent department for action soon thereafter, but the 
record does not show when this occurred. 
From the time when Miller’s invention disclosure was rated “A (Ready)” more 
than four years elapsed until Miller’s filing date. Miller continued working on cavi-
tation inhibitors of undisclosed nature during this time, and in September 1966 he 
gave presentations at several U.S. aviation industry meetings on Monsanto’s solution 
of the Trident valve damage problem. Stainbrook stated that he ran vibrating probe 
tests in October 1967 using Freon 112(a) (apparently tetrachlorodifluoroethane) as 
the additive and that he informed Miller of his results. What Miller did with this in-
formation is not indicated in the record. Meanwhile, there is no evidence of action 
in Monsanto’s patent department until the arrival of Mr. Black in October 1968, 
some two and a half years after Miller’s alleged actual reduction to practice. Mr. 
Black’s affidavit states in material part: 
• He was employed by Monsanto on October 14, 1968. He was assigned 




                                                
3 “Cavitation” may be defined as “Formation of gas or vapor-filled cavities within 
liquids by mechanical forces; *** ; specifically, the formation of vapor-filled cavities 
in the interior or on the solid boundaries of vaporized liquids in motion where the 
pressure is reduced to a critical value without a change in ambient temperature.” 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 237 (1974). 
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Synthetic Lubricants 
• He was assigned four areas because the three attorneys who had previously 
handled them had resigned in the previous four months. 
• He recalls that as of January 1969 he was responsible for: 
1) about 60 to 70 pending U.S. Applications 
2) over 400 foreign pending applications 
3) over 100 active invention disclosures of which 
27 were A – ready to file 
21 were A – not ready to file 
• He recalls that as of that date, [Miller’s] invention disclosure *** was in order 
of filing priority, 31st on the list out of 48 cases. 
• He generally filed invention disclosures according to their order of priority. 
The Board Opinions 
The board majority found that Miller had actually reduced the invention of the 
counts to practice in April 1966 and that he had not abandoned, suppressed, or 
concealed the invention within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). The majority 
found that Miller’s March 1966 vibrating probe tests were sufficient to show that 
the invention was suitable for the use set forth in the counts, i.e., cavitation inhi-
bition in hydraulic systems. The tests were held not to have been abandoned exper-
iments. The majority rejected Peeler’s claim that Miller had suppressed the inven-
tion, on the basis that there was no evidence that Miller intended to suppress the 
invention or in fact did so. 
The dissenting member disagreed on both the reduction to practice and sup-
pression issues. He concluded that the single probe test using FREON 11 as the 
additive was insufficient to establish reproducibility of results, citing Conner v. Joris, 
241 F.2d 944 (CCPA 1957), and that Miller’s March 14 notebook entry showed 
that Miller believed he had a “lead,” not an actual reduction to practice, which re-
quired further experimentation “to better assess such additives.” The dissenter 
viewed the inactivity at Monsanto after the purported reduction to practice, coupled 
with Stainbrook’s 1967 experiments, to indicate a lack of conviction of success by 
those in authority at Monsanto, and he concluded that the March 1966 tests consti-
tuted abandoned experiments. On the suppression issue, the dissenter commented: 
*** I also believe that the patent statutes were not designed to protect a 
first inventor who slumbers, to the detriment of a second inventor who 
tries to disclose his invention to the public and this I believe is what we 
have before us. 
He concluded that the delay at Monsanto was “an unreasonable delay analo-
gous to ‘res ipsa loquitur’ transferring the burden of proof to Miller to prove that 
the invention was not suppressed, concealed, or abandoned under the provisions of 
35 USC 102(g).” The dissenter relied on the majority and concurring opinions—
the latter by the author of this opinion—in Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277 
(CCPA 1974), to support this conclusion. 
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Opinion 
While we agree with the board majority that Miller proved by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he had actually reduced the invention to practice in March 
1966, we also agree with the dissenting member of the board that Miller must be 
deemed to have suppressed the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) through the 
behavior of his assignee. Perforce, the decision of the board must be reversed. We 
reach both issues, since without an actual reduction to practice there is no invention 
in existence which can be abandoned, suppressed, or concealed under § 102(g).  
Bogoslowsky v. Huse, 142 F.2d 75 (CCPA 1944). 
I 
Peeler argues that the one successful vibrating probe test relied upon by Miller 
to establish an actual reduction to practice was preliminary in nature and failed to 
show that the invention would work “as intended to work in its practical con-
templated use, i.e., as an aircraft hydraulic fluid *** .” Peeler also urges us to find 
that a single successful test is insufficient to establish reproducibility of results and 
that the probe test was an abandoned experiment because Miller lacked conviction 
of success. Connected with these arguments is Peeler’s contention that Miller is at-
tempting to prove actual reduction to practice nunc pro tunc by relying on an affi-
davit by his colleague Fairing which, Peeler submits, presents Fairing’s opinion as of 
1973, when it was executed, and not at the time of Miller’s reduction to practice in 
March 1966. 
We note that the counts are not directed to aircraft hydraulic systems, which are 
special environments with high speed flow and extremes of temperature and pressure 
causing accelerated wear of valves and other hydraulic system components, but to 
hydraulic systems generally. Thus Miller need show only that his invention is suit-
able for reducing cavitation damage in any hydraulic system. We find Peeler in a  
peculiarly unfavorable position to assert that the vibrating probe test is insufficient to 
prove actual reduction to practice. The only tests disclosed in Peeler’s examples illus-
trating his invention are probe tests, and it is these tests upon which Peeler is in ef-
fect relying to show a constructive reduction to practice by the application which 
matured into his patent. Miller’s March 14 notebook entry and the 1971 Monsanto 
brochure on “Aircraft Valve Life” do not suffice to show that the vibrating probe 
test was inadequate to demonstrate suitability of the Freon 11 additive for reducing 
cavitation damage in hydraulic systems generally. The Monsanto brochure is specifi-
cally addressed to testing additives for use in aircraft. Thus, it may be true that the 
vibrating probe test is a rapid screening method for choosing candidates for more 
rigorous testing, but that does not vitiate the conclusion by Miller, corroborated by 
Fairing, that the vibrating probe test was considered in 1966 by those in the art, 
based in part on the knowledge that the success of water as an additive was predict-
ed by the probe test, to simulate conditions which would cause valve damage in air-
craft. This is more than ample nexus between the test conditions and the intended 
functional setting contemplated by the counts. Stencel v. Nordine, 481 F.2d 916 
(CCPA 1973). Miller’s comment in the March 14 notebook entry indicating a need 
“to better assess such additives” does not, it seems to us, indicate that he considered 
Freon 11 unsuitable. In the same notebook entry Miller also said: 
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Low boiling additives have generally exhibited marked damage-reducing 
tendencies in the ultrasonic probe tests, even though no special precautions 
were taken to prevent loss of volatiles. 
Thus, hermetically sealed containers were not necessary for successful probe tests, 
and Miller knew it. Miller is not required to prove that Freon 11 was known by him 
to be a commercially practicable additive for use in aircraft in order to establish an 
actual reduction to practice. Miller’s record, unrebutted by Peeler, suffices to show 
that the vibrating probe test was an adequate means for determining the suitability 
of Freon 11 as a cavitation damage reducing additive. Peeler has adduced no evi-
dence to show that other tests are necessary. See Campbell v. Wettstein, 476 F.2d 
642, 647 (CCPA 1973). 
We are not disposed to hold that the single probe test was insufficient to show 
reproducibility of results. This invention is not in a notoriously unpredictable field 
like catalytic chemistry. The prior experience with water as an additive created confi-
dence in the efficacy of the probe test. On the basis of all the evidence and the rela-
tive simplicity of the invention, see Patterson v. Hauck, 341 F.2d 131 (CCPA 1965), 
we find unpersuasive Peeler’s argument that a series of probe tests was necessary to 
establish an actual reduction to practice. … In this case the evidence supports by at 
least a preponderance the conclusion that a single probe test, consisting of a control 
run and a run with additive in the fluid, is sufficient to demonstrate to a reasonable 
certainty whether a particular additive will reduce cavitation damage in a hydraulic 
system. Peeler had ample opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence but failed to do 
so, placing his faith in the arguments of counsel, which are not evidence. In re  
Scarbrough, 500 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1974). 
The Fairing affidavit and other evidence also lead us to conclude that Miller 
does not seek to establish actual reduction to practice nunc pro tunc, which this 
court held was impossible in Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915 (CCPA 1972), and 
Heard v. Burton, 333 F.2d 239 (CCPA 1964). At the time of the work relied upon 
by Miller to prove actual reduction to practice, Miller’s notebook entry indicates 
that Miller recognized that Freon 11 would work. The notebook entry is signed by 
Miller and witnessed by one Wygant, whose affidavit stating that he read and under-
stood the notebook page on April 5, the day Miller filed his invention disclosure, is 
of record. … This situation is not like those in Langer and Heard, where the evi-
dence showed that while the unsuccessful appellants had in fact practiced the inven-
tions there in issue, there was no evidence of contemporaneous appreciation of what 
had been done. The record is clear in this case that Miller recognized the success of 
Freon 11, and that persons of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized Freon 
11 as a success, from the probe test results. See Spero v. Ringold, 377 F.2d 652 
(CCPA 1967). 
Finally, we hold that the March 1966 probe test was not an abandoned experi-
ment. Except for Miller’s September 1966 presentation, the record is devoid of any 
activity with respect to the invention by Miller personally after he filed the invention 
disclosure. This lack of activity is understandable in light of the realities of corporate 
research. Once he filed his invention disclosure with his superiors, Miller was fin-
ished with the invention. He had other work to do. If Monsanto desired protection 
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for its employee’s invention, any further action was in the hands of people other 
than Miller. That Stainbrook performed tests in 1967 on additives which the dis-
senting board member said were outside the scope of the counts is of no moment. 
There is no evidence that Miller changed his mind about the efficacy of the additives 
he found. In some cases the passage of a long period between reduction to practice 
and filing raises an inference that the purported reduction to practice was an aban-
doned experiment. See, e.g., Bowers v. Valley, 149 F.2d 284 (CCPA 1945). This in-
ference, however, only arises where there is doubt that the activities relied on consti-
tute a reduction to practice. Walkup v. Greig, 332 F.2d 800 (CCPA 1964). We have 
no reason to doubt that Miller considered his invention successful when he filed his 
invention disclosure; subsequent corporate inactivity does not raise the inference 
that Miller later thought his work incomplete or unsuccessful. As indicated below, 
this passage of time redounds to the detriment of Monsanto, but not because of an 
inference that there was no reduction of the invention to practice. 
II 
Determining whether a de facto first inventor, Miller in this case, should also be 
considered the de jure first inventor under § 102 requires resolution of the policy 
question: which of the rival inventors has the greater right to a patent? Brokaw v. 
Vogel, 429 F.2d 476 (CCPA 1970). Under the facts of this case and the public  
policy inherent in § 102(g), we hold that the evidence has raised an inference of 
suppression of the invention by Miller’s assignee, Monsanto, the real party in in-
terest, which has not been rebutted. Monsanto’s conduct is, of course, imputable to 
Miller under elementary legal principles. In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623 (CCPA 1975); 
Wilson v. Goldmark, 172 F.2d 575 (CCPA 1949). 
The evidence here is striking in its paucity. There is no evidence that Miller (or 
Monsanto) was spurred into filing his application by knowledge of Peeler’s inven-
tion; spurring, however, is not an essential element of suppression. Neither Miller 
nor anyone else at Monsanto appears to have had any specific intent to suppress or 
conceal the invention. But proof of specific intent to suppress is not necessary where 
the time between actual reduction to practice and filing is unreasonable. This un-
reasonable delay may raise an inference of intent to suppress. Pingree v. Hull, 518 
F.2d 624 (CCPA 1975); Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d at 1281 n.3. The evidence 
shows, however, that over four years elapsed between the rating of Miller’s inven-
tion disclosure “A (Ready)” and Miller’s filing date and that much, if not all, of the 
delay occurred while the disclosure lay dormant in Monsanto’s patent department. 
In our opinion, a four-year delay from the time an inventor is satisfied with his 
invention and completes his work on it and the time his assignee-employer files a 
patent application is, prima facie, unreasonably long in an interference with a party 
who filed first. The circumstances surrounding the delay and Monsanto’s attempted 
justification thereof serve only to persuade us of the correctness of our opinion. We 
make no criticism of Mr. Black; getting Miller’s application filed in the time he did 
may have been an extraordinary effort. Monsanto, however, can take no comfort in 
that, since its neglect of Miller’s application for the 2½ years preceding Mr. Black’s 
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arrival and its failure to replace two of the three attorneys who resigned were at least 
partial causes of the backlog which greeted Mr. Black.8 
In its brief, Monsanto attempts to justify its inaction as follows: 
Although delay in filing was encountered as set forth in the affidavit of  
William T. Black *** the invention disclosure was handled in accordance 
with established Monsanto practices which is [sic] consistent with normal 
business practices. At the invention disclosure review meetings, which were 
conducted approximately semi-annually, Dr. Miller, and his immediate  
superior, Dr. Richard, consistently urged that a patent application be filed. 
The fact that the invention disclosure rating was never changed from “A –
Ready to file” is indicative of the fact that Miller intended to get an appli-
cation on file as soon as his patent attorney could do so. 
This excuse is lame on two counts: First, there is no evidence of what Monsan-
to’s “established practices” were or that the review meetings ever took place. We 
will not accept statements in briefs as substitutes for evidence. Second, and more 
importantly, assuming the truth of Monsanto’s assertions, we do not consider this 
four-year delay to be in accordance with any “normal” business practice that we 
should accept as part of a sound patent system. 9  Whether Monsanto’s behavior is, 
in fact, a normal business practice is immaterial. Concepts of normality in business, 
and in patent law, change; that a practice is normal does not mean that it is one that 
courts should approve. We certainly cannot approve of the supine attitude toward 
delay exhibited by the statement in Monsanto’s excuse that the “delay in filing was 
encountered,” as though it had been come upon by surprise. The record, however, 
contains nothing to show that the delay was other than fully within Monsanto’s 
control at all times. 
Miller and the board majority rely heavily on the statement, often repeated in 
varying language by this court, that “Mere delay, without more, is not sufficient to 
establish suppression or concealment.” Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d at 1281, and 
cases cited therein. What we are deciding here is that Monsanto’s delay is not “mere 
delay” and that Monsanto’s justification for the delay is inadequate to overcome the 
inference of suppression created by its excessive delay. Surely, the word “mere” does 
not imply a total absence of a limit on the duration of the delay. … As Mr. Justice 
Holmes said in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918), “A word is not a crystal, 
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in 
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” 
The living thought clothed by the phrase “mere delay” is not susceptible of dis-
cernment as an absolute matter. Whether any delay is “mere” in contemplation of 
                                                
8 It is appropriate to wonder why, if Mr. Black could get to and file Miller’s applica-
tion in approximately 15 months, the three attorneys whom he replaced could not 
have completed it in much less time after it was marked ‘A – Ready’ in April 1966. 
9 Furthermore, we cannot believe that anyone, let alone a sophisticated corporation 
like Monsanto, would consider letting four years pass as a normal or prudent  
business practice, in light of the encouragement to early filing inherent in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b), for example. 
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law is a policy decision that can be made only on a case-by-case basis. A delay may 
be of no legal consequence because it is not long enough. Or the delay may be ex-
cused by activities of the inventor or his assignee during the delay period. See, e.g., 
Frey v. Wagner, 87 F.2d 212 (CCPA 1937). There may be other factors. But as we 
intimated in Pingree v. Hull, in line with our warning in Young v. Dworkin, that 
“one who delays filing his application does so at the peril of a finding of suppression 
or concealment due to the circumstances surrounding the delay,” the unreasonable 
length of a delay may be ample circumstance in itself to find suppression. At least 
since Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (1898), the courts have implemented a 
public policy favoring, in interference situations, the party who expeditiously starts 
his invention on the path to public disclosure through the issuance of patents by 
filing a patent application. This policy is now implemented through § 102(g) even 
as it was in Mason v. Hepburn prior to that statute, by denying de jure first inventor 
status to de facto first inventors who, or whose assignees, frustrate this policy. 
We conclude that Monsanto’s delay was not “mere delay,” that the delay was 
excessive, and that as between Peeler and Miller, Peeler has the better right to a  
patent, on the statutory ground that Miller, through the acts of his assignee, sup-
pressed the invention. The decision of the board is reversed. 
Miller, Judge, concurring:  
I agree that appellee reduced the invention to practice and that, through the 
acts of his assignee, he suppressed the invention. Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), a  
second inventor is not entitled to a patent unless the first inventor abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed the invention. In an interference the burden of proving aban-
donment, suppression, or concealment falls on the second inventor, regardless of 
who filed first. Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1279 (CCPA 1974). 
This court has consistently held that suppression or concealment, to amount to 
forfeiture of the right to a patent in favor of a later inventor, must be deliberate or 
intentional. Pingree v. Hull, 518 F.2d 624, 629 (CCPA 1975); Young v. Dworkin, 
489 F.2d at 1280-81. Young v. Dworkin, however, was a harbinger of the outcome 
of this case. It was not redundancy when, speaking for the majority of this court, I 
wrote “Mere delay, without more, is not sufficient to establish suppression or con-
cealment.” Mere delay is to be contrasted with excessive or unreasonable delay, 
which, without more, is sufficient to establish suppression or concealment. The 
four-year delay in this case, without more, is excessive. 
Such delay, however, only gives rise to an inference of intent to suppress. Young 
v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d at 1281 n.3. It shifts the burden to the first inventor to ex-
plain the delay by showing that there was no intent to suppress. Appellee has failed 
to do so since he has presented virtually no evidence covering the 2½ year gap be-
tween reduction to practice and the arrival of attorney Black. This failure decides the 
case. 
The majority indulges in dictum which would engraft onto the statute a policy 
“favoring *** the party who expeditiously starts his invention on the path to public 
disclosure *** by filing a patent application.” It implies that the failure to hire a suf-
ficient number of attorneys to deal with a backlog of patent applications results in 
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forfeiture of the patent right to one who has been “expeditious.” However, not 
even diligence is required after reduction to practice. 
The public policy referred to in Brokaw v. Vogel, 429 F.2d 476, 480 (CCPA 
1970), is that prescribed by Congress in § 102(g). The party with the right to a  
patent is the first inventor unless he has abandoned, suppressed, or concealed the 
invention. The policy is concerned with the action or inaction of the first inventor—
not that of his opponent. …  
… 
Brown v. Barbacid 
276 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
Rader, Judge: 
In an interference over a new assay to identify anti-cancer compounds, the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interfer-
ences (Board) awarded priority to Mariano Barbacid and Veeraswamy Manne (col-
lectively Barbacid) over Michael Brown, Joseph Goldstein, and Yuval Reiss (collec-
tively Brown). Because the Board did not consider evidence that Brown conceived 
the invention before Barbacid reduced it to practice and diligently pursued the in-
vention from the time of Barbacid’s reduction to practice through Brown’s filing 
date, this court vacates the award of priority to Barbacid and remands. 
Background 
This case involves an interference between U.S. Patent No. 5,185,248 (the 
Barbacid patent) and U.S. patent application Serial No. 07/937,893 (the Brown 
application). The Barbacid patent and the Brown application both claim an assay for 
identifying new anti-cancer compounds that inhibit farnesyl transferase (FT), an en-
zyme involved in the control of cell growth. FT functions in the cell by adding far-
nesyl … to a cysteine amino acid near one end of the protein chain … . An im-
portant protein susceptible to addition of farnesyl is “ras.” The farnesylation reaction 
activates the ras protein (which stimulates cell growth) by moving ras to the vicinity 
of the cell membrane. Once near the membrane, ras stimulates cell growth. Thus, an 
FT inhibitor would reduce the amount of ras reaching the membrane and therefore 
reduce ras-stimulated growth (including “cancerous” growth). 
…  
The Barbacid patent application was filed on May 8, 1990, and issued on Feb-
ruary 9, 1993. The Brown application was filed on December 22, 1992, but was 
accorded the benefit of an earlier related application filed on April 18, 1990. Thus, 
Brown was the senior party. Barbacid, as the junior party, had the burden to prove 
priority by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Board found that Barbacid showed an actual reduction to practice no later 
than March 6, 1990. The Board also found that Brown did not show reduction to 
practice of the count before March 6, 1990. Specifically, the Board found that Dr. 
Yuval Reiss’ September 20, 1989 FT experiment did not satisfy every limitation of 
the count because it did not include a test or candidate substance in the assay. The 
Board also discounted a September 25, 1989 experiment (which may have satisfied 
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the count) because Dr. Reiss could not authenticate his lab notebooks and auto-
radiographs. Moreover Dr. Patrick Casey could not corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testi-
mony and documents relating to the September 25 experiment. 
…  
Discussion  
Priority and its issues of conception and reduction to practice are questions of 
law predicated on subsidiary factual findings. Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, this court reviews without deference the 
Board’s legal conclusions on priority, conception, and reduction to practice,  
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
1986), and reviews for substantial evidence the Board’s factual findings. Dickinson v. 
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999); In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). Finally this court reviews the Board’s application of its permissive inter-
ference rules for an abuse of discretion. Abrutyn v. Giovanniello, 15 F.3d 1048, 
1050 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
I. 
In an interference with an application filed after the date of the patent, the jun-
ior party must show priority by clear and convincing evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(c) 
(2001); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In interferences, 
such as this case, with an application whose effective filing date antedates the patent 
issuance, the junior party must show priority by a preponderance of the evidence. 37 
C.F.R. § 1.657(c); Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 541-42 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
Barbacid, as the junior party, has the ultimate burden to prove priority. Id. Brown 
asserts that the Board inappropriately shifted the burden of proof by requiring 
Brown to show by a preponderance conception or reduction to practice before 
March 6, 1990—the date of Barbacid’s actual reduction to practice. Brown argues 
that the Board should have shifted to Brown the burden of production—the burden 
of going forward with sufficient evidence—rather than the burden of proof. 
This court has not addressed whether a senior party has the burden to show by 
a preponderance a date of invention before the priority date shown by the junior 
party. The Board cites to a Board decision, Fisher v. Gardiner, 215 USPQ 620, 625 
(Bd. Pat. Interferences 1981) (“Inasmuch as Fisher et al. [the junior party] have es-
tablished a reduction to practice of the subject matter in counts 1, 2 and 4 prior to 
the senior party’s filing date, the burden shifts to Aymami [the senior party] to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence a priority date for that subject matter  
earlier than the July 12, 1973 date established by Fisher et al.”). 
To the contrary, 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(a) states: “A rebuttable presumption shall 
exist that, as to each count, the inventors made their invention in the chronological 
order of their effective filing dates. The burden of proof shall be upon a party who con-
tends otherwise.” (emphasis added). Paragraph (b) of the same section explains that 
the junior party has the burden of establishing priority by a preponderance of evi-
dence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(b). In other words, the burden of proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence “shall be on a party” contending they made their invention 
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out of chronological order of the effective filing dates, i.e., the junior party. This 
burden of proof does not shift. 
Irrespective of that burden, however, both parties must be given an opportunity 
to submit evidence regarding priority in an interference proceeding. Once all  
evidence has been submitted, the Board must assess, in light of all the evidence pre-
sented by both parties, whether the junior party has met its ultimate burden of  
proving priority by preponderance of the evidence. 
In sum, under 37 C.F.R. § 1.657(a) and (b), the ultimate burden of proof al-
ways remained on the junior party, Barbacid. Thus, the Board erred in stating that 
the burden of proof shifted to Brown at any point in this case. Notwithstanding that 
error, this court must still determine whether the record supports the Board’s award 
of priority to Barbacid. Specifically, this court (or the Board on remand, as the case 
may be) must determine, based on the entire evidentiary record, whether Barbacid 
ultimately prevailed in proving priority by a preponderance of evidence. 
II. 
Brown alleges that the Board erred in denying authentication to Dr. Reiss’ lab 
notebooks and autoradiographs under 37 C.F.R. § 1.671(f). Paragraph (f) of 
§ 1.671 (entitled “Evidence must comply with rules”) states: “The significance of 
documentary and other exhibits identified by a witness in an affidavit or during oral 
deposition shall be discussed with particularity by a witness.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.671(f) 
(2001) (emphasis added). The Board noted that § 1.671(f) requires a witness to 
explain the entries of various pages of the lab notebooks and exhibits. Cf. Fed. R. 
Evid. 902 (excluding notes and lab notebooks from the list of self-authenticating 
extrinsic evidence). The Board found that Dr. Reiss did not give sufficient testimony 
regarding specific entries in his lab notebook or on relevant autoradiographs (i.e., 
Exhibit 32). Without an adequate explanation of Exhibit 32, the Board rejected the 
exhibit for lack of authentication. 
Exhibit 32 refers to notebook pages and autoradiographs from Dr. Reiss’ exper-
iments from August to October 1989, including experiments dated September 20 
and September 25, 1989. With regard to the September 25 experiment, Dr. Reiss 
stated in paragraph 24 of his declaration: 
On September 25, 1989, I conducted an assay to determine the pH  
dependence of the farnesyl transferase preparation currently under use  
(Exhibit 32; pages 0035 to 0039). This study employed a peptide consid-
ered to be a potential inhibitor of ras farnesylation. This peptide comprised 
the carboxy-terminus ten amino acids of the ras molecule. The format of 
this assay was the gel electrophoresis format, described above in paragraph 
20 [discussing the September 20 experiment]. The radioautograph de-
veloped from the corresponding gel (Exhibit 32; page 0038) clearly shows 
that inclusion of peptide at 10 and 20 ìg (lanes 14 and 15, respectively) in-
hibited farnesyl transferase-mediated labeling of ras by 14C-FPP, as deter-
mined by the reduction/absence of ras-specific bands in these lanes. 
This explanation informs one of skill in the art, upon a review of the relevant 
autoradiographs and lab notebook pages in Exhibit 32, that Dr. Reiss conducted an 
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FT experiment on September 20, 1989, and then conducted another FT assay using 
a peptide inhibitor on September 25, 1989. Moreover, an examination of the Sep-
tember 25 autoradiograph from those experiments, specifically lanes 14 and 15 
(which can be identified by counting lanes starting from the left), shows that farne-
syl transferase-mediated labeling of ras by 14C-FPP was reduced in the presence of 
the inhibiting peptide. 
Dr. Reiss did not analyze every lane in the autoradiograph. For example, he did 
not expressly state which bands in the gels corresponded to the labeled ras protein. 
Nor did Dr. Reiss discuss the molecular weight markers (in lane 1 on the left of the 
autoradiograph). Likewise, he did not describe each experiment in every single lane 
of the gels. Nevertheless, comparing lanes 2-11 to lanes 14-15 in the September 25 
autoradiograph, one of skill in this art would understand that Dr. Reiss had inhib-
ited ras farnesylation in the presence of the peptide. 
While Dr. Reiss could have discussed the September 25 experiment in more de-
tail, the Board must nonetheless weigh that evidence from the vantage point of one 
of skill in the art. See Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (stating that the trier of fact can conclude for itself what documents show, 
aided by testimony about the meaning of the exhibit to one skilled in the art). In 
this case, the notebook data itself explains the methods and results of the September 
assays. Thus, in light of Dr. Reiss’ testimony, one of skill in this art would under-
stand Exhibit 32 relating to the September experiments. 
In excluding Exhibit 32 for lack of authentication, the Board applied its own 
rule. This court reviews the Board’s application of its rules for an abuse of discretion. 
Abrutyn, 15 F.3d at 1050. Notwithstanding that high standard of review, this court 
finds that the Board abused its discretion by excluding evidence within the under-
standing of skilled artisans when considering authentication requirements. See Ma-
hurkar, 79 F.3d at 1578. 
III. 
Brown further argues that the Board erred in refusing to allow an inventor’s 
own documentation to corroborate his conception or reduction to practice. A party 
seeking to prove conception via the oral testimony of a putative inventor must prof-
fer evidence corroborating that testimony. Singh v. Brake, 222 F.3d 1362, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1577; Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 
1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993). This corroboration rule does not apply with the same force 
to proof of inventive facts with physical exhibits. Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1577-78 
(“This court does not require corroboration where a party seeks to prove conception 
through the use of physical exhibits. The trier of fact can conclude for itself what 
documents show, aided by testimony as to what the exhibit would mean to one 
skilled in the art.”); Price, 988 F.2d at 1195-96; Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 
594 (1882). 
Thus, Brown’s physical evidence, such as Dr. Reiss’ notebooks and autoradio-
graphs, do not require corroboration to demonstrate the content of the physical ev-
idence itself, namely that FT assay experiments took place on September 20 and 25, 
1989. Conversely, however, the physical evidence in this case may not single-
handedly corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testimony. See Price, 988 F.2d at 1195 (“Unlike a 
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situation where an inventor is proffering oral testimony attempting to remember 
specifically what was conceived and when it was conceived *** ‘corroboration’ is 
not necessary to establish what a physical exhibit before the board includes. Only the 
inventor’s testimony requires corroboration before it can be considered.”). Thus, an 
inventor’s testimonial assertions of inventive facts require corroboration by inde-
pendent evidence. Thomson S.A. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 1174-75 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
This court applies a “rule of reason” analysis to determine sufficient corrobora-
tion. Singh, 222 F.3d at 1367; Price, 988 F.2d at 1195. In applying the “rule of  
reason” test, this court examines “all pertinent evidence” to determine the credi-
bility of the “inventor’s story.” Price, 988 F.2d at 1195. This “rule of reason” analy-
sis does not alter the requirement of corroboration for an inventor’s testimony. The 
inventive facts must not rest alone on testimonial evidence from the inventor him-
self. …  
Thus, independent evidence must corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testimony of concep-
tion or actual reduction to practice. The Board did not err in holding that an inven-
tor’s own unwitnessed documentation does not corroborate an inventor’s testimony 
about inventive facts. 
IV. 
Conception is “the formation in the mind of the inventor[] of a definite and 
permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be ap-
plied in practice.” Singh, 222 F.3d at 1367 (quoting Kridl v. McCormick, 105 F.3d 
1446, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1997). A conception must encompass all limitations of the 
claimed invention, see id., and “is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined 
in the inventor’s mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the in-
vention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation,” Id. (quoting 
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
As correctly found by the Board, Dr. Reiss did not satisfy every limitation of the 
count when he conducted his FT assay experiment on September 20, 1989. The 
laboratory notebook and autoradiograph themselves show that the September 20 
experiment did not include the use of a test/candidate substrate (i.e., an inhibitor of 
FT)—an element of the count. Likewise, in the only independent testimony corrob-
orating Dr. Reiss’ experiments, Dr. Casey did not suggest that the September 20 
experiment included an FT inhibitor. Thus, the physical and testimonial evidence 
regarding the September 20 experiment do not show conception or reduction to 
practice. 
V. 
Unlike the September 20 experiment, the September 25 experiment included a 
peptide inhibitor of FT in the FT assay. Thus, the September 25 experiment con-
tained all of the limitations of the count. As discussed above, however, independent 
evidence (testimony or physical evidence from a source other than Dr. Reiss) must 
corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testimony to show an actual reduction to practice. In other 
words, Dr. Casey’s testimony, the only other relevant independent evidence availa-
ble, must corroborate Dr. Reiss’ own statements and documents to show a reduc-
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tion to practice on September 25, 1989. Cooper, 154 F.3d at 1330. Dr. Casey’s tes-
timony could not corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testimony regarding the September 25 ex-
periment, however, because Dr. Casey did not purport to witness the September 25 
autoradiograph. Nor did Dr. Casey purport to discuss the September 25 experiment 
in particular with Dr. Reiss at any time. 
In his declaration submitted to the Board, Dr. Casey stated: 
8. On Thursday, September 14, 1989, Dr. Janice Buss came to Southwest-
ern Medical School to present a seminar. I recall that within a week or so 
of that date, Dr. Reiss showed me the results of a study in which he had 
demonstrated farnesyl transferase activity in a gel-based assay. ***  
[Description of the experiment] I distinctly recall this study, as it was a very 
important showing. The notebook page shown in Exhibit 32 as page 0031 
[dated September 20, 1989] is the experiment Dr. Reiss showed to me. 
*** 
9. In the latter part of September, 1989, there was a major development in 
my own research project that consumed my efforts, and distracted me from 
the farnesyl transferase project, for about one month. I recall, however, 
that by at least about the end of October or the beginning of November, I 
was aware that Dr. Reiss had demonstrated that short peptides, derived 
from ras, inhibited farnesyl transferase in vitro in the gel-based assay de-
scribed above. 
Thus, Dr. Casey did not discuss the September 25 experiment in his decla-
ration. Consequently, the Board did not err when it determined that evidence re-
garding the September 25, 1989 experiment did not show a reduction to practice. 
On the other hand, the physical evidence itself — the September 25 lab note-
book pages and autoradiographs — show that an experiment containing all elements 
of the count took place on that date. As discussed above, this physical evidence re-
quires no further corroboration to demonstrate the content of the physical evidence 
itself. Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1577; Price, 988 F.2d at 1195-96. In addition, while 
Dr. Casey’s vague testimony does not corroborate Dr. Reiss’ testimony of an actual 
reduction to practice, Dr. Casey’s testimony certainly suggests that Dr. Reiss had the 
idea of combining the FT assay with the use of FT peptide inhibitors sometime be-
fore the end of October or the beginning of November 1989. Thus, Dr. Casey’s 
independent testimony corroborates Dr. Reiss’ testimony of a conception before 
November 1989. 
In the Facts section of their brief to the Board, Brown stated that they con-
ceived of the invention by September 25, 1989, when that assay showed both FT 
activity and an inhibition of FT activity by candidate inhibitors. Moreover, in their 
Argument section, under “Brown’s First Alternative Case for Priority—‘Simul-
taneous’ Conception and Reduction to Practice,” Brown argued (albeit in the alter-
native and primarily in the section title itself) that Brown both conceived and re-
duced to practice their invention on September 25, 1989. Brown also cited Dr. 
Reiss’ September 25 lab notebook pages and autoradiographs, as well as Dr. Casey’s 
independent corroboration of Dr. Reiss’ testimony regarding conception before the 
end of October or the beginning of November 1989. 
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Despite Brown’s argument and citation to relevant physical and testimonial evi-
dence, the Board did not address whether the September 25 experiment demon-
strated conception. The Board only addressed whether the September 20 experi-
ment demonstrated conception and whether the September 25 experiment demon-
strated an actual reduction to practice. Moreover, the Board noted: “Without a con-
ception, the issue of reasonable diligence by the inventors to a reduction to practice 
is moot. Accordingly, we have not considered any evidence relating to diligence.”  
Priority of invention “goes to the first party to reduce an invention to practice 
unless the other party can show that it was the first to conceive the invention and 
that it exercised reasonable diligence in later reducing that invention to practice.” 
Price, 988 F.2d at 1190. Because Brown asserted to the Board conception of the 
invention on September 25, and invoked physical evidence that did not require cor-
roboration, as well as testimony by Dr. Casey corroborating Dr. Reiss’ testimony 
regarding conception, the Board erred in failing to consider whether the September 
25 lab notebook pages and autoradiographs themselves, especially in light of the 
independent testimony by Dr. Casey, demonstrated conception by Brown. Likewise, 
the Board erred in failing to consider whether Brown was diligent from March 6, 
1990, the date of Barbacid’s actual reduction to practice, until Brown’s filing date 
on April 18, 1990.  
…  
Conclusion 
Because the Board did not consider the September 25, 1989 experiment or Dr. 
Casey’s corroborating testimony with regard to conception by Brown, or any evi-
dence of reasonable diligence by Brown between the date of Barbacid’s actual re-
duction to practice and the filing of Brown’s patent application on April 18, 1990 
… , this court vacates the award of priority to Barbacid. Accordingly, this court re-
mands this case back to the Board for further proceedings on Brown’s conception 
and reasonable diligence. 
Newman, Judge, dissenting: 
… I must dissent from my colleagues’ assignment of error to the Board’s state-
ment of the procedural burdens; this court’s departure from decades of precedent 
and practice is unwarranted. 
…  
I agree that the Board erred in law in its treatment of the proffered evidence of 
corroboration. Dr. Reiss’ testimonial and documentary evidence of conception and 
reduction to practice was supported by witnesses who testified variously that they 
conducted chemical and biological analyses, ordered and prepared materials, dis-
cussed the work in progress and its results, and repeated the work. The purpose of 
the corroboration requirement is to probe the veracity of the inventor’s assertions by 
determining, on the entirety of the testimonial and documentary record, whether it 
is more likely than not that the asserted activities and events occurred. 
… A full record has been presented, of generally undisputed facts. … Applying 
the correct law to the undisputed facts with respect to conception, diligence, and 
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reduction to practice, it follows that the party Brown established priority of inven-
tion before the dates established by the party Barbacid. 
Brown v. Barbacid 
436 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
Newman, Judge: 
This appeal … returns to the Federal Circuit … . The parties are Michael 
Brown, Joseph Goldstein and Yuval Reiss (together “Brown”) and Mariano Bar-
bacid and Veeraswamy Manne (together “Barbacid”). The invention common to 
Brown and Barbacid is a method or assay for identifying compounds that inhibit 
farnesyl transferase (“FT”), an enzyme involved in the control of cell growth. …   
… 
In the first appeal, Brown I, this court held that the Board erred in holding, in-
ter alia, that the laboratory notebooks and recorded autoradiographs of Dr. Yuval 
Reiss were inadequately explained on their face and therefore could not serve as evi-
dence of either conception or reduction to practice. The Federal Circuit reversed, 
holding that the Board must “weigh that evidence from the vantage point of one of 
skill in the art,” Brown I, 276 F.3d at 1334, and that the testimony of Dr. Patrick 
Casey, taken with the content of the notebooks, was adequate to corroborate Dr. 
Reiss’ testimony as to conception of the invention, although Dr. Casey’s evidence 
was not sufficiently specific to serve as corroboration of an actual reduction to prac-
tice. The court stated that “while Dr. Casey’s vague testimony does not corroborate 
Dr. Reiss’ testimony of an actual reduction to practice, Dr. Casey’s testimony cer-
tainly suggests that Dr. Reiss had the idea of combining the FT assay with the use of 
FT peptide inhibitors sometime before the end of October or the beginning of  
November 1989.” Brown I, 276 F.3d at 1337. We remanded to the Board for more 
precise determination of the party Brown’s date of conception, and determination of 
Brown’s reasonable diligence, as the party who was first to conceive but second to 
reduce to practice. 
On remand, the Board held that Brown had established conception no later 
than November 15, 1989, but had failed to provide corroborated evidence of dili-
gence. The Board again awarded priority to Barbacid, and Brown again appeals. 
Discussion 
The party that is first to conceive the invention in interference, if last to reduce 
the invention to practice, is entitled to the patent based on prior conception if, as 
first to conceive, he exercised reasonable diligence from a time before the other par-
ty’s conception date to his own reduction to practice date. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g); 
Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (a party that is 
first to conceive but second to reduce to practice “must demonstrate reasonable dil-
igence toward reduction to practice”). 
The purpose of requiring reasonable diligence by the first to conceive the in-
vention but second to reduce to practice is to assure that the invention was not 
abandoned or unreasonably delayed by the first inventor during the period after the 
second inventor entered the field. The question of reasonable diligence is one of 
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fact. In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 
1243, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We review the Board’s factual findings for support by 
substantial evidence. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (applying 
the criteria of the Administrative Procedure Act to review of rulings of the PTO). 
The admissibility of physical and testimonial evidence is determined in accordance 
with the Federal Rules of Evidence, which have been adopted by the Board, 37 
C.F.R. § 1.671(b) (1998), as amplified by precedent directed to patent interference 
proceedings. 
Barbacid argues that Brown must show diligence measured from the Barbacid 
date of conception, not Barbacid’s date of reduction to practice. The first Board  
decision found Barbacid’s date of actual reduction to practice; the Board did not 
decide Barbacid’s conception date. Barbacid, the junior party, had been accorded its 
date of actual reduction to practice of March 6, 1990. No earlier date was proposed 
to this court in Brown I. Thus this court instructed that on remand the Board 
should determine whether Brown showed reasonable diligence from March 6, 1990, 
until Brown’s filing date as constructive reduction to practice on April 18, 1990. 
Barbacid states that the Federal Circuit in Brown I erroneously limited the diligence 
inquiry to the period starting with Barbacid’s date of reduction to practice, rather 
than the date of Barbacid’s conception. See Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1578 (when the 
first to conceive is the last to reduce to practice, reasonable diligence must be shown 
from “a date just prior to the other party’s conception”). Brown responds that this 
objection was not preserved, for Barbacid’s brief in Brown I did not suggest its pos-
sible entitlement to an earlier date than the reduction to practice date awarded by 
the Board. Further, Barbacid filed no objection, such as a request for reconsidera-
tion or clarification, if Barbacid believed that this court had issued legally flawed in-
structions for the determination of diligence on remand to the Board. This court’s 
instruction that the Board should determine Brown’s diligence upon remand neces-
sarily presupposed that Barbacid did not have a prior conception date, for diligence 
is only required for the party that is “first to conceive.” 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Brown 
states that this silence by Barbacid was a waiver of the issue of the scope of the dili-
gence showing. We agree. On the information before the court, and the silence 
throughout briefing, argument, and decision, we hold that Barbacid waived the is-
sue of the length of the period during which diligence should be shown. The Board 
did not err in declining to open the issue on remand. Cf. Barrow v. Falck, 11 F.3d 
729, 730 (7th Cir. 1993) (“An argument bypassed by the litigants, and therefore 
not presented in the court of appeals, may not be resurrected on remand and used as 
a reason to disregard the court of appeals’ decision”). 
Brown provided evidence from inventor Dr. Reiss and laboratory technician 
Ms. Morgan concerning the exercise of reasonable diligence during the period from 
Barbacid’s accorded date to Brown’s filing date. Dr. Reiss stated that after Septem-
ber 1989 he worked on the farnesyl transferase project “on a daily basis.” For the 
period following Barbacid’s actual reduction to practice on March 6, 1990, Dr. 
Reiss stated that his experiments were directed at further characterizing the FT en-
zyme, improving the methodology for purifying the enzyme, and improving the 
overall performance of the assay. He stated that he performed studies to assess the 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
222 
metal dependency of FT, evaluated gels with various affinity chromatography  
eluates, conducted a freeze-thaw study to determine the stability of FT, performed 
cyanide bromide cleavage of various FT fractions and examined the products of that 
cleavage, studied the effect of guanosine triphosphate binding on farnesylation, and 
studied the effect of peptide saturation on FT activity. He provided laboratory note-
book pages recording this work. 
The Board rejected Dr. Reiss’ testimony for lack of corroboration, and also ob-
served that even if his notebook records showing this work were deemed to corrob-
orate his testimony, they recorded work on only ten of the thirty-one days from 
March 6 to April 18, and thus were insufficient to establish reasonable diligence. 
Precedent requires that an inventor’s testimony concerning his diligence be cor-
roborated. See Jolley, 308 F.3d at 1328 (“corroboration is required to support an 
inventor’s testimony regarding his reasonable diligence in pursuit of the invention”). 
Corroboration is determined by application of a rule of reason, for “corroboration 
of every factual issue contested by the parties is not a requirement of law.” Jolley, 
308 F.3d at 1328; see also Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(“all of the evidence put forth” must be considered “as a whole, not individually” in 
evaluating whether the inventor’s testimony is credible). 
Unlike the legal rigor of conception and reduction to practice, diligence and its 
corroboration may be shown by a variety of activities, as precedent illustrates. For 
example, in Lacotte v. Thomas, 758 F.2d 611, 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985), the testimony 
of the inventor and his notebook records were held adequately corroborated by his 
obtaining relevant supplies and the testimony of his associate. In Bey v. Kollonitsch, 
806 F.2d 1024, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1986), diligence was shown by an attorney’s work 
in preparing the patent application. In Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d at 1248, diligence 
was shown by efforts to locate a construction company capable of building a manu-
facturing plant for practicing the process on a large scale. In Jolley, 308 F.3d at 
1327, diligence was shown by activity to obtain necessary supplies and laboratory 
glassware and by testing of related materials. The basic inquiry is whether, on all of 
the evidence, there was reasonably continuing activity to reduce the invention to 
practice. There is no rule requiring a specific kind of activity in determining whether 
the applicant was reasonably diligent in proceeding toward an actual or constructive 
reduction to practice. 
Brown provided evidence of laboratory work during this period performed by 
Debra Morgan, a scientist working in the Brown laboratory, as evidence of diligence 
and as corroboration of Dr. Reiss’ testimony. Ms. Morgan declared that she was 
aware that Dr. Reiss “was working on *** the development of an assay for screening 
of potential inhibitors of this [FT] enzyme,” that she worked on the FT assay, and 
that she performed experiments designed by Dr. Reiss. Ms. Morgan stated that her 
work was to “screen various peptides for possible inhibitory effect on farnesyl trans-
ferase.” She stated that the studies used a fiber-binding assay format where “farnesyl 
transferase, 3H-Fpp, ras substrate and the candidate inhibitor peptide were incu-
bated together,” and that the methodology of the assay was that “when the radioac-
tively labeled FPP is incorporated into the ras substrate, the radioactivity will associ-
ate with the filter by virtue of the adsorption of the ras thereto.” Ms. Morgan de-
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scribed various farnesyl transferase inhibition studies with reference to the specific 
study numbers on the notebook pages, and the dates the work was done. She ex-
plained a comparative study, with reference to study number and date, in which “a 
biotin conjugated substrate is used rather than ras as a target for farnesylation,” as 
well as a study in which farnesyl transferase reaction samples were prepared for analy-
sis by thin layer chromatography. Her declaration was accompanied by copies of 
thirty-eight laboratory notebook pages. Each of the thirty-eight notebook pages was 
associated with tests specified in her declaration. 
The Board found that Ms. Morgan’s notebook records along with those of Dr. 
Reiss filled all but six days of the critical period, and that each of the six remaining 
days was a single-day gap; this was deemed sufficient to show substantially continu-
ing activity. The Board found that Ms. Morgan “worked for the inventors” and that 
“her work could inure to the benefit of the inventors to establish reasonable dili-
gence over the entire period.” However, the Board refused to credit any of Ms. 
Morgan’s evidence, criticizing what it described as the absence of explanation of the 
content and purpose of these experiments. The Board stated that it was not clear 
from the face of the notebook pages what Ms. Morgan had done and why, present-
ing as an example of an inadequate record the following page of Ms. Morgan’s 
notebook[.] 
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The Board stated that it “surmised” that this page recorded 11 experiments in-
volving the ras oncogene protein, farnesyl pyrophosphate, and a peptide, based on 
the designations “RAS,” “FPP” and “Peptide # 3” in the column headings. The 
Board described its concerns as follows: 
the relationship between ras, farnesyl pyrophosphate and peptide is not ex-
plained. Nor are the results of the assays understood. What do they signify? 
*** The issue is whether Ms. Morgan’s work shows reasonable diligence 
was exercised to reduce the invention of the count to practice. We are giv-
en a number of laboratory pages, the content of which is never explained, 
leaving it to us to decipher whether they are relevant and to what extent 
they are relevant to the issue of reasonable diligence. There is no expla-
nation of what these pages are saying. 
The Board also stated that if Ms. Morgan’s evidence were credited, it would suffice, 
with that of Dr. Reiss, to establish diligence. 
Brown states that Ms. Morgan’s work was explained in her declaration, and that 
her notebook pages report the subject of her studies in scientific detail that would 
be readily understood by persons ex-perienced in this field. Brown points out that 
her declaration references specific study numbers recorded on the notebook pages 
and the dates recorded on those pages, and that her declaration and documentary 
records would be understood by persons experienced in this field of science. Brown 
states that the Board erred in requiring that the records themselves and the content 
of the supporting declaration contain explanations more elaborate than needed to 
record the work and communicate to persons experienced in this field. Barbacid de-
fends the Board’s ruling, characterizing Ms. Morgan’s testimony as “cursory” and 
fatally flawed because it did not explain how each experiment moved the inventive 
process toward completion, and states that the Board acted reasonably in refusing to 
credit any of Ms. Morgan’s evidence as showing reasonable diligence and establish-
ing corroboration of Dr. Reiss’ testimony. 
We conclude that the Board erred in law, in failing to view the proffered evi-
dence as it would be viewed by persons experienced in the field of the invention. See 
Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1577-78 (the trier of fact is aided by an understanding of 
how the evidence would be viewed by one skilled in the art). The Board is charged 
with expertise appropriate to the invention under examination, and with under-
standing that a laboratory notebook recording daily experimentation, reasonably 
considered from the viewpoint of persons experienced in the field, need not repro-
duce on each page a statement of the larger research purpose; this purpose may  
reasonably be shown in the various declarations. 
It is undisputed that the subject matter recorded on the Morgan notebook pag-
es and described in her declaration concerns the subject matter of the count. This is 
the same form and content of evidence that the court in Brown I deemed admissible 
for purposes of showing conception. The Board agreed that Ms. Morgan’s activity 
during the critical period, if accepted into evidence, established diligence. We con-
clude that the Board erred in refusing to accept this evidence, and that reasonable 
diligence is deemed established. 
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The Board’s holding that Brown’s reasonable diligence had not been shown is 
reversed. The only remaining issue of which we have been made aware relates to pa-
tentability. The Board did not review the ruling of the administrative patent judge 
denying Barbacid’s motion challenging the patentability of Brown’s claims, deeming 
this aspect “moot” because of the award of priority to Barbacid. Brown asks us to 
take up this issue “in the interests of judicial economy,” expressing concern about 
the time already consumed in this interference proceeding and the delay of a further 
remand. Indeed, this interference has been pending for over ten years. However, we 
must agree with Barbacid that the question of patentability cannot be decided ab 
initio on appeal. See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“review of an 
administrative decision must be made on the grounds relied on by the agency”). 
Although we deplore the lengthy pendency of this proceeding, on remand the 
Board may decide whether further proceedings as to this issue are warranted. 
Editor’s Note: 
Brown, who had filed first, won the interference in 2007. “On June 5, 2006, 
the [BPAI] issued its Final Decision on Second Remand from the Federal Circuit, 
awarding Brown priority.” Barbacid v. Brown, 223 Fed. Appx. 972 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). This is the same merits outcome a first-to-file regime would have produced. 
Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co. 
254 F.3d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Apotex USA, Inc. appeals from the decision … granting Merck & Co., Inc.’s 
motion for summary judgment that the claims of U.S. Patents 5,573,780 and 
5,690,962 are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Because the district court did not 
err in granting summary judgment that the ’780 and ’962 patents are invalid under 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g), we affirm. 
Background 
Apotex is the assignee of the ’780 and ’962 patents, which relate to a process 
for making a stable solid formulation of enalapril sodium for use in the treatment of 
high blood pressure. Claim 1 of the ’780 patent, which is representative of the 
claims at issue, reads as follows: 
1. A process of manufacture of a pharmaceutical solid composition com-
prising enalapril sodium, which process comprises the steps of: 
i) a) mixing enalapril maleate with an alkaline sodium compound and at 
least one other excipient, adding water sufficient to moisten, and mixing to 
achieve a wet mass, or 
b) mixing enalapril maleate with at least one excipient other than an alka-
line sodium compound, adding a solution of an alkaline sodium compound 
in water, sufficient to moisten and mixing to achieve a wet mass; thereby to 
achieve a reaction without converting the enalapril maleate to a clear solu-
tion of enalapril sodium and maleic acid sodium salt in water, 
ii) drying the wet mass, and 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
226 
iii) further processing the dried material into tablets. 
The claims of the ’962 patent, which is a continuation of the application that led to 
the ’780 patent, are identical to those found in the ’780 patent except that they are 
not restricted to tablet form, but rather encompass any solid pharmaceutical dosage 
form of enalapril sodium. This distinction is not material to the resolution of this 
appeal. 
Merck manufactures enalapril sodium under the trade name Vasotec, and has 
been continuously manufacturing and commercially selling Vasotec tablets since 
1983. Merck owns both U.S. and Canadian patents covering the enalapril sodium 
compound, but does not own a patent covering its process of manufacturing Vaso-
tec. However, in 1992, Merck disclosed the ingredients utilized in its Vasotec 
manufacturing process in a Canadian product monograph, and more than 30,000 
copies of the monograph were distributed in 1993 alone. Merck also disclosed the 
ingredients used in manufacturing Renitec (the trademark used for its enalapril so-
dium product sold in various foreign countries) in the 1988 edition of the Diction-
naire Vidal, a French pharmaceutical dictionary. 
In 1991, Merck and its Canadian subsidiary, Merck Frosst Canada, Inc., sued 
Apotex’s Canadian affiliate, Apotex Canada, for infringement of Merck’s Canadian 
patent covering the enalapril sodium compound. During the 1994 trial (“the Ca-
nadian trial”), Brian McLeod, Merck’s then-vice president of marketing, performed 
a step-by-step narration of a videotape demonstrating Merck’s process of manufac-
turing Vasotec. Within days of hearing this testimony, Dr. Bernard Sherman, an 
Apotex official, allegedly conceived the patented process at issue. 
Apotex filed the present action against Merck, alleging that Merck’s process of 
manufacturing Vasotec infringes all of the claims of both the ’780 and ’962  
patents. Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of in-
fringement, and Merck cross-moved for summary judgment of invalidity under 
§ 102(g). The district court granted Apotex’s motion for summary judgment of in-
fringement, but also granted Merck’s cross-motion for summary judgment of in-
validity because it found that Merck invented the process claimed in the ’780 and 
’962 patents within the United States before Apotex, and did not abandon, sup-
press, or conceal that invention within the meaning of § 102(g). 
Apotex thereafter filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its grant of 
summary judgment of invalidity, which the district court denied. Apotex appeals 
from the district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity. … 
Discussion 
…  
Apotex argues that the district court improperly invalidated the ’780 and ’962 
patents because Merck failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it did 
not suppress or conceal the patented process. Apotex contends that proof of invalid-
ity under § 102(g) requires Merck to prove that it did not suppress or conceal the 
process of manufacturing Vasotec tablets based on its activities within the United 
States, and that Merck’s foreign disclosures therefore cannot be used to satisfy its 
burden of proof. Apotex also contends that, in any event, Merck’s foreign disclo-
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sures fail to prove that it did not suppress or conceal the process because nothing in 
the testimony from the Canadian trial, the product monograph, or the French dic-
tionary disclosed the use of water, the occurrence of an acid-base chemical reaction 
between enalapril maleate and sodium bicarbonate, or the resultant enalapril sodium 
product. Finally, Apotex argues that the evidence demonstrates that Merck in fact 
suppressed or concealed its invention by failing to file a patent application on the 
process, by submitting misleading information in its New Drug Application 
(“NDA”) that only disclosed the starting ingredients used to make Vasotec, and by 
preventing the details of its process from circulating outside of the company. 
Merck responds that § 102(g) only requires proof that the prior invention was 
made in the United States, and that evidence of lack of suppression or concealment 
can be proven by both foreign and domestic activities. Merck further argues that it 
did not suppress or conceal the process because it used it commercially, disclosed it 
in open court directly to its competitor, and published the ingredients used to make 
Vasotec tablets in both the product monograph and the French dictionary. Merck 
also argues that the submissions it made with respect to its NDA were proper and in 
any event could not constitute suppression or concealment because it was the Food 
and Drug Administration that never made those submissions public. Finally, Merck 
contends that the process was not suppressed or concealed because it was obvious 
and Dr. Sherman admitted that Vasotec tablets could be reverse-engineered to re-
veal the details of the process. 
Section 102(g) operates to ensure that a patent is awarded only to the “first” 
inventor in law. In addition to governing priority determinations in interference 
proceedings in the PTO, § 102(g) may be asserted as a basis for invalidating a patent 
in defense to an infringement suit. New Idea Farm Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 
F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990). That section provides in relevant part that: “A 
person shall be entitled to a patent unless *** before such person’s invention there-
of, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed it.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g). Therefore, if a patent-
ee’s invention has been made by another, prior inventor who has not abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed the invention, § 102(g) will invalidate that patent. New 
Idea, 916 F.2d at 1566. 
Apotex does not dispute that Merck invented the patented process in the  
United States well before Dr. Sherman’s alleged date of conception. Apotex also 
concedes that Merck did not abandon its process of manufacturing Vasotec tablets 
as shown by its continuous commercial use of the process since 1983. The sole issue 
on appeal, therefore, is whether Merck “suppressed” or “concealed” the process 
within the meaning of § 102(g). Whether suppression or concealment has occurred 
is a question of law, which we review de novo. Brokaw v. Vogel, 429 F.2d 476, 480 
(CCPA 1970). 
As an initial matter, we disagree with Apotex’s interpretation of § 102(g) as re-
quiring proof negating suppression or concealment to arise from activities occurring 
within the United States. The plain language of § 102(g) clearly requires that the 
prior invention be made “in this country.” However, in light of the grammatical 
structure of § 102(g), it would be a strained reading of that provision to interpret 
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the language “in this country” to also modify the requirement that the prior inven-
tion was “not *** abandoned, suppressed, or concealed.” A more reasonable inter-
pretation is that it only modifies the antecedent verb “made,” but not the “aban-
doned, suppressed, or concealed” clause that follows it. Had Congress intended the 
phrase “in this country” to modify “abandoned, suppressed, or concealed,” it would 
have inserted language to that effect. 
Indeed, if there were any doubt, the legislative history of § 102(g) demon-
strates that Congress contemplated that precise modification, as it applied to anoth-
er clause in § 102(g), and failed to adopt it. An earlier version of that provision con-
sidered in the House read as follows: 
[B]efore the applicant’s invention thereof the invention was in fact made in 
this country by another who had not abandoned it and who was using  
reasonable diligence in this country in reducing it to practice or had re-
duced it to practice. 
H.R. 3760, 82nd Cong. (1951) (emphasis added). The fact that the drafters found 
it desirable to emphasize that the language “in this country” applies to “using  
reasonable diligence” as well as to the word “made” supports the conclusion that it 
only modifies the verb that precedes it and not any subordinate clause that follows 
it. Accordingly, based upon the plain language of § 102(g) and the relevant legis-
lative history of that provision, we conclude that the language “in this country” only 
applies to the country where “the invention was made,” and that proof negating 
suppression or concealment is not limited to activities occurring within the United 
States. 
We next turn to an issue that has not been squarely addressed by this court in 
considering suppression or concealment as negating prior invention in a defense to 
an infringement suit under § 102(g)—the burdens of proof governing such a de-
termination. Section 282 of the Patent Act provides that “[a] patent shall be pre-
sumed valid.” 35 U.S.C. § 282. In order to overcome the presumption of validity, 
the party challenging a patent must prove facts supporting a determination of in-
validity by clear and convincing evidence. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Section 282 applies with full force to a 
§ 102(g) defense, and thus a party asserting invalidity under § 102(g) must prove 
facts by clear and convincing evidence establishing a prior invention that was not 
abandoned, suppressed, or concealed. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble 
Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
In Young v. Dworkin, one of our predecessor courts set forth the relevant bur-
dens of proof governing a determination whether a prior invention was suppressed 
or concealed, in the context of an interference between co-pending applications, as 
follows: 
The sole remaining question is whether the board correctly held that junior 
party-appellant suppressed or concealed his invention within the meaning 
of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). Here, the senior party-appellee bears the burden of 
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, notwithstanding junior party-
appellant’s burden on the issue of priority of invention which he has sus-
tained. 
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Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1279 (CCPA 1974). Thus, under § 102(g) in-
terference law involving co-pending applications, once the first party to invent has 
established priority of invention, the second party to conceive and reduce the inven-
tion to practice has the burden of proving that the first party suppressed or con-
cealed the invention. In such an interference, the first party to invent does not bear 
any burden of proof regarding suppression or concealment once it has established an 
earlier date of invention. 
A § 102(g) prior invention defense is governed by the identical “suppressed or 
concealed” language applicable to priority determinations in interference pro-
ceedings. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). We must therefore interpret the § 102(g) defense 
provision consistently with established interference law. However, infringement ac-
tions implicating a § 102(g) defense differ from interferences in that a patent has 
been granted on the invention at issue, and therefore the presumption of validity 
under § 282 applies.1 Because the patentee (analogous to the second-to-invent in 
the interference context) has the benefit of the presumption of validity, that party 
should only be held to bear a burden of producing evidence indicating that the prior 
inventor may have suppressed or concealed the invention once the challenger  
(analogous to the first-to-invent in the interference context) has established prior 
invention by clear and convincing evidence. That burden bears a rough similarity to 
placing the burden of proving suppression or concealment on the second-to-invent 
under interference law, but at the same time is appropriately limited to one of pro-
duction, not persuasion, giving due regard to the presumption of validity. 
We therefore interpret § 102(g) as requiring that once a challenger of a patent 
has proven by clear and convincing evidence that “the invention was made in this 
country by another inventor,” 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the burden of production shifts 
to the patentee to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the prior inventor has suppressed or concealed the invention. 
However, in accordance with the statutory presumption in 35 U.S.C. § 282, the 
ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the party challenging the validity of the 
patent. See Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“While a patentee may have the burden of going forward with 
rebuttal evidence once a challenger presented a prima facie case of invalidity, the 
                                                
1 Generally speaking, the presumption of validity does not apply to patents involved 
in interference proceedings, and thus the invalidity of a patent involved in an inter-
ference under § 102(g) need only be proven by preponderant evidence. See Bruning 
v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that, in an interference in-
volving a patent issued from an application that was co-pending with the interfering 
application, the appropriate standard of proof for validity challenges is the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard because the presumption of validity is inapplic-
able). However, the presumption may effectively be implicated in the case of a prior-
ity contest between an issued patent and an application that was filed after the issu-
ance of the patent. In such a situation, the junior party must establish priority of in-
vention by clear and convincing evidence. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1194 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). Such a factual scenario is not before us. 
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presumption of validity remains intact and the ultimate burden of proving invalidity 
remains with the challenger throughout the litigation.”). Once the patentee has sat-
isfied its burden of production, the party alleging invalidity under § 102(g) must 
rebut any alleged suppression or concealment with clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
Our case law distinguishes between two types of suppression or concealment. 
The first is implicated in a situation in which an inventor actively suppresses or con-
ceals his invention from the public. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1567 
(Fed. Cir. 1996). The second involves a legal inference of suppression or conceal-
ment based upon an unreasonable delay in filing a patent application.2 Peeler v. Mil-
ler, 535 F.2d 647, 655 (CCPA 1976) (holding that a four-year delay in filing a pa-
tent application after the invention was perfected was unreasonably long); Shindelar 
v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1342 (CCPA 1980) (finding suppression or conceal-
ment because no reasonable explanation was given for the two-year and five-month 
delay between reduction to practice and the filing of a patent application). The latter 
type is involved here. 
Although a prior inventor implicated in a § 102(g) infringement defense may 
not have filed a patent application, in contrast to an interference contestant, that 
party’s delay in otherwise bringing the knowledge of the invention to the public may 
nevertheless raise a similar inference of suppression or concealment. See Int’l Glass 
Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (holding that the prior in-
vention of a process did not invalidate a patent on the same process under § 102(g) 
because the prior inventor did nothing to make the invention known to the public). 
Even though there is no explicit disclosure requirement in § 102(g), the spirit and 
policy of the patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that “the 
public has gained knowledge of the invention which will insure its preservation in 
the public domain” or else run the risk of being dominated by the patent of another. 
Palmer v. Dudzik, 481 F.2d 1377, 1387 (CCPA 1973); see also Kimberly-Clark 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (defining § 102 
“prior art” to be “technology already available to the public,” and stating that  
“secret prior art” may not be used to invalidate a patent under § 102(g)); Oddzon 
Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen the 
possessor of secret prior art (art that has been abandoned, suppressed, or concealed) 
that predates the critical date is faced with a later-filed patent, the later-filed patent 
should not be invalidated in the face of this ‘prior’ art, which has not been made 
available to the public. Thus, prior, but non-public, inventors yield to later inventors 
who utilize the patent system.”). Absent a satisfactory explanation for the delay or 
the presence of other mitigating facts, a prior invention will therefore be deemed 
suppressed or concealed within the meaning of § 102(g) “if, within a reasonable 
                                                
2 A subset of the category of “inferred” suppression or concealment arises in a situa-
tion in which the first inventor is “spurred” into filing a patent application by anoth-
er application, Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (D.C. Cir. 1898), or by the 
commercial activity of another, Woofter v. Carlson, 367 F.2d 436, 445-446 (CCPA 
1967). This case does not involve “spurring.” 
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time after completion, no steps are taken to make the invention publicly known.” 
Int’l Glass, 408 F.2d at 403. 
In the case at hand, we find that Apotex has satisfied its burden of producing 
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that Merck suppressed 
or concealed its process of manufacturing enalapril sodium tablets. We emphasize at 
the outset that although § 102(g) prior art must be somehow made available to the 
public in order to defeat another patent, a § 102(g) prior inventor is under no obli-
gation to file a patent application. Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. United States Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Thus, while Merck’s failure to file a 
patent application may be relevant to a determination whether it suppressed or con-
cealed its process, especially if there were evidence that such failure was based on a 
decision to retain the invention as a trade secret, that failure alone does not satisfy 
the patentee’s burden of producing evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact of suppression or concealment. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that a pa-
tent application need not be filed on an invention for it to be considered § 102(g) 
prior art as long as the invention is found not to have been abandoned, suppressed, 
or concealed). 
However, Apotex did allege that Merck failed to make its invention publicly 
known. Merck perfected its process and began commercially using the process to 
manufacture Vasotec tablets no later than 1983. Although Merck argues that its 
process was disclosed to the public because its Vasotec tablets could have been  
reverse-engineered, that argument is based on the admissions of Dr. Sherman, who 
drew upon the information provided in Merck’s subsequent disclosures to determine 
the details of the process.3 Thus, it appears that Merck took no steps to make the 
invention publicly known for nearly five years, when it first published the ingredients 
used in its process in the 1988 edition of the Dictionnaire Vidal. We find that such 
a delay raises an inference that Merck suppressed or concealed its invention. Accord-
ingly, because Apotex has successfully discharged its burden of going forward with 
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact of suppression or concealment, the 
burden shifts to Merck to rebut that showing by clear and convincing evidence to 
the contrary. 
We conclude that Merck has succeeded in rebutting the inference of suppres-
sion or concealment created by its period of inactivity by clear and convincing evi-
dence. In Paulik v. Rizkalla, we stated the rule that “the first inventor will not be 
barred from relying on later, resumed activity antedating an opponent’s entry into 
the field, merely because the work done before the delay was sufficient to amount to 
                                                
3 It is worth noting that if it were clear that Merck’s process could be reverse-
engineered by one of ordinary skill through an inspection of Vasotec tablets, Apotex 
could not benefit from the inference of suppression or concealment because Merck 
could not be said to have delayed in making the benefits of its invention known to 
the public. See Palmer, 481 F.2d at 1386-87 (stating that a commercial use of an 
invention will preclude a finding of suppression or concealment only when such use 
enables the public to learn of the invention). 
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a reduction to practice.” 760 F.2d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the 
inference of suppression or concealment from a four-year delay between reduction 
to practice and the filing of a patent application was overcome by the first inventor’s 
resumption of activity before the second inventor’s date of conception). Thus, even 
though Merck may have suppressed or concealed the process for a period of time 
after it reduced it to practice in 1983, as long as it “resumed activity” (i.e., made the 
benefits of its invention known to the public) before Apotex’s entry into the field, it 
cannot be deemed to have suppressed or concealed the invention within the mean-
ing of § 102(g). 
Merck made several disclosures following its period of suppression or conceal-
ment that made the invention publicly known, all of which took place before Apo-
tex’s entry into the field (here, Dr. Sherman’s alleged conception in April of 1994). 
First, Merck disclosed the ingredients used in manufacturing Vasotec tablets in the 
1988 edition of the Dictionnaire Vidal. It also widely distributed the product mon-
ograph in Canada from October 1992 through 1994, which similarly disclosed the 
ingredients it used in its manufacturing process. Merck also provided a step-by-step 
description of the process through the testimony given by Brian McLeod at the  
Canadian trial on March 28, 1994. 
Apotex argues that these disclosures inadequately described Merck’s process of 
manufacturing Vasotec tablets, and therefore that the public never received the ben-
efit of the invention. However, Dr. Sherman admitted both in his deposition in this 
case and in his 1994 Statement of Facts prepared for the Canadian trial that his in-
spection of the Vasotec tablets that Merck sold commercially revealed that they were 
made using a wet granulation process. He also admitted that, after learning of the 
disclosed starting ingredients from the Canadian product monograph (which in-
cluded sodium bicarbonate), it “immediately occurred” to him and was “obvious to 
any knowledgeable formulator or chemist” that the final enalapril sodium product in 
the Vasotec tablets was the result of an acid-base chemical reaction between enalapril 
maleate and sodium bicarbonate in water. Merck’s various disclosures, in conjunc-
tion with Apotex’s admissions, therefore clearly and convincingly prove that Merck 
made the knowledge of its invention available to the public, thereby satisfying its 
burden of rebutting Apotex’s evidence of suppression or concealment. 
Moreover, Apotex’s argument that Merck suppressed or concealed the process 
by submitting misleading information to the FDA in 1983 is irrelevant because any 
suppression that was implicated was overcome by Merck’s subsequent activity. We 
therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 
that the ’780 and ’962 patents are invalid under § 102(g). 
We have considered Apotex’s remaining arguments and find them to be unper-
suasive. 
… 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  233 
Amkor Technology v. International Trade Commission 
692 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
Linn, Judge: 
Complainant-Appellant, Amkor Technology (“Amkor”), appeals the determina-
tion of the International Trade Commission (“Commission”) that Amkor’s U.S. 
Patent No. 6,433,277 is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). The respondents in 
the Commission investigation below, Carsem (M) Sdn Bhd, Carsem Semiconductor 
Sdn Bhd, and Carsem, Inc. (collectively, “Carsem”), intervene. Because the Com-
mission applied an erroneous legal standard, this court reverses the Commission’s 
determination on prior invention under § 102(g)(2). …  
I. Background 
On December 19, 2003, Amkor initiated Commission Investigation No. 337-
TA-501, alleging that Carsem violated section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended in 19 U.S.C. § 1337, based on the importation, sale for importation, and 
sale within the United States after importation of certain encapsulated integrated 
circuit devices that allegedly infringed claims 1-4, 7, 17, 18, and 20-23 of the ’277 
Patent, and other claims of two related patents not on appeal. 
A. ’277 Patent 
The ’277 Patent, titled “Plastic and Integrated Circuit Package and Method 
and Leadframe for Making the Package,” was filed on July 13, 2000, and issued on 
August 13, 2002. The invention relates to smaller and “more reliable” integrated 
circuit packages. Integrated circuit die—small blocks of semiconducting material 
that contain a circuit—are conventionally enclosed in a plastic package, or “encap-
sulant.” A metal leadframe serves as the central support structure for the package. In 
the prior art, part of the leadframe was completely surrounded by encapsulant, and 
part of the leadframe extended outside of the package to connect the package exter-
nally. The internal structure of the leadframes in the prior art limited the ability of 
those in the art to further reduce the package size. 
The claimed packages are “near chipscale” packages, meaning that the finished 
package is only marginally larger than the semiconductor chip itself. The smaller size 
is achieved by encapsulating only a top portion of the package. Fig. 2 from the ’277 
Patent depicts the invention: 
 
… 
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B. Procedural History 
On February 11, 2004, the Administrative Law Judge issued a subpoena to 
third parties ASAT, Inc., ASAT Holdings, and ASAT Limited (collectively, 
“ASAT”), seeking certain documents related to ASAT’s leadless plastic chip carrier 
package invention (“ASAT invention”) described in U.S. Patent 6,229,200 that 
Carsem asserted were critical to its defense. ASAT failed to comply with the subpoe-
na. On November 18, 2004, prior to receiving the ASAT documents, the ALJ is-
sued a first Initial Determination finding no violation of section 337. The ALJ de-
termined (1) that some or all of Carsem’s accused micro leadframe package products 
infringed claims 1, 7, 17, and 20 of the ’277 Patent; (2) that claims 1, 7, 17, 18, 
and 20 of the ’277 Patent were invalid as anticipated; and (3) that claims 2-4 and 
21-23 of the ’277 Patent … were [invalid as] indefinite … . 
On review, the Commission modified the ALJ’s claim construction … and re-
manded. On November 9, 2005, the ALJ issued a second Initial Determination 
finding, based on the Commission’s claim construction, that (1) some or all of 
Carsem’s micro leadframe package products infringed claims 2-4 and 21-23 of the 
’277 Patent; (2) that claims 2-4 and 21-23 of the ’277 Patent are not invalid as an-
ticipated or obvious; and (3) that Carsem violated section 337. The new claim con-
struction did not change the ALJ’s finding that claims 1, 7, 17, 18, and 20 were in-
valid as anticipated. 
On July 1, 2009, after the Commission finally obtained the ASAT documents 
(following two enforcement petitions in district court), the Commission remanded 
the Investigation to the ALJ to determine whether the ASAT invention qualified as 
prior art to the ’277 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). On October 30, 2009, 
the ALJ issued a first Supplemental Initial Determination finding that (1) the co-
inventor of the ASAT invention conceived of the ASAT invention in a foreign coun-
try sometime during April or May; and (2) Amkor’s ’277 Patent technology was 
conceived sometime during May through August, or on December 10, of that same 
year. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the ASAT invention is not prior art under 
§ 102(g)(2) because “Carsem [] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the April/May [] date of invention [for the ASAT invention] *** is prior to the 
[May through August] date of invention accorded the asserted claims of the patents-
in-suit.” On review, the Commission reversed and remanded, holding that the 
ASAT invention is § 102(g)(2) prior art because, under Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 
581, 584 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the earliest possible priority date of the ’227 Patent must 
be the last date in the range of dates, or December 10, which falls after the 
April/May date of invention for the ASAT invention. On remand, the ALJ issued a 
second Supplemental Initial Determination holding all disputed claims of the ’277 
Patent invalid under § 102(g)(2) in view of the ASAT invention. Amkor appeals the 
Commission’s holding that the ASAT invention qualifies as § 102(g)(2) prior art. …  
II. Discussion 
A. Standard of Review 
This court reviews the Commission’s legal determinations de novo and factual 
determinations for substantial evidence. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “Priority of an invention is a 
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question of law to be determined based upon underlying factual determinations.” 
Innovative Scuba Concepts, Inc. v. Feder Indus., Inc., 26 F.3d 1112, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (citing Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Anticipation 
is a question of fact … . In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
B. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) 
1. Domestic Disclosure Under Scott 
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 divided § 102(g) into subsec-
tions (1) and (2), eliminating the “made in this country” requirement under subsec-
tion (1) governing interferences, and retaining the “made in this country” require-
ment under subsection (2) governing prior invention generally. The post-AIPA ver-
sion of § 102(g), which governs this appeal, provides in pertinent part: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless: 
*** 
(g)(1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 
or section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes *** that be-
fore such person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such other 
inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such 
person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by anoth-
er inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it *** . 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (emphasis added). Prior to the passage of the AIPA, § 102(g) 
did not distinguish interferences from prior invention generally, and provided that a 
person shall be entitled to a patent unless “before the applicant’s invention thereof 
the invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned, sup-
pressed, or concealed it.” § 102(g) (1994) (emphasis added). 
Applying the pre-AIPA version of § 102(g) in an interference case, this court 
stated in Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2002), that “the inventor of an 
invention of foreign origin may rely on the date that the invention was disclosed in 
the United States[] as a conception date for priority purposes.” Id. at 1247 (citing 
Thomas v. Reese, 1880 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 196, 198 (“If [an inventor], having 
conceived [the invention] and reduced it to practice in a foreign country *** com-
municates it to an agent in the United States for the purpose of obtaining letters 
patent or of introducing it to public use in the United States, he may, in an interfer-
ence, carry the date of his invention back to the day in which it was fully disclosed to 
such agent in the United States.”)). Because nothing in the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress attempted to abandon this court’s interpretation of the “made 
in this country” language of the pre-AIPA version of § 102(g) when it amended the 
statute and retained the language in § 102(g)(2), this court holds that the court’s 
interpretation of this language in Scott governs this noninterference, prior invention 
case under § 102(g)(2). See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here 
*** Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress 
normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the 
incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”). This court’s inter-
pretation of the “made in this country” language of § 102(g) (1994) in Scott is con-
sistent with how both parties in this appeal and district courts have interpreted the 
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“made in this country” language of § 102(g)(2) as it applies to prior invention, out-
side of the interference context. See Solvay S.A. v. Honeywell Specialty Materials LLC, 
827 F. Supp. 2d 358, 363-64 (D. Del. 2011) (“[N]o authority indicat[es] that the 
language of § 102(g)(2) should be interpreted differently than that same language 
had been interpreted before the 1999 amendment.”), on remand from 622 F.3d 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 
835, 865 n.26 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[F]or an invention conceived outside the United 
States, the date of conception for purposes of priority for a United States patent is 
the date the invention is first reported to the inventor’s agent within the United 
States.” (citing Scott, 281 F.3d at 1247)). 
2. Sufficiency of Disclosure 
Amkor accepts Scott as binding—and thus does not contest that domestic dis-
closure and reduction to practice may be sufficient to satisfy the “made in this coun-
try” requirement of § 102(g)(2)—but argues that Scott requires a full disclosure of 
the invention in writing for a foreign invention to be deemed “made in this coun-
try” under § 102(g)(2). According to Amkor, “[t]he Commission’s new broad and 
lax standard” permitting “any U.S. disclosure—oral or otherwise—of a foreign con-
ception to qualify as a U.S. conception date” “would lead to absurd results and 
would effectively eliminate the ‘made in this county’ requirements from 
§ 102(g)(2).” 
The Commission counters that Scott does “not in any way limit the disclosure 
of the invention to the written form.” According to the Commission, the word 
“communicate” in the domestic disclosure rule, by definition, includes oral and 
written conveyances. Carsem contends, relying on Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal 
& Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001), that the only difference 
between written and oral disclosure is that “[w]hen an inventor, foreign or domes-
tic, orally discloses an invention in the United States, independent corroboration is 
required.” Both the Commission and Carsem argue that to be “made in this coun-
try” under § 102(g)(2), a foreign invention need only be disclosed in the United 
States in a manner sufficient to show conception, i.e., “the formation in the mind of 
the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative inven-
tion, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice,” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr 
Labs. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal 
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)), which may occur orally or 
in writing. 
The domestic disclosure rule cited in Scott, first articulated in Thomas, provides 
that an inventor who “communicates [his invention] to an agent in the United 
States *** may *** carry the date of his invention back to the day in which it was 
fully disclosed to such agent in the United States.” 281 F.3d at 1247 (citing Thom-
as, 1880 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 198). Under this rule, domestic disclosure is satis-
fied by a “communication” that “fully disclose[s]” the invention. Id. It is generally 
understood that a “communication” may occur orally or in writing. See, e.g., Oxford 
English Dictionary (3d ed. 2009) (defining “communicate” as “[t]o impart (infor-
mation, knowledge, or the like) *** ; to convey, express”); Webster’s Third New In-
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ternational Dictionary, Unabridged (2002) (defining “communicate” as to “speak, 
gesticulate, or write to another to convey information”). 
While this court’s limited precedent on this issue establishes that writings can 
satisfy the full domestic disclosure requirement, the cases do not establish any per se 
requirement that such disclosure must be in writing. See Scott, 281 F.3d at 1246-47 
(finding prior conception in the Unites States where both parties conceded that “a 
full description of the process of the count was contained in written materials dis-
closed to persons at ICI Americas,” but articulating the requirement only as “dis-
clos[ure] in the United States”); Holmwood v. Sugavanam, 948 F.2d 1236, 1238-
40 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (finding prior reduction to practice in the United States based 
on domestic testing of a foreign fungicide, proof of which was established through 
oral testimony and test results); Mortsell v. Laurila, 301 F.2d 947, 951 (CCPA 
1962) (finding prior conception in the United States based solely on the oral testi-
mony of the applicant’s United States patent attorney and his employee, where the 
oral testimony established that the patent attorney’s secretary made a complete Eng-
lish language translation of a German patent application fully disclosing the inven-
tion). These cases require a domestic disclosure sufficient to establish conception. 
Amkor is incorrect that the failure to import a writing requirement leads to a 
“broad and lax standard” where effectively any domestic disclosure would establish 
domestic conception. The content of the domestic disclosure must be specific 
enough to encompass the “complete and operative” invention, see Hybritech, 802 
F.2d at 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and an inventor’s oral testimony to this extent is a 
question of proof, see Sandt, 264 F.3d at 1350-51, and Price, 988 F.2d at 1194. 
Amkor argues that Carsem failed to submit sufficient evidence to corroborate 
the ASAT inventor’s testimony that he fully disclosed the invention to his colleague 
in the United States prior to the critical date. However, even if the ASAT inventor’s 
domestic disclosure was sufficient—and this court is not persuaded that it was—the 
Commission erred in its priority date determination with respect to Amkor for the 
reasons explained below. 
3. The Commission’s Application of Oka was Legal Error 
In Oka, the junior party in an interference submitted a range of dates of possi-
ble conception in an attempt to prove prior invention under § 102(g). Oka, 849 
F.2d at 584. This court held: 
 Because Oka is the senior party, Youssefyeh was required to establish 
reduction to practice before Oka’s filing date, or conception before that 
date coupled with reasonable diligence from just before that date to 
Youssefyeh’s filing date. The Board’s finding that Youssefyeh initiated 
preparation of a 5-inadanyl compound “in the last week of October 1980” 
supports the conclusion that Youssefyeh failed to establish conception, 
much less a reduction to practice, of that class of compounds earlier than 
October 31, 1980. In dealing with a reduction to practice, the court in 
Haultain v. DeWindt, 254 F.2d 141[, 142] (CCPA 1958), stated [that] 
*** “where testimony merely places the acts within a stated time period, 
the inventor has not established a date for his activities earlier than the last 
day of the period.” That rule is equally appropriate in establishing a date of 
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conception, nor does Youssefyeh dispute Oka’s position that “the last week 
in October” means October 31. 
 Thus Youssefyeh’s conception and Oka’s filing date are the same, i.e., 
October 31, 1980. Oka, as the senior party, is presumptively entitled to an 
award of priority, and Youssefyeh, as the junior party in an interference be-
tween pending applications, must overcome that presumption with a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In the event of a tie, therefore, priority must 
be awarded to the senior party. Because Youssefyeh, the junior party, failed 
to show a conception date earlier than Oka’s filing date, Oka is entitled to 
priority. We reverse the Board’s award of priority to Youssefyeh. 
849 F.2d at 584-85. 
Amkor argues that the Oka rule—i.e., according the last possible conception 
date to a party who can only provide a range of dates—applies only to the party with 
the burden of persuasion on the issue of prior invention. Amkor further contends 
that because Carsem bore the burden of persuasion, the Oka rule applies only to the 
ASAT invention, not Amkor’s invention. Amkor argues under Oka that the ASAT 
invention is entitled to the last possible conception date in its April/May range, or 
May 31, which is later than Amkor’s May 1 through August 31 range of conception 
dates, “or at most a tie.” 
Carsem counters that “the Oka rule applies to any party with a burden to prove 
a date of invention, whether that party is junior or senior [or] has the ultimate bur-
den of persuasion.” Similarly, the Commission argues that “it [] would make no 
sense to have two different rules for determining the date of conception *** one 
applicable to a party that has the burden of persuasion, and another applicable to a 
party without such a burden.” 
The Oka rule does not apply to patent owners like ASAT in validity disputes. 
This is not an interference, and the standards that apply to interferences do not nec-
essarily apply to disputes over validity. An issued patent is entitled to a presumption 
of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282, which can be overcome only with clear and con-
vincing evidence. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2241 (2011); Sandt, 
264 F.3d at 1350. The presumption of validity and the clear and convincing burden 
associated with it did not apply in the interference in Oka. In Oka, the question of 
entitlement to priority did not carry any presumption and was determined based on 
preponderant evidence. See Oka, 849 F.2d at 584. In Oka, even under the prepon-
derant evidence standard, the junior party could not prove prior invention by pre-
senting a range of dates that primarily predated but overlapped by one day with the 
senior party’s conception date. Id. at 584-85. 
To invalidate Amkor’s ’277 Patent under § 102(g)(2), Carsem bore the burden 
of persuasion and was required to submit not just preponderant evidence but clear 
and convincing evidence that the ASAT invention was conceived in the United 
States before the invention of the ’277 Patent. Carsem could only show a range of 
dates of possible United States disclosure, the first 30 days of which pre-dated Am-
kor’s possible conception date, and the last 31 days of which overlapped with Am-
kor’s possible conception dates. Such a showing, at best, establishes that the ASAT 
inventor might have conceived of the invention first. Evidence establishing that there 
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might have been a prior conception is not sufficient to meet the clear and con-
vincing burden needed to invalidate a patent. Accordingly, the ALJ was correct ... 
when he concluded that “Carsem [] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the April/May [] date of invention *** is prior to the [May through August] 
date of invention accorded the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit.” The Commis-
sion committed legal error in reversing this determination based on an erroneous 
application of the Oka rule to the patent holder. Because Carsem failed to prove 
prior invention in the United States by clear and convincing evidence, this court re-
verses the Commission’s determination that the ’277 Patent is invalid under 
§ 102(g)(2). 
… 
For the foregoing reasons, this court reverses … and remands for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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Chapter 6: Nonobviousness 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 271-312 
Electromechanical Cases 
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc. 
485 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. appeals from the order … entering judgment of non-
infringement and invalidity of claim 25 of Leapfrog’s U.S. Patent 5,813,861 in favor 
of Fisher-Price, Inc. and Mattel, Inc. (collectively “Fisher-Price”). We affirm. 
Background 
Leapfrog filed suit in October 2003, alleging that Fisher-Price’s PowerTouch 
product infringed claim 25 of the ’861 patent. … The ’861 patent relates to a learn-
ing device to help young children read phonetically. Claim 25 reads as follows: 
An interactive learning device, comprising: 
a housing including a plurality of switches; 
a sound production device in communication with the switches and includ-
ing a processor and a memory; 
at least one depiction of a sequence of letters, each letter being associable 
with a switch; and 
a reader configured to communicate the identity of the depiction to the 
processor, 
wherein selection of a depicted letter activates an associated switch to 
communicate with the processor, causing the sound production device to 
generate a signal corresponding to a sound associated with the selected let-
ter, the sound being determined by a position of the letter in the sequence 
of letters. 
 ’861 patent, col. 10, ll. 23-36. 
… 
The trial court issued its decision 
on March 30, 2006, finding claim 25 
of the ’861 … invalid as obvious. The 
court … concluded that claim 25 was 
invalid as obvious in view of the com-
bination of U.S. Patent No. 3,748, 
748 to Bevan, the Texas Instruments 
Super Speak & Read (“SSR”) device, 
and the knowledge of one of ordinary 
skill in the art as represented by the 
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“Obviousness is a question of law, reviewed de novo, based upon underlying 
factual questions which are reviewed for clear error following a bench trial.” Alza 
Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
Leapfrog argues that the district court engaged in improper hindsight in reach-
ing its conclusion of obviousness by concluding that all of the limitations of the 
claim are found in the prior art. Leapfrog also argues that the court’s finding that 
the Bevan device has the same functionality as claim 25 was clearly erroneous be-
cause the components of Bevan’s device are mechanical, and thus different in struc-
ture and interrelation from the electronic components described in claim 25, and 
therefore cannot provide the same functionality. Leapfrog argues that there was in-
adequate evidence in the record to support a motivation to combine Bevan, the 
Texas Instruments SSR, and a reader to arrive at the invention of claim 25. Finally, 
Leapfrog argues that the district court did not properly consider the strong evidence 
of secondary considerations of nonobviousness. 
In response, Fisher-Price argues that claim 25 is nothing more than the Bevan 
device, a toy that teaches reading based on the association of letters with their pho-
nemic sounds, updated with modern electronics that were common by the time of 
the alleged invention. Fisher-Price also responds that particularized and specific mo-
tivations to combine need not be found in the prior art references themselves in the 
context of an improvement that arises from a desire to generally improve a known 
device (e.g., to make the product smaller, lighter, or less expensive) using newer 
technology. Finally, Fisher-Price argues that the district court did give proper con-
sideration to secondary considerations of nonobviousness, but simply concluded that 
those considerations were not sufficient to overcome the determination of obvious-
ness based on primary considerations. 
We agree with Fisher-Price that the district court correctly concluded that the 
subject matter of claim 25 of the ’861 patent would have been obvious in view of 
the combination of Bevan, the SSR, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in 
the art. An obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula disassoci-
ated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the common sense of 
those skilled in the art demonstrates why some combinations would have been obvi-
ous where others would not. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 
(2007) (“The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is like-
ly to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”). Thus, we 
bear in mind that the goal of the claim 25 device was to allow a child to press a 
switch associated with a single letter in a word and hear the sound of the letter as it 
is used in that word. In this way, the child would both associate the sound of the 
letter with the letter itself and be able to sound out the word one letter at a time to 
learn to read phonetically. Accommodating a prior art mechanical device that ac-
complishes that goal to modern electronics would have been reasonably obvious to 
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one of ordinary skill in designing children’s learning devices. Applying modern elec-
tronics to older mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent years. 
The Bevan patent was one of the pieces of prior art relied upon by the district 
court, and it describes an electro-mechanical learning toy. In the preferred embodi-
ment of the Bevan device, a housing contains a phonograph record as a voice  
storage means, a speaker for playing sounds from the voice storage means, and an 
actuated electric motor to turn the record. Uniquely shaped puzzle pieces fit into 
correspondingly shaped openings in the top of the housing. Depressing the puzzle 
pieces in the openings causes the motor to turn the record and brings phonographic 
needles into contact with the portions of the record where the sounds associated 
with the puzzle pieces are stored so that they can be played through the speaker. In 
one embodiment, each puzzle piece is imprinted with one letter from a word, and 
pressing each puzzle piece produces the sound of a single letter in that word. Thus, 
although it relies on an electric motor and mechanical structures rather than a pro-
cessor and related electronics, Bevan teaches an apparatus that achieves the goals 
described above of associating letters with their sounds and encouraging children to 
sound out words phonetically through a similar type of interaction. We therefore see 
no clear error in the district court’s finding that the Bevan device has the same 
method of operation, viewed as a whole, as claim 25 of Leapfrog’s ’861 patent. 
  
A second piece of prior art relied upon by the district court was the Texas In-
struments SSR. The SSR is a more modern type of prior art learning toy, construct-
ed with electronic components, that has a slightly different mode of operation than 
Bevan. The SSR has a hinged plastic housing that opens to lie flat. Books for use 
with the toy fit into a recess in the housing. The housing contains switches that can 
detect when a child presses on different areas of the books’ pages. The housing also 
contains a processor, memory, and a speaker to produce sounds. In one mode of 
operation, the SSR allows the child to press the first letter of a word and hear the 
sound of that letter. The remainder of the letters in the word are grouped together 
and played together. For example, the child can press the letter “t” and hear the 
t phoneme and then press “ug” to hear all the sounds in the word “tug.” Similarly, 
the child can press the letter “b” and then “ug” to hear the sounds in “bug.” The 
SSR does not include a reader that allows the processor to automatically identify the 
inserted book. Instead, the user can press a triangle printed on the first page of the 
book, and the processor determines from the location of the triangle printed on the 
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page which book is inserted. 
Similarly, the user can press a 
star on each page of the 
book, and the processor de-
termines from the location of 
the star on the page which 
page of the book is being 
viewed. Thus, the SSR pro-
vides a roadmap for one of 
ordinary skill in the art desir-
ing to produce an electron-
ics-based learning toy for children that allows the use of phonetic-based learning 
methods, including the association of individual letters with their phonemes. 
We agree with the district court that one of ordinary skill in the art of children’s 
learning toys would have found it obvious to combine the Bevan device with the 
SSR to update it using modern electronic components in order to gain the com-
monly understood benefits of such adaptation, such as decreased size, increased reli-
ability, simplified operation, and reduced cost. While the SSR only permits genera-
tion of a sound corresponding to the first letter of a word, it does so using electronic 
means. The combination is thus the adaptation of an old idea or invention (Bevan) 
using newer technology that is commonly available and understood in the art (the 
SSR). We therefore also find no clear error in the finding of the district court that 
one of ordinary skill in the art could have utilized the electronics of the SSR device, 
with the method of operation taught by Bevan, to allow a child to press each indi-
vidual letter in a word and hear the individual phonemes associated with each letter 
to sound out the words. 
This combination of Bevan and the SSR lacks only the “reader” of claim 25 of 
the ’861 patent. The district court found that readers were well-known in the art at 
the time of the invention. As there is ample evidence in the record to support that 
finding, we find no clear error in the court’s determination. Furthermore, the  
reasons for adding a reader to the Bevan/SSR combination are the same as those for 
using readers in other children’s toys—namely, providing an added benefit and sim-
plified use of the toy for the child in order to increase its marketability. Leapfrog 
presents no evidence that the inclusion of a reader in this type of device was unique-
ly challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 
418. Nor does Leapfrog present any evidence that the inclusion of a device com-
monly used in the field of electronics (a reader), and even in the narrower art of 
electronic children’s toys, represented an unobvious step over the prior art. Our 
conclusion is further reinforced by testimony from the sole inventor at trial that he 
did not have a technical background, could not have actually built the prototype 
himself, and relied on the assistance of an electrical engineer and Sandia National 
Laboratory to build a prototype of his invention. 
Finally, we do not agree with Leapfrog that the court failed to give proper con-
sideration to secondary considerations. The district court explicitly stated in its opin-
ion that Leapfrog had provided substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, 
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and long-felt need, but that, given the strength of the prima facie obviousness show-
ing, the evidence on secondary considerations was inadequate to overcome a final 
conclusion that claim 25 would have been obvious. We have no basis to disagree 
with the district court’s conclusion. 
In light of our review of the evidence and the lack of any clear error in the dis-
trict court’s factual findings, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that claim 
25 of the ’861 is invalid as obvious in view of the combination of Bevan, the SSR 
device, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art concerning readers. 
…  
Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp. 
520 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
Moore, Judge: 
Agrizap, Inc. has sued Woodstream Corporation … for fraudulent misrepresen-
tation and infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,949,636, which pertains to an elec-
tronic rodent-killing device. Woodstream appeals the district court’s denial of its 
motion for judgment as a matter of law … for invalidity and unenforceability. 
Agrizap cross-appeals the district court’s final judgment of noninfringement. 
… Though we defer to the jury for its fact findings on obviousness, we ulti-
mately conclude that, despite those findings, the patent claims in dispute are invalid 
for obviousness and thus reverse the district court’s denial of Woodstream’s JMOL 
in that respect. As our decision on those issues completely resolves this case, we de-
cline to address the other arguments … . 
Background 
Agrizap is the holder of the ’636 patent, which relates to a method and appa-
ratus for electrocuting pests, such as gophers, rats, and the like. The disclosed inven-
tion operates by sensing the presence of a pest with a resistive switch. When the hap-
less pest makes contact with a high voltage electrode and a reference electrode, its 
body creates a leakage current that completes an electric circuit and triggers a gener-
ator. The generator then produces a voltage and current of sufficiently high magni-
tude to send the pest towards its demise. After the expiration of a predetermined 
amount of time, the generator deactivates and cannot be retriggered to dispatch an-
other pest until the invention is reset by turning it off and then on again. 
In March of 2000, Woodstream, a nationwide distributor of pest control prod-
ucts such as traditional snap traps and glue traps, approached Agrizap about market-
ing the Rat Zapper, the commercial embodiment of the ’636 patent. The two par-
ties engaged in negotiations from April 2000 to September 2000. During this time, 
they signed a mutual confidentiality agreement that permitted either party to dis-
close certain secret and proprietary information for the purposes of assessing Wood-
stream’s interest in purchasing Agrizap’s products and forming a business relation-
ship with Agrizap. 
In July 2000, without Agrizap’s knowledge, Woodstream sent samples of the 
Rat Zapper to offshore Chinese manufacturers. Upon learning of Woodstream’s ac-
tions, in August 2000, Agrizap’s president, Robert Noe, emailed Woodstream’s ex-
Miller’s Patent Cases 
246 
ecutive vice president, Andy Woolworth, seeking written assurance that Wood-
stream’s actions fell within the terms of their confidentiality agreement. Woolworth 
responded but did not directly address the confidentiality agreement. This prompted 
Noe to send a second email repeating his original request for assurances. Only then 
did Woolworth respond, “Bob – Please reference our point 5 of the confidentiality 
agreement to cover your concern below. We asked a source *** to quote on the 
product.” 
Roughly five days later, unbeknownst to Agrizap, Woodstream instructed its 
Chinese supplier that it would make the product itself. At trial, Woodstream admit-
ted that its vice president had not actually read the confidentiality agreement. An 
internal Woodstream document produced at that time revealed: “We are going 
through Agrizap in the short term to give Woodstream access to the technology.” 
At the end of negotiations, the parties established an oral marketing agreement 
whereby Agrizap would fulfill Woodstream’s purchase orders at a lower wholesale 
price. The products would still be named “Rat Zapper,” but would use Wood-
stream’s Victor brand label. Woodstream agreed to distribute the Rat Zappers to 
large retail stores, such as Home Depot, Ace, and Lowe’s. Agrizap agreed not to 
compete with Woodstream in these venues. Accordingly, from 2000-2003, Agrizap 
delivered 11,100 units of the Rat Zappers with the Victor label to Woodstream for a 
total of $226,000. 
In 2003, Woodstream released its Electronic Mouse Trap (EMT) and in 2004, 
its Electronic Rat Trap (ERT). Upon learning of the ERT in 2004, Agrizap termi-
nated its relationship with Woodstream. … 
Agrizap sued Woodstream, alleging that Woodstream fraudulently misrepre-
sented its motive behind sending the Rat Zappers overseas. … Agrizap also sued 
Woodstream for infringement of independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2, 3, 5, 
and 10, and independent claim 16 of the ’636 patent. Woodstream presented a vast 
arsenal of affirmative defenses … . 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Agrizap on the fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claim and awarded $1,275,000 in past and future damages. As for Agrizap’s 
patent infringement claims, the jury found none of Woodstream’s affirmative de-
fenses viable. Determining that Woodstream had infringed independent claim 16, 





Because the patent law aspects of this case can be decided entirely on the 
grounds of obviousness—notwithstanding the panoply of issues raised by the parties 
on appeal—we limit our discussion to only that which is necessary. 
We review the underpinning facts of a jury verdict of nonobviousness for sub-
stantial evidence, according due deference to the jury, as always, in its role as the 
factfinder. See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 719 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Our review of the facts, regardless of whether they are explicit or 
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implicit within the verdict, is bound by this high level of deference. See LNP Eng’g 
Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
Thus, even when the jury is given an essentially black box verdict form—that is, a 
form that merely asks the jury to answer “yes” or “no” as to whether a claim is ob-
vious, such as was done in this case—we presume all factual disputes were resolved 
in favor of the verdict. See Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
However, as the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a question of law, it re-
mains our duty as the appellate court to ensure that the law has been correctly ap-
plied to the facts. Structural Rubber Prods., 749 F.2d at 719. In other words, we 
review de novo the conclusion on obviousness. Though we are fully cognizant of the 
hindsight bias that often plagues determinations of obviousness, Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966), we are also mindful that “[t]he combination of 
familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does 
no more than yield predictable results,” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
416 (2007). 
During prosecution, the PTO rejected Agrizap’s application for the ’636 patent 
as being unpatentable over the claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,269,091 in view of U.S. 
Patent No. 4,048,746 (the Dye patent) and U.S. Patent No. 4,200,809 (the Mad-
sen patent), due to obviousness-type double patenting.[†] The ’091 patent, a patent 
that Agrizap obtained before the ’636 patent, is also directed to a pest electrocution 
device and discloses all of the limitations of the asserted claims in the ‘636 patent 
with one exception—it discloses a mechanical switch instead of a resistive switch to 
complete its circuit. At two separate trade shows in California in February of 1993, 
Agrizap demonstrated a commercial embodiment of the ’091 patent, the Gopher 
Zapper. It is undisputed that, while the PTO 
was aware of the ’091 patent, it was not aware 
of the public use of its commercial embodi-
ment. 
The Dye patent, which Agrizap’s expert 
described as a “killer cane,” discloses “[a]n 
electronic executing device used to demise go-
phers and other underground rodents” wherein 
the presence of the rodent completes the circuit 
when it touches two separate contact points. 
While the Madsen patent does not pertain to 
pest control, it discloses an apparatus akin to a 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note—As Mueller’s Patent Law explains, at 701, “double patenting” is the 
“prohibition against the issuance of more than one U.S. patent on a particular in-
vention. If an applicant attempts to obtain a second patent claiming the same inven-
tion or an obvious variant of the invention he has previously patented, he may con-
front a USPTO rejection of the second application’s claims on the basis of double 
patenting. … [O]bviousness-type double patenting  rejections may be overcome by 
the filing of a terminal disclaimer in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 253, ¶ 2.” ] 
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cattle prod that generates an electric charge when an external load, such as the body 
of a cow, completes a circuit by crossing two electrodes and creating a resistance 
current. Notably, in its rejection, the PTO explained that “[t]he patented claims dif-
fer [from the claims of the ’091 patent] in the type of sensor used to effect the elec-
trocution. … Thus the obvious substitution is that of the above combination of 
DYE and MADSEN as set forth above in detail regarding the use of electrocution 
via the resistive sensing electrodes.” In response, Agrizap corrected the inventorship 
for the ’636 patent so that both the ’636 patent and the ’091 patent had the same 
inventor and filed for terminal disclaimer. This eliminated the ’091 patent as a basis 
for rejection [on an] obviousness-type double patenting [theory]. 
Woodstream contends on appeal that the claims of the ’636 patent are obvious 
and thus invalid in light of the Gopher Zapper, the Dye patent, and the Madsen  
patent. In support, Woodstream argues that the examiner properly rejected the as-
serted claims during prosecution based on the ’091 patent, the Dye patent, and the 
Madsen patent—a combination of prior art identical to that which has been present-
ed by Woodstream on appeal. While Agrizap’s correction of inventorship disquali-
fied the ’091 patent as a basis for a double patenting rejection, it did not disqualify 
the commercial embodiment of that patent, the Gopher Zapper, from being consid-
ered as prior art. The parties do not dispute that the Gopher Zapper was used in 
public more than a year before the filing date of the ’636 patent and is therefore 
prior art. Moreover, there is no dispute that the ’091 patent and, in turn, the  
Gopher Zapper disclose every single limitation of the asserted claims save for the 
resistive switch that is disclosed in the Madsen and Dye patents. See Oral Arg. 
33:56-36:42 (Feb. 7, 2008). Thus, we effectively find ourselves in the curious po-
sition of reviewing the same prior art that the PTO relied upon to reject the asserted 
claims. 
Certainly, the PTO’s rejection in light of this identical prior art is by no means 
dispositive of the issues that need to be resolved to determine the validity of the as-
serted claims. The PTO was never presented with the objective evidence of nonob-
viousness, including the commercial success of the Rat Zapper, copying by Wood-
stream, and a long felt need in the market for electronic rat traps, which was pre-
sented to the jury. Even when we presume the jury found that the objective evi-
dence of nonobviousness favored Agrizap, this evidence is insufficient to overcome 
the overwhelming strength of Woodstream’s prima facie case of obviousness. 
This is a textbook case of when the asserted claims involve a combination of 
familiar elements according to known methods that does no more than yield pre-
dictable results. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. The only difference between the Gopher 
Zapper and the asserted claims, as conceded by Agrizap, is the type of switch used to 
complete the circuit that triggers the generator. The asserted claims simply substi-
tute a resistive electrical switch for the mechanical pressure switch employed by the 
Gopher Zapper. As illustrated by the Dye and Madsen patents, the use of an animal 
body as a resistive switch to complete a circuit for the generation of an electric 
charge was already well known in the prior art. In favoring resistive switches over 
mechanical switches, both the Dye and Madsen patents are directed to solving the 
same problem as the ’636 patent—the malfunction of mechanical switches in en-
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vironments prone to dirt and dampness. See ’746 patent, col. 1, ll. 43-46, 53-63; 
’809 patent, col. 1, ll.31-55. 
In this case, the objective evidence of nonobviousness simply cannot overcome 
such a strong prima facie case of obviousness. Similarly, in Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Fisher-Price, Inc., we held that the objective considerations of nonobviousness 
presented in that case, including substantial evidence of commercial success, praise, 
and long-felt need, were inadequate to overcome a strong showing of primary con-
siderations that rendered the claims at issue invalid. 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). Based on the foregoing, we reverse the district court’s denial of Wood-
stream’s motion for JMOL as to the obviousness of the asserted claims. 
… 
In re Giannelli 
739 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Lourie, Judge:  
Raymond Giannelli appeals from the decision of the [PTO Board] affirming the 
rejection of claims 1-25 of U.S. Patent Application 10/378,261 under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) as obvious over U.S. Patent 5,997,447. Because the Board erred in con-
cluding that the claims of the ’261 application would have been obvious in view of 
the ’447 patent, we reverse. 
Background 
Giannelli filed the ’261 application, entitled “Rowing Machine,” in March 
2003. The ’261 application discloses an exercise machine on which a user can per-
form a rowing motion against a selected resistance, thereby strengthening the back 
muscles. ’261 application, at 2-3. 
Claim 1, as amended, is representative of the claims on appeal and reads as fol-
lows: 
1. A row exercise machine comprising an input assembly including a first 
handle portion adapted to be moved from a first position to a second po-
sition by a pulling force exerted by a user on the first handle portion in a 
rowing motion, the input assembly defining a substantially linear path for 
the first handle portion from the first position to the second position. 
Response to Office Action, No. 10/378,261, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2006). 
The specification teaches that the rowing ma-
chine’s arms travel in a substantially linear path as the 
handles are pulled. ’261 application, at 3-4. An exem-
plary method of operation described in the specifica-
tion depicts the user as pulling the machine’s handles 
to overcome a selected resistance. Figure 4 of the ’261 
application … shows a left side view of an embodiment 
of the row exercise machine. 
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The PTO examiner initially rejected all the 
original claims of the ’261 application, finding the 
claims anticipated by the ’447 patent. 
The ’447 patent, entitled “Chest Press Appa-
ratus for Exercising Regions of the Upper Body,” 
describes a chest press exercise machine where the 
user performs the exercise by pushing on the han-
dles to overcome the selected resistance. ’447  
patent, col. 11, ll. 39-50. Figure 1 of the ’447  
patent … depicts an angled view of the chest press 
apparatus. 
In response to the rejection, Giannelli amend-
ed the claims to add the limitation “by a pulling 
force exerted by a user on the first handle portion 
in a rowing motion,” but the examiner again re-
jected the ’261 application under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a) in view of the 
’447 patent. The rejection was made final. 
Giannelli appealed the examiner’s rejection to the Board. The Board affirmed 
the obviousness rejection and did not address the anticipation rejection. The Board 
characterized the dispositive issue as being whether the chest press machine of the 
’447 patent was “capable of being used by exerting a pulling force on the handles in 
a rowing motion.” The Board deemed it reasonable that a user could face the han-
dles of the prior art chest press machine and exert a pulling force on its handles in a 
rowing motion. The Board noted that the recitation of a new intended use for an 
old product did not make a claim to that old product patentable, and consequently 
determined that the ’261 application simply recited the new intended use of rowing 
for the ’447 patent chest press apparatus. The Board further found that even though 
using the ’447 patent’s invention as a rowing machine “may not fully achieve the 
‘purpose’ of [the ’447] apparatus,” Giannelli had not shown that the apparatus 
could not be used in such a manner. In the Board’s view, Giannelli thus failed to 
rebut the Board’s showing of capability of pulling the handles. The Board also 
found that the ’261 application’s claimed “substantially linear path” encompassed 
the “slightly curvilinear path” disclosed in the ’447 patent Abstract. 
… 
Discussion 
We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo, In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 
1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and the Board’s factual findings underlying those determina-
tions for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might 
accept the evidence to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 
197, 229 (1938). Obviousness is a question of law, based on underlying factual 
findings. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966); Elsner, 381 F.3d at 
1127. …  
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Giannelli argues that the Board’s decision sustaining the examiner’s rejection is 
based on an incorrect assertion that the chest press machine disclosed in the ’447 
patent could be used as a rowing machine rather than considering how it would be 
used. Giannelli contends that the Board erred in concluding that the examiner had 
met the burden of establishing a case of prima facie obviousness over the cited ’447 
reference because he failed to explain how or why a user could possibly use the prior 
art chest press machine to perform a rowing motion. The Director responds that 
claim 1 only requires an exercise machine with handles that can be pulled. The  
Director contends that the Board correctly found that the chest press machine de-
scribed in the ’447 patent either disclosed or rendered obvious all of the limitations 
of the ’261 application claims. The Director further contends that the Board cor-
rectly held that Giannelli did not rebut the finding of capability because he did not 
provide any persuasive argument or evidence to show that the chest press machine 
described in the ’447 patent could not be used to perform the rowing exercise. 
The Board did not review and decide the anticipation issue, so neither will we. 
Thus, it is obviousness that is before us, and we conclude that the Board erred in 
concluding that the claims of the ’261 application would have been obvious in view 
of the ’447 patent. The Board premised its conclusion on its theory that the ma-
chine described in the ’447 patent was “capable of” having its handles pulled. 
The PTO bears the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of obviousness. 
In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When a prima facie case of 
obviousness is made, the burden then shifts to the applicant to come forward with 
evidence and/or argument supporting patentability. In re Glaug, 283 F.3d 1335, 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The PTO did not carry its burden in this case. 
The claims of the ’261 application specifically require a “first handle portion 
adapted to be moved from a first position to a second position by a pulling force … 
in a rowing motion.” We have noted that, “the phrase ‘adapted to’ is frequently 
used to mean ‘made to,’ ‘designed to,’ or ‘configured to,’ … .” Aspex Eyewear, Inc. 
v. Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Although the 
phrase can also mean “‘capable of’ or ‘suitable for,’” id., here the written description 
makes clear that “adapted to,” as used in the ’261 application, has a narrower mean-
ing, viz., that the claimed machine is designed or constructed to be used as a rowing 
machine whereby a pulling force is exerted on the handles. 
The written description of the ’261 application describes how the position of 
the handles relative to the primary and secondary lever arms and the resistance 
mechanism renders them “adapted” to be moved by the user’s pulling force. For 
example, the application states that the exercise machine “enables a user to maintain 
biomechanical alignment of the user’s wrist and forearm during performance of the 
exercise, while maintaining a consistent resistance applied to the muscles, in the sta-
bility of an exercise machine.” ’261 application, at 3. The location of those handles 
relative to the other components is one of their structural attributes that enables 
performance of the rowing motion against the selected resistance. ’261 application, 
at 4 (“The declining, substantially linear path [of the pulled handles] enables the 
user to maintain proper biomechanical alignment of the force angle being applied to 
the grip. This allows for a fairly consistent torque application at the shoulder 
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throughout the range of motion of the exercise.”). Consequently, the relevant ques-
tion before the Board was whether the apparatus described in the ’447 patent was 
“‘made to,’ ‘designed to,’ or ‘configured to,’” allow the user to perform a rowing 
exercise by pulling on the handles as claimed in the ’261 application. 
There is no question that the ’447 patent does not have handles that are 
adapted to be pulled in a rowing motion. The ’447 patent’s written description de-
scribes the exercise machine’s structure as allowing a movement that “simulates as 
natural a human musculoskeletal outward pushing motion as possible while main-
taining proper biomechanical alignment of the user’s joints.” ’447 patent col. 11, ll. 
61-64; see also id. col. 2, ll. 37-41 (stating that the position of the machine and han-
dles allows the exercising user to “maintain the proper biomechanical alignment of 
the joints” and “the proper alignment of the wrists”). The Board stated that using 
the ’447 patent as a rowing machine was a new intended use of the prior art appa-
ratus. In the context of the claimed rowing machine, however, the mere capability 
of pulling the handles is not the inquiry that the Board should have made; it should 
have determined whether it would have been obvious to modify the prior art appa-
ratus to arrive at the claimed rowing machine. Because the Board determined that 
the machine claimed in the ’261 application would have been obvious by merely 
showing that a rowing exercise could be performed on the machine disclosed in the 
’447 patent, and not whether it was obvious to modify the chest press machine to 
contain handles “adapted to” perform the rowing motion by pulling on them, the 
Board erred in concluding that the examiner had met his initial burden of establish-
ing a case of prima facie obviousness. Sullivan, 498 F.3d at 1351. 
Physical capability alone does not render obvious that which is contraindicated. 
And, on this record, it is not obvious to modify a machine with handles designed to 
be pushed to one with handles adapted to be pulled. A chest press machine is not a 
rowing machine, nor has evidence been shown that it is. In fact, anyone who has 
used exercise machines knows that a sure-fire way to cause injury is to use a machine 
in a manner not intended by the manufacturer. 
Because the Board’s analysis began with the premise that “adapted to” meant 
“capable of,” its affirmance of the examiner’s rejection also contained no expla-
nation why or how a person having ordinary skill in the art would modify the prior 
art chest press machine to arrive at the apparatus of the ’261 application. And be-
cause the initial burden was not met, Giannelli was not obligated to submit ad-
ditional evidence to rebut the examiner’s findings of pulling capability. See In re 
Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Only if that burden [of establish-
ing a prima facie case] is met, does the burden of coming forward with evidence or 
argument shift to the applicant.”). The Board thus erred in affirming the conclusion 
of the examiner that the ’447 patent apparatus rendered obvious the claimed inven-
tion of the ’261 application. 
As indicated earlier, the Board did not review the examiner’s anticipation rejec-
tion, so neither will we. However, as we are reversing the Board’s obviousness con-
clusion, it is hard to see how these claims could have been anticipated by the cited 
’447 patent. 
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Finally, we do not need to address the distinction between the “substantially 
linear” path claimed in the ’261 application and the “slightly curvilinear” path dis-
closed in the ’447 patent. At oral argument, counsel for Giannelli conceded that the 
two phrases are not inconsistent. Oral Argument at 2:50, In re Giannelli, Case No. 
2013-1167, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oralargumentrecordings/ 
13-1167/all. 
… 
The “Analogous Arts” Question 
Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entertainment, Inc. 
637 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
Lourie, Judge: 
MGA Entertainment, Inc. [and others] (collectively, “MGA”) appeal from the 
summary judgment decision … that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent 7,264,242 
were infringed and were not invalid for obviousness. … The district court … erred 
in several of its factual findings underlying its nonobviousness determination. We 




Innovention Toys, LLC (“Innovention”) brought suit against MGA for in-
fringement of the ’242 patent, which claims a chess-like, light-reflecting board game 
and methods of playing the same. The disclosed game includes a chess-styled playing 
surface, laser sources positioned to project light beams over the playing surface when 
“fired,” mirrored and non-mirrored playing pieces used to direct the lasers’ beams, 
and non-mirrored “key playing pieces” equivalent to the king pieces in chess. To 
play the game, players take turns either moving a playing piece to an unoccupied, 
adjacent square or rotating (reorienting) a piece within a square. After moving or 
rotating a piece, a player then fires his laser, and if the laser’s beam strikes the non-
mirrored surface of a playing piece, that piece is eliminated from the game. To win 
the game, a player must direct his laser beam to strike, or illuminate, his opponent’s 
non-mirrored key playing piece, ending the game. 
All the asserted claims … include a “key playing pieces” limitation in which the 
key pieces are “movable.” Claim 31 is representative: 
A board game for two opposing players or teams of players comprising: 
a game board, movable playing pieces having at least one mirrored surface, 
movable key playing pieces having no mirrored surfaces, and a laser source, 
wherein alternate turns are taken to move playing pieces for the purpose of 
deflecting laser beams, so as to illuminate the key playing piece of the op-
ponent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
254 
MGA counterclaimed, denying infringement and alleging, inter alia, that the 
’242 patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. In making its obviousness argu-
ment, MGA relied on the combination of (1) two articles describing computer-
based, chess-like strategy games, Laser Chess and Advanced Laser Chess (collective-
ly, “the Laser Chess references”); and (2) U.S. Patent 5,145,182 (“the Swift pa-
tent”) describing a physical, chess-like, laser-based strategy game. 
The Laser Chess game is described in an article entitled “Laser Chess First Prize 
$5,000.00 Winner Atari ST Programming Contest,” published in the April 1987 
edition of Compute!. Advanced Laser Chess is described in an article published in 
the Summer 1989 edition of Compute!’s Amiga Resource. Both articles disclose 
chess-like computer games with virtual lasers and mirrored and non-mirrored pieces, 
which are moved or rotated by players during alternating turns on a virtual, chess-
like playing board. The goal of each game is to manipulate one’s laser beam using 
the various game pieces to eliminate the other player’s non-mirrored king piece by 
striking it with the laser beam. In Laser Chess, a player’s king piece may move 
squares during game play: “[The king] can capture any opposing piece by moving 
onto its square.” Similarly, in Advanced Laser Chess “Kings possess the ability to 
capture other pieces [by moving on top of them].” 
The Swift patent discloses a physical (rather than electronic) strategy game in 
which players take turns placing mirrored game pieces onto squares of a chess-styled 
game board. The players position the pieces so as to direct their laser’s beam to-
wards the opposing player’s scoring module and away from their own. A player 
scores when his laser beam, having been deflected around the game board, strikes 
his opponent’s scoring module. The scoring modules are mounted to the frame of 
the game board and thus are not physically capable of movement on the game 
board. 
MGA’s accused game, Laser Battle, is a physical board game for playing a chess-
like strategy game. Players take turns moving or rotating mirrored playing pieces so 
as to direct a laser beam to strike the opposing player’s non-mirrored Tower playing 
piece to win the game. …  
II. 
On October 14, 2009, the district court ruled on the parties’ cross-motions for 
summary judgment of infringement and invalidity. The district court granted Inno-
vention’s motion for summary judgment of literal infringement. … 
… 
The district court also granted Innovention’s motion for summary judgment of 
nonobviousness. The court first found that the Laser Chess references were non-
analogous art because they described electronic, rather than real-world, laser games. 
The district court then held that, because MGA had provided no evidence to sup-
port a finding as to the level of ordinary skill in the art, MGA’s obviousness argu-
ment could be pursued only on the basis of what would have been obvious to a lay-
person. The court then decided that because MGA had not provided any evidence 
that a layperson would have known of the Laser Chess articles or would have had 
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any reason to modify the teachings of the Laser Chess references, MGA had failed to 
state a prima facie case of obviousness. 
Finally, the court found that Innovention had demonstrated several secondary 
considerations of nonobviousness. These included (1) commercial success based on 
the sale of 140,000 games by Innovention, a small company with minimal market-
ing capabilities, and evidence that fans had started clubs and tournaments around 
the world; (2) long-felt need based on the game’s sudden success and media praise; 
and (3) industry praise based on, inter alia, the game’s nomination for Outstanding 
Technology of the Year by the International Academy of Science and its being one 
of five finalists for the Toy Industry Association’s 2007 Game of the Year award. In 
light of its summary judgment rulings, the district court granted Innovention’s  
motion for a permanent injunction on January 13, 2010. 




… Although the ultimate determination of obviousness under § 103 is a ques-
tion of law, it is based on several underlying factual findings, including (1) the scope 
and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; 
(3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) evidence 
of secondary factors, such as commercial success, long-felt need, and the failure of 
others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). …  
MGA argues that, rather than being nonobvious, the asserted claims would 
have been obvious based on the combination of the Laser Chess references, which 
teach the claimed game in electronic form, and the Swift patent, which teaches a 
physical laser-based game. According to MGA, the district court erred both (1) in 
concluding that because the ’242 patent relates to a physical game, the Laser Chess 
articles were non-analogous art; and (2) in assuming that a person of skill in the art 
was a layperson rather than, as put forth by Innovention, a mechanical engineer with 
knowledge of optics. Finally, MGA argues, Innovention’s unsupported and conclu-
sory assertions of secondary considerations fail to overcome MGA’s prima facie case 
of obviousness. 
Innovention responds that the Laser Chess references in combination with the 
Swift patent fail to teach or suggest every limitation of the asserted claims, and thus 
MGA has failed to state a prima facie case of obviousness. Specifically, Innovention 
argues that Swift, as MGA admits, fails to disclose movable key pieces and that the 
Laser Chess references fail to disclose any physical, non-virtual game components. 
Accordingly, Innovention argues that the Laser Chess references are non-analogous 
art because they are neither within the inventors’ field of endeavor, i.e., a non-
virtual, three-dimensional, laser board game, nor reasonably pertinent to it. Inno-
vention also argues that because MGA offered no evidence as to the level of skill in 
the art, the skill level defaults to that of a layperson, and that its evidence of second-
ary considerations provides further evidence that the claimed invention would not 
have been obvious. 
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We conclude that the district court clearly erred in several of the factual findings 
underlying its obviousness analysis. The district court erred in finding that the Laser 
Chess references fail to qualify as analogous art. The court also erred in concluding 
that the level of skill in the art is that of a layperson. We address each in turn. 
A. Analogous Art 
A reference qualifies as prior art for a determination under § 103 when it is 
analogous to the claimed invention. In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). “Two separate tests define the scope of analogous art: (1) whether the art is 
from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, and (2) if the 
reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference 
still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is in-
volved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “A reference is reason-
ably pertinent if *** it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals,  
logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his 
problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 659. “If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as 
the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact sup-
ports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection.” Id. Whether a prior art ref-
erence is “analogous” is a question of fact. Id. at 658. 
Innovention argues that the Laser Chess articles are non-analogous art because 
the ’242 patent’s inventors were concerned with making a non-virtual, three-
dimensional, laser-based board game, a project that involves mechanical engineering 
and optics, not computer programming. The district court appears to have agreed, 
finding that the Laser Chess references were non-analogous art since each discloses 
“an electronic version of the ’242 patent.” The court, however, failed to consider 
whether a reference disclosing an electronic laser-based strategy game, even if not in 
the same field of endeavor, would nonetheless have been reasonably pertinent to the 
problem facing an inventor of a new physical laser-based strategy game. In this case, 
the district court clearly erred in not finding the Laser Chess references to be analo-
gous art based on this test as a matter of law. 
The ’242 patent and the Laser Chess references are directed to the same pur-
pose: detailing the specific game elements comprising a chess-like, laser-based strat-
egy game. Specifically, the ’242 patent describes (1) the game’s components, includ-
ing the game board and various types of playing pieces; (2) the game’s specific rules, 
including how the pieces may move on the game board during a player’s turn; and 
(3) the game’s ultimate objective, namely, illuminating an opponent’s key playing 
piece with a laser beam. The specification even distinguishes prior art patents based 
on these game elements, stating that U.S. Patent 3,516,671 lacks “the unique ele-
ments and rules of the [’242 patent’s] invention,” and U.S. Patent 6,702,286 con-
templates a game in which the objective is not to “illuminate playing pieces,” but 
rather “to maneuver one’s pieces to flank (or surround) those of the opposing play-
er.” 
The Laser Chess references likewise describe specific playing pieces, rules, and 
objectives to create a chess-like, laser-based strategy game. Both Laser Chess and 
Advanced Laser Chess disclose, for example, (1) various game pieces, each with 
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unique capabilities; (2) rules for each player’s turn; and (3) an ultimate objective of 
eliminating an opponent’s king piece. 
Accordingly, the ’242 patent and the Laser Chess references relate to the same 
goal: designing a winnable yet entertaining strategy game. The ’242 patent’s specifi-
cation confirms that game design was one objective facing its inventors. In particu-
lar, the specification states that “[s]trategy games may differ in a variety of ways,” 
such as in board layout, the number and types of playing pieces, and the manner in 
which each piece moves on the game board, and that “[e]ach of these variations af-
fects the strategy of the play and the degree of skill required to play the game.” The 
specification thus admonishes that if the game elements “are overly simplistic, the 
game is too easy, will usually end in a draw or a predictable manner, and quickly be-
come uninteresting for the average player.” Conversely, according to the specifica-
tion, if the game elements “are overly complicated, the game takes too long to learn 
[and] is frustrating and uninteresting for the average player.” 
The specific combination of game elements disclosed and claimed in the ’242 
patent thus deals with the problem of game design, and game elements from any 
strategy game, regardless how implemented, “logically would have commended it-
self to an inventor’s attention in considering [this] problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d at 
659. Basic game elements remain the same regardless of the medium in which they 
are implemented: whether molded in plastic by a mechanical engineer or coded in 
software by a computer scientist. And, as MGA’s evidence shows, inventors of  
numerous prior art patents contemplated the implementation of their strategy games 
in both physical and electronic formats. For example, the Swift patent states that 
“[a]lthough the preferred embodiment is played by two players, obvious modifica-
tions of the game allow for *** a single player playing against a computer.” Swift 
patent, col. 2, ll. 47-51. Thus, because no reasonable jury could find that the Laser 
Chess references do not qualify as analogous prior art, and the district court erred in 
not so concluding as a matter of law. 
Because of its error, the district court failed to properly consider the scope and 
content of the relevant prior art as well as the differences between that art and the 
claimed invention, including whether one of ordinary skill in the art would have 
been motivated to combine the teachings of the Laser Chess references with the 
Swift patent in light of the standard articulated in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). We therefore remand these factual determinations to the 
district court to consider in the first instance. Furthermore, should the district court 
conclude that MGA has made out a prima facie case of obviousness based on the 
Laser Chess articles and the Swift patent, the court must then determine whether 
Innovention’s secondary considerations overcome MGA’s prima facie case. 
B. Level of Skill in the Art 
A determination of obviousness requires a factual finding of the level of ordi-
nary skill in the art. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a); Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. Yet, a district 
court’s failure to make a correct finding on the level of skill constitutes reversible 
error only where it affects the ultimate conclusion under § 103. Custom Accessories, 
Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1986). For example, 
no reversal is necessary where a district court makes a determination that an inven-
Miller’s Patent Cases 
258 
tion would have been obvious to one having the lowest level of skill, i.e., a layper-
son, because what is obvious to a layperson is necessarily obvious to one with a 
higher level of skill in the field of the invention. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible 
Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Knorr-
Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (en banc). Conversely, no reversal is necessary where a district court makes a 
determination of nonobviousness based on a finding of the highest possible level of 
skill in the relevant art, as fewer inventions are obvious to a person with a lower level 
of skill than to one with a higher level of skill. Id. A less sophisticated level of skill 
generally favors a determination of nonobviousness, and thus the patentee, while a 
higher level of skill favors the reverse. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Am. Can Co., 724 
F.2d 1567, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
In this case, the district court found that MGA had failed to provide any evi-
dence of the level of skill in the art, and thus concluded that MGA’s obviousness 
argument could be pursued only on the basis of what is obvious to a layperson. In 
so concluding, the district court erred. While MGA is permitted to argue that any 
level of skill, and thus the skill of a layperson, would suffice to support a holding of 
obviousness, the factual record in this case does not support such a finding. Here, 
Innovention conceded to the district court that the level of ordinary skill in the art 
was greater than that of a layperson. Specifically, Innovention asserted that the de-
velopment of a three-dimensional game would not, in fact, be easy for the average 
layperson, as it took Innovention’s game creators, a Ph.D. in mechanical engineer-
ing and two mechanical engineering students, a year and a half to develop and final-
ize Innovention’s game, and that Innovention’s patent reveals that the claimed in-
vention requires an understanding of geometrical optics. The district court appeared 
to agree, stating that “it seems some knowledge of mechanical engineering or optics 
is required.” The district court thus clearly erred in basing its obviousness analysis 
on what would have been obvious to a layperson notwithstanding evidence in the 
record and its apparent factual finding that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
possess a higher level of skill in the art. 
Because the district court found nonobviousness based on an inappropriately 
low level of skill in the art, the error was not harmless. Kloster, 793 F.2d at 1574. 
Accordingly, on remand, the district court must make a finding on the level of skill 
in the art and base its obviousness analysis on that level of skill. 
…  
In re Klein. 
647 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
Schall, Judge: 
Arnold G. Klein appeals the final decision of the Board … affirming the rejec-
tion of certain claims of U.S. Patent Application No. 10/200,747 as obvious under 
35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the Board’s finding that five references at issue are analo-
gous art is not supported by substantial evidence, the obviousness rejections cannot 
be sustained and, accordingly, we reverse. 
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Background 
I. 
Mr. Klein filed the ’747 application, titled “Convenience Mixing and Storage 
Devices,” on July 24, 2002. The ’747 application concerns a mixing device for use 
in preparation of sugar-water nectar for certain bird and butterfly feeders. According 
to the specification, the device has a series of rails that, when engaged with a divider, 
allow for the creation of two compartments for separating sugar and water within 
the device. The rails are located to divide the device into proportionate volumes of 
one part sugar to four parts water (to make hummingbird nectar), one part sugar to 
six parts water (to make oriole nectar), and one part sugar to nine parts water (to 
make butterfly nectar). Once the respective compartments have been filled to the 
same level with sugar and water, the divider is removed, allowing the sugar and wa-
ter to mix and be stirred. The specification does not suggest that the sugar to water 
ratios are novel, instead disclosing in the “Background of the Invention” that these 
ratios are “currently recognized as being proportionally equivalent in sugar content 
as the birds, and butterflies [sic] natural nectar food sources.” 
Figures 1, 2A-2B, and 4 of the ’747 application, shown below, illustrate device 
11, divider 21, and rails 15, 16, and 17[.] 
The sole independent claim at issue, 
claim 21, recites: 
A convenience nectar mixing device for 
use in preparation of sugar-water nec-
tar for feeding hummingbirds, orioles 
or butterflies, said device comprising: 
a container that is adapted to receive 
water, 
receiving means fixed to said container, 
and 
a divider movably held by said receiv-
ing means for forming a compartment 
within said container, wherein said 
compartment has a volume that is pro-
portionately less than a volume of said container, by a ratio established for 
the formulation of sugar-water nectar for hummingbirds, orioles or butter-
flies, wherein said compartment is adapted to receive sugar, and wherein 
removal of said divider from said receiving means allows mixing of said 
sugar and water to occur to provide said sugar-water nectar. 
The remaining claims at issue, claims 22-25, 29, and 30, each depend from 
claim 21. 
In a final rejection dated September 24, 2007, the examiner made five separate 
rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) [, each one involving a combination of one 
prior art reference and “the prior art sugar to water ratios discussed in the Klein 
specification.” Those five prior art references, all U.S. patents, are as follows: U.S. 
Patent No. 580,899 to Roberts; U.S. Patent No. 1,523,136 to O’Connor; U.S. 
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Patent No. 2,985,333 to Kirkman; U.S. Patent No. 2,787,268 to Greenspan; and 
U.S. Patent No. 3,221,917 to De Santo.] Mr. Klein appealed the final rejection to 
the Board. 
II. 
The Board affirmed each of the five obviousness rejections. The Board de-
scribed Roberts, O’Connor, Kirkman, Greenspan, and De Santo as each “teach[ing] 
a device with a container having a movable divider held in place by a ‘receiving 
means,’ such as slots, grooves, or threads, which could be used to divide ingredients 
in specific ratios.” In addition, the Board pointed to the Klein specification’s own 
statement that the sugar-water ratios were known. According to the Board, “[t]hose 
of skill in the art would have had reason to use the known ratios with the available 
containers having movable dividers to achieve the correct proportions of water and 
sugar and to mix the ingredients for different nectars.” The Board rejected Mr. 
Klein’s argument that the five cited references are non-analogous art. In doing so, 
the Board found that the prior art was properly relied upon by the examiner because 
it is reasonably pertinent to the problem Mr. Klein addresses, which the Board 
found to be “making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to prepare different ra-
tios of sugar and water for different animals.” 
Mr. Klein appealed. … 
Discussion 
…  
… The Board’s determination that a prior art reference is analogous art presents 
an issue of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence. In re Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 
496 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
I. 
On appeal, Mr. Klein argues that the Board erred when it summarily concluded 
that the five cited references are “reasonably pertinent to the problem addressed by 
Klein.” Although the Board made a finding of fact as to the particular problem that 
Mr. Klein was addressing, specifically, “making a nectar feeder with a movable divid-
er to prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals,” Mr. Klein 
contends that the Board failed to make any finding that any of the cited references 
are “reasonably pertinent” to that problem. Further, Mr. Klein argues, the Board 
identified no evidence that suggests that an inventor seeking to solve the problem 
Mr. Klein was addressing, which Mr. Klein characterizes as a “multiple ratio mixing 
problem,” would look to any of the references to address the problem of preparing 
different ratios. 
The government responds that the Board correctly found that the prior art ref-
erences were directed toward the same problem Mr. Klein sought to solve with his 
device, which the government characterizes as a “compartment separation prob-
lem.” Because “[t]he problem of keeping things separated is not unique to nectar 
mixing and storage devices,” and “nothing about the prior art containers with ad-
justable, removable dividers is unique to their particular applications,” the govern-
ment contends that “[o]ne confronted with Klein’s desire to keep two ingredients 
separated and also allow for them to be mixed together would have readily consult-
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ed these references to discover the broad solution therein … and applied it to his 
particular application … .” 
II. 
A reference qualifies as prior art for an obviousness determination under § 103 
only when it is analogous to the claimed invention. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Two sepa-
rate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the 
same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference 
is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is rea-
sonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” 
Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325. Here, the Board focused exclusively on the “reasonably 
pertinent to the particular problem” test. “A reference is reasonably pertinent if, 
even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is 
one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have com-
mended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem.” Clay, 966 F.2d 
at 659. “If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the 
reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in 
an obviousness rejection.” Id. 
Mr. Klein does not challenge the Board’s factual finding of the problem he was 
addressing, namely “making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to prepare differ-
ent ratios of sugar and water for different animals.” Mr. Klein argues, however, that 
Roberts, O’Connor, Kirkman, Greenspan, and De Santo are each directed to a 
wholly different problem than the one he faced. We examine each reference in turn. 
Roberts is directed to an “Apparatus for Keeping Accounts.” The apparatus of 
Roberts includes receptacles, such as recepta-
cles 1 and 2 (shown in dotted lines in Figure 
1 [to the right]), having a “series of vertical 
channels 11, adapted to receive removable 
partitions 12, by means of which the recepta-
cle[s] may be subdivided into compart-
ments.” Roberts patent. According to Rob-
erts, the receptacles are “designed to receive 
*** statement-cards,” and each includes a 
hand-hole 10 to assist in removing the recep-
tacle from a drawer. … 
O’Connor is directed to a tool tray having dividers that are “readily movable” 
and that is “adapted to contain 
comparatively small articles, for ex-
ample, drills, reamers, bits, etc., or 
hardware supplies such as bolts, nuts 
and the like.” O’Connor patent. As 
shown in Figure 1 of O’Connor, 
reproduced [at right], divider 8 is 
not positioned flush with the bot-
tom of the tray[.] 
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Kirkman is directed to a “Plastic 
Cabinet Drawer with Removable Par-
titions.” Kirkman explains that it “re-
lates to drawers for relatively small 
cabinets for containing various types 
of small articles, and more particularly 
to a drawer of this type provided with 
removable partitions or dividers, for 
dividing the drawer into two or more 
compartments of varying size, with 
means for frictionally holding the par-
titions in adjusted position [sic] with-
in the drawer.” Kirkman patent. As shown in Figure 1 of Kirkman [at left], the low-
er edge of partition 9 has a small notch[.] 
Mr. Klein argues that, consistent with the Board’s own express findings, Rob-
erts, O’Connor, and Kirkman are each directed to a container designed to separate 
its contents, as opposed to one designed to facilitate the mixing of those contents. 
Mr. Klein also argues that, in view of (1) the hand-hole 10 of Roberts, (2) how di-
vider 8 of O’Con-nor is positioned to not be flush with the bottom of the tray, and 
(3) the notch in the lower edge of partition 9 of Kirkman, none of these three refer-
ences is “adapted to receive water,” as is required by claim 21 of the ’747 applica-
tion. 
We agree with Mr. Klein that the Board’s conclusory finding that Roberts, 
O’Connor, and Kirkman are analogous is not supported by substantial evidence. 
The purpose of each of Roberts, O’Connor, or Kirkman is to separate solid objects. 
An inventor considering the problem of “making a nectar feeder with a movable di-
vider to prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals,” would not 
have been motivated to consider any of these references when making his invention, 
particularly since none of these three references shows a partitioned container that is 
adapted to receive water or contain it long enough to be able to prepare different 
ratios in the different compartments. See Clay, 966 F.2d at 659 (“If [a reference] is 
directed to a different purpose, the inventor would accordingly have had less moti-





                                                
1 We agree with Mr. Klein that, to the extent the government attempts to do so, it 
cannot redefine the problem Mr. Klein was addressing as a “compartment separation 
problem” on appeal. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 
(1943) (“[A]n administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon 
which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can 
be sustained.”). 
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Turning to the remaining two references, Greenspan is di-
rected to a “Blood Plasma Bottle” having a compartment for 
dried plasma and a compartment for water, where the com-
partments are separated by a “wall which is normally plugged 
during transportation of the bottle.” Greenspan col. 2, ll. 12-
17. When the plasma is going to be used, the plasma compart-
ment is unplugged, the plug becomes the cap for the bottle, 
and the bottle is shaken to dissolve the plasma. As shown in 
Figure 2 of Greenspan, [to the right], the wall 24 cannot be 
moved to adjust the relative sizes of the lower (plasma) com-
partment 30 or upper (water) compartment 28[.] 
De Santo’s “Fluid Container” has two compartments de-
signed to hold two different types of fluid, which can be “rapid-
ly and thoroughly mixed together at the desired time without 
opening the container externally” to make, for example, hair 
rinses. De Santo col. 1, ll. 8-17, 23-28. Compartments 24 and 
26 are separated by partition 28, which is “provided with a cen-
tral opening 32 defining an annular valve seat 34 which is engageable with a valve 
member 36 to open and close the partition as desired.” As shown [at left] in Figure 
5, partition 28 is in a fixed location. 
Greenspan and De Santo are not analogous, Mr. Klein ar-
gues, because they do not address multiple ratios or have a 
“movable divider.” We agree. While Greenspan and De Santo 
are each directed to containers that facilitate the mixing of two 
separated substances together, an inventor considering the 
problem of “making a nectar feeder with a movable divider to 
prepare different ratios of sugar and water for different animals,” 
would not have been motivated to consider either of these ref-
erences since neither of the references shows a movable divider 
or the ability to prepare different ratios.2 (Emphasis added). In 
[its d]ecision, the Board did not set forth any reasoning in sup-
port of its finding that Greenspan and De Santo are analogous, 
and thus, this finding is also not supported by substantial evi-
dence. 
…  
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the 
Board. The case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Editor’s Note 
Klein ultimately did receive his patent, U.S. Patent No. 8,147,119. 
                                                
2 As noted above, we agree with Mr. Klein that the government cannot now rede-
fine the problem Mr. Klein was addressing as a “compartment separation problem.” 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
264 
K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp. 
696 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Vita-Mix Corporation (“Vita-Mix”) appeals from the district court’s final 
judgment in which the court concluded that … that two prior art references were 
not analogous art for the purpjoses of an obviousness analysis [and] that substantial 
evidence supported the jury’s findings that the asserted claims were not proved in-
valid … . On appeal, Vita-Mix challenges those conclusions in addition to other  
rulings made by the district court during trial. Because the district court did not err 
in any respect and the jury’s findings were properly supported, we affirm. 
Background 
I. 
This patent case relates to commercial blenders that are used to make blended 
beverages. K-TEC, a company that manufactures and sells commercial blending 
equipment, owns U.S. Patents 6,979,117 and 7,281,842, which generally disclose 
and claim a blending system that contains a blending jar with a specific geometry. 
The benefit of the claimed geometry is that it alters the flow pattern of the liquid 
during blending in a way that reduces cavitation, which occurs when a pocket of air 
envelops the area surrounding the blender blade during blending. ’842 patent, col. 
2, ll. 11-15; col. 7, ll. 4-14. 
The two patents are related—the ’117 patent is the parent of the ’842 patent. 
Claim 1 of the ’842 patent is representative for the purposes of this appeal. It claims 
a “blending jar” that comprises “four side walls” and a “fifth truncated wall” ar-
ranged in a specific geometry: 
1. A blending jar apparatus, comprising: 
a blending jar having a blending element which rotates on a central axis, 
the jar to hold at least one foodstuff to be blended, the blending jar com-
prising: 
a bottom wall; 
four side walls extending from the bottom wall, the four side walls defining 
an opening having a generally rectangular shape, the opening being con-
figured to receive the at least one foodstuff; 
a fifth truncated wall disposed between two of the four side walls; 
a handle secured to the blending jar adjacent to the fifth truncated wall; 
wherein the fifth truncated wall is positioned closer to the central axis than 
corners formed by the four side walls. 
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The written description details the claimed geometry. In particular, Figure 11, re-
produced below, depicts the claimed jar, with four side walls, labeled 132, 134, 136, 
and 138, and a fifth truncated wall, labeled 135. 
In the … figure, the fifth truncated wall is disposed between side walls 138 and 
132 and is positioned closer to the blending jar’s central axis 144 than the corners 
formed by the four side walls. The written description explains that the fifth wall 
“truncates, in essence, the typical corner that would otherwise be formed between 
wall 132 and 138.” Similarly, K-TEC explained to the [PTO] that the truncated 
wall “may be planar or curved, as long as it 
truncates a typical corner that would otherwise 
be formed if the truncated wall were not pre-
sent.” The corners created by the sidewalls 
“may be formed at generally right angles,” 
although the specification depicts them also as 
rounded. 
As a result of this geometry, the vortex 
created when blending liquid inside the con-
tainer moves away from the central axis and 
toward the truncated wall. The shifted vortex 
creates a flow pattern in which, during blend-
ing, the liquid will climb up the corner opposite the truncated wall and will be lower 
at the truncated wall. That flow pattern reduces cavitation in the container, increas-
ing the speed and efficiency with which smoothies and other beverages can be made. 
K-TEC and Vita-Mix compete in the market for commercial blenders. In 2001, 
K-TEC began selling a five-sided blending jar that was an embodiment of the ’117 
and ’842 patents’ claims. After K-TEC acquired a number of customers in 2001 and 
2002, Vita-Mix began to consider upgrading its existing four-sided container. In 
that process, its “example” design was K-TEC’s five-sided container. Although Vita-
Mix attempted different design changes, it introduced its new MP container in May 
2003, a design that Vita-Mix personnel admitted was a copy of K-TEC’s five-sided 
container. 
After Vita-Mix released the MP container, K-TEC notified Vita-Mix in March 
2005 that the container infringed the parent patent of the ’117 and ’842 patents. In 
late 2005, one of K-TEC’s employees notified Vita-Mix personnel that the ’117  
patent would soon issue and that Vita-Mix’s MP container would infringe that  
patent. The day after the patent issued, the record shows that Vita-Mix’s CEO knew 
that “the K-Tec patent for the MP container” had issued. 
… 
II. 
Shortly after the ’117 patent issued, K-TEC sued Vita-Mix … alleging that the 
MP container infringed a number of claims of the ’117 patent. Thereafter, K-TEC 
amended its complaint to include the ’842 patent and the [Vita-Mix] XP container. 
Ultimately, K-TEC pursued damages only for sales of the XP container. 
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During the proceedings, the district court … granted K-TEC’s motion for 
summary judgment that the XP container infringed the asserted claims and partially 
granted K-TEC’s motion that the asserted claims are not invalid. … In partially 
granting K-TEC’s motion upholding the validity of the ’117 and ’842 patents, the 
court concluded that Vita-Mix had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that 
[the] two nonblender designs [shown below] that depict five-sided containers, U.S. 
Design Patents 163,117 (“Hobbs”) and 227,535 (“Grimes”), would have been rea-
sonably pertinent to solving the cavitation problem that the ’117 and ’842 patents’ 
inventor faced when he conceived those inventions.  
…  
In 2010, the parties tried the remaining invalidity, willfulness, and damages is-
sues to a jury, which found in favor of K-TEC on all issues. …  




… Vita-Mix argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 
that Grimes and Hobbs are not analogous art. To support its argument that those 
references were reasonably pertinent art, Vita-Mix points to the inventor’s depo-
sition testimony that the problems he confronted during the development of the 
patented jar included designing a jar that would fit within a particular dimension. 
Vita-Mix also points to its expert’s report on invalidity. Finally, Vita-Mix points to 
the PTO’s reexamination of the ’117 patent, in which the Board held that Hobbs 
and Grimes were analogous art. 
K-TEC responds that the ornamental designs of containers had no bearing on 
the inventor’s cavitation problem, a problem specific to the field of blenders. K-TEC 
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argues that the size of the container and the jar’s hand clearance were not problems 
in the prior art. Finally, K-TEC argues that even if Hobbs and Grimes are analogous 
prior art, inclusion of those references would not have had a material effect on the 
district court’s determination of obviousness. 
We agree with K-TEC that the district court properly granted summary judg-
ment that Grimes and Hobbs are not analogous art. To qualify as prior art for an 
obviousness analysis, a reference must qualify as “analogous art,” i.e., it must satisfy 
one of the following conditions: (1) the reference must be from the same field of 
endeavor; or (2) the reference must be reasonably pertinent to the particular prob-
lem with which the inventor is involved. Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, 
Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A reference is reasonably pertinent if it, 
as a result of its subject matter, “logically would have commended itself to an inven-
tor’s attention in considering his problem.” Id. 
Here, Vita-Mix does not dispute that Hobbs and Grimes are not in the same 
field of endeavor as the ’117 and ’842 patents. However, Vita-Mix also failed to 
raise a genuine issue of material fact that the references would have been reasonably 
pertinent the inventor in considering his problem. 
First, the inventor’s testimony, by itself, failed to raise a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact that Hobbs and Grimes would have been considered reasonably pertinent 
art. According to the specification, there are four prior art problems that the inven-
tion solves: blender speed, safety, cavitation, and the blender’s ability to blend fro-
zen ingredients. Consistent with that description, the inventor testified that he 
sought to create a blending jar that “would reduce or prevent cavitation when 
blending frozen drinks.” While the inventor’s testimony also mentioned that, in de-
veloping the patented jar, he also wanted the resulting jar to fit within K-TEC’s ex-
isting quiet box, there is no dispute that creating a smaller jar was not the problem 
he set out to solve because K-TEC’s existing jars already fit within the quiet box. 
Thus, the inventor’s testimony does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Second, Vita-Mix’s expert’s report on invalidity failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact because, as the district court correctly concluded, the report was “silent 
on the question of why [the inventor] would have looked to non-blending contain-
ers to discover the[] commonplace designs” depicted in Hobbs and Grimes. Indeed, 
the report did not address the Grimes reference. Ultimately, the district court rightly 
concluded that the report did not “explain any rational underpinning for [the inven-
tor] to have consulted non-blending containers or food mixers in order to solve the 
problems he encountered in designing a new blending container,” and properly 
concluded that the report failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
Finally, the Board’s decision that Hobbs and Grimes were analogous art does 
not raise a genuine issue of material fact. As an initial matter, the district court did 
not have the benefit of the Board’s [reexamination] analysis because the Board’s 
opinion did not issue until well after the district court entered final judgment in this 
case. But, regardless whether we consider such post-judgment events in this appeal, 
see Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc), summary judgment was appropriate in this case. Here, it was Vita-
Mix’s burden before the district court to proffer evidence such that a reasonable ju-
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ror could find the ’117 and ’842 patents invalid under the clear and convincing 
standard of proof. As recounted above, Vita-Mix failed to meet that burden. 
… 
Biochemical Cases 
Takeda Chemical Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. 
492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. and Genpharm, Inc. (collectively “Alphapharm”) appeal 
from the decision … following a bench trial that U.S. Patent 4,687,777 was not 
shown to be invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because we conclude that the district 
court did not err in determining that the claimed compounds would not have been 
obvious in light of the prior art, and hence that the patent has not been shown to be 
invalid, we affirm. 
Background 
Diabetes is a disease that is characterized by the body’s inability to regulate 
blood sugar. It is generally caused by inadequate levels of insulin—a hormone pro-
duced in the pancreas. Insulin allows blood sugar or glucose, which is derived from 
food, to enter into the body’s cells and be converted into energy. There are two 
types of diabetes, known as Type 1 and Type 2. In Type 1 diabetes, the pancreas 
fails to produce insulin, and individuals suffering from this type of diabetes must 
regularly receive insulin from an external source. In contrast, Type 2 diabetic indi-
viduals produce insulin. However, their bodies are unable to effectively use the insu-
lin that is produced. This is also referred to as insulin resistance. As a result, glucose 
is unable to enter the cells, thereby depriving the body of its main source of energy. 
Type 2 diabetes is the most common form of diabetes—affecting over 90% of dia-
betic individuals. 
In the 1990s, a class of drugs known as thiazolidinediones (“TZDs”) was in-
troduced on the market as a treatment for Type 2 diabetes. Takeda Chemical Indus-
tries, Ltd., and Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc. (collectively “Takeda”) 
first invented certain TZDs in the 1970s. Takeda’s research revealed that TZDs act-
ed as insulin sensitizers, i.e., compounds that ameliorate insulin resistance. Although 
the function of TZDs was not completely understood, TZDs appeared to lower 
blood glucose levels by binding to a molecule in the nucleus of the cell known as 
PPAR-gamma, which activates insulin receptors and stimulates the production of 
glucose transporters. The transporters then travel to the cellular surface and enable 
glucose to enter the cell from the bloodstream. 
Takeda developed the drug ACTOS, which is used to control blood sugar in 
patients who suffer from Type 2 diabetes. ACTOS has enjoyed substantial commer-
cial success since its launch in 1999. By 2003, it held 47% of the TZD market, and 
gross sales for that year exceeded $1.7 billion. The active ingredient in ACTOS is 
the TZD compound pioglitazone, a compound claimed in the patent in suit. 
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Takeda owns the ’777 patent, entitled “Thiazolidinedione Derivatives, Useful 
As Antidiabetic Agents.” The patent is directed to “compounds which can be practi-
cally used as antidiabetic agents having a broad safety margin between pharmacolog-
ical effect and toxicity or unfavorable side reactions.” ’777 patent, col. 1, ll. 34-37. 
The asserted claims are claims 1, 2, and 5. Claim 1 claims a genus of compounds. 
Claim 5 claims pharmaceutical compositions containing that genus of compounds. 
Those claims read as follows: 
1. A compound of the formula: 
 
or a pharmacologically acceptable salt thereof. 
5. An antidiabetic composition which consists essentially of a compound of 
the formula: 
 
or a pharmacologically acceptable salt thereof, in association with a phar-
macologically acceptable carrier, excipient, or diluent. 
For purposes of this appeal, the critical portion of the compound structure is 
the left moiety[†] of the molecule, namely, the ethyl-substituted pyridyl ring.1 That 
chemical structure, which has an ethyl substituent (C2H5) pictorially drawn to the 
center of the pyridyl ring, indicates that the structure covers four possible com-
pounds, viz., compounds with an ethyl substituent located at the four available po-
sitions on the pyridyl ring. The formula includes the 3-ethyl compound, 4-ethyl 
compound, 5-ethyl compound (pioglitazone), and 6-ethyl compound. 
Claim 2 of the ’777 patent covers the single compound pioglitazone. … 
Pioglitazone is referred to as the 5-ethyl compound 
because the ethyl substituent is attached to the 5-
position on the pyridyl ring. That portion of the com-
pound is depicted as: 
Alphapharm, a generic drug manufacturer, filed an Abbreviated New Drug Ap-
plication (“ANDA”) … seeking [FDA] approval … to manufacture and sell a gener-
ic version of pioglitazone. Alphapharm filed a[n appropriate] certification with its 
ANDA … asserting that the ’777 patent is invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103. In response, Takeda sued Alphapharm, along with three other generic drug 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note—In chemical parlance, a “moiety” is simply a molecule portion, which 
may contain whole functional groups or parts of functional groups. ] 
1 Pyridine is a six-membered carbon-containing ring with one carbon replaced by a 
nitrogen. 
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manufacturers who [had] also sought FDA approval to market generic pioglitazone, 
alleging that the defendants have infringed or will infringe the ’777 patent. 
On January 17, 2006, the district court commenced a bench trial solely on the 
issues of validity and enforceability of the ’777 patent. Alphapharm advanced its in-
validity argument, asserting that the claimed compounds would have been obvious 
at the time of the alleged invention. Alphapharm’s obviousness contention rested 
entirely on a prior art TZD compound that is referenced in Table 1 of the ’777  
patent [itself] as “compound b.” The left moiety of 
compound b consists of a pyridyl ring with a methyl 
(CH3) group attached to the 6-position of the ring. 
That portion of its chemical structure is illustrated as 
follows: 
Alphapharm asserted that the claimed compounds would have been obvious 
over compound b. 
The district court found that Alphapharm failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the asserted claims were invalid as obvious under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103. The court first concluded that there was no motivation in the prior art to 
select compound b as the lead compound for antidiabetic research, and that the pri-
or art taught away from its use. As such, the court concluded that Alphapharm failed 
to make a prima facie case of obviousness. The court continued its analysis and 
found that even if Alphapharm succeeded in making a prima facie showing, Takeda 
would still prevail because any prima facie case of obviousness was rebutted by the 
unexpected results of pioglitazone’s nontoxicity. The court then rendered judgment 





Alphapharm … asserts that the district court misapplied the law, particularly the 
law governing obviousness in the context of structurally similar chemical com-
pounds. According to Alphapharm, the record established that compound b was the 
most effective antidiabetic compound in the prior art, and thus the court erred by 
failing to apply a presumption that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been 
motivated to make the claimed compounds. Alphapharm asserts that such a conclu-
sion is mandated by our case law, including our en banc decision in In re Dillon, 919 
F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990). …  
Takeda responds that the district court correctly determined that Alphapharm 
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted claims are invalid 
as obvious. Takeda contends that there was overwhelming evidence presented at tri-
al to support the court’s conclusion that no motivation existed in the prior art for 
one of ordinary skill in the art to select compound b as a lead compound, and even 
if there was, that the unexpected results of pioglitazone’s improved toxicity would 
have rebutted any prima facie showing of obviousness. …  
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We agree with Takeda that the district court did not err in concluding that the 
asserted claims of the ’777 patent would not have been obvious. The Supreme 
Court recently addressed the issue of obviousness in KSR International Co. v. Tele-
flex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). The Court stated that the Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), factors still control an obviousness inquiry. …  
In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, albeit rendered before KSR was de-
cided by the Supreme Court, the district court made extensive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as to the four Graham factors. Alphapharm’s arguments chal-
lenge the court’s determinations with respect to certain of these factors, which we 
now address. 
1. Differences Between the Prior Art and the Claims 
a. Selection of Compound b as Lead Compound—Alphapharm’s first argument 
challenges the court’s determination with regard to the “differences between the 
prior art and the claims.” Alphapharm contends that the court erred as a matter of 
law in holding that the ethyl-substituted TZDs were nonobvious in light of the clos-
est prior art compound, compound b, by misapplying the law relating to obvious-
ness of chemical compounds. 
We disagree. Our case law concerning prima facie obviousness of structurally 
similar compounds is well-established. We have held that “structural similarity be-
tween claimed and prior art subject matter, proved by combining references or oth-
erwise, where the prior art gives reason or motivation to make the claimed composi-
tions, creates a prima facie case of obviousness.” Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692. In addi-
tion to structural similarity between the compounds, a prima facie case of obvious-
ness also requires a showing of “adequate support in the prior art” for the change in 
structure. In re Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729, 731-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
We elaborated on this requirement in the case of In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 
1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995), where we stated that “[n]ormally a prima facie case of ob-
viousness is based upon structural similarity, i.e., an established structural relation-
ship between a prior art compound and the claimed compound.” That is so because 
close or established “[s]tructural relationships may provide the requisite motivation 
or suggestion to modify known compounds to obtain new compounds.” Id. A 
known compound may suggest its homolog, analog, or isomer because such com-
pounds “often have similar properties and therefore chemists of ordinary skill would 
ordinarily contemplate making them to try to obtain compounds with improved 
properties.” Id. We clarified, however, that in order to find a prima facie case of un-
patentability in such instances, a showing that the “prior art would have suggested 
making the specific molecular modifications necessary to achieve the claimed inven-
tion” was also required. Id. (citing In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Dil-
lon, 919 F.2d 688; Grabiak, 769 F.2d 729; In re Lalu, 747 F.2d 703 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)). 
That test for prima facie obviousness for chemical compounds is consistent with 
the legal principles enunciated in KSR. While the KSR Court rejected a rigid appli-
cation of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation (“TSM”) test in an obviousness 
inquiry, the Court acknowledged the importance of identifying “a reason that would 
have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the ele-
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ments in the way the claimed new invention does” in an obviousness determination. 
KSR, 550 U.S. at 418. Moreover, the Court indicated that there is “no necessary 
inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.” 
Id. at 419. As long as the test is not applied as a “rigid and mandatory” formula, 
that test can provide “helpful insight” to an obviousness inquiry. Id. Thus, in cases 
involving new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to identify some reason 
that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound in a particular manner 
to establish prima facie obviousness of a new claimed compound. 
We agree with Takeda and the district court that Alphapharm failed to make 
that showing here. Alphapharm argues that the prior art would have led one of or-
dinary skill in the art to select compound b as a lead compound. By “lead com-
pound,” we understand Alphapharm to refer to a compound in the prior art that 
would be most promising to modify in order to improve upon its antidiabetic activi-
ty and obtain a compound with better activity.2 Upon selecting that compound for 
antidiabetic research, Alphapharm asserts that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have made two obvious chemical changes: first, homologation, i.e., replacing the 
methyl group with an ethyl group, which would have resulted in a 6-ethyl com-
pound; and second, “ring-walking,” or moving the ethyl substituent to another po-
sition on the ring, the 5-position, thereby leading to the discovery of pioglitazone. 
Thus, Alphapharm’s obviousness argument clearly depends on a preliminary finding 
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have selected compound b as a lead com-
pound. 
The district court found, however, that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
not have selected compound b as the lead compound. In reaching its determination, 
the court first considered Takeda’s U.S. Patent 4,287,200, which was issued on Sep-
tember 1, 1981, and its prosecution history. The court found that the ’200 patent 
“discloses hundreds of millions of TZD compounds.”3 The patent specifically identi-
fied fifty-four compounds, including compound b, that were synthesized according 
to the procedures described in the patent, but did not disclose experimental data or 
test results for any of those compounds. The prosecution history, however, disclosed 
test results for nine specific compounds, including compound b. That information 
was provided to the examiner in response to a rejection in order to show that the 
claimed compounds of the ’200 patent were superior to the known compounds that 
were disclosed in a cited reference. The court, however, found nothing in the ’200 
patent, or in its file history, to suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that those 
nine compounds, out of the hundreds of millions of compounds covered by the  
                                                
2 The parties do not dispute that compound b was the closest prior art compound. 
Thus, the legal question is whether or not the claimed subject matter would have 
been obvious over that compound. We will, however, use Alphapharm’s terminolo-
gy of “lead compound” in this opinion, deciding the appeal as it has been argued. 
3 Three divisional applications derive from the ’200 patent. Those applications ma-
tured into U.S. Patent 4,340,605; U.S. Patent 4,438,141; and U.S. Patent No. 
4,444,779. The ’779 patent is of particular relevance in this appeal and is discussed 
below. 
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patent application, were the best performing compounds as antidiabetics, and hence 
targets for modification to seek improved properties. 
The court next considered an article that was published the following year in 
1982 by T. Sodha et al. entitled “Studies on Antidiabetic Agents. II. Synthesis of 5-
[4-(1-Methylcyclohexylmethoxy)-benzyl-]thiazolidine-2,4-dione (ADD-3878) and 
Its Derivatives” (“Sodha II”). The Sodha II reference disclosed data relating to hy-
poglycemic activity and plasma triglyceride lowering activity for 101 TZD com-
pounds. Those compounds did not include pioglitazone, but included compound b. 
Significantly, Sodha II identified three specific compounds that were deemed most 
favorable in terms of toxicity and activity. Notably, compound b was not identified 
as one of the three most favorable compounds. On the contrary, compound b, was 
singled out as causing “considerable increases in body weight and brown fat 
weight.” 
The court also considered Takeda’s ’779 patent. That patent covers a subset of 
compounds originally included in the ’200 patent application, namely, TZD com-
pounds “where the pyridyl or thiazolyl groups may be substituted.” The broadest 
claim of the ’779 patent covers over one million compounds. Compound b was spe-
cifically claimed in claim 4 of the patent. The court noted that a preliminary 
amendment in the prosecution history of the patent contained a statement that “the 
compounds in which these heterocyclic rings are substituted have become im-
portant, especially [compound b].” 
Based on the prior art as a whole, however, the court found that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would not have selected compound b as a lead compound 
for antidiabetic treatment. Although the prosecution history of the ’779 patent in-
cluded the statement that characterized compound b as “especially important,” the 
court found that any suggestion to select compound b was essentially negated by the 
disclosure of the Sodha II reference. The court reasoned that one of ordinary skill in 
the art would not have chosen compound b, notwithstanding the statement in the 
’779 patent prosecution history, “given the more exhaustive and reliable scientific 
analysis presented by Sodha II, which taught away from compound b, and the evi-
dence from all of the TZD patents that Takeda filed contemporaneously with the 
’779 [p]atent showing that there were many promising, broad avenues for further 
research.” 
The court found that the three compounds that the Sodha II reference identi-
fied as “most favorable” and “valuable for the treatment of maturity-onset dia-
betes,” not compound b, would have served as the best “starting point for further 
investigation” to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Because diabetes is a chronic 
disease and thus would require long term treatment, the court reasoned that re-
searchers would have been dissuaded from selecting a lead compound that exhibited 
negative effects, such as toxicity, or other adverse side effects, especially one that 
causes “considerable increases in body weight and brown fat weight.” Thus, the 
court determined that the prior art did not suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art 
that compound b would be the best candidate as the lead compound for antidiabetic 
research. 
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Admissions from Alphapharm witnesses further buttressed the court’s conclu-
sion. Dr. Rosenberg, head of Alphapharm’s intellectual property department, testi-
fied as a [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 30(b)(6) witness on behalf of Alphapharm. In discussing 
Sodha II, Dr. Rosenberg admitted that there was nothing in the article that would 
recommend that a person of ordinary skill in the art choose compound b over other 
compounds in the article that had the same efficacy rating. Dr. Rosenberg, acknowl-
edging that compound b had the negative side effects of increased body weight and 
brown fat, also admitted that a compound with such side effects would “presumably 
not” be a suitable candidate compound for treatment of Type 2 diabetes. Alpha-
pharm’s expert, Dr. Mosberg, concurred in that view at his deposition when he ad-
mitted that a medicinal chemist would find such side effects “undesirable.” 
Moreover, another Alphapharm 30(b)(6) witness, Barry Spencer, testified at his 
deposition that in reviewing the prior art, one of ordinary skill in the art would have 
chosen three compounds in Sodha II as lead compounds for research, not solely 
compound b. In addition, Takeda’s witness, Dr. Morton, testified that at the time 
Sodha II was published, it was known that obesity contributed to insulin resistance 
and Type 2 diabetes. Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would have concluded 
that Sodha II taught away from pyridyl compounds because it associated adverse side 
effects with compound b. 
We do not accept Alphapharm’s assertion that KSR, as well as another case re-
cently decided by this court, Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 
2007), mandates reversal. Relying on KSR, Alphapharm argues that the claimed 
compounds would have been obvious because the prior art compound fell within 
“the objective reach of the claim,” and the evidence demonstrated that using the 
techniques of homologation and ring-walking would have been “obvious to try.” 
Additionally, Alphapharm argues that our holding in Pfizer, where we found obvi-
ous certain claims covering a particular acid-addition salt, directly supports its posi-
tion. 
We disagree. The KSR Court recognized that “[w]hen there is a design need or 
market pressure to solve a problem and there are a finite number of identified, pre-
dictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known 
options within his or her technical grasp.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. In such circum-
stances, “the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was ob-
vious under § 103.” Id. That is not the case here. Rather than identify predictable 
solutions for antidiabetic treatment, the prior art disclosed a broad selection of com-
pounds any one of which could have been selected as a lead compound for further 
investigation. Significantly, the closest prior art compound (compound b, the 6-
methyl) exhibited negative properties that would have directed one of ordinary skill 
in the art away from that compound. Thus, this case fails to present the type of situ-
ation contemplated by the Court when it stated that an invention may be deemed 
obvious if it was “obvious to try.” The evidence showed that it was not obvious to 
try. 
Similarly, Alphapharm’s reliance on Pfizer fares no better. In Pfizer, we held 
that certain claims covering the besylate salt of amlodipine would have been obvi-
ous. The prior art included a reference, referred to as the Berge reference, that dis-
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closed a genus of pharmaceutically acceptable anions that could be used to form 
pharmaceutically acceptable acid addition salts, as well as other publications that dis-
closed the chemical characteristics of the besylate salt. Pfizer, 480 F.3d at 1363. 
Noting that our conclusion was based on the “particularized facts of this case,” we 
found that the prior art provided “ample motivation to narrow the genus of 53 
pharmaceutically-acceptable anions disclosed by [the] Berge [reference] to a few, 
including benzene sulphonate.” Id. at 1363, 1367. Here, the court found nothing 
in the prior art to narrow the possibilities of a lead compound to compound b. In 
contrast, the court found that one of ordinary skill in the art would have chosen one 
of the many compounds disclosed in Sodha II, of which there were over ninety, that 
“did not disclose the existence of toxicity or side effects, and to engage in research 
to increase the efficacy and confirm the absence of toxicity of those compounds,  
rather than to choose as a starting point a compound with identified adverse ef-
fects.” Thus, Pfizer does not control this case. 
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the district court’s fact-
findings were not clearly erroneous and were supported by evidence in the record. 
Moreover, we reject the assertion that the court failed to correctly apply the law re-
lating to prima facie obviousness of chemical compounds. Because Alphapharm’s 
obviousness argument rested entirely on the court making a preliminary finding that 
the prior art would have led to the selection of compound b as the lead compound, 
and Alphapharm failed to prove that assertion, the court did not commit reversible 
error by failing to apply a presumption of motivation. We thus conclude that the 
court did not err in holding that Alphapharm failed to establish a prima facie case of 
obviousness. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., 471 F.3d 1369 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court’s finding of nonobviousness upon conclud-
ing, in part, that the prior art compound would not have been chosen as a lead 
compound). 
b. Choice of the Claimed Compounds—Even if Alphapharm had established that 
preliminary finding, and we have concluded that it did not, the record demonstrates 
that Alphapharm’s obviousness argument fails on a second ground. The district 
court found nothing in the prior art to suggest making the specific molecular modi-
fications to compound b that are necessary to achieve the claimed compounds. In 
reaching that conclusion, the court first found that the process of modifying lead 
compounds was not routine at the time of the invention. Dr. Mosberg opined that 
the steps of homologation and ringwalking were “routine steps in the drug optimi-
zation process,” but the court found that testimony unavailing in light of the con-
trary, more credible, testimony offered by Takeda’s experts. In addition, the court 
relied on Dr. Rosenberg’s admission that a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
“look at a host of substituents, such as chlorides, halides and others, not just  
methyls” in modifying the pyridyl ring. 
Pioglitazone differs from compound b in two respects, and one would have to 
both homologate the methyl group of compound b and move the resulting ethyl 
group to the 5-position on the pyridyl ring in order to obtain pioglitazone. With 
regard to homologation, the court found nothing in the prior art to provide a  
reasonable expectation that adding a methyl group to compound b would reduce or 
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eliminate its toxicity. Based on the test results of the numerous compounds dis-
closed in Sodha II, the court concluded that “homologation had no tendency to de-
crease unwanted side effects” and thus researchers would have been inclined “to fo-
cus research efforts elsewhere.” Indeed, several other compounds exhibited similar 
or better potency than compound b, and one compound in particular, compound 
99, that had no identified problems differed significantly from compound b in struc-
ture. Moreover, Dr. Mosberg agreed with Takeda’s expert, Dr. Danishefsky, that 
the biological activities of various substituents were “unpredictable” based on the 
disclosure of Sodha II. The court also found nothing in the ’200 and ’779 patents to 
suggest to one of ordinary skill in the art that homologation would bring about a 
reasonable expectation of success. 
As for ring-walking, the court found that there was no reasonable expectation 
in the art that changing the positions of a substituent on a pyridyl ring would result 
in beneficial changes. Dr. Mosberg opined that the process of ring-walking was 
“known” to Takeda, but the court found that testimony inapt as it failed to support 
a reasonable expectation to one of ordinary skill in the art that performing that 
chemical change would cause a compound to be more efficacious or less toxic. 
Moreover, Dr. Mosberg relied on the efficacy data of phenyl compounds in Sodha 
II, but the court found those data insufficient to show that the same effects would 
occur in pyridyl compounds. 
…  
We thus conclude that Alphapharm’s challenges fail to identify grounds for re-
versible error. The court properly considered the teachings of the prior art and made 
credibility determinations regarding the witnesses at trial. We do not see any error in 
the district court’s determination that one of ordinary skill in the art would not have 
been prompted to modify compound b, using the steps of homologation and ring-
walking, to synthesize the claimed compounds. Because the court’s conclusions are 
not clearly erroneous and are supported by the record evidence, we find no basis to 
disturb them. 
The court properly concluded that Alphapharm did not make out a prima facie 
case of obviousness because Alphapharm failed to adduce evidence that compound b 
would have been selected as the lead compound and, even if that preliminary show-
ing had been made, it failed to show that there existed a reason, based on what was 
known at the time of the invention, to perform the chemical modifications necessary 
to achieve the claimed compounds. 
In light of our conclusion that Alphapharm failed to prove that the claimed 
compounds would have been prima facie obvious, we need not consider any objec-
tive indicia of nonobviousness. 
…  
We have considered Alphapharm’s remaining arguments and find none that 
warrant reversal of the district court’s decision. 
… 
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Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Apotex Inc. 
748 F.3d 1326  (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Bryson, Judge: 
Plaintiff Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., appeals from the decision … granting the 
defendant generic drug companies summary judgment of invalidity as to claims 1-8 
of U.S. Patent No. 7,718,634 and claims 1-10 of U.S. Patent No. 7,410,957. We 
affirm. 
I 
The patents at issue in this appeal are directed to methods of treating osteo-
porosis through the once monthly administration of ibandronate, one of a class of 
compounds known as bisphosphonates. Ibandronate, a salt of ibandronic acid, is 
commercially available as Roche’s once monthly Boniva, which was approved by the 
FDA in 2005 for the treatment of osteoporosis. Once monthly Boniva provides a 
150 mg dose of ibandronate. 
Osteoporosis is a disease characterized by abnormal bone resorption. Resorp-
tion, the biological process by which bone is broken down, causes decreased bone 
strength and an increased risk of fractures. Bisphosphonates are “potent inhibitors of 
bone resorption.” ’957 patent, col. 1, ll. 39-40. They inhibit abnormal bone de-
struction and enable the gradual restoration of lost bone mineral density (“BMD”). 
Bisphosphonates are generally known to have a low bioavailability when admin-
istered orally, i.e., only a small fraction of a given dose is absorbed into the blood. 
Additionally, oral administration of bisphosphonates can result in adverse esophageal 
and gastrointestinal side effects. As a result of the side effects and to improve the 
bioavailability of the drug, patients taking bisphosphonates must adhere to a dosing 
regimen that requires a bisphosphonate tablet to be taken in a fasting state at least 
30 minutes before eating or drinking. In the past, the inconvenience of that regimen 
created problems of patient compliance. Researchers in the field believed that less-
frequent dosing would result in patients continuing the treatment for the long term, 
which is required for bisphosphonate treatments to be successful. 
Roche owns the ’634 patent and the ’957 patent, which is the parent of the 
’634 patent. Claims 1-8 of the ’634 patent and claims 1-10 of the ’957 patent are at 
issue in this case and describe a method of treating osteoporosis consisting of orally 
administering about 150 mg of ibandronic acid once monthly on a single day. Claim 
1 of the ’634 patent is representative of the claims on appeal: 
1. A method for treating or inhibiting postmenopausal osteoporosis in a 
postmenopausal woman in need of treatment or inhibition of postmeno-
pausal osteoporosis by administration of a pharmaceutically acceptable salt 
of ibandronic acid, comprising: 
(a) commencing the administration of the pharmaceutically acceptable salt 
of ibandronic acid by orally administering to the postmenopausal woman, 
on a single day, a first dose in the form of a tablet, wherein the tablet com-
prises an amount of the pharmaceutically acceptable salt of ibandronic acid 
that is equivalent to about 150 mg of ibandronic acid; and 
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(b) continuing the administration by orally administering, once monthly 
on a single day, a tablet comprising an amount of the pharmaceutically ac-
ceptable salt of ibandronic acid that is equivalent to about 150 mg of 
ibandronic acid. 
II 
The defendants in this case are generic drug manufacturers who submitted Ab-
breviated New Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) to the FDA for approval to engage in 
the manufacture and sale of generic versions of Boniva prior to the expiration of 
Roche’s patents. Roche sued the defendants … alleging infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) based on the defendants’ ANDA filings. 
Roche moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the  
motion, holding that Roche had failed to prove it was likely to succeed in defeating 
the defendants’ obviousness challenge. This court affirmed the district court’s denial 
of the preliminary injunction. See 496 Fed. Appx. 46 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
While the appeal of the preliminary injunction decision was pending, the district 
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of invalidity of claims 
1-8 of the ’634 patent due to obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). As to the fre-
quency of dosing, the court found that once monthly oral dosing of ibandronate 
was established in the prior art. As to the amount of the monthly dose, the court 
found that the combination of several prior art references suggested a dosage level of 
about 150 mg per month, or at least indicated that a monthly dose of 150 mg was 
obvious to try. 
The district court considered Roche’s evidence of objective considerations of 
nonobviousness but concluded that “Roche’s objective considerations evidence … is 
not sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment.” In response to Roche’s 
argument that the 150 mg once monthly dose gave results that were superior to a 
2.5 mg daily dose, the court found that Roche had “pointed to no evidence in sup-
port of [its] claim that the skilled artisan would have been surprised that the 150 mg 
once-monthly dose was superior to the 2.5 mg daily dose.” The court refused to 
consider contentions, raised at oral argument, that the 150 mg dose had a superior 
and unexpected level of bioavailability, because Roche had not raised that argument 
in its opposition brief. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) the court then raised, on its 
own motion, the issue of summary judgment of invalidity of claims 1-10 of the ’957 
patent. After considering the parties’ submissions, the court held those claims invalid 
for the same reasons that applied to the claims of the ’634 patent. Roche argued 
that it was unexpected that an intermittent ibandronate regimen would be effective 
in reducing fractures. But the court concluded that the evidence on which Roche 
relied failed to show that a person of skill in the art would not have had a reasonable 
expectation that the patented method would succeed in reducing fractures. The 
court explained that “empirical confirmation that a method for increasing bone 
mineral density helps increase bone strength enough that bones break less easily 
would not appear to be all that surprising.” 
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In its motion for reconsideration, Roche argued that the district court had im-
properly failed to consider evidence that the 150 mg dose of ibandronate showed an 
unexpected level of bioavailability as compared with lower doses. On the merits of 
that argument, the district court found that the “evidence that the 150mg dosage 
was absorbed better by the body simply has no relevance to the core finding that the 
difference between the 150mg dose and the prior art was small” and that there was a 
reasonable expectation of success with the 150 mg dose. 
Roche timely appealed the grants of summary judgment of obviousness. 
III 
The issue in this case is whether it would have been obvious at the time of in-
vention to select a once monthly oral dosing regimen of ibandronate to treat osteo-
porosis and to set that dose at 150 mg. 
A. Monthly Dosing 
1. A relatively infrequent dosing schedule has long been viewed as a potential 
solution to the problem of patient compliance stemming from the inconvenience of 
oral bisphosphonate regimens. Fosamax, a prior art bisphosphonate product sold by 
Merck & Co., was administered weekly, and several prior art references taught once 
monthly oral dosing of ibandronate or other bisphosphonates. 
First, an article in the trade journal Lunar News entitled Update: Bisphosphonates 
(“Lunar News”) stated that “[r]esearchers are seeking solutions for better compli-
ance,” including approaches that “use bisphosphonates with high potency yet low 
irritability, such as *** ibandronate (Roche). Oral agents could be given intermit-
tently (once/month, for example) and still be quite potent.” Second, a 2001 article 
by Carey Krause in Chemical Market Reporter (“Krause”) disclosed that Roche 
would likely seek FDA approval of an “oral once-monthly” formulation of ibandro-
nate in 2003. Finally, United States Patent No. 6,468,559 (“Chen”) disclosed coat-
ed-dosage forms of bisphosphonic acids and methods for orally administering those 
dosage forms. Ibandronic acid was identified as one of many known bisphosphonic 
acids. Chen disclosed a preferred embodiment in which “a dosage form of the in-
vention is administered to a patient *** preferably once a month.” Lunar News, 
Krause, and Chen therefore specifically taught the monthly administration of iban-
dronate. 
Similarly, the prior art contained references to the monthly oral administration 
of bisphosphonates in general. United States Patent Application No. 
2003/0118634 (“Schofield”) taught dosing of “bone-active phosponate[s]” and 
referred to equivalent doses that “can be given every other day, twice a week, week-
ly, biweekly or monthly.” United States Patent No. 5,616,560 (“Geddes”) disclosed 
a bisphosphonate administration regimen in which “said bisphosphonate is adminis-
tered at least 1 day of every said thirty(30)-day treatment period.” 
2. Roche argues that the art taught away from once monthly dosing because, 
according to Roche, it was widely believed as of the date of invention that a 
bisphosphonate regimen with a dose-free interval longer than one or two weeks 
would not be effective. To support that contention, Roche primarily relies on the 
alleged failure of its intravenous ibandronate study (“Recker”) to demonstrate anti-
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fracture efficacy with quarterly dosing. Secondarily, Roche relies on a prior art article 
by Thomas Schnitzer (“Schnitzer”) speculating that the failure of the Recker study 
was due to the long dose-free interval. 
The Recker study, however, showed a 26% reduction in vertebral fractures with 
intravenous ibandronate administered once every three months. The study was a 
“failure” only in the sense that the 26% reduction was statistically insignificant given 
the large number of patients that would have been required to reach a statistically 
significant conclusion about the relative rates of fractures in the control and subject 
groups. With respect to the reduction of hip fractures, for example, Recker conclud-
ed that “a meaningful conclusion with regard to efficacy could not be made owing 
to the low absolute number of hip fractures.” Recker’s failure to generate statistically 
significant results points to a fault in the study; it does not teach that infrequent 
ibandronate dosing is ineffective in treating osteoporosis. 
The prior art references that interpreted Recker’s results demonstrate only that 
it was unknown why Recker was unsuccessful in demonstrating statistically signifi-
cant antifracture efficacy. Schnitzer speculated that the long drug-free interval was to 
blame for the inconclusive results and that dosing intervals longer than one or two 
weeks would be ineffective. On the other hand, an article by Dr. Dennis Black 
(“Black”) described speculation that the doses used in Recker were too low. In fact, 
Roche itself subsequently acknowledged that the Recker study was underdosed. 
Thus, Schnitzer’s speculation did not amount to an affirmative teaching away from 
monthly oral dosing of ibandronate, especially in the face of Black’s competing ex-
planation of the Recker results. 
Any doubt about the efficacy of oral ibandronate dosing that may have been 
created by Schnitzer’s speculation was put to rest by an article published in 2001 by 
Riis et al. entitled Ibandronate: A Comparison of Oral Daily Dosing Versus Intermit-
tent Dosing in Postmenopausal Osteoporosis (“Riis”). Riis demonstrated that “inter-
mittent ibandronate is as effective as the continuous treatment in terms of signifi-
cantly increasing BMD at the spine and hip and suppressing markers of bone turn-
over.” Riis showed that increases in BMD equivalent to those obtained with a 2.5 
mg per day treatment regimen were obtained with a regimen of 20 mg of iban-
dronate every other day for the first 24 days of every three-month period. Those 
results, Riis concluded, “confirm[ed] preclinical data showing that it is the total 
dose over a predefined period and not the dosing regimens that is the determining 
factor for effect on bone mass and architecture after ibandronate treatment.” Riis’s 
teaching that a dose-free interval of more than two months did not impact the BMD 
efficacy of ibandronate was directly contrary to Schnitzer’s speculation that such a 
dosing regimen would not be effective. Therefore, even if Schnitzer’s interpretation 
of the Recker study were viewed as teaching away from monthly dosing, Riis’s con-
trary findings substantially undermined that interpretation. 
Roche argues that Riis did not overcome Schnitzer’s interpretation because Riis 
was not an antifracture trial. Roche argues that prior art focusing only on BMD and 
bone-turnover improvements, instead of on antifracture efficacy, does not bear on 
the obviousness analysis in this case because such prior art does not establish a  
reasonable expectation of success in reducing fracture risk. 
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While it is true that BMD improvements do not perfectly correlate with anti-
fracture efficacy, it was well established in the art that BMD is a powerful surrogate 
for measuring fracture risk. For example, Roche’s own expert explained: 
Bone mineral density is directly related to fracture risk. It is one of the 
most powerful surrogate markers in the field of medicine. It is as powerful 
an indicator of osteoporosis as blood pressure is a predictor of stroke. For 
every standard deviation reduction in bone mineral density, fracture risk is 
doubled. 
Roche’s patents do not themselves present data demonstrating antifracture effi-
cacy for a once monthly 150 mg dose. In fact, antifracture efficacy for Boniva was 
demonstrated to the FDA through a “bridging study” that used BMD and bone 
turnover results—not antifracture testing—to establish the therapeutic noninferiority 
of the 150 mg monthly dose relative to the previously approved 2.5 mg daily dose, 
for which antifracture efficacy had been demonstrated. 
Conclusive proof of efficacy is not necessary to show obviousness. All that is re-
quired is a reasonable expectation of success. See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. 
ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 
480 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Riis—along with other prior art that used 
BMD improvement as the primary efficacy marker for treating osteoporosis—
established at least a reasonable expectation that once monthly dosing of ibandro-
nate could successfully treat osteoporosis and reduce fracture risk. 
B. Selecting the 150 mg Dose 
1. Riis confirmed the total-dose concept whereby “the efficacy of ibandronate 
depends on the total oral dose given rather than on the dosing schedule.” Riis there-
fore teaches that in setting the dosage level for an intermittent ibandronate regimen, 
one need only scale up a known-effective dose from a short-interval regimen—e.g., 
daily dosing—to achieve approximately the same BMD and bone-loss efficacy with a 
long-interval regimen. 
The prior art provided substantial guidance as to the total dose, within a given 
time period, that would produce effective results. A 1996 article by Ravn et al. 
(“Ravn”) reported the results of a study that measured BMD improvements and 
bone-turnover markers for daily ibandronate doses of 0.25 mg, 0.5 mg, 1.0 mg, 2.5 
mg, and 5 mg. The authors concluded that the “average change in bone mass 
showed positive outcome in all regions in the groups receiving ibandronate 2.5 and 
5.0 mg.” The 2.5 mg dose exhibited a response that was “virtually equal” to the 5 
mg dose, even though it contained only half the amount of ibandronate. The 2.5 
mg dose was thereby deemed the “most effective dose.” 
A person skilled in the art looking to scale to a monthly dose of oral ibandro-
nate from a known-effective daily dose was thus faced with a very limited set of pos-
sibilities: Of the five daily doses tested in Ravn, only the 2.5 and 5 mg doses 
“showed positive outcome in all regions.” Even though the 5 mg dose did not 
demonstrate greater efficacy than the 2.5 mg dose, it was still deemed an equivalent-
ly effective dose so that someone scaling it to a single monthly dose of 150 mg (5 
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mg/day x 30 days/month) would have anticipated equivalent success in raising 
BMD and limiting bone turnover, based on Riis. 
Additionally, United States Patent No. 6,432,932 (“Daifotis”) disclosed weekly 
doses of ibandronate “from the group consisting of 35 mg, 40 mg, 45 mg, or 50 
mg.” The 35 mg weekly dose corresponds to the same total dose as a 5 mg daily 
dose. The total-dose equivalent to 5 mg of ibandronate per day is thus the only dose 
that appears in both Ravn and Daifotis—suggesting that there was a reasonable ex-
pectation of success with the total-dose equivalents of the 5 mg daily dose, i.e., 150 
mg per month. 
Accordingly, the prior art pointed to a monthly treatment of 150 mg of iband-
ronate. At the very least, the 150 mg dose was obvious to try: There was a need to 
solve the problem of patient compliance by looking to less-frequent dosing regi-
mens. And, based on Ravn and Daifotis, in light of Riis’s total-dose concept, there 
were only a “finite number of identified, predictable solutions.” KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007). 
2. Roche contends that findings by the FDA taught away from further devel-
opment of the 5 mg daily dose (and its total-dose equivalents) because the FDA ap-
proved a 2.5 mg daily dose of ibandronate instead of a 5 mg daily dose. But the 
FDA never made any findings contrary to the 5 mg daily dose, because it was never 
asked to approve that dose. Instead, in approving the 2.5 mg daily dose, the FDA 
merely restated the results of Ravn and concluded that “the 2.5 mg daily dose of 
ibandronate has the most favorable benefit–risk ratio and is the most appropriate 
dose for the prevention and treatment of postmenopausal osteoporosis.” 
Roche next contends that Schofield taught away from using anything other 
than the lowest effective dose of a bisphosphonate, which, according to Roche, was 
established by Ravn to be 2.5 mg for ibandronate. Schofield, however, does not 
teach that the lowest effective dose is the only dose that should be used when treat-
ing osteoporosis with a bisphosphonate. Instead, Schofield merely defined the low-
est effective dose as a measure of a drug’s potency relative to its therapeutic effects. 
Schofield then described a preferred embodiment of a method for treating bone dis-
orders in which the maintenance dose of a “bone-active phosphonate” ranged from 
2.5 to 15 mg per day. That range clearly encompasses more than just a lowest effec-
tive dose. Moreover, Ravn never purported to establish a lowest effective dose. In-
stead, it sought to establish a “most effective [daily] dose.” 
Roche argues that the district court misinterpreted and misapplied the total-
dose concept from Riis. According to Roche, the district court “took a technical 
leap” in finding that Riis’s total-dose concept implied only simple multiplication to 
scale from an efficacious daily dose to a monthly dose. The evidence before the dis-
trict court, however, showed that the total-dose concept can be used as an effective 
rule of thumb by a person skilled in the art deciding how to scale to an efficacious 
intermittent dose of ibandronate. The Riis study, in particular, established that the 
total dose concept can reliably predict that the efficacy of an ibandronate treatment 
depends on the total dose administered to a patient over a given period, not on the 
amount administered at any single point in time. In light of that evidence, it was 
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reasonable to expect that a once monthly dose of 150 mg would have roughly the 
same efficacy as a daily dose of 5 mg. 
C. Safety of the 150 mg Dose 
Roche next contends that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether it 
would have been obvious to administer once monthly doses of 150 mg in light of 
alleged safety concerns about the adverse gastrointestinal effects of ibandronate and 
other bisphosphonates. 
First, Roche argues that Ravn taught away from further development of the 5 
mg daily dose, and thereby its total-dose equivalents, because Ravn taught that the 
2.5 mg daily dose was more effective than the 5 mg daily dose and had fewer side 
effects. Ravn, however, concluded that “the responses in the groups receiving 2.5 
and 5 mg ibandronate were virtually equal,” not that the 2.5 mg dose was more ef-
fective. And although patients on the 5 mg daily dose dropped out of the study at a 
higher rate than patients on lower doses, Ravn did not conclude that the higher 
drop-out rate was statistically significant. Instead, the authors merely noted that a 
higher frequency of diarrhea was experienced with the 5 mg dose. A higher frequen-
cy of diarrhea does not necessarily teach away from the 5 mg daily dose or its 
equivalents, however, as the prior art indicated that modest gastrointestinal side ef-
fects must be weighed in light of the benefits of the drug. Indeed, Ravn itself con-
cluded that “[i]n the present study, the side effect profile of ibandronate seemed to 
be safe” and that “[i]n general, the safety evaluation did not reveal any differences 
between ibandronate and placebo treated groups.” 
Moreover, even if the higher incidence of diarrhea and the larger number of 
dropouts in the Ravn study were initially enough to teach away from further devel-
opment of the 5 mg daily dose and its total dose equivalents, any such teaching 
away would have been overcome by Riis’s finding that an oral administration of 20 
mg of ibandronate every other day for 24 days, followed by a nine-week rest phase, 
resulted in the same rate of side effects as a 2.5 mg daily regimen. 
Aside from Ravn, Roche does not point to any references suggesting that there 
were safety concerns associated with the 150 mg dose. Nor was Roche’s expert, Dr. 
Harris, aware of anything that taught that a once monthly, 150 mg dose of iban-
dronate would be unsafe. 
To the contrary, the prior art establishes that doses even higher than 150 mg 
were considered safe. United States Patent No. 6,143,326 (“Möckel”) stated that 
rapid-release ibandronate formulations showed “no significant side effects *** in 
clinical studies using ibandronate even at high dosages” and disclosed single-dose 
units up to 250 mg. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Yates, testified that the disclosures in 
Möckel would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand that iban-
dronate doses up to 250 mg would be well tolerated. Likewise, Daifotis disclosed 
that “[f]or human oral compositions comprising ibandronate *** a unit dosage typ-
ically comprises from about 3.5 mg to about 200 mg of the ibandronate com-
pound.” 
There is thus no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the prior art taught 
away from the 150 mg dose based on safety concerns. 
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D. Unexpected Results 
Roche argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment of 
obviousness because the evidence of record showed that the 150 mg monthly dose 
was more effective than the 2.5 mg daily dose and that the superior effectiveness of 
the 150 mg monthly dose was unexpected. Roche also contends that ibandronate’s 
nonlinear bioavailability at the 150 mg dosage level was an unexpected result. 
Roche’s MOBILE study, published in 2005, demonstrated that a 150 mg 
monthly dose is more effective than a 2.5 mg daily dose with respect to BMD im-
provement in the lumbar spine and most hip sites. The MOBILE study demon-
strated, for example, a mean BMD improvement in the lumbar spine of 4.9% after 
one year for patients taking the 150 mg monthly dose and 3.9% after one year for 
patients taking the 2.5 mg daily dose. Another study published in 2005 showed that 
the extent of ibandronate’s bioavailability is nonlinear with increasing dosages: In-
creasing the oral dose by 50 percent, from 100 mg to 150 mg, resulted in a nearly 
150 percent increase in the amount of the drug absorbed by the blood. 
While the evidence would support a finding of superior efficacy of the 150 mg 
monthly dose in raising BMD levels, as compared to a 2.5 mg daily dose, that im-
proved efficacy does not rebut the strong showing that the prior art disclosed 
monthly dosing and that there was a reason to set that dose at 150 mg. See In re 
Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The evidence of superior effi-
cacy does nothing to undercut the showing that there was a reasonable expectation 
of success with the 150 mg monthly dose, even if the level of success may have 
turned out to be somewhat greater than would have been expected. 
For the same reasons, the nonlinear bioavailability of ibandronate does not re-
but the prima facie showing of obviousness of a once monthly dose of 150 mg. The 
increased level of bioavailability has not been shown to be responsible for the im-
proved osteoporosis treatment efficacy of the 150 mg dose. A study by Ravn et al. in 
2002 showed, for example, that a near doubling of the blood-serum concentration 
of ibandronate with a 5 mg daily dose, compared to a 2.5 mg daily dose, produced 
no further BMD increase and no further reduction in bone turnover. Other record 
evidence confirms that “[d]ue to strong binding to the bone surface, the effects of 
the systemically available amount of a bisphosphonate are almost exclusively related 
to its concentration in bone rather than [blood] serum level.” The evidence regard-
ing bioavailability is therefore of little relevance to the obviousness inquiry. 
Accordingly, we uphold the judgment of the district court that claims 1-8 of 
the ‘634 patent and claims 1-10 of the ‘957 patent would have been obvious in 
light of the prior art and are therefore invalid. 
…  
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Common Sense & Objective Indicia 
Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc. 
724 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
Wallach, Judge: 
In this patent infringement case, Plantronics, Inc. (“Plantronics”) filed suit al-
leging that Aliph, Inc. and Aliphcom, Inc.’s (collectively, “Aliph”) products infringe 
U.S. Patent No. 5,712,453, entitled “Concha Headset Stabilizer.” On March 23, 
2012, the district court granted-in-part Aliph’s motion for summary judgment of 
noninfringement and invalidity, construing certain disputed terms, finding in rele-
vant part that the accused products do not infringe claims 1 and 10, and holding the 
asserted claims invalid as obvious. The district court’s decision is reversed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. 
Background 
The ’453 patent is directed to a concha-style headset for transmitting received 
sounds to the ear of a user, e.g., headsets used with cell phone receivers. In particu-
lar, the patent discloses an apparatus for stabilizing a concha style headset during 
use. Because the claimed appa-
ratus requires some familiarity 
with the human ear, an illustra-
tion is provided [at right.] 
Of particular relevance is the 
concha, “a deep cavity containing 
the entry to the ear canal,” and 
which is divided into the upper 
and lower concha, 43 and 41. 
Prior art headset stabilizers included large supports outside the ear or relied on 
appendages to hook onto the crux of the helix 31. The ’453 patent purports to im-
prove upon prior art headset stabilizers. In particular, the claimed headset consists of 
“a receiver attachment that couples to the body of the receiver, a support member 
extending from the receiver attachment, and a concha stabilizer pad coupled to the 
end of the support member such that the concha stabilizer pad contacts the upper 
concha under the antihelix of the ear with the receiver placed in the lower concha in 
front of the ear canal.” Thus, the concha stabilizer pad has three points of contact: 
the tragus, the anti-tragus, and the upper concha. Certain embodiments of the 
claimed concha stabilizer are depicted below[.] 
The stabilizing concha style headset is described as typically including a receiver 
27 and a voice tube 30. A receiver attachment comprises an ear cushion 11 pref-
erably dimensioned as an oblate spheroid, formed of a reticulated, fully open-pore 
flexible, ester type polyurethane foam. The ear cushion 11 has an open central re-
cessed portion 13 forming a “C” shape, which is dimensioned to fit snugly onto the 
receiver 27. A flexible support member, stabilizer support 17, extends from the up-
per surface of the ear cushion 11. The end of the stabilizer support 17 is coupled to 
a concha stabilizer pad 21 which contacts the upper concha 43 beneath the anti-
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helix. When placed into the lower 
concha 41 during use, the ear 
cushion 11 contacts the tragus 35 
and the antitragus 39 at a tragus 
contact point 23 and an antitragus 
contact point 25, respectively, 
where the face 15 of the ear cush-
ion 11 rests in the lower concha 
41 and faces toward the ear canal 
33. The left/right orientation of 
the tragus contact point 23 and the antitragus contact point 25 with respect to the 
face 15 of the ear cushion 11 is reversed for the left and right ears. 
Independent claim 1 is representative of the asserted claims: 
1. An apparatus for stabilizing a headset including a receiver sized to fit be-
tween a tragus and an anti-tragus of an ear, the apparatus comprising: 
an ear cushion dimensioned to cover a portion of the receiver disposed be-
tween the tragus and the anti-tragus; 
a resilient and flexible stabilizer support member coupled to the ear cush-
ion, and dimensioned to fit within an upper concha with the ear cushion 
coupled to the receiver and the receiver disposed between the tragus and 
the anti-tragus; and 
a concha stabilizer pad coupled to the stabilizer support member, for con-
tacting the upper concha. 
Independent claim 10 is also relevant here and is recited below: 
10. A headset comprising: 
a receiver sized to fit between a tragus and an anti-tragus of an ear, the re-
ceiver having a tragus contact point, and an anti-tragus contact point dis-
posed substantially opposite to the tragus contact point; an ear cushion 
dimensioned to cover a portion of the receiver; and 
a concha stabilizer coupled to the ear cushion and dimensioned to contact 
an upper concha between an antihelix and a crux of a helix with the receiv-
er disposed between the tragus and the antitragus. 
On January 15, 2009, Plantronics filed the underlying patent infringement suit 
against Aliph originally asserting claims 1, 7, 10 and 11. …  
…  
In its summary judgment decision, the district court … held claims 1, 7, 10, 11, 
18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 30, 43 and 44 of the ’453 patent were invalid as obvious in light 
of the combination of U.S. Patent No. 1,893,474 (“Lieber”) with Japanese Utility 
Patent Application No. 60-40187(U) (“Komoda”). Furthermore, the district court 
determined that dependent claims 25, 29, 31-42 and 45-56 were obvious by the 
combination of the Lieber patent, the Komoda patent and U.S. Patent No. 
5,048,090 (“Geers”). …  
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Discussion 
…  
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment without defer-
ence. OSRAM Sylvania, Inc. v. Am. Induction Techs., Inc., 701 F.3d 698, 704 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). … In addition, “a district court can properly grant, as a matter of law, a 
motion for summary judgment on patent invalidity when the factual inquiries into 
obviousness present no genuine issue of material facts.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, 
Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1991). “When the facts underlying an obvious-
ness determination are not in dispute, we review whether summary judgment of in-
validity is correct by applying the law to the undisputed facts.” Tokai Corp. v. Easton 
Enters., 632 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
Whether the claimed subject matter would have been obvious to an ordinarily 
skilled artisan at the time of the invention “is a question of law based on underlying 
questions of fact.” Green Edge Enters., LLC v. Rubber Mulch Etc. LLC, 620 F.3d 
1287, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The underlying factual inquiries include: (1) “the 
scope and content of the prior art”; (2) “differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue”; (3) “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art”; and (4) relevant 
objective considerations, including “commercial success, long felt but unsolved 
needs, [and] failure of others *** .” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
406 (2007) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)). Ob-
viousness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 989, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The burden of proof 
lies with the challenger, and this court has rejected any formal burden-shifting 
framework in evaluating the four Graham factors. OSRAM, 701 F.3d at 709. Thus, 
the inquiry on summary judgment is whether a jury applying the clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard could reasonably find, based on the evidence produced by the 
accused infringer, that the claimed invention was obvious. See TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker 
Corp., 608 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
The gravamen of the parties’ dispute here involved whether a skilled artisan 
would have been motivated to combine certain prior art references, an issue that fo-
cuses heavily on the first and third Graham factors. Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 
464 F.3d 1286, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he motivation to combine requirement 
entails consideration of both the scope and content of the prior art and level of or-
dinary skill in the pertinent art aspects of the Graham test.”). The district court 
found that Lieber and Komoda disclosed “a receiver, ear cushion, stabilizer support 
and pad” and that any gap between these prior art elements and those recited, in 
relevant part, claims 1 and 11 of the ’453 patent was bridged by “common sense.” 
In particular, the district court determined that (1) the need for a stabilizing mem-
ber that worked with the anatomy of an ear was a problem known in the art at the 
time of the invention, (2) there was a trend towards miniaturization of in-the-ear 
devices, and (3) miniaturizing the receiver described in Lieber and Komoda while 
pairing the receiver with a comfortable, adaptable, and stabilizing ear cushion as 
claimed in the ’453 patent was a matter of common sense for those skilled in the art 
at the time of the invention. 
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“An invention may be a combination of old elements disclosed in multiple prior 
art references.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 
1293, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Applying a flexible approach to the obviousness in-
quiry, the Supreme Court observed that common sense can be a source of reasons 
to combine or modify prior art references to achieve the patented invention. KSR, 
550 U.S. at 420. Therefore, motivation to combine may be found explicitly or im-
plicitly in market forces; design incentives; the “interrelated teachings of multiple 
patents”; “any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of inven-
tion and addressed by the patent”; and the background knowledge, creativity, and 
common sense of the person of ordinary skill. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, 
Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418-
21). 
Although the obviousness analysis is somewhat flexible, a district court’s con-
clusions with respect to obviousness must find support in the record. In determining 
that a person of skill in the art would have been motivated to combine the refer-
ences at issue, the district court did not cite any expert testimony indicating that 
there was a motivation to combine. Instead, the court determined that common 
sense would motivate a skilled artisan to combine the relevant references’ teachings. 
As we have said before though: 
“the mere recitation of the words ‘common sense’ without any support 
adds nothing to the obviousness equation.” Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, 679 
F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, we have required that [obvious-
ness findings] grounded in “common sense” must contain explicit and 
clear reasoning providing some rational underpinning why common sense 
compels a finding of obviousness. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; In re Kahn, 
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Rejections on obviousness grounds 
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be 
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the 
legal conclusion of obviousness.”). 
In re Nouvel, 493 Fed. Appx. 85, 92 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Where, as here, the necessary 
reasoning is absent, we cannot simply assume that “an ordinary artisan would be 
awakened to modify prior art in such a way as to lead to an obviousness rejection.” 
Id. It is in such circumstances, moreover, that it is especially important to guard 
against the dangers of hindsight bias. 
As a safeguard against “slipping into use of hindsight and to resist the tempta-
tion to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue,” we have re-
quired courts to consider evidence of the objective indicia of nonobviousness prior 
to making the ultimate determination of whether an invention is obvious. Graham, 
383 U.S. at 36; Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (objective considerations “may often be the most probative and cogent evi-
dence [of nonobviousness] in the record”). Failure to give proper consideration to 
such evidence, as in this case, can be fatal because “common sense” may not be so 
apparent in view of objective evidence of nonobviousness (e.g., commercial success 
and copying), particularly when all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the 
patentee. See Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors 
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USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (reversing for failure to consider 
the objective evidence of nonobviousness and because there are genuine issues of 
material fact remaining as to objective considerations). 
Here, the district court concluded that the ’453 patent was invalid as obvious 
before considering objective indicia of nonobviousness. According to the district 
court, “[i]t would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the 
Lieber device to reduce the size of the in-the-ear receiver while pairing the receiver 
with a comfortable, adaptable ear cushion that stabilized the device with a flexible 
support member that invoked the ear anatomy to avoid the use of headsets and ear-
hooks.” The district court addressed Plantronics’ objective evidence of nonobvious-
ness—including copying and commercial success—only after reaching this conclu-
sion. It stated: “Even accepting as true Plantronics’ assertions on these secondary 
considerations, they do not save Plantronics from summary judgment here since 
such secondary considerations simply cannot overcome a strong prima facie case of 
obviousness.” To the extent the district court conducted a post hoc analysis of objec-
tive considerations, it was improper. 
This court has consistently pronounced that all evidence pertaining to the ob-
jective indicia of nonobviousness must be considered before reaching an obviousness 
conclusion. See, e.g., In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended-Release Capsule 
Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The significance of this fourth 
Graham factor cannot be overlooked or be relegated to “secondary status.” See id. 
at 1079. …  
Plantronics contends that it presented evidence of copying and commercial suc-
cess that at least raise genuine issues of material fact underlying the ultimate conclu-
sion of obviousness. For example, Plantronics argues that the design of Aliph’s ac-
cused product began with Plantronics’ concha-style headset stabilizer, that it is un-
disputed that Aliph initially installed Plantronics’ stabilizer into Aliph’s headset, and 
from there, that Aliph copied Plantronics’ design. Plantronics also avers that it pre-
sented evidence that the functional fit provided by the copied design is critical to 
Aliph’s headset, establishing a nexus between the secondary evidence and the 
claimed invention. With the copied design, Plantronics argues that Aliph enjoyed 
commercial success. In response, Aliph contends that the evidence Plantronics pre-
sented was not sufficient, but otherwise does little to rebut the evidence. The district 
court’s scant consideration of relevant objective evidence belies Aliph’s argument. 
The full extent of the district court’s analysis was as follows: “In support of  
these secondary considerations, Plantronics relies, in part, upon the supplemental 
report of its expert, Barry Katz. Consistent with the evidentiary rulings above, I did 
not rely on this supplemental, unsworn expert report.” The district court also stated: 
“I did not find Plantronics’ evidence of secondary considerations, to the extent it 
was not in expert reports I did not consider, particularly persuasive. For example, I 
found nothing helpful in the Drysdale testimony *** .” These statements, alone, fail 
to provide any meaningful analysis for this court’s review. Nevertheless, Aliph asks 
that we reject Plantronics’ objective considerations by finding in the first instance 
that Plantronics’ evidence is not tied adequately to the full scope of the asserted 
claims. This argument is without merit because “[i]t is not our role to scour the 
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record and search for something to justify a lower court’s conclusions, particularly at 
the summary judgment stage.” OSRAM, 701 F.3d at 707. “[T]his court must be 
furnished sufficient findings and reasoning to permit meaningful appellate scrutiny.” 
Id. The district court’s opinion lacked such findings and reasoning. 
Moreover, we cannot discern whether the district court, in this summary judg-
ment context, drew all justifiable inferences in favor of Plantronics and found no 
disputed issues of material fact to support its holding with respect to obviousness. 
Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1305 (stressing that a court must draw all reasonable infer-
ences in favor of a patent owner with respect to objective evidence of nonobvious-
ness in the context of a motion for summary judgment of obviousness). In fact, 
when all of the factual disputes regarding the objective evidence are resolved in favor 
of Plantronics, we cannot hold that the claims would have been obvious as a matter 
of law. See id. (“Viewing the objective evidence of nonobviousness in a light most 
favorable to Transocean, we cannot hold that the claims would have been obvious as 
a matter of law.”); see also Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 
1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (reversing the lower court, in part, because evidence of 
objective considerations, particularly commercial success, was extremely strong and 
entitled to great weight). The commercial success of Aliph’s alleged copied product 
and the failure of attempts to combine the prior art elements before the ’453 patent 
provide a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it would be “common sense” 
to combine the elements in the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention. Because 
evidence pertaining to objective considerations raises genuine issues of material fact, 
the district court’s decision is reversed as to all the asserted claims in this case.3  
…  
Randall Mfg. v. Rea 
733 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
Taranto, Judge: 
FG Products owns U.S. Patent No. 7,214,017, which is directed to moveable 
bulkheads for partitioning cargo space in a shipping container. FG’s competitor, 
Randall Manufacturing, requested inter partes reexamination of the ’017 patent, and 
the … examiner rejected a number of FG’s claims as obvious over a combination of 
four prior-art references. On appeal, the Board … reversed, unable to discern any 
reason that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine 
the cited references. Randall appeals the Board’s determination to this court. Be-
cause the Board failed to consider a wealth of well-documented knowledge that is 
highly material to evaluating the motivation to combine references to arrive at the 
claimed invention, we vacate the Board’s decision and remand the matter. 
  
                                                
3 The district court also erred to the extent it invalidated the unasserted claims of the 
’453 patent or to the extent the district court invalidated claims not at issue in the 
motion before it. Accordingly, to the extent the district court’s final judgment inval-
idates patent claims not at issue, that determination is vacated. 
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Background 
FG and Randall are competitors in selling products for refrigerated trucks. In 
particular, both parties manufacture moveable, track-mounted bulkheads (partitions) 
used for dividing cargo space. The ’017 patent, issued on May 8, 2007, discloses 
partitioning apparatuses that include two half-width panels independently mounted 
on the ceiling of a shipping container using rail-and-trolley assemblies, so that the 
panels may be strapped together to form a full-width partition, separately moved 
along the length of the container for separate positioning, or raised and stowed 
against the ceiling. Figures 1, 6, and 7 are illustrative[.] 
On December 4, 2007, Randall requested inter partes reexamination of the 
’017 patent. The Examiner granted Randall’s request and subsequently rejected all 
15 original claims of the ’017 patent. In response, FG amended or canceled its orig-
inal claims and added 78 new claims. Three years of additional prosecution ensued, 
including consideration of dozens of prior-art references, resulting in a series of re-
jections, responses, and amendments. New 
claim 38 is representative of FG’s claims on 
appeal: 
An apparatus for separating cargo areas 
in a trailer, comprising: 
a trailer that includes a cargo space; 
first and second panels, each panel ex-
tending in a direction generally per-
pendicular to a longitudinal axis of the 
trailer, wherein when in a first opera-
tive position the first and second panels 
are arranged in a side-by-side configu-
ration and abut one another along ad-
jacent peripheral edges of the panels; 
fastening straps that releasably secure 
the first and second panels together in 
the side-by-side configuration to form 
a full-width bulkhead that extends between opposing sidewalls of the cargo 
space of the trailer; 
a mounting system that provides each of the first and second panels with a 
first degree of freedom to convey the panels in a longitudinal direction in-
dependently of one another and that provides each of the first and second 
panels with a second degree of freedom to raise the panels independently, 
… and 
a first lift mechanism mounted proximate to a longitudinal end of at least 
one of the first set of two longitudinal rails … and 
a second lift mechanism mounted proximate to a longitudinal end of at 
least one of the second set of two longitudinal rails … . 
Ultimately, the Examiner allowed many of FG’s new and amended claims, but 
rejected [many other] claims … as obvious over a combination of four references: 
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two advertisements from third-party bulkhead manufacturer ROM; U.S. Patent No. 
3,217,664, issued to Aquino; and U.S. Patent No. 1,193,254, issued to Gibbs. The 
Examiner cited the ROM references for their disclosure of half-width panels with 
straps for positioning and joining the panels together to form a full-width partition, 
as depicted below: 
 
The Examiner cited Aquino for its disclosure of independently movable half-
width panels mounted on the ceiling of a container using rail-and-trolley assemblies: 
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The Examiner cited Gibbs for its disclosure of a panel that can be lifted by 
means of a lift mechanism and stowed near the ceiling of a container: 
 
The Examiner concluded that all of the elements of the rejected claims were 
well known at the time of FG’s application and that it would have been obvious to 
one of ordinary skill in the art to combine them. 
FG appealed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections to the Board, arguing that 
one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the cited 
references, both because of alleged physical impediments to their combination and 
because the references each taught distinct features that were at cross-purposes with 
one another. In particular, FG argued that the lift mechanism of Gibbs would be 
incompatible with Aquino, that the panels of Aquino could not be lifted to the ceil-
ing of the container without colliding with the rails on which they were mounted, 
and that Aquino, in providing for stowage of its panels against the wall of the con-
tainer, taught away from ceiling stowage. FG supported its contentions with declara-
tions from named inventor and FG co-owner Chad Nelson. 
In its briefing before the Board, Randall argued that the state of the art and the 
level of skill at the time of FG’s application included well-known options for lifting 
moveable, track-mounted bulkheads and stowing them against the ceiling. As evi-
dence of what one of ordinary skill in the art would have known, Randall cited a 
host of references that had been considered by the Examiner during the course of 
the reexamination—some of which had provided the basis for rejecting FG’s original 
claims—including multiple references disclosing track-and trailer-mounted bulk-
heads that could be raised to the ceiling, and a variety of references teaching straps 
and lift mechanisms to assist in stowage. Randall also provided a declaration from its 
employee, Gregory Boyer, who confirmed that a bulkhead designer at the time of 
FG’s application would have recognized that the panels of Aquino could be raised 
and stowed near the ceiling, noting references showing that it was well known how 
to adjust the geometry of a track-mounted assembly so that the rails would not in-
terfere with lifting the panel. 
At oral argument before the Board, patentee FG stated that “we concede that 
raising of doors is known” and that the “crux” of its appeal focused specifically on 
Aquino and “why one would modify Aquino when Aquino already provides a solu-
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tion for stowing the door.” Randall, in contrast, stressed the broad range of 
knowledge demonstrated in the art “going back close to a hundred years,” arguing 
that “a person of ordinary skill in the art would think of this because raising panels 
to the ceiling, at this point in time, was so pervasive.” Randall contended that the 
side stowage of panels shown in Aquino was the exception rather than the rule, and 
that “raising them to the ceiling was the standard method of getting a panel out of 
the way.” 
In its decision reversing the Examiner on the rejections at issue here, the Board 
did not consider the background references Randall had cited as evidence of the 
knowledge of one of skill in the art. Instead, the Board looked to “the content of 
the prior art relied upon in rejecting FG Products’ claim 1.” Analyzing just Aquino, 
Gibbs, and the two ROM references, and focusing specifically on modifying Aquino 
to allow ceiling stowage, the Board found that it “simply does not follow” that ceil-
ing stowage “would have been contemplated for Aquino’s assembly for which there 
is no need or intent for such a position.” The Board observed that “the nature and 
extent of the raising of the panels” was “at the center of the dispute,” but unable to 
identify any reason that one of skill in the art would have sought to modify Aquino 





In KSR, the Supreme Court criticized a rigid approach to determining obvi-
ousness based on the disclosures of individual prior-art references, with little re-
course to the knowledge, creativity, and common sense that an ordinarily skilled ar-
tisan would have brought to bear when considering combinations or modifications. 
KSR, 550 U.S. 398, 415-22 (2007). Rejecting a blinkered focus on individual doc-
uments, the Court required an analysis that reads the prior art in context, taking ac-
count of “demands known to the design community,” “the background knowledge 
possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the art,” and “the inferences and crea-
tive steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418. This 
“expansive and flexible approach,” id. at 415, is consistent with our own pre-KSR 
decisions acknowledging that the inquiry “not only permits, but requires, considera-
tion of common knowledge and common sense.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. 
Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
The Board’s analysis in this case ran afoul of that basic mandate. By narrowly 
focusing on the four prior-art references cited by the Examiner and ignoring the ad-
ditional record evidence Randall cited to demonstrate the knowledge and perspec-
tive of one of ordinary skill in the art, the Board failed to account for critical back-
ground information that could easily explain why an ordinarily skilled artisan would 
have been motivated to combine or modify the cited references to arrive at the 
claimed inventions. As KSR established, the knowledge of such an artisan is part of 
the store of public knowledge that must be consulted when considering whether a 
claimed invention would have been obvious. 
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In recognizing the role of common knowledge and common sense, we have 
emphasized the importance of a factual foundation to support a party’s claim about 
what one of ordinary skill in the relevant art would have known. See, e.g., Mintz v. 
Dietz & Watson, Inc., 679 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Perfect Web Techs., 
Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009). One form of evidence 
to provide such a foundation, perhaps the most reliable because not litigation-
generated, is documentary evidence consisting of prior art in the area. Randall relied 
on just such evidence in citing to extensive references of record showing a familiar, 
even favored, approach to bulkhead stowage. For instance, Randall cited four U.S. 
patents (Nos. 1,148,382; 2,752,864; 2,866,419; and 4,019,442) that disclose 
bulkheads designed to be lifted and stowed near the ceiling, three of which (the 
’382, ’864, and ’419 patents) describe such stowage for movable, track-mounted 
panels. The significance of those and other references did not depend on any at-
tempt to change the combination that formed the basis of the Examiner’s rejections; 
rather, the references constitute important evidence of the state of the art and the 
context in which the Examiner-cited combination should be evaluated. 
The Board’s failure to consider that evidence—its failure to consider the 
knowledge of one of skill in the art appropriately—was plainly prejudicial.3 Once it is 
established that a prevalent, perhaps even predominant, method of stowing a bulk-
head panel was to raise it to the ceiling, it is hard to see why one of skill in the art 
would not have thought to modify Aquino to include this feature—doing so would 
allow the designer to achieve the other advantages of the Aquino assembly while 
using a stowage strategy that was very familiar in the industry.4 Moreover, although 
FG claims that, as depicted, the panels of Aquino may have been impeded by the 
rails from being raised all the way to the ceiling, there is no dispute that it would 
have been well within the capabilities of an ordinary bulkhead designer to adjust the 
geometry (e.g., drop the hinge axis down a few inches) so that the panels could be 
freely raised to the ceiling. There are no apparent functional concerns that would 
have discouraged a bulkhead designer of ordinary skill from attempting the combi-
nation. 
Particularly when viewed in the context of the background references Randall 
provided, the evidence strongly supports the notion that the bulkhead design FG 
claimed was nothing more than the “combination of familiar elements according to 
known methods,” “‘each performing the same function it had been known to per-
form,’“ “yield[ing] predictable results.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 416-17 (quoting Sakrai-
                                                
3 Although the Examiner did not articulate this analysis, Randall, as the appellee be-
fore the Board, was entitled to defend the Examiner’s rejection on this ground, 
which it had presented in the record. Rexnord Indus., LLC v. Kappos, 705 F.3d 
1347, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
4 Familiarity may be reason enough, but the widespread industry use of ceiling stow-
age may reflect particular judgments. At least in some situations, for instance, it may 
be more important to reserve space for cargo at the sides of a container than near 
the ceiling, as packing cargo against the walls helps distribute weight more evenly 
and may be easier than piling cargo toward the ceiling. 
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da v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976)). In addition, neither FG nor the 
Board points to any objective indicia of non-obviousness. On this record, the 
Board’s finding of lack of motivation to combine is infected by prejudicial error. We 
accordingly vacate the Board’s reversal of the Examiner’s rejection … for obvious-
ness. 
… 
In re Chaganti 
554 Fed. Appx. 917 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Per Curiam 
Naren Chaganti appeals from the decision of the [Board] affirming the obvi-
ousness rejections of all the claims of U.S. Patent Application No. 09/634,725. Be-
cause the factual findings underlying the Board’s conclusion are supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and because the Board did not commit legal error, we affirm. 
Background 
The invention claimed in Mr. Chaganti’s ’725 application is a method and sys-
tem for providing limited access to articles, books, music, movies, and other copy-
righted content through the Internet pursuant to a license. The system examines 
copyright license information to ensure that persons requesting access to the content 
have such access only for a particular amount of time or during particular time peri-
ods. The invention also allows for a limited number of requestors to simultaneously 
access information. Finally, the invention uses a formatting program that enables 
content to be viewed on the requestor's device. Claims 45 through 61 are at issue in 
this appeal. Claim 45 is representative: 
A server-computer implemented method of providing online repository 
services to a plurality of users *** comprising *** : 
establishing on the server computer connected to the Internet an account 
for each of a plurality of users; 
storing on the server computer a copyright-protected information object; 
and 
controlling access to the copyright-protected information object by one or 
more of the plurality of users in accord with one or more restrictions. 
Illustrative claims that depend from claim 45 add the further limitations of: 
“examining license information for the copyright-protected information object to 
determine a number N (where N ≥ 1) of simultaneous users who could access the 
copyright-protected information object” (claim 48); allowing access to the copy-
righted information “for a predetermined time” and during a particular “time peri-
od” (claim 49 and 50); and “formatting” the copyrighted information so that it is 
“suitable to the requirements of a user's device” (claim 51). The examiner rejected 
the pending claims as unpatentable over U.S. Patent No. 7,243,079 (Manolis) in 
view of U.S. Patent No. 6,453,305 (Glassman). 
Manolis discloses a system that enables users to purchase prints of their digital 
photographs online and share photographs online. Manolis discloses that a “user 
optionally can share his/her online photos (i.e., those images that the user has up-
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loaded to the host computer system) with other users *** .” Sharing photos online 
“causes the host system to set access permissions as appropriate to allow the intend-
ed share recipient to access the online images specified by the user.” Manolis also 
discloses creating and displaying an image thumbnail for each of the uploaded pho-
tographs. 
Glassman discloses an “electronic commerce system and method [that] enforces 
a license agreement for content on an open network by restricting the number of 
consumers that can concurrently access the content.” It discloses tracking “the users 
of [a] web site and block[ing] users who are not licensed or who have exceeded the 
scope of the applicable license.” Glassman also describes an embodiment in which a 
vendor of copyrighted content has a license that permits a fixed number of users to 
access content at any given time. This embodiment further allows the vendor to 
“check[] to determine whether there is an available license (i.e., whether an ad-
ditional consumer is allowed to view the content under the license).” Glassman also 
discloses that the length of time and the time period during which customers are 




A. Analogous Art 
The parties dispute whether Manolis is analogous art. “Two separate tests de-
fine the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the art is from the same endeavor, 
regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field 
of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the 
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 
1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Board found that Manolis is analogous to the claimed 
invention under the first test, concluding that “both the invention and Manolis’ 
teachings are directed to systems which allow for the storage and retrieval of infor-
mation objects by a plurality of users.” Mr. Chaganti argues that there is no substan-
tial evidence that Manolis is analogous art. He contends that Manolis is not con-
cerned with copyright-protected information and “the Board did not explain why it 
ignored this key differentiator” in finding that Manolis was relevant.  
We agree with the PTO that Manolis is analogous art. Because both Manolis 
and the claimed invention are directed to the controlled distribution of content via 
the Internet, they have essentially the same function and are in the same field of en-
deavor. The fact that Manolis does not specify that the photographs distributed by 
the system are copyrighted does not suggest that a skilled artisan would not consult 
Manolis. Manolis need not disclose every limitation of the claimed invention to fall 
within the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention. 
B. Teaching Away 
In finding that the claims of the ’725 application would have been obvious in 
view of the combination of Manolis with Glassman, the Board found that Glassman 
does not teach away from the claimed invention. Mr. Chaganti argues that the 
Board's finding lacks substantial evidence. He contends that Glassman’s statement 
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that “existing lock servers are undesirable on an open network” teaches away from 
using existing lock server architectures to provide controlled access to copyrighted 
material on an open network. 
While Glassman describes the then-existing lock servers as “undesirable,” we 
disagree that this constitutes a teaching away from mechanisms for controlling In-
ternet access to copyrighted material. “A reference may be said to teach away when a 
person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from fol-
lowing the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction divergent 
from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 
(Fed. Cir. 1994). Glassman delineates the “undesirable” features of existing lock 
servers, but it also lists various features that a lock server should incorporate to avoid 
those deficiencies. Glassman affirmatively states that the “method and system for 
electronic commerce” disclosed meets those needs. Glassman further teaches the use 
of a locking mechanism to police content use over the Internet and states that it is 
an object of the invention to “allow enforcement of an N-user license for content 
located on an open network like the Internet.” Therefore, we find that substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Glassman does not teach away from 
the claimed invention’s disclosure of limiting Internet access to copyrighted materi-
al. 
C. Reason to Combine 
The Board found that a person of skill in the art would have had reason to 
combine Manolis with Glassman to arrive at the claimed invention. Mr. Chaganti 
argues that the Board erred by failing to articulate that reason. He contends that the 
Board's reason to combine the references was motivated by hindsight bias. He fur-
ther argues that the Board erred by failing to make factual findings with respect to 
the level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention. 
We disagree. The Board found that a person of ordinary skill would have had a 
reason to use “the online print service of Manolis to provide licensed access to copy-
righted images in order to provide account users with the ability [to] control access 
to their copyrighted images” while “at the same time providing concurrent access to 
the images as suggested by Glassman.” We read this as a statement that common 
sense would have provided a reason to combine these references. We find this per-
suasive given that, while Manolis does not specify that the images distributed by the 
system are copyrighted, they almost certainly are. See 17 U.S.C. § 102. Common 
sense would have provided a person of ordinary skill with reason to use the teach-
ings of Glassman to distribute these copyrighted images under the appropriate li-
censes. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Chaganti’s argument regarding the lack of a stated reason to 
combine is not unreasonable. We caution the Board and the PTO that such reasons 
must be clearly articulated. It is not enough to say [as the Board did] that there 
would have been a reason to combine two references because to do so would “have 
been obvious to one of ordinary skill.” Such circular reasoning is not sufficient—
more is needed to sustain an obviousness rejection. 
We agree with the PTO that the absence of factual findings with respect to the 
level of ordinary skill in the field of the invention does not “give rise to reversible 
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error” where, as here, “the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for 
testimony is not shown.” Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). Moreover, Mr. Chaganti has not made any showing that a finding regarding 
the level of ordinary skill would impact the ultimate conclusion of obviousness un-
der § 103. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 
963 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
D. Dependent Claims 
The Board found that Glassman teaches examining a license to determine a 
number N of authorized concurrent users (claim 48), as well as restricting the 
amount of time or time periods during which the requestor is given access to the 
information (claims 49 and 50). With respect to claims 51 and 57-60, the Board 
affirmed the examiner's finding that Manolis’ description of creating thumbnail im-
ages of photographs teaches “formatting” information and using a formatter as re-
quired by those claims. 
Mr. Chaganti disputes the Board’s findings. First, he argues that Glassman does 
not examine license information to determine N, as required by claim 48, but in-
stead starts with a known N. Next, he contends that Glassman does not disclose the 
step of receiving licensing information indicating that the license is for access of in-
formation for a predetermined time (Tlicense) as required by claim 49. Similarly, he 
contends that Glassman does not disclose the step of determining a time period (T) 
during which the copyright-protected information object may be accessed as re-
quired by dependent claim 50. 
With respect to dependent claims 51, and 57-60, Mr. Chaganti seems to argue 
that the Board misconstrued the terms “formatting,” “formatter,” and “format.” 
However, Mr. Chaganti does not offer any construction of these terms. Instead, he 
argues only that the creation of thumbnail images from a photograph as disclosed in 
Manolis does not constitute formatting an image in a manner suitable to a user’s 
device. He contends that the thumbnails Manolis discloses are created at the time of 
uploading an image and before a user is allowed access to online photographs and 
thus are not formatted to be “suitable to the requirements of a user’s device.” 
We agree with the PTO that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings 
that the combination of Manolis and Glassman discloses each limitation of depend-
ent claims 48-50, 51, and 57-60, and renders these claims obvious. First, with re-
spect to dependent claim 48, there is substantial evidence that Glassman teaches us-
ing license information to determine the number of users, N, that are allowed to 
access content, and does not arbitrarily predetermine this number. For instance, 
Glassman describes an embodiment in which “[p]referably, the vendor *** main-
tains a data structure associated with the licensed content that can be quickly 
scanned to determine whether a license is available.” In this embodiment, the ven-
dor “checks to determine whether there is an available license”—suggesting that the 
number of users is determined on the basis of what the license allows. Next, with 
respect to dependent claims 49 and 50, there is substantial evidence that Glassman 
discloses limiting access to copyrighted information “for a predetermined time” and 
during a fixed “time period.” Glassman discloses that “permission to access specific 
content *** may be unlimited or it may be for only a relatively brief period of time, 
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say a few minutes to a few hours.” It further teaches that “optionally, [the inven-
tion] provides the consumer with an estimate of when a license will be available.” 
Finally, we also agree with the PTO that substantial evidence supports the 
Board’s finding that Manolis discloses formatting content and using a formatting 
program as required by dependent claims 51 and 57-60. Manolis describes format-
ting uploaded photographs to display them as thumbnail images on a user’s device. 
We have considered Mr. Chaganti’s remaining arguments and find them unper-
suasive. Because each of the pending claims would have been obvious in light of the 
combination of Manolis and Glassman, we do not reach the Board’s additional bases 
for rejecting the claims. 
…  
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Chapter 7: Infringement 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 439-442 (top of page), 466-489 
The Doctrine of Equivalents 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 489-499 
Brilliant Instruments Inc. v. GuideTech, LLC 
707 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
Moore, Judge: 
GuideTech, LLC (GuideTech) appeals from the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment that Brilliant Instruments, Inc. (Brilliant) did not infringe three re-
lated GuideTech patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 6,226,231; 6,091,671; and 6,181,649. 
Because the court erred in granting summary judgment, we reverse and remand. 
Background 
This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action that Brilliant filed after 
the inventor of the patents-in-suit left GuideTech to found Brilliant. GuideTech’s 
patents generally relate to circuits that measure the timing errors of digital signals in 
high-speed microprocessors. These circuits, which are referred to as time interval 
analyzers, detect timing errors by analyzing a digital circuit’s clock signal and output 
signals. 
The patents share a common specification and claim different aspects of the 
time interval measuring circuit. The ’231 patent claims the circuit at a high level, 
reciting that the circuit comprises a “signal channel,” a “plurality of measurement 
circuits defined within said signal channel,” and a “processor circuit.” Claim 1 is 
representative of the claims at issue: 
A time interval analyzer for measuring time intervals between signal events, 
said analyzer comprising: 
a signal channel that receives an input signal; 
a plurality of measurement circuits defined within said signal channel in 
parallel with each other, *** ; and 
a processor circuit in communication with said signal channel *** . 
(Emphasis added). The issue on appeal with regard to the ’231 patent is whether 
Brilliant’s time interval analyzers have “a plurality of measurement circuits defined 
within said signal channel.” For purposes of this appeal, the parties agree that Bril-
liant’s accused BI200 and BI220 products operate identically. Both products em-
ploy a “One-Channel-Two-Edge” mode in which they operate using “a single 
channel” and use two measurement circuits. 
The ’671 and ’649 patent claims are directed to internal circuitry of a meas-
urement circuit. Claim 1 of the ’671 patent is representative: 
A time interval analyzer for measuring time intervals between events in an 
input signal, said analyzer comprising: 
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*** a first current circuit having a constant current source or a constant 
current sink *** ; 
a second current circuit *** ; 
a capacitor; [and] a shunt, wherein said shunt and said capacitor are opera-
tively disposed in parallel with respect to said first current circuit, wherein 
said shunt is disposed between said first current circuit and said second cur-
rent circuit *** . 
(Emphasis added). The issue on appeal regarding the ’671 and ’649 patents is 
whether the measurement circuits in the BI200 and BI220 contain a capacitor “op-
eratively disposed in parallel” with respect to a first current circuit. In its infringe-
ment allegations, GuideTech identified a capacitor that is part of the alleged “first 
current circuit.” 
The district court construed the disputed claim terms and entered summary 
judgment of noninfringement in favor of Brilliant for all three patents. GuideTech 
appeals. …  
Discussion 
… 
Infringement, either literal or under the doctrine of equivalents, is a question of 
fact. Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1312 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). “Thus, on appeal from a grant of summary judgment of nonin-
fringement, we must determine whether, after resolving reasonable factual inferences 
in favor of the patentee, the district court correctly concluded that no reasonable 
jury could find infringement.” Id. (quoting IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, 
Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
II. Infringement of the ’231 Patent 
GuideTech challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment of nonin-
fringement of the ’231 patent. At summary judgment, the court construed the “de-
fined within said signal channel” limitation as “contained within a signal channel.” 
It further defined a “signal channel” as “an electrical circuit that includes a signal 
path for transmitting electrical signals.” Neither party challenges these construc-
tions. 
The district court concluded that GuideTech failed to present sufficient evi-
dence that the BI200 and BI220 have multiple measurement circuits contained 
within a signal channel. The court held that, although the accused products require 
the use of two measurement circuits, “it does not follow that both circuits are con-
tained in a single channel.” The court concluded that the testimony of GuideTech’s 
expert, Dr. West, failed to show that the measurement circuits were “contained” in 
the same channel. 
GuideTech argues that the district court erred in concluding that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact. GuideTech points to Dr. West’s expert report, argu-
ing that it shows that the BI200 and BI220 employ two circuits contained within a 
single channel when operating in the One-Channel-Two-Edge mode. GuideTech 
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also argues that Brilliant’s datasheets show that the accused products operate on a 
single channel and use two measurement circuits. 
Brilliant argues that the district court properly granted summary judgment. 
Brilliant argues that it cannot infringe because the district court, as a matter of claim 
construction, rejected GuideTech’s argument that “defined within” allowed a meas-
urement circuit to be present in more than one channel. Brilliant argues that the 
BI200 and BI220 do not infringe because each signal channel contains only one 
measurement circuit and simply borrows a second measurement circuit during One-
Channel-Two-Edge mode. 
We agree with GuideTech that the district court erred when it granted sum-
mary judgment. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the BI200 and 
BI220, when operating in One-Channel-Two-Edge mode, have two measurement 
circuits contained within a signal channel, i.e., an electrical circuit that includes a 
signal path for transmitting electrical signals. Dr. West explained how the BI200 and 
BI220 meet the asserted claims when operating in One-Channel-Two-Edge mode. 
Brilliant’s schematics also show that, during operation in One-Channel-Two-Edge 
mode, the only active signal path flows from the input to two measurement circuits: 
 
In the above schematic, a user sets the circuit to One-Channel-Two Edge 
Mode with Channel A as the input. The signal path during operation in this mode is 
highlighted in the above schematic. Once received, the signal first flows through a 
comparator. The signal then flows into two multiplexers. The outputs of the multi-
plexers are then input into two measurement circuits (the timetag circuits). 
This schematic and Dr. West’s testimony, viewed in GuideTech’s favor, shows 
that the only signal channel operative during One-Channel-Two-Edge mode con-
tains two measurement circuits. This evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Brilliant’s products literally infringe the ’231 patent claims. Accord-
ingly, the district court erred when it granted Brilliant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
III. Infringement of the ’671 and ’649 Patents 
GuideTech also challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment that 
Brilliant’s accused products do not infringe the ’671 and ’649 patents. The district 
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court construed the term “operatively disposed in parallel” to mean “arranged in a 
manner capable of forming alternative paths of current such that current can flow 
across one or the other path.” The parties do not challenge that construction on 
appeal. 
The district court concluded that Brilliant was entitled to summary judgment 
because Dr. West conceded that the capacitor in Brilliant’s products is “part of the 
first current circuit.” The court concluded that Dr. West’s testimony indicated “that 
the capacitor is not on an alternative path on which current flows from the first cur-
rent circuit.” Because it was undisputed that the capacitor in the accused products 
was part of the first current circuit and not arranged in parallel with the first current 
circuit, the court concluded that the accused products do not infringe the ’671 and 
’649 patents, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. 
GuideTech argues that nothing in the claims precludes the capacitor from being 
part of the first current circuit and, at the same time, operatively disposed in parallel 
with the shunt. It points to Dr. West’s expert report, arguing that he opined that 
the measurement capacitor and the shunt are arranged to form alternate current 
paths during operation. Finally, GuideTech argues that Dr. West explained how the 
operation of the accused products was equivalent to operatively disposing the shunt 
and capacitor in parallel with respect to the first current circuit. 
Brilliant responds that its products cannot literally infringe because it was un-
disputed that the accused capacitor is part of the first current circuit, not disposed in 
parallel with respect to it. Brilliant argues that GuideTech’s infringement theory un-
der the doctrine of equivalents fails because it would vitiate the requirement that the 
claimed “first current circuit” and the “capacitor” are separate elements. 
We agree with Brilliant that the district court properly granted summary judg-
ment that Brilliant’s accused products do not literally infringe. The claims recite 
“said shunt and said capacitor are operatively disposed in parallel with respect to said 
first current circuit.” It is undisputed that in Brilliant’s accused product the capacitor 
is part of the first current circuit. Because, according to the undisputed facts, 
GuideTech cannot establish literal infringement, summary judgment of no literal 
infringement was appropriately granted. 
We agree with GuideTech, however, that the district court erred when it grant-
ed summary judgment that Brilliant does not infringe under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. To find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, any differences be-
tween the claimed invention and the accused product must be insubstantial. Graver 
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). One way of 
proving infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is to show, for each claim 
limitation, that the accused product “performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way with substantially the same result as each claim limitation 
of the patented product.” Crown Packaging, 559 F.3d at 1312. This is a question of 
fact. Id.; Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
In this case, GuideTech submitted an expert report by Dr. West that detailed its 
doctrine of equivalents theory under the function-way-result test. Brilliant does not 
contest Dr. West’s recitations of the function, way, and result of the asserted claims 
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or the accused products. Nor does Brilliant provide any contrary evidence. Instead, 
it argues that GuideTech’s doctrine of equivalents infringement theory vitiates the 
requirement that the claimed “first current circuit” and the “capacitor” are separate 
claim elements. 
Brilliant’s vitiation argument fails. As we recently explained in Deere & Co. v. 
Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012): 
“Vitiation” is not an exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but instead a 
legal determination that “the evidence is such that no reasonable jury 
could determine two elements to be equivalent.” The proper inquiry for 
the court is to apply the doctrine of equivalents, asking whether an asserted 
equivalent represents an “insubstantial difference” from the claimed ele-
ment, or “whether the substitute element matches the function, way, and 
result of the claimed element.” If no reasonable jury could find equiva-
lence, then the court must grant summary judgment of no infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Id. at 1356. The vitiation concept has its clearest application “where the accused 
device contain[s] the antithesis of the claimed structure.” Planet Bingo, LLC v. 
GameTech Int’l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). This makes sense; two 
elements likely are not insubstantially different when they are polar opposites. As we 
explained in Deere, “[c]ourts should be cautious not to shortcut this inquiry by 
identifying a ‘binary’ choice in which an element is either present or ‘not present.’ 
Stated otherwise, the vitiation test cannot be satisfied by simply noting that an ele-
ment is missing from the claimed structure or process because the doctrine of equiv-
alents, by definition, recognizes that an element is missing that must be supplied by 
the equivalent substitute.” Deere, 703 F.3d at 1356-57. The vitiation test cannot be 
satisfied merely by noting that the equivalent substitute is outside the claimed limi-
tation’s literal scope. Rather, vitiation applies when one of skill in the art would un-
derstand that the literal and substitute limitations are not interchangeable, not in-
substantially different, and when they do not perform substantially the same func-
tion in substantially the same way, to accomplish substantially the same result. In 
short, saying that a claim element would be vitiated is akin to saying that there is no 
equivalent to the claim element in the accused device based on the well-established 
“function-way-result” or “insubstantial differences” tests. 
To succeed on a doctrine of equivalents theory, the patentee must demonstrate 
equivalence under one of these two tests. This will be more difficult when the ac-
cused structure has an element that is the opposite of the claimed element, especially 
where the specification or prosecution history highlights the differences. If the 
claimed and accused elements are recognized by those of skill in the art to be oppos-
ing ways of doing something, they are likely not insubstantially different. The con-
cept of vitiation is an acknowledgement that each element in the claim must be pre-
sent in the accused device either literally or equivalently. And we have applied this 
concept to cases where we have recognized that two alternatives exist that are very 
different from each other and therefore cannot be equivalents for infringement pur-
poses. See, e.g., Planet Bingo, 472 F.3d at 1345 (concluding that determining a win-
ning combination after a game starts was not equivalent to determining a winning 
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combination before the game starts); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Std. Register Co., 229 
F.3d 1091, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t would defy logic to conclude that a minor-
ity—the very antithesis of a majority—could be insubstantially different from a claim 
limitation requiring a majority, and no reasonable juror could find otherwise.”). 
Applying these concepts to the facts of this case, we conclude that summary 
judgment must be reversed. The element at issue is: “wherein said shunt and said 
capacitor are operatively disposed in parallel with respect to said first current cir-
cuit.” Dr. West, GuideTech’s expert, agreed that in the accused device, the meas-
urement capacitor is a component of the first current circuit. While this disposes of 
literal infringement, the doctrine of equivalents inquiry is: did GuideTech create a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Brilliant’s capacitor, located within 
the first current circuit, performs substantially the same function in substantially the 
same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed capacitor, which is 
operatively disposed in parallel to the shunt? Everyone agrees that the capacitor in 
the accused device is not located in exactly the same place as the claimed capacitor, 
but is the change in location an insubstantial difference? We conclude that, viewing 
all factual inferences in favor of GuideTech, it has created a genuine issue of material 
fact which precludes summary judgment. Dr. West explained: 
The electrical disposition of the shunt and the capacitor with respect to the 
first current circuit of the BI200 and BI220 is equivalent to the electrical 
disposition of the shunt and the capacitor with respect to the first current 
circuit of this claim limitation because it performs substantially the same 
function (allowing the shunt to control the path of current flow to or from 
the first current circuit) in substantially the same way (wherein an electrical 
path from the first current circuit can be traced to either the capacitor or 
the shunt) to achieve substantially the same result (providing an electrical 
relationship wherein, e.g., the shunt can direct current to flow from the 
first current circuit to the second current circuit or from the first current 
circuit to the capacitor). 
This detailed application of the function-way-result test to the claim element 
and the allegedly equivalent feature of the accused product is sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact for the jury to resolve. The main difference between 
the accused circuit and the claimed circuit is that the capacitor in the accused circuit 
aids in delivering power and is thus part of the first current circuit. There is, howev-
er, no evidence suggesting that this added advantage of the accused design alters Dr. 
West’s function-way-result analysis. On this record, GuideTech has created a genu-
ine issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment of noninfringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents. 
…  
Dyk, Judge, concurring in part & dissenting in part: 
I agree with the majority with respect to the ’231 patent, and with its holding 
that there is no literal infringement of the ’671 patent and ’649 patent. However, I 
disagree with the majority that a genuine issue of material fact remains as to in-
fringement of the ’671 and ’649 patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 
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The only relevant claim limitation at issue with respect to the ’671 and ’649 pa-
tents requires that the “shunt and *** capacitor [be] operatively disposed in parallel 
with respect to [the] first current circuit.” The district court construed the “opera-
tively disposed in parallel” portion of this limitation to mean “arranged in a manner 
capable of forming alternative paths of current such that current can flow across one 
or the other path.” It also implicitly recognized, however, that the remaining por-
tion of this limitation required that this current flow be “with respect to” the first 
current circuit. 
There is no dispute in this case that the capacitor in the accused device was part 
of the first current circuit and therefore inside of that circuit. Thus, the capacitor 
could not possibly be disposed in parallel “with respect to” something of which it is 
already a part. The district court, in rendering a judgment of noninfringement for 
Brilliant, therefore emphasized that “the capacitor is not on an alternative path on 
which current flows from the first current circuit.” (Emphasis added). The majority 
acknowledges that “in Brilliant’s accused product the capacitor is part of the first 
current circuit,” and holds that “GuideTech cannot establish literal infringement” of 
either the ’671 or the ’649 patent. However, the majority rejects the district court’s 
conclusion that this fact “preclude[d] a finding of infringement *** under the doc-
trine of equivalents.” In so doing, it relied on GuideTech’s expert report from Dr. 
West as raising a genuine issue of material fact. 
I disagree. The function-way-result test for equivalents requires “showing on a 
limitation by limitation basis that the accused product performs substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same result.” 
Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1312 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Similarly, we have recently reiterated that 
“[r]egardless [of] how the equivalence test is articulated, ‘the doctrine of equivalents 
must be applied to individual limitations of the claim, not to the invention as a 
whole.’” Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple Inc., 692 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)) 
(emphasis added). This guidance to consider each claim limitation under the doc-
trine of equivalents flows from the principles of claim vitiation, which require a de-
termination of whether there is a substantial difference or a difference in kind be-
tween each individual claim limitation and the accused product. See Trading Techs. 
Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
While Dr. West purports to follow this guidance, in fact Dr. West’s report is in-
consistent with the approach articulated in the cases. It applies the equivalent to the 
invention as a whole rather than to the particular claim limitation at issue. The Dr. 
West expert report, in reciting the function-way-result of the claimed invention, 
states: 
[T]he electrical disposition of the shunt and the capacitor with respect to 
the first current circuit of the BI200 and BI220 is equivalent to the electri-
cal disposition of the shunt and the capacitor with respect to the first cur-
rent circuit of this claim limitation because it performs substantially the 
same function (allowing the shunt to control the path of current flowing to or 
from the first current circuit) in substantially the same way (wherein an elec-
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trical path from the first current circuit can be traced to either the capacitor 
or the shunt) to achieve substantially the same result (providing an electrical 
relationship wherein, e.g., the shunt can direct current to flow from the first 
current circuit to the second current circuit or from the first current circuit to 
the capacitor). 
(Emphasis added). As the majority properly asks, “[e]veryone agrees that the capaci-
tor in the accused device is not located [such that it is operatively disposed in parallel 
with respect to the first current circuit], but is the change in location an insubstan-
tial difference?” Dr. West’s report fails to even address this question. 
The “same result” Dr. West contends is achieved by the accused device is a re-
sult where “the shunt can direct current to flow from the first current circuit to the 
second current circuit or from the first current circuit to the capacitor.” (Emphasis 
added). But this “same result” cannot occur in the accused device, as it is undisput-
ed that, because the capacitor is inside the first current circuit, current cannot flow 
from the first current circuit to the capacitor. An appropriate doctrine of equivalents 
analysis would have identified an identical result that was achieved in both the 
claimed invention and the accused invention, thereby demonstrating that the differ-
ence between the two was insubstantial. But there is no evidence in the record—
from Dr. West or elsewhere—explaining why the difference between the claimed 
invention and the accused device (i.e., that the capacitor in the accused device is lo-
cated inside, as opposed to outside, the first current circuit) is insubstantial or how 
the function-way-result test is satisfied as to this limitation. 
Once Brilliant brought forth expert evidence that its devices were outside the 
scope of the claim limitations under a doctrine of equivalents analysis, the burden 
fell on “the nonmoving party [in this case, Guidetech] to set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.” Minkin v. Gibbons, P.C., 680 F.3d 
1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Shum v. Intel Corp., 633 F.3d 1067, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). This Guidetech did not do. Indeed, given that no evidence exists showing 
that Brilliant’s accused products met the “with respect to” portion of the relevant 
limitation under the doctrine of equivalents, Brilliant merely needed to point out, as 
it did, “that there is an absence of evidence to support [Guidetech’s infringement] 
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent as to this aspect of the majority’s opinion, 
and I would affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement as to the ’671 
and ’649 patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. 
743 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Moore, Judge: 
Defendant ARB Corporation Ltd. (ARB) appeals from the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment of noninfringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,591,098 (the ’098 
patent) to Ring & Pinion Service, Inc. (R&P). Because the district court erred by 
improperly applying the doctrine of claim vitiation, we reverse and remand with in-
structions to enter judgment of infringement for ARB. 
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Background 
The invention claimed in the ’098 patent is an improved automobile locking 
differential. A differential is a mechanism that allows wheels to rotate at different 
speeds relative to each other. When locked, a locking differential distributes torque 
from the engine such that both wheels spin at the same rate. Claim 1 is representa-
tive: 
A locking differential comprising 
a differential carrier *** , 
a locking means *** , 
cylinder means formed in said differential carrier and housing an actuator 
position[ed] to cause movement of said locking means relative to said car-
rier 
(Emphasis added). 
R&P sought declaratory judgment that its Ziplocker product did not infringe 
the ’098 patent. Following claim construction, the parties cross-moved for summary 
judgment. After briefing was complete, the parties jointly stipulated that there were 
“no issues of material fact regarding infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.” The parties agreed that the Ziplocker product literally met every limitation of 
claim 1 except the “cylinder means formed in” limitation, but that the Ziplocker 
included an “equivalent” cylinder. Moreover, the parties agreed that the cylinder in 
the Ziplocker “would have been foreseeable to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art at the time the application for the ’098 patent was filed.” 
The parties agreed that “should the Court hold *** that foreseeability of an 
equivalent at the time of application prevents use of the doctrine of equivalents, *** 
the accused differential would not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.” In the 
alternative, they further agreed that “should the Court hold *** that foreseeability 
at the time of application does not prevent use of the doctrine of equivalents, *** 
the accused differential would infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.” Thus, the 
parties agreed that the outcome of the case would be determined by the resolution 
of a single legal issue: whether an equivalent is barred under the doctrine of equiva-
lents because it was foreseeable at the time of the patent application. The district 
court entered an order approving the parties’ joint stipulation. Subsequently, the 
court requested that the parties submit additional briefing to address the all-
limitations rule. 
The court held that, while foreseeability did not preclude the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents, a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
would vitiate the “cylinder means formed in *** ” limitation. Therefore, the court 




In ruling on the parties’ summary judgment motions, the district court held 
that “foreseeability at the time of [patent] drafting alone[] is not a formally recog-
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nized limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.” R&P argues that the district court 
erred. Relying principally on Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc., 126 F.3d 
1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997), R&P contends that we have found that the doctrine of 
equivalents does not apply to equivalents that were foreseeable at the time of the 
patent application. It argues in the alternative that the doctrine of equivalents has 
been found to exclude foreseeable equivalents under certain circumstances and that 
we should extend those exclusions to create a per se foreseeability bar to application 
of the doctrine. 
We do not agree. There is not, nor has there ever been, a foreseeability limita-
tion on the application of the doctrine of equivalents. It has long been clear that 
known interchangeability weighs in favor of finding infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 
(1997) (“The known interchangeability of substitutes for an element of a patent is 
one of the express objective factors * * * bearing upon whether the accused device is 
substantially the same as the patented invention.”); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. 
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (holding that “whether persons 
reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an in-
gredient not contained in the patent with one that was” is an “important factor” 
weighing in favor of equivalence); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma (USA) 
Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding that “known interchangeabil-
ity” is a “factor to consider in a doctrine of equivalents analysis” that “aids the fact-
finder in assessing the similarities and differences between a claimed and an accused 
element.”); Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that “the known interchangeability test looks to the 
knowledge of a skilled artisan to see whether that artisan would contemplate the in-
terchange as a design choice.”); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 
868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that “the substitution of an ingredi-
ent known to be an equivalent to that required by the claim presents a classic ex-
ample for a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”). Excluding 
equivalents that were foreseeable at the time of patenting would directly conflict 
with these holdings that “known interchangeability” supports infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents. We conclude that the foreseeability of an equivalent at 
the time of patenting is not a bar to a finding of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
R&P’s reliance on Sage Products to argue that a general foreseeability bar to the 
doctrine of equivalents exists is misplaced. Sage Products held that claim vitiation, 
not foreseeability, prevented the application of the doctrine of equivalents in that 
case because its application “would have utterly written” express limitations “out of 
the claim.” Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 194 F.3d 1261, 1271 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing 126 F.3d at 1423-25). “[B]ecause the scope of the claim” 
in Sage Products “was limited in a way that plainly and necessarily excluded a struc-
tural feature that was the opposite of the one recited in the claim, that different 
structure could not be brought within the scope of patent protection through the 
doctrine of equivalents.” SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 
242 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 126 F.3d at 1425). Sage Products did 
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not create a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, but instead held 
that a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate a 
claim limitation based on the facts of that case. 
Relying on our holding in Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal In-
dustries, Inc., 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998), R&P argues that there is a foresee-
ability bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents for means-plus-function 
limitations. R&P misstates the law. There is no such foreseeability limit on the doc-
trine of equivalents, nor did we create one in Chiuminatta. 
In Chiuminatta, we explained that there are two differences between the 
equivalence determination made for literal infringement purposes under § 112(f) 
and a doctrine of equivalents determination for the same limitation: timing and 
function. 145 F.3d at 1310. Equivalence under § 112(f) is evaluated at the time of 
issuance. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
Equivalence under the doctrine of equivalents, in contrast, is evaluated at the time 
of infringement. Id. Hence, an after-arising technology, a technology that did not 
exist at the time of patenting, can be found to be an equivalent under the doctrine 
of equivalents even though it cannot be an equivalent under the literal infringement 
analysis of § 112(f). Id. 
The second difference between literal infringement and doctrine of equivalents 
infringement under § 112(f) relates to the function of the element. For literal in-
fringement, the accused structures must perform the function recited in the claim 
(identical function). The doctrine of equivalents covers accused structures that per-
form substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially 
the same results. The doctrine of equivalents thus covers structures with equivalent, 
but not identical, functions. This is true whether the accused equivalent was known 
at the time of patenting or later arising. As we explained in Interactive Pictures, 
whether the accused structure “predates” the patent or is after-arising technology, 
the doctrine of equivalents applied to a means-plus-function clause requires only 
that equivalent structures perform substantially the same function. 274 F.3d at 
1381-82. Where a finding of non-infringement under § 112(f) is based solely on the 
lack of identical function, it does not preclude a finding of equivalence under the 
doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1382. 
As we have explained in other cases, when the accused technology was known 
at the time of patenting and the functions are identical, the structural equivalence 
inquiry under § 112 and the structural equivalence portion of the doctrine of equiv-
alents are coextensive. Al-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1320 n.2 (holding that for pre-
existing structures where the functions are identical “any analysis for equivalent 
structure under the doctrine of equivalents collapses into the [§ 112(f)] analysis.”) 
(emphasis added); see also Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1100 
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int’l, 
Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Nothing in Chiuminatta or in any 
other case cited by R&P supports its assertion that there exists a foreseeability excep-
tion to the doctrine of equivalents that applies to means-plus-function or any other 
claim terms. 
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We agree with the district court that foreseeability does not create a bar to the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents. Given the joint stipulation, this con-
clusion should have resolved the case and the court should have entered a judgment 
of infringement pursuant to the stipulation. 
II 
In its order, the district court concluded that finding that the accused cylinder 
design was equivalent to the recited “cylinder means formed in *** ” limitation 
would vitiate the claim limitation as a matter of law, and thus granted R&P’s mo-
tion for summary judgment of noninfringement. The court did not discuss the im-
pact of the joint stipulation on its summary judgment ruling. 
ARB argues that, once the district court determined that foreseeability does not 
prevent the application of the doctrine of equivalents, it should have enforced the 
parties’ joint stipulation by entering the stipulated finding of infringement. It con-
tends that the district court reviewed and entered the joint stipulation and that R&P 
is bound by it. 
…  
We … agree with ARB that the district court erred by failing to enforce the par-
ties’ stipulation. A stipulation of fact that is fairly entered into is controlling on the 
parties and the court is generally bound to enforce it. See Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lace-
law Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the parties stipulated to equiv-
alence, which is a question of fact, and agreed that there were no remaining issues of 
fact. See Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC, 703 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The 
district court nonetheless held that a finding of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents would vitiate the “cylinder means formed in *** ” claim limitation. That 
was legal error. 
Vitiation is “not an exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but instead a legal 
determination that the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two 
elements to be equivalent.” Deere, 703 F.3d at 1356; see Brilliant Instruments, Inc. 
v. GuideTech, LLC, 707 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The parties’ stipulation 
precludes the conclusion that the “cylinder means formed in *** ” limitation is viti-
ated because it states that the Ziplocker includes an equivalent to that limitation. 
Thus, we hold that the court erred by failing to grant summary judgment of in-
fringement to ARB under the doctrine of equivalents. 
…  
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Joint Infringement & Active Inducement 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 442-446 
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp. 
532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
Gajarsa, Judge: 
This is a patent infringement case. Thomson Corporation and I-Deal, LLC 
(collectively “Thomson”) appeal from a final judgment, after a jury trial, that the 
asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,161,099 are not obvious, that Thomson will-
fully infringed the asserted claims of the ’099 patent, that Muniauction, Inc. is en-
titled to approximately $77 million for lost profits damages enhanced for Thomson’s 
willful infringement, and that Thomson is permanently enjoined from continued 
infringement of the ’099 patent. Because claims 1, 9, 14, 31, 36, and 56 of the ’099 
patent are obvious as a matter of law, the judgment of nonobviousness is reversed as 
to these claims. Similarly, because Thomson does not infringe the remaining assert-
ed claims as a matter of law, the judgment of infringement is reversed, and the re-
mainder of the final judgment is vacated. 
Background 
The ’099 patent is directed to electronic methods for conducting “original issu-
er auctions of financial instruments.” Col. 2, ll. 49-50. Specifically, the ’099 patent 
is directed to original issuer municipal bond auctions over an electronic network, 
e.g., the Internet, using a web browser. In this type of auction, the municipality 
(“issuer”) offers its bonds to underwriters (“bidders”), who typically bid on and 
purchase the entire bond offering, i.e., all-or-none bidding, and thereafter resell in-
dividual bonds to the public. A bond offering may be a package of debt instruments 
consisting of bonds having different principle amounts and having different maturity 
dates. A bidder submits a price and a related interest rate represented by a coupon 
for each of the bonds differentiated by a respective maturity date. … In addition to 
all-or-none bidding, the ’099 patent discloses maturity-by-maturity bidding by 
which a bidder may bid on less than the entire debt offering. 
The ’099 patent discusses many prior art electronic auction and trading sys-
tems, yet criticizes those systems as inapplicable to original issuer auctions of finan-
cial instruments. The ’099 patent also discusses the Parity electronic bid submission 
system, developed by 21st Century Municipals, Inc. for use in municipal bond auc-
tions. “The PARITY bid submission system allows bidders who have previously ob-
tained and installed appropriate software to electronically submit bids in an auction 
over a computer network.” Col. 3, ll. 4-7. The ’099 patent criticizes the Parity sys-
tem for three reasons. First, the prior art system requires bidders to obtain and in-
stall the Parity software prior to participating in an auction over the computer net-
work; second, the system “is designed to be used together with fax and other bid 
submission methods during an auction”; and third, the system operates as a sealed 
bid system in which the received bids are not evaluated and no feedback is provided 
to the bidders until the auction closes. 
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Accordingly, the invention of the ’099 patent provides an “integrated system 
on a single server” that allows issuers to run the auction and bidders to prepare and 
submit bids using a conventional web browser, without the use of other separate 
software. Col. 5, ll. 13-28. The system of the ’099 patent also allows issuers to mon-
itor the progress of the auction and allows bidders to monitor their bid vis-à-vis the 
current best bid. Claim 1 states: 
In an electronic auction system including an issuer’s computer having 
a display and at least one bidder’s computer having an input device and a 
display, said bidder’s computer being located remotely from said issuer’s 
computer, said computers being coupled to at least one electronic network 
for communicating data messages between said computers, an electronic 
auctioning process for auctioning fixed income financial instruments com-
prising: 
inputting data associated with at least one bid for at least one fixed in-
come financial instrument into said bidder’s computer via said input de-
vice; 
automatically computing at least one interest cost value based at least 
in part on said inputted data, said automatically computed interest cost 
value specifying a rate representing borrowing cost associated with said at 
least one fixed income financial instrument; 
submitting said bid by transmitting at least some of said inputted data 
from said bidder’s computer over said at least one electronic network; and 
communicating at least one message associated with said submitted 
bid to said issuer’s computer over said at least one electronic network and 
displaying, on said issuer’s computer display, information associated with 
said bid including said computed interest cost value, 
wherein at least one of the inputting step, the automatically compu-
ting step, the submitting step, the communicating step and the displaying 
step is performed using a web browser. 
The accused process has as its genesis the Parity system discussed in the ’099 
patent. … In 1997, Thomson acquired Parity from 21st Century Municipals and 
integrated [its preexisting] BidComp [product with] Parity … into a single system 
marketed as BidComp/Parity. In 1998, Thomson modified BidComp/Parity to 
allow issuers to view bids over the Internet using a web browser rather than over a 
proprietary computer network. 
On June 1, 2001, Muniauction filed suit against Thomson … . 
Discussion 
…  
Turning to infringement … , the only theory of infringement presented by 
Muniauction is that of so-called joint infringement. The law of this circuit is axio-
matic that a method claim is directly infringed only if each step of the claimed 
method is performed. BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 
1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007). With respect to the ’099 patent, the parties do not dis-
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pute that no single party performs every step of the asserted claims. For example, at 
least the inputting step of claim 1 is completed by the bidder, whereas at least a ma-
jority of the remaining steps are performed by the auctioneer’s system (e.g., Thom-
son’s BidComp/Parity system). The issue is thus whether the actions of at least the 
bidder and the auctioneer may be combined under the law so as to give rise to a 
finding of direct infringement by the auctioneer. 
In BMC Resources, this court clarified the proper standard for whether a meth-
od claim is directly infringed by the combined actions of multiple parties. The 
court’s analysis was founded on the proposition that direct infringement requires a 
single party to perform every step of a claimed method. 498 F.3d at 1380 (conclud-
ing that this requirement derived directly from 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)); see also NTP, 
Inc. v. Research in Motion, 418 F.3d 1282, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that 
users of accused system could not infringe method claims in the United States be-
cause one step of the method was performed in Canada). Yet the court recognized a 
tension between this proposition and the well-settled rule that “a defendant cannot 
thus avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else carry out one or 
more of the claimed steps on its behalf.” Id. at 1379. Accordingly, where the actions 
of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a claimed method, the claim is 
directly infringed only if one party exercises “control or direction” over the entire 
process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party, i.e., the “mas-
termind.” Id. at 1380-81. At the other end of this multi-party spectrum, mere 
“arms-length cooperation” will not give rise to direct infringement by any party. Id. 
at 1371. 
Under BMC Resources then, the issue of infringement in this case turns on 
whether Thomson sufficiently controls or directs other parties (e.g., the bidder) such 
that Thomson itself can be said to have performed every step of the asserted claims. 
… The jury instruction on joint infringement [used in this case] read as follows: 
Consider whether the parties are acting jointly or together in relation to 
the electronic auction process. Are they aware of each other’s existence and 
interacting with each other in relation to the electronic auction process? Is 
there one party teaching, instructing, or facilitating the other party’s partic-
ipation in the electronic auction process? These are the types of questions 
that you should ask in making your decision on this issue. If you find that 
there is a sufficient connection between Thomson and the bidders and the 
issuers that used Thomson’s process, then you could find Thomson liable 
for direct infringement. 
However, … none of the questions identified by the jury instruction are relevant to 
whether Thomson satisfies the “control or direction” standard of BMC Resources. 
That Thomson controls access to its system and instructs bidders on its use is not 
sufficient to incur liability for direct infringement. 
Under BMC Resources, the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations 
where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable 
for the acts committed by another party that are required to complete performance 
of a claimed method. 498 F.3d at 1379; accord Int’l Rectifier v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
361 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing district court’s ruling that Sam-
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sung violated a permanent injunction prohibiting infringement in the United States 
on the grounds that Samsung did not control or participate in the extraterritorial 
activities of a third party such that the acts of the third party were not attributable to 
Samsung). In this case, Thomson neither performed every step of the claimed meth-
ods nor had another party perform steps on its behalf, and Muniauction has identi-
fied no legal theory under which Thomson might be vicariously liable for the actions 
of the bidders. Therefore, Thomson does not infringe the asserted claims as a matter 
of law. 
… 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 499-505 
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc. 
917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
Michel, Judge: 
Paramount Systems, Inc. (Paramount), Robert S. Butterworth, and Anthony J. 
DiSimone appeal the … judgment awarding Manville Sales Corp. damages for in-
fringement of U.S. Patent No. 3,847,333. … We affirm all appealed issues except 
we reverse as to personal liability of individual defendants. 
Background 
In early 1971, a Manville division was awarded a subcontract to supply the lu-
minaire assembly for a 150-foot tall, three-foot diameter lighting pole to be installed 
in the Fort Steele Rest Area along a highway near Rawlins, Wyoming. The assembly 
was installed, but failed in September, 1971. 
Later that same month, Manville’s research manager, Robert Zeller, conceived 
of a new self-centering luminaire assembly design capable of travelling readily up and 
down a pole, thereby providing reliable accessibility for maintenance to the lumi-
naires. The invention had “iris” guide arms, whereas the prior art device installed in 
Wyoming had vertical guide arms. The guide arms are intended to apply forces be-
tween the light pole and the luminaire support such that the assembly maintains a 
centered position while travelling up and down the pole. Otherwise, the luminaire 
assembly can get stuck high up the pole. By late October, Zeller had constructed a 
working model of the new design and had installed it on a test pole at Manville’s 
R&D center in Ohio. 
On October 29, 1971, after the new design proved operable on the test pole, 
Zeller sought permission from a Wyoming state official to try his new iris arm design 
as a substitute for the vertical guide arm device previously installed that had failed. 
With his request, Zeller sent a drawing that included a confidentiality notice. Wyo-
ming law preserved the confidentiality of such drawings. 
In response to Zeller’s request, a Wyoming official conditionally approved pay-
ment for the new design subject to its performing satisfactorily, after installation. 
… 
Zeller installed the iris arm device at the rest area in November 1971 when it 
was not yet open to the public. In March 1972, Zeller was notified by a Manville 
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sales representative that supports that attach the luminaires to the ring had fallen off 
due to severe weather conditions. Zeller returned to Wyoming that month to fix the 
supports. After Zeller lowered the assembly, he concluded that the iris arms worked 
properly even after the Wyoming winter and despite the luminaire-to-ring support 
failure. On his way back to Ohio, Zeller stopped in Cheyenne and sought state ap-
proval for purchase of the iris arm device as fulfilling the original contract. In April 
1972, Wyoming officials inspected the device and authorized payment. The rest area 
was opened to the public in June 1972. 
Meanwhile, on February 7, 1972, Zeller had begun pursuing an iris arm design 
for two-foot diameter poles. Manville subsequently delayed shipments of lowering 
devices so that the new iris arms could be included. On March 10, 1972, Manville 
approved the iris arms for commercial use. Manville began notifying its sales staff of 
the decision to use the iris arms on March 15, 1972, and the iris arms first appeared 
in Manville’s owners’ manuals one week later. On April 20, 1972, Manville installed 
an iris arm in Nebraska. A patent application was filed on February 5, 1973, that 
later issued as the ’333 patent. 
In 1984, Anthony DiSimone, Paramount’s corporate secretary, obtained a copy 
of a drawing of Manville’s iris arm device that had been submitted to the Florida 
Department of Transportation. DiSimone sent the drawing to Robert Butterworth, 
Paramount’s president. Butterworth gave the drawing to Ralph Bloom, a Paramount 
designer, for use in designing a self-centering raise/lower device that was later made 
and sold by Paramount. 
Manville filed suit against Paramount on July 14, 1986, alleging infringement 
of the ’333 patent. DiSimone and Butterworth were added as party-defendants on 
March 11, 1987. After a bench trial, the district court found direct infringement by 
Paramount, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), and direct and induced infringement 




III. Personal Liability of Paramount’s Officers 
A. Direct Infringement – 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
Section 271(a) provides that “whoever without authority makes, uses or sells 
any patented invention *** infringes the patent.” For Butterworth and DiSimone, 
officers of Paramount, to be personally liable for Paramount’s infringement under 
§ 271(a), there must be evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil. See A. Stucki 
Co. v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 593, 596 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Often a party 
asking a court to disregard the corporate existence will attempt to show that the 
corporation was merely the alter ego of its officers. See Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 
267, 271-72 (3d Cir. 1967). More generally, a court may exert its equitable powers 
and disregard the corporate entity if it decides that piercing the veil will prevent 
fraud, illegality, injustice, a contravention of public policy, or prevent the corpora-
tion from shielding someone from criminal liability. Id. at 272. The court, however, 
must “start from the general rule that the corporate entity should be recognized and 
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upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception.” Id. at 273. 
Moreover, unless there is at least “specific intent to escape liability for a specific tort 
*** the cause of justice does not require disregarding the corporate entity.” Id. 
In the instant case, the district court determined that Butterworth and Di-
Simone were personally liable for direct infringement. The district court based this 
decision on its finding that Butterworth and DiSimone took actions that assisted the 
copying of Manville’s design. DiSimone obtained a drawing of Manville’s iris arm 
design from the Florida Department of Transportation. He sent it to Butterworth 
who passed it on to Paramount’s designer for use in designing Paramount’s self-
centering device. Although these facts support the conclusion that the officers had 
knowledge of their acts, these acts were within the scope of their employment and 
thus were protected by the corporate veil. See W. Fletcher, 10 Fletcher Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations § 4877 at 323-24 (rev. perm. ed. 1986). 
Nonetheless, the court held them personally liable. The court did so despite 
having concluded that Paramount was not the alter ego of the officers. Moreover, 
the court had found that the “evidence at trial did not demonstrate that Paramount 
knew of Manville’s patent prior to this lawsuit” and that Paramount’s subsequent 
infringing activity continued because of Paramount’s good faith belief, based on the 
advice of counsel, that it was not infringing. Although the district court made these 
findings explicitly with respect to Paramount, we conclude that these findings must 
also apply to Butterworth and DiSimone; any contrary knowledge or belief by the 
officers would have been imputed to the corporation under agency principles. See 3 
Fletcher Cyclopedia § 832 at 171. 
Based on the district court’s own underlying findings, and the record presented 
to us, we conclude that the court’s determination that Butterworth and DiSimone 
were personally liable, because it was based on piercing the corporate veil, was an 
abuse of its equitable powers. The district court’s findings establish that the officers 
were acting within the scope of their employment. The court’s findings preclude any 
inference that Butterworth and DiSimone were attempting to avoid liability under 
the protection of the corporate veil. Accordingly, we reverse as to the liability of the 
officers in their individual capacities with respect to infringement under § 271(a). 
B. Active Inducement to Infringe – 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) 
Section 271(b) provides that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a  
patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Under this section, corporate officers who ac-
tively assist with their corporation’s infringement may be personally liable for in-
ducing infringement regardless of whether the circumstances are such that a court 
should disregard the corporate entity and pierce the corporate veil. See Orthokinetics, 
Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The 
alleged infringer must be shown, however, to have knowingly induced infringement. 
Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It 
must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage anoth-
er’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had knowledge of the acts al-
leged to constitute inducement. The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the 
alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have 
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known his actions would induce actual infringements. See id.; see also Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
In the instant case, the district court determined, pursuant to § 271(b), that 
Butterworth and DiSimone were liable for inducing infringement. The court did so, 
however, after finding that like Paramount, Butterworth and DiSimone were not 
aware of Manville’s patent until suit was filed and that Paramount’s subsequent in-
fringing acts continued upon Butterworth’s and DiSimone’s “good faith belief,” 
based on advice of counsel, that Paramount’s product did not infringe. 
Based on the district court’s own findings and the record presented to us, we 
conclude that the district court’s decision to hold Butterworth and DiSimone liable 
under § 271(b) was contrary to law. There is simply neither compelling evidence 
nor any findings that the officers had specific intent to cause another to infringe. We 
therefore reverse as to the liability of the officers in their individual capacities with 
respect to infringement under § 271(b). 
… 
DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co. 
471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in part) 
Rader, Judge: 
DSU Medical Corporation (DSU) and Medisystems Corporation (MDS) (col-
lectively DSU) sued JMS Company, Limited (JMS) and JMS North America (collec-
tively JMS) and ITL Corporation Pty, Limited (ITL) for patent infringement, in-
ducement to infringe, and contributory infringement of United States Patent Nos. 
5,112,311 and 5,266,072. … 
I. 
The ’311 and ’072 patents claim a guarded, winged-needle assembly. The in-
vention reduces the risk of accidental needle-stick injuries. Needle puncture wounds 
can transmit blood-borne diseases such as Hepatitis B and AIDS. The ’311 and ’072 
patented inventions effectively guard standard winged-needle-sets to prevent needle-
stick injuries. 
The ’311 patent claims a “slotted, locking guard for shielding a needle, and a 
winged needle assembly including a needle, a winged needle hub, and a slotted, 
locking guard.” This invention includes both “[a] slotted guard for locking a needle 
in a shielded position as the needle is removed from the patient”, and “a guarded 
winged needle assembly *** slidably mounted within the guard.” … 
… 
The alleged infringing device, made by ITL (an Australian company) sells under 
the name Platypus Needle Guard (Platypus). ITL manufactures the Platypus in Ma-
laysia and Singapore. The Platypus needle guard is a “stand-alone” product: a small 
configured piece of plastic. This plastic guard structure is not attached to any other 
device. In other words, the Platypus does not include a needle, but only a sheathing 
structure. Some claims of the ’311 patent recite both a slotted guard and a guarded 
winged needle assembly. Before use, the Platypus resembles an open clamshell 
(open-shell configuration). During use, the halves of the clam shell close to form the 
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needle guard (closed-shell configuration). … The Platypus has an upper and a lower 
“jaw.” When closed, the upper jaw extends around and overlaps the inner, lower 
jaw. During use, a medical technician closes the Platypus and locks it around tubing 
connected to the winged needle assembly. When the technician removes the needle 
from a patient, the worker slides the guard down the tube until the needle assem-
bly’s wings meet and pry the jaws apart. The wings and their attached needle assem-
bly slide into and through the guard, forcing the jaws ever wider as the wings make 
their way into a notched opening at the guard’s back. Ultimately the wings slide in-
to the rear opening. At that point, the jaws close around the used needle. 
JMS is a large Japanese medical supply business that competes with MDS in the 
United States market. Beginning in June 1999, JMS purchased Platypus needle 
guards from ITL, entering into an agreement to distribute the Platypus worldwide 
(the Supply Agreement). Under the Supply Agreement, JMS bought open-shell 
configuration Platypus guard units from ITL in Singapore and Malaysia. JMS gener-
ally closed the Platypus guards around needle sets before distributing them to cus-
tomers. 
DSU alleges that the Platypus infringes the ’311 patent. DSU also alleges that 
JMS and ITL contributed to and induced each other’s infringement. JMS sought to 
sell ITL’s infringing Platypus until it could produce its substitute non-infringing 
product, the WingEater. ITL offered to supply its infringing Platypus. DSU ad-
ditionally seeks damages from JMS because it “stole” MDS’s ability to renew a  
MasterGuard exclusive license with a former customer, Fresenius USA Mfg. 
… 
III. 
The jury found that JMS North America and JMS directly and contributorily 
infringed, and that JMS additionally induced JMS North America to infringe. How-
ever, the jury returned a verdict of non-infringement in favor of ITL. The jury en-
tered a verdict finding that ITL did not engage in contributory infringement or in-
ducement to infringe. The trial court denied DSU's motion for new trial on the ju-
ry's verdict that ITL did not contributorily infringe or induce infringement. 
… 
B. 
Resolution of Conflicting Precedent ~ 
Section III.B., only, is considered en banc. 
This court addresses Part III.B., of this opinion en banc. This section addresses, 
in the context of induced infringement, “the required intent *** to induce the  
specific acts of [infringement] or additionally to cause an infringement.” MEMC 
Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1378 n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). This section clarifies that intent requirement by holding en banc 
that, as was stated in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 
554 (Fed. Cir. 1990), “[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged 
infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known 
his actions would induce actual infringements.” The requirement that the alleged 
infringer knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringement 
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necessarily includes the requirement that he or she knew of the patent. See Golden 
Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1364 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Manville and explaining that the inducing infringement standard was satisfied 
“because it is undisputed that [the alleged infringer] had notice of the patent”). 
DSU claims the district court improperly instructed the jury on the state of 
mind necessary to prove inducement to infringe under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). This 
court reviews the legal sufficiency of jury instructions on an issue of patent law with-
out deference to the district court. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 
212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This Court reviews jury instructions in their 
entirety and “only orders a new trial when errors in the instructions as a whole clear-
ly mislead the jury.” Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 
415 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
Under § 271(b), “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be 
liable as an infringer.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). To establish liability under § 271(b), a 
patent holder must prove that once the defendants knew of the patent, they “active-
ly and knowingly aid[ed] and abett[ed] another’s direct infringement.” Water Tech-
nologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis in or-
iginal). However, “knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement” is not 
enough. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). The “mere knowledge of possible infringement by others does not amount 
to inducement; specific intent and action to induce infringement must be proven.” 
Id. at 1364 (citing Manville, 917 F.2d at 554). 
DSU asked the court to instruct the jury, purportedly in accordance with 
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990), that 
to induce infringement, the inducer need only intend to cause the acts of the third 
party that constitute direct infringement. The trial court gave the following instruc-
tion to the jury: 
In order to induce infringement, there must first be an act of direct in-
fringement and proof that the defendant knowingly induced infringement 
with the intent to encourage the infringement. The defendant must have 
intended to cause the acts that constitute the direct infringement and must 
have known or should have known than[sic] its action would cause the di-
rect infringement. Unlike direct infringement, which must take place with-
in the United States, induced infringement does not require any activity by 
the indirect infringer in this country, as long as the direct infringement oc-
curs here. 
Transcript at 432. Thus, the court charged the jury in accordance with Manville. 
The statute does not define whether the purported infringer must intend to induce 
the infringement or whether the purported infringer must merely intend to engage 
in the acts that induce the infringement regardless of whether it knows it is causing 
another to infringe. DSU complains that the instruction is incorrect because it re-
quires that the inducer possess specific intent to encourage another’s infringement, 
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and not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute in-
fringement.2 
In Grokster, which was a copyright case, the Supreme Court cited with approval 
this court’s decision in Water Technologies when it discussed inducement of in-
fringement, stating: 
The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is 
no different today. Evidence of “active steps *** taken to encourage direct 
infringement,” such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to 
engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the product be 
used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged over-
comes the law’s reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a 
commercial product suitable for some lawful use. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005). As a 
result, if an entity offers a product with the object of promoting its use to infringe, 
as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, 
it is then liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. Id. at 937. 
“The inducement rule *** premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and 
conduct.” Id. 
Grokster thus validates this court’s articulation of the state of mind requirement 
for inducement. See Manville, 917 F.2d at 544. In Manville, this court held that the 
“alleged infringer must be shown *** to have knowingly induced infringement,” 
917 F.2d at 553, not merely knowingly induced the acts that constitute direct in-
fringement. This court explained its “knowing” requirement: 
It must be established that the defendant possessed specific intent to en-
courage another’s infringement and not merely that the defendant had 
knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute inducement. The plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced in-
fringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would in-
duce actual infringements. 
Id. at 553. In Water Technologies, also cited with approval by the Supreme Court, 
this court clarified: “While proof of intent is necessary, direct evidence is not re-
quired; rather, circumstantial evidence may suffice.” 850 F.2d at 668. Although this 
court stated “that proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the in-
fringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active inducement,” Hewlett-
Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469, Grokster has clarified that the intent requirement for 
inducement requires more than just intent to cause the acts that produce direct in-
fringement. Beyond that threshold knowledge, the inducer must have an affirmative 
intent to cause direct infringement. In the words of a recent decision, inducement 
requires “‘that the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed 
                                                
2 In Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 
1990), this court stated that “[p]roof of actual intent to cause the acts which consti-
tute infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active infringement.” DSU 
reads this statement as standing for the proposition that proof of intent to cause in-
fringing acts is all that is required in order to establish inducement of infringement. 
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specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.’” MEMC Elec., 420 F.3d at 
1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 
F.3d 1294, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, inducement requires evidence 
of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement, not merely 
that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities. Accordingly, the 
district court correctly instructed the jury in this case. 
C. 
The district court denied DSU’s motion for a new trial on the issue of induce-
ment to infringe. This court reviews a denial of a motion for a new trial after a jury 
trial for abuse of discretion, affirming on any basis that supports the verdict. In 
denying the motion for new trial, the trial court stated: 
Fundamental principles of law hold that it is up to the jury to make deter-
minations of witness credibility, to decide the existence of any factual infer-
ences, and to determine the weight to be attributed to any direct or indi-
rect evidence. Although Plaintiffs introduced circumstantial evidence which 
permitted inferences of ITL’s intentions, it is up to the Jury to decide 
whether or not to draw any inference and to consider the weight of any 
such evidence. Assessing competing evidence is what the law asks juries to 
do, and the Court declines to take over this fundamental role of the Jury. 
The jury heard evidence about the commercial transactions between ITL and 
JMS, including JMS’s intention to sell ITL’s Platypus to Fresenius until JMS could 
get its own WingEater approved by the Food & Drug Administration and ready for 
market. The jury also heard evidence that Mr. Utterberg’s lawyer informed ITL in 
January 1997 that the Platypus infringed the ’311 patent. Additionally, the jury 
learned that ITL contacted an Australian attorney, who concluded that its Platypus 
would not infringe. JMS and ITL then also obtained letters from U.S. patent coun-
sel advising that the Platypus did not infringe. Mr. William Mobbs, one of the own-
ers of ITL who had participated in the design of the Platypus, testified that ITL had 
no intent to infringe the ’311 patent. 
Thus, on this record, the jury was well within the law to conclude that ITL did 
not induce JMS to infringe by purposefully and culpably encouraging JMS’s in-
fringement. To the contrary, the record contains evidence that ITL did not believe 
its Platypus infringed. Therefore, it had no intent to infringe. Accordingly, the rec-
ord supports the jury’s verdict based on the evidence showing a lack of the necessary 
specific intent. The trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion. 
… 
  
Miller’s Patent Cases 
324 
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 
131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) 
Alito, Justice: 
We consider whether a party who “actively induces infringement of a patent” 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) must know that the induced acts constitute patent in-
fringement. 
I 
This case concerns a patent for an innovative deep fryer designed by respondent 
SEB S.A., a French maker of home appliances. In the late 1980’s, SEB invented a 
“cool-touch” deep fryer, that is, a deep fryer for home use with external surfaces 
that remain cool during the frying process. The cool-touch deep fryer consisted of a 
metal frying pot surrounded by a plastic outer housing. Attached to the housing was 
a ring that suspended the metal pot and insulated the housing from heat by sepa-
rating it from the pot, creating air space between the two components. SEB ob-
tained a U.S. patent for its design in 1991, and sometime later, SEB started manu-
facturing the cool-touch fryer and selling it in this country under its well-known “T-
Fal” brand. Superior to other products in the American market at the time, SEB’s 
fryer was a commercial success. 
In 1997, Sunbeam Products, Inc., a U.S. competitor of SEB, asked petitioner 
Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd., to supply it with deep fryers meeting certain specifica-
tions. Pentalpha is a Hong Kong maker of home appliances and a wholly owned 
subsidiary of petitioner Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. [collectively “Pentalpha”]. 
In order to develop a deep fryer for Sunbeam, Pentalpha purchased an SEB fry-
er in Hong Kong and copied all but its cosmetic features. Because the SEB fryer 
bought in Hong Kong was made for sale in a foreign market, it bore no U.S. patent 
markings. After copying SEB’s design, Pentalpha retained an attorney to conduct a 
right-to-use study, but Pentalpha refrained from telling the attorney that its design 
was copied directly from SEB’s. 
The attorney failed to locate SEB’s patent, and in August 1997 he issued an 
opinion letter stating that Pentalpha’s deep fryer did not infringe any of the patents 
that he had found. That same month, Pentalpha started selling its deep fryers to 
Sunbeam, which resold them in the United States under its trademarks. By obtain-
ing its product from a manufacturer with lower production costs, Sunbeam was able 
to undercut SEB in the U.S. market. 
After SEB’s customers started defecting to Sunbeam, SEB sued Sunbeam in 
March 1998, alleging that Sunbeam’s sales infringed SEB’s patent. Sunbeam noti-
fied Pentalpha of the lawsuit the following month. Undeterred, Pentalpha went on 
to sell deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward & Co., both of which 
resold them in the United States under their respective trademarks. 
SEB settled the lawsuit with Sunbeam, and then sued Pentalpha, asserting two 
theories of recovery: First, SEB claimed that Pentalpha had directly infringed SEB’s 
patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), by selling or offering to sell its deep fry-
ers; and second, SEB claimed that Pentalpha had contravened § 271(b) by actively 
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inducing Sunbeam, Fingerhut, and Montgomery Ward to sell or to offer to sell  
Pentalpha’s deep fryers in violation of SEB’s patent rights. 
Following a 5-day trial, the jury found for SEB on both theories … . Pentalpha 
filed post-trial motions seeking a new trial or judgment as a matter of law … ar-
gu[ing, among other things,] that there was insufficient evidence to support the  
jury’s finding of induced infringement under § 271(b) because Pentalpha did not 
actually know of SEB’s patent until it received the notice of the Sunbeam lawsuit in 
April 1998. 
The District Court rejected Pentalpha’s argument, as did the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the judgment. Summarizing a recent en banc 
decision, the Federal Circuit stated that induced infringement under § 271(b) re-
quires a “plaintiff [to] show that the alleged infringer knew or should have known 
that his actions would induce actual infringements” and that this showing includes 
proof that the alleged infringer knew of the patent. Although the record contained 
no direct evidence that Pentalpha knew of SEB’s patent before April 1998, the court 
found adequate evidence to support a finding that “Pentalpha deliberately disre-
garded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent.” Such disregard, the court 
said, “is not different from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual knowledge.” 
…  
II 
Pentalpha argues that active inducement liability under § 271(b) requires more 
than deliberate indifference to a known risk that the induced acts may violate an  
existing patent. Instead, Pentalpha maintains, actual knowledge of the patent is 
needed. 
A 
In assessing Pentalpha’s argument, we begin with the text of § 271(b)—which 
is short, simple, and, with respect to the question presented in this case, inconclu-
sive. Section 271(b) states: “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall 
be liable as an infringer.” 
Although the text of § 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at 
least some intent is required. The term “induce” means “[t]o lead on; to influence; 
to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.” Webster’s New International Dic-
tionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945). The addition of the adverb “actively” suggests that the 
inducement must involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring about the desired 
result, see id. at 27. 
When a person actively induces another to take some action, the inducer obvi-
ously knows the action that he or she wishes to bring about. If a used car salesman 
induces a customer to buy a car, the salesman knows that the desired result is the 
purchase of the car. But what if it is said that the salesman induced the customer to 
buy a damaged car? Does this mean merely that the salesman induced the customer 
to purchase a car that happened to be damaged, a fact of which the salesman may 
have been unaware? Or does this mean that the salesman knew that the car was 
damaged? The statement that the salesman induced the customer to buy a damaged 
car is ambiguous. 
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So is § 271(b). In referring to a party that “induces infringement,” this pro-
vision may require merely that the inducer lead another to engage in conduct that 
happens to amount to infringement, i.e., the making, using, offering to sell, selling, 
or importing of a patented invention. See § 271(a).2 On the other hand, the refer-
ence to a party that “induces infringement” may also be read to mean that the in-
ducer must persuade another to engage in conduct that the inducer knows is in-
fringement. Both readings are possible. 
B 
Finding no definitive answer in the statutory text, we turn to the case law that 
predates the enactment of § 271 as part the Patent Act of 1952. As we recognized 
in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) (Aro II), 
“[t]he section was designed to ‘codify in statutory form principles of contributory 
infringement’ which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years.’” Id. at 485-486, 
n. 6 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1952)). 
Unfortunately, the relevant pre-1952 cases are less clear than one might hope 
with respect to the question presented here. Before 1952, both the conduct now 
covered by § 271(b) (induced infringement) and the conduct now addressed by 
§ 271(c) (sale of a component of a patented invention) were viewed as falling within 
the overarching concept of “contributory infringement.” Cases in the latter catego-
ry—i.e., cases in which a party sold an item that was not itself covered by the claims 
of a patent but that enabled another party to make or use a patented machine, pro-
cess, or combination—were more common. 
The pre-1952 case law provides conflicting signals regarding the intent needed 
in such cases. In an oft-cited decision, then-Judge Taft suggested that it was suffi-
cient if the seller of the component part intended that the part be used in an inven-
tion that happened to infringe a patent. He wrote that it was “well settled that 
where one makes and sells one element of a combination covered by a patent with 
the intention and for the purpose of bringing about its use in such a combination he 
is guilty of contributory infringement.” Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 
80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897). 
On the other hand, this Court, in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), 
overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 
243 U.S. 502 (1917), stated that “if the defendants [who were accused of contribu-
tory infringement] knew of the patent and that [the direct infringer] had unlawfully 
made the patented article *** with the intent and purpose that [the direct infringer] 
should use the infringing article *** they would assist in her infringing use.” 224 
U.S. at 33 (emphasis added and deleted). Our decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), which looked to the law of con-
tributory patent infringement for guidance in determining the standard to be ap-
plied in a case claiming contributory copyright infringement, contains dicta that may 
be read as interpreting the pre-1952 cases this way. In Grokster, we said that “[t]he 
                                                
2 Direct infringement has long been understood to require no more than the unau-
thorized use of a patented invention. Thus, a direct infringer’s knowledge or intent 
is irrelevant. 
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inducement rule *** premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and con-
duct.” Id. at 937. 
While both the language of § 271(b) and the pre-1952 case law that this pro-
vision was meant to codify are susceptible to conflicting interpretations, our decision 
in Aro II resolves the question in this case. In Aro II, a majority held that a violator 
of § 271(c) must know “that the combination for which his component was es-
pecially designed was both patented and infringing,” 377 U.S. at 488, and as we 
explain below, that conclusion compels this same knowledge for liability under 
§ 271(b). 
C 
As noted above, induced infringement was not considered a separate theory of 
indirect liability in the pre-1952 case law. Rather, it was treated as evidence of “con-
tributory infringement,” that is, the aiding and abetting of direct infringement by 
another party. When Congress enacted § 271, it separated what had previously been 
regarded as contributory infringement into two categories, one covered by § 271(b) 
and the other covered by § 271(c). 
Aro II concerned § 271(c), which states in relevant part: 
Whoever offers to sell or sells *** a component of a patented [invention] 
***, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be 
especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such  
patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 
(Emphasis added). This language contains exactly the same ambiguity as § 271(b). 
The phrase “knowing [a component] to be especially made or especially adapted for 
use in an infringement” may be read to mean that a violator must know that the 
component is “especially adapted for use” in a product that happens to infringe a 
patent. Or the phrase may be read to require, in addition, knowledge of the patent’s 
existence. 
This question closely divided the Aro II Court. In a badly fractured decision, a 
majority concluded that knowledge of the patent was needed. 377 U.S. at 488 & n. 
8; id. at 514 (White, J., concurring); id. at 524-527 (Black, J., dissenting).5 Justice 
Black’s opinion, which explained the basis for the majority’s view, concluded that 
the language of § 271(c) supported this interpretation. See id. at 525. His opinion 
also relied on an amendment to this language that was adopted when the bill was in 
committee. Id. at 525-527. 
Four Justices disagreed with this interpretation and would have held that a vio-
lator of § 271(c) need know only that the component is specially adapted for use in 
a product that happens to infringe a patent. See id. at 488-490, n. 8. These Justices 
                                                
5 Although Justice Black disagreed with the judgment and was thus in dissent, he 
was in the majority with respect to the interpretation of § 271(c), and his opinion 
sets out the reasoning of the majority on this point. Three other Justices joined his 
opinion, and a fourth, Justice White, endorsed his reasoning with respect to the in-
terpretation of § 271(c). See 377 U.S. at 514 (White, J., concurring). 
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thought that this reading was supported by the language of § 271(c) and the pre-
1952 case law, and they disagreed with the inference drawn by the majority from the 
amendment of § 271(c)’s language. 
While there is much to be said in favor of both views expressed in Aro II, the 
“holding in Aro II has become a fixture in the law of contributory infringement un-
der § 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents § 15:20, p. 15-131 (4th ed. 2009)—so 
much so that SEB has not asked us to overrule it. Nor has Congress seen fit to alter 
§ 271(c)’s intent requirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was decided. 
In light of the “‘special force’” of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to ques-
tions of statutory interpretation, see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 
U.S. 130, 139 (2008), we proceed on the premise that § 271(c) requires knowledge 
of the existence of the patent that is infringed. 
Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for induced 
infringement under § 271(b). As noted, the two provisions have a common origin 
in the pre-1952 understanding of contributory infringement, and the language of 
the two provisions creates the same difficult interpretive choice. It would thus be 
strange to hold that knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(c) but 
not under § 271(b). 
Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires 
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. 
III 
Returning to Pentalpha’s principal challenge, we agree that deliberate indiffer-
ence to a known risk that a patent exists is not the appropriate standard under 
§ 271(b). We nevertheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the 
evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to support a finding of Pentalpha’s 
knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness. 
A 
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many crim-
inal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts 
applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the 
reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of 
critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances. The traditional  
rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as 
culpable as those who have actual knowledge. Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of 
Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. Rev. 294, 302 (1954) (hereinafter Edwards) (observing on 
the basis of English authorities that “up to the present day, no real doubt has been 
cast on the proposition that [willful blindness] is as culpable as actual knowledge”). 
It is also said that persons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof of 
critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts. See United States v. Jewell, 
532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
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This Court’s opinion more than a century ago in Spurr v. United States, 174 
U.S. 728 (1899),6 while not using the term “willful blindness,” endorsed a similar 
concept. The case involved a criminal statute that prohibited a bank officer from 
“willfully” certifying a check drawn against insufficient funds. We said that a willful 
violation would occur “if the [bank] officer purposely keeps himself in ignorance of 
whether the drawer has money in the bank.” Id. at 735. Following our decision in 
Spurr, several federal prosecutions in the first half of the 20th century invoked the 
doctrine of willful blindness. Later, a 1962 proposed draft of the Model Penal Code, 
which has since become official, attempted to incorporate the doctrine by defining 
“knowledge of the existence of a particular fact” to include a situation in which “a 
person is aware of a high probability of [the fact’s] existence, unless he actually be-
lieves that it does not exist.” ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). Our Court has used the Code’s definition as a guide in analyzing 
whether certain statutory presumptions of knowledge comported with due process. 
See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-417 (1970); Leary v. United States, 
395 U.S. 6, 46-47 & n. 93 (1969). And every Court of Appeals—with the possible 
exception of the District of Columbia Circuit—has fully embraced willful blindness, 
applying the doctrine to a wide range of criminal statutes. 
Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in the Feder-
al Judiciary, we can see no reason why the doctrine should not apply in civil lawsuits 
for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).8 
Pentalpha urges us not to take this step, arguing that § 271(b) demands more 
than willful blindness with respect to the induced acts that constitute infringement. 
This question, however, is not at issue here. There is no need to invoke the doctrine 
of willful blindness to establish that Pentalpha knew that the retailers who purchased 
its fryer were selling that product in the American market; Pentalpha was indis-
putably aware that its customers were selling its product in this country. 
Pentalpha further contends that this Court in Grokster did not accept the Solici-
tor General’s suggestion that Grokster and StreamCast could be held liable for in-
ducing the infringement of copyrights under a theory of willful blindness. But the 
Court had no need to consider the doctrine of willful blindness in that case because 
                                                
6 The doctrine emerged in English law almost four decades earlier and became firm-
ly established by the end of the 19th century. Edwards 298-301. In American law, 
one of the earliest references to the doctrine appears in an 1882 jury charge in a fed-
eral prosecution. In the charge, the trial judge rejected the “great misapprehension” 
that a person may “close his eyes, when he pleases, upon all sources of information, 
and then excuse his ignorance by saying that he does not see anything.” See United 
States v. Houghton, 14 F. 544, 547 (D.N.J. 1882). 
8 Unlike the dissent, we do not think that utilitarian concerns demand a stricter 
standard for knowledge under § 271(b). The dissent does not explain—nor can we 
see—why promoting “‘the Progress of Science and useful Arts’” requires protecting 
parties who actively encourage others to violate patent rights and who take deliber-
ate steps to remain ignorant of those rights despite a high probability that the rights 
exist and are being infringed. 
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the Court found ample evidence that Grokster and StreamCast were fully aware—in 
the ordinary sense of the term—that their file-sharing software was routinely used in 
carrying out the acts that constituted infringement (the unauthorized sharing of 
copyrighted works) and that these acts violated the rights of copyright holders. See 
545 U.S. at 922-927, 937-940. 
B 
While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slight-
ly different ways, all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) the defendant 
must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the 
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact. We think these 
requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses 
recklessness and negligence. Under this formulation, a willfully blind defendant is 
one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrong-
doing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts. See G. 
Williams, Criminal Law § 57, p. 159 (2d ed. 1961) (“A court can properly find wil-
ful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant actually knew”). By 
contrast, a reckless defendant is one who merely knows of a substantial and unjusti-
fied risk of such wrongdoing, see ALI, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (1985), and a 
negligent defendant is one who should have known of a similar risk but, in fact, did 
not, see § 2.02(2)(d). 
The test applied by the Federal Circuit in this case departs from the proper will-
ful blindness standard in two important respects. First, it permits a finding of 
knowledge when there is merely a “known risk” that the induced acts are infringing. 
Second, in demanding only “deliberate indifference” to that risk, the Federal Cir-
cuit’s test does not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing about the 
infringing nature of the activities. 
In spite of these flaws, we believe that the evidence when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict for SEB is sufficient under the correct standard. The 
jury could have easily found that before April 1998 Pentalpha willfully blinded itself 
to the infringing nature of the sales it encouraged Sunbeam to make.10 
SEB’s cool-touch fryer was an innovation in the U.S. market when Pentalpha 
copied it. As one would expect with any superior product, sales of SEB’s fryer had 
been growing for some time. Pentalpha knew all of this, for its CEO and president, 
John Sham, testified that, in developing a product for Sunbeam, Pentalpha per-
formed “market research” and “gather[ed] information as much as possible.” Pen-
talpha’s belief that SEB’s fryer embodied advanced technology that would be  
valuable in the U.S. market is evidenced by its decision to copy all but the cosmetic 
features of SEB’s fryer. 
                                                
10 The District Court did not instruct the jury according to the standard we set out 
today, and Pentalpha asks us to remand the case so it can move for a new trial. We 
reject that request. Pentalpha did not challenge the jury instructions in the Court of 
Appeals, and that court did not pass upon the issue. Finding no “exceptional” cir-
cumstances in this case, we follow our usual course and refuse to consider the issue. 
See Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam). 
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Also revealing is Pentalpha’s decision to copy an overseas model of SEB’s fryer. 
Pentalpha knew that the product it was designing was for the U.S. market, and 
Sham—himself a named inventor on numerous U.S. patents—was well aware that 
products made for overseas markets usually do not bear U.S. patent markings. Even 
more telling is Sham’s decision not to inform the attorney from whom Pentalpha 
sought a right-to-use opinion that the product to be evaluated was simply a 
knockoff of SEB’s deep fryer. On the facts of this case, we cannot fathom what mo-
tive Sham could have had for withholding this information other than to manufac-
ture a claim of plausible deniability in the event that his company was later accused 
of patent infringement. Nor does Sham’s testimony on this subject provide any  
reason to doubt that inference. Asked whether the attorney would have fared better 
had he known of SEB’s design, Sham was nonresponsive. All he could say was that a 
patent search is not an “easy job” and that is why he hired attorneys to perform 
them. 
Taken together, this evidence was more than sufficient for a jury to find that 
Pentalpha subjectively believed there was a high probability that SEB’s fryer was  
patented, that Pentalpha took deliberate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and that it 
therefore willfully blinded itself to the infringing nature of Sunbeam’s sales. 
…  
Kennedy, Justice, dissenting: 
The Court is correct, in my view, to conclude that 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) must be 
read in tandem with § 271(c), and therefore that to induce infringement a defend-
ant must know “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” 
Yet the Court does more. Having interpreted the statute to require a showing 
of knowledge, the Court holds that willful blindness will suffice. This is a mistaken 
step. Willful blindness is not knowledge; and judges should not broaden a legislative 
proscription by analogy. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 
1976) (en banc) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“When a statute specifically requires 
knowledge as an element of a crime, however, the substitution of some other state 
of mind cannot be justified even if the court deems that both are equally blamewor-
thy.”). In my respectful submission, the Court is incorrect in the definition it now 
adopts; but even on its own terms the Court should remand to the Court of Appeals 
to consider in the first instance whether there is sufficient evidence of knowledge to 
support the jury’s finding of inducement. 
The Court invokes willful blindness to bring those who lack knowledge within 
§ 271(b)’s prohibition. The Court’s definition of willful blindness reveals this basic 
purpose. One can believe that there is a “high probability” that acts might infringe a 
patent but nonetheless conclude they do not infringe. The alleged inducer who be-
lieves a device is noninfringing cannot be said to know otherwise. 
The Court justifies its substitution of willful blindness for the statutory 
knowledge requirement in two ways, neither of which is convincing. 
First, the Court appeals to moral theory by citing the “traditional rationale” 
that willfully blind defendants “are just as culpable as those who have actual 
knowledge.” But the moral question is a difficult one. Is it true that the lawyer who 
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knowingly suborns perjury is no more culpable than the lawyer who avoids learning 
that his client, a criminal defendant, lies when he testifies that he was not the shoot-
er? See Hellman, Willfully Blind for Good Reason, 3 Crim. L. & Phil. 301, 305-308 
(2009); Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 Geo. L.J. 957 (1999). The answer is not 
obvious. Perhaps the culpability of willful blindness depends on a person’s reasons 
for remaining blind. Or perhaps only the person’s justification for his conduct is rel-
evant. This is a question of morality and of policy best left to the political branches. 
Even if one were to accept the substitution of equally blameworthy mental states in 
criminal cases in light of the retributive purposes of the criminal law, those purposes 
have no force in the domain of patent law that controls in this case. The Constitu-
tion confirms that the purpose of the patent law is a utilitarian one, to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Second, the Court appeals to precedent, noting that a “similar concept” to will-
ful blindness appears in this Court’s cases as early as 1899. But this Court has never 
before held that willful blindness can substitute for a statutory requirement of 
knowledge. Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899), explained that “evil 
design may be presumed if the [bank] officer purposefully keeps himself in ig-
norance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or is grossly indiffer-
ent to his duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact.” The question in Spurr 
was whether the defendant’s admitted violation was willful, and with this sentence 
the Court simply explained that wrongful intent may be inferred from the circum-
stances. It did not suggest that blindness can substitute for knowledge. Neither did 
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), or Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 
(1969). As the Court here explains, both cases held only that certain statutory pre-
sumptions of knowledge were consistent with due process. And although most 
Courts of Appeals have embraced willful blindness, counting courts in a circuit split 
is not this Court’s usual method for deciding important questions of law. 
The Court appears to endorse the willful blindness doctrine here for all federal 
criminal cases involving knowledge. It does so in a civil case where it has received no 
briefing or argument from the criminal defense bar, which might have provided im-
portant counsel on this difficult issue. 
There is no need to invoke willful blindness for the first time in this case. Facts 
that support willful blindness are often probative of actual knowledge. Circumstan-
tial facts like these tend to be the only available evidence in any event, for the jury 
lacks direct access to the defendant’s mind. The jury must often infer knowledge 
from conduct, and attempts to eliminate evidence of knowledge may justify such 
inference, as where an accused inducer avoids further confirming what he already 
believes with good reason to be true. The majority’s decision to expand the statute’s 
scope appears to depend on the unstated premise that knowledge requires certainty, 
but the law often permits probabilistic judgments to count as knowledge. 
The instant dispute provides a case in point. Pentalpha copied an innovative fry-
er. The model it copied bore no U.S. patent markings, but that could not have been 
a surprise, for Pentalpha knew that a fryer purchased in Hong Kong was unlikely to 
bear such markings. And Pentalpha failed to tell the lawyer who ran a patent search 
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that it copied the SEB fryer. These facts may suggest knowledge that Pentalpha’s 
fryers were infringing, and perhaps a jury could so find. 
But examining the sufficiency of the evidence presented in the 5-day trial re-
quires careful review of an extensive record. The trial transcript alone spans over 
1,000 pages. If willful blindness is as close to knowledge and as far from the “knew 
or should have known” jury instruction provided in this case as the Court suggests, 
then reviewing the record becomes all the more difficult. I would leave that task to 
the Court of Appeals in the first instance on remand. 
For these reasons, and with respect, I dissent. 
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) 
Alito, Justice: 
This case presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for inducing 
infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly in-
fringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision. The statutory 
text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in the 




Respondent the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is the assignee of U.S. 
Patent No. 6,108,703, which claims a method of delivering electronic data using a 
“content delivery network,” or “CDN.” Respondent Akamai Technologies, Inc., is 
the exclusive licensee. Akamai maintains many servers distributed in various loca-
tions. Proprietors of Web sites, known as “content providers,” contract with Akamai 
to deliver their Web sites’ content to individual Internet users. The ’703 patent pro-
vides for the designation of certain components of a content provider’s Web site (of-
ten large files, such as video or music files) to be stored on Akamai’s servers and ac-
cessed from those servers by Internet users. The process of designating components 
to be stored on Akamai’s servers is known as “tagging.” By “aggregat[ing] the data 
demands of multiple content providers with differing peak usage patterns and 
serv[ing] that content from multiple servers in multiple locations,” 614 F. Supp. 2d 
90, 96 (D. Mass. 2009), as well as by delivering content from servers located in the 
same geographic area as the users who are attempting to access it, Akamai is able to 
increase the speed with which Internet users access the content of its customers’ 
Web sites. 
Petitioner Limelight Networks, Inc., also operates a CDN and carries out sever-
al of the steps claimed in the ’703 patent. But instead of tagging those components 
of its customers’ Web sites that it intends to store on its servers (a step included in 
the ’703 patent), Limelight requires its customers to do their own tagging. Re-
spondents claim that Limelight “provides instructions and offers technical assis-
tance” to its customers regarding how to tag, 629 F.3d 1311, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 
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2010), but the record is undisputed that Limelight does not tag the components to 
be stored on its servers. 
B 
In 2006, respondents sued Limelight … claiming patent infringement. The case 
was tried to a jury, which found that Limelight had committed infringement and 
awarded more than $40 million in damages. 
Respondents’ victory was short-lived, however. After the jury returned its ver-
dict, the Federal Circuit decided Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In that case the Court of Appeals rejected a claim that the 
defendant’s method, involving bidding on financial instruments using a computer 
system, directly infringed the plaintiff’s patent. The defendant performed some of 
the steps of the patented method, and its customers, to whom the defendant gave 
access to its system along with instructions on the use of the system, performed the 
remaining steps. The court started from “the proposition that direct infringement 
requires a single party to perform every step of a claimed method.” Id. at 1329. This 
requirement is satisfied even though the steps are actually undertaken by multiple 
parties, the court explained, if a single defendant “exercises ‘control or direction’ 
over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling party.” 
Id. The court held that the defendant in Muniauction was not liable for direct in-
fringement because it did not exercise control or direction over its customers’ per-
formance of those steps of the patent that the defendant itself did not perform. Id. 
at 1330. 
In light of Muniauction, Limelight moved for reconsideration of its earlier mo-
tion for judgment as a matter of law, which the District Court had denied. The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion, concluding that Muniauction precluded a finding of 
direct infringement under § 271(a) because infringement of the ’703 patent re-
quired tagging and Limelight does not control or direct its customers’ tagging. A 
panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed, explaining that a defendant that does not itself 
undertake all of a patent’s steps can be liable for direct infringement only “when 
there is an agency relationship between the parties who perform the method steps or 
when one party is contractually obligated to the other to perform the steps.” 629 
F.3d at 1320. Since neither of these conditions was met in the present case, the 
Federal Circuit panel held that Limelight could not be held liable for direct in-
fringement. Id. 
The Federal Circuit granted en banc review and reversed. The en banc court 
found it unnecessary to revisit its § 271(a) direct infringement case law. Instead, it 
concluded that the “evidence could support a judgment in [respondents’] favor on a 
theory of induced infringement” under § 271(b). 692 F.3d 1301, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (per curiam). This was true, the court explained, because § 271(b) liability 
arises when a defendant carries out some steps constituting a method patent and 
encourages others to carry out the remaining steps—even if no one would be liable 
as a direct infringer in such circumstances, because those who performed the re-
maining steps did not act as agents of, or under the direction or control of, the de-
fendant. The Court of Appeals did not dispute that “there can be no indirect in-
fringement without direct infringement,” id. at 1308, but it explained that “[r]e-
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quiring proof that there has been direct infringement *** is not the same as requir-
ing proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer,”[†] id. at 1308-
1309. … 
Limelight sought certiorari, which we granted. …  
II 
A 
Neither the Federal Circuit, see 692 F.3d at 1308, nor respondents, see Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 44, dispute the proposition that liability for inducement must be predi-
cated on direct infringement. This is for good reason, as our case law leaves no 
doubt that inducement liability may arise “if, but only if, [there is] *** direct in-
fringement.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 
(1961).3  
One might think that this simple truth is enough to dispose of this appeal. But 
the Federal Circuit reasoned that a defendant can be liable for inducing infringe-
ment under § 271(b) even if no one has committed direct infringement within the 
terms of § 271(a) (or any other provision of the patent laws), because direct in-
fringement can exist independently of a violation of these statutory provisions. 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to 
infringe a method patent.[‡] A method patent claims a number of steps; under this 
Court’s case law, the patent is not infringed unless all the steps are carried out. See, 
e.g., Aro, 365 U.S. at 344 (a “patent covers only the totality of the elements in the 
claim and *** no element, separately viewed, is within the grant”). This principle 
follows ineluctably from what a patent is: the conferral of rights in a particular 
claimed set of elements. “Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed ma-
terial to defining the scope of the patented invention,” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hil-
ton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997), and a patentee’s rights extend  
only to the claimed combination of elements, and no further. 
The Federal Circuit held in Muniauction that a method’s steps have not all 
been performed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same 
defendant, either because the defendant actually performed those steps or because 
he directed or controlled others who performed them. See 532 F.3d at 1329-1330. 
Assuming without deciding that the Federal Circuit’s holding in Muniauction is cor-
rect, there has simply been no infringement of the method in which respondents 
have staked out an interest, because the performance of all the patent’s steps is not 
attributable to any one person. And, as both the Federal Circuit and respondents 
admit, where there has been no direct infringement, there can be no inducement of 
infringement under § 271(b). 
                                                
† [ Ed. Note: What the what ?!? ] 
3 Aro addressed contributory infringement under § 271(c), rather than inducement 
of infringement under § 271(b), but we see no basis to distinguish for these pur-
poses between the two, which after all spring from common stock. See Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067-2068 (2011). 
‡ [ Ed. Note: Ouch! ] 
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The Federal Circuit’s contrary view would deprive § 271(b) of ascertainable 
standards. If a defendant can be held liable under § 271(b) for inducing conduct 
that does not constitute infringement, then how can a court assess when a patent 
holder’s rights have been invaded? What if a defendant pays another to perform just 
one step of a 12-step process, and no one performs the other steps, but that one 
step can be viewed as the most important step in the process? In that case the de-
fendant has not encouraged infringement, but no principled reason prevents him 
from being held liable for inducement under the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, which 
permits inducement liability when fewer than all of a method’s steps have been per-
formed within the meaning of the patent. The decision below would require the 
courts to develop two parallel bodies of infringement law: one for liability for direct 
infringement, and one for liability for inducement. 
Section 271(f)(1) reinforces our reading of § 271(b). That subsection imposes 
liability on a party who “supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United 
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention *** in 
such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of 
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination 
occurred within the United States” (emphasis added). As this provision illustrates, 
when Congress wishes to impose liability for inducing activity that does not itself 
constitute direct infringement, it knows precisely how to do so. The courts should 
not create liability for inducement of noninfringing conduct where Congress has 
elected not to extend that concept. 
The Federal Circuit seems to have adopted the view that Limelight induced in-
fringement on the theory that the steps that Limelight and its customers perform 
would infringe the ’703 patent if all the steps were performed by the same person. 
But we have already rejected the notion that conduct which would be infringing in 
altered circumstances can form the basis for contributory infringement, and we see 
no reason to apply a different rule for inducement. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), a manufacturer produced components of a 
patented machine and then exported those components overseas to be assembled by 
its foreign customers.4 (The assembly by the foreign customers did not violate U.S. 
patent laws.) In both Deepsouth and this case, the conduct that the defendant in-
duced or contributed to would have been infringing if committed in altered circum-
stances: in Deepsouth if the machines had been assembled in the United States, see id. 
at 526, and in this case if performance of all of the claimed steps had been attributa-
ble to the same person. In Deepsouth, we rejected the possibility of contributory in-
fringement because the machines had not been assembled in the United States, and 
direct infringement had consequently never occurred. See id. at 526-527. Similarly, 
in this case, performance of all the claimed steps cannot be attributed to a single per-
son, so direct infringement never occurred. Limelight cannot be liable for inducing 
infringement that never came to pass. 
                                                
4 Section 271(f) now prohibits the exporter’s conduct at issue in Deepsouth. 
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B 
Respondents’ arguments in support of the Federal Circuit’s reading of the stat-
ute are unpersuasive. First, respondents note that tort law imposes liability on a de-
fendant who harms another through a third party, even if that third party would not 
himself be liable, and respondents contend that, given the background tort prin-
ciples against which the Patent Act of 1952 was enacted, it should not matter that 
no one is liable for direct infringement in this case. But the reason Limelight could 
not have induced infringement under § 271(b) is not that no third party is liable for 
direct infringement; the problem, instead, is that no direct infringement was com-
mitted. Muniauction (which, again, we assume to be correct) instructs that a meth-
od patent is not directly infringed—and the patentee’s interest is thus not violated—
unless a single actor can be held responsible for the performance of all steps of the 
patent. Because Limelight did not undertake all steps of the ’703 patent and cannot 
otherwise be held responsible for all those steps, respondents’ rights have not been 
violated. Unsurprisingly, respondents point us to no tort case in which liability was 
imposed because a defendant caused an innocent third party to undertake action 
that did not violate the plaintiff’s legal rights. 
In a related argument, respondents contend that, at tort, liability sometimes at-
taches where two or more defendants inflict injury, even if each defendant’s con-
duct, standing alone, would not be actionable. See W. Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on Torts § 52, at 354 (5th ed. 1984) (multiple defendants who each add 
negligible impurities to stream liable if aggregate impurities cause harm). But the 
rationale for imposing liability in these circumstances is that the defendants collec-
tively invaded the plaintiff’s protected interests. By contrast, under the Muniauction 
rule, respondents’ interests in the ’703 patent have not been invaded. 
Second, respondents seek to analogize § 271(b) to the federal aiding and abet-
ting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, and they argue that two parties who divide all the neces-
sary elements of a crime between them are both guilty under § 2. The analogy does 
not hold up. The aiding and abetting statute must be read “against its common-law 
background,” Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 19 (1980), and at common 
law two or more defendants, each of whom committed an element of a crime, were 
liable as principals. See, e.g., 1 J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law § 649, 
at 392 (7th ed. 1882). While we have drawn on criminal law concepts in the past in 
interpreting § 271(b), see Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 
2068-2070 (2011), we think it unlikely that Congress had this particular doctrine in 
mind when it enacted the Patent Act of 1952, given the doctrine’s inconsistency 
with the Act’s cornerstone principle that patentees have a right only to the set of 
elements claimed in their patents and nothing further. 
Third, respondents contend that patent law principles established before the 
enactment of the Patent Act demonstrate that a defendant that performs some steps 
of a patent with the purpose of having its customers perform the remaining steps is 
liable for inducing infringement. But here, too, the nature of the rights created by 
the Patent Act defeats the notion that Congress could have intended to permit in-
ducement liability where there is no underlying direct infringement. According to 
respondents, their understanding of the pre-1952 doctrine casts doubt on the  
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Muniauction rule for direct infringement under § 271(a), on the ground that that 
rule has the indirect effect of preventing inducement liability where Congress would 
have wanted it. But the possibility that the Federal Circuit erred by too narrowly 
circumscribing the scope of § 271(a) is no reason for this Court to err a second time 
by misconstruing § 271(b) to impose liability for inducing infringement where no 
infringement has occurred. 
Finally, respondents, like the Federal Circuit, criticize our interpretation of 
§ 271(b) as permitting a would-be infringer to evade liability by dividing perfor-
mance of a method patent’s steps with another whom the defendant neither directs 
nor controls. We acknowledge this concern. Any such anomaly, however, would  
result from the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of § 271(a) in Muniauction. A desire 
to avoid Muniauction’s natural consequences does not justify fundamentally altering 
the rules of inducement liability that the text and structure of the Patent Act clearly 
require—an alteration that would result in its own serious and problematic conse-
quences, namely, creating for § 271(b) purposes some free-floating concept of “in-
fringement” both untethered to the statutory text and difficult for the lower courts 
to apply consistently. 
III 
Respondents ask us to review the merits of the Federal Circuit’s Muniauction 
rule for direct infringement under § 271(a). We decline to do so today. 
In the first place, the question presented is clearly focused on § 271(b), not 
§ 271(a). We granted certiorari on the following question: “Whether the Federal 
Circuit erred in holding that a defendant may be held liable for inducing patent in-
fringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) even though no one has committed direct 
infringement under § 271(a).” Pet. for Cert. i. The question presupposes that Lime-
light has not committed direct infringement under § 271(a). And since the question 
on which we granted certiorari did not involve § 271(a), petitioner did not address 
that important issue in its opening brief. Our decision on the § 271(b) question ne-
cessitates a remand to the Federal Circuit, and on remand, the Federal Circuit will 
have the opportunity to revisit the § 271(a) question if it so chooses. 
IV 
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
Editor’s Note 
On remand, the Federal Circuit—in a sharply divided opinion—adhered to the 
view that there was no direct infringement in the case because neither Limelight nor 
its customers performed all the steps of the claimed methods. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. 
Limelight Networks, Inc., __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 2216261 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2015). 
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Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. 
135 S. Ct. 19__ (2015) 
Kennedy, Justice:  
A patent holder, and the holder’s lawful licensees, can recover for monetary in-
jury when their exclusive rights are violated by others’ wrongful conduct. One form 
of patent injury occurs if unauthorized persons or entities copy, use, or otherwise 
infringe upon the patented invention. Another form of injury to the patent holder 
or his licensees can occur when the actor induces others to infringe the patent. In 
the instant case, both forms of injury—direct infringement and wrongful induce-
ment of others to commit infringement—were alleged. After two trials, the defend-
ant was found liable for both types of injury. The dispute now before the Court 
concerns the inducement aspect of the case. 
I 
The patent holder who commenced this action is the petitioner here, Commil. 
The technical details of Commil’s patent are not at issue. So it suffices to say, with 
much oversimplification, that the patent is for a method of implementing short-
range wireless networks. Suppose an extensive business headquarters or a resort or a 
college campus wants a single, central wireless system (sometimes called a Wi-Fi 
network). In order to cover the large space, the system needs multiple base stations 
so a user can move around the area and still stay connected. Commil’s patent relates 
to a method of providing faster and more reliable communications between devices 
and base stations. …  
Commil brought this action against Cisco Systems, which makes and sells wire-
less networking equipment. … Commil alleged that Cisco had infringed Commil’s 
patent by making and using networking equipment. In addition Commil alleged 
that Cisco had induced others to infringe the patent by selling the infringing 
equipment for them to use, in contravention of Commil’s exclusive patent rights. 
At the first trial, the jury concluded that Commil’s patent was valid and that 
Cisco had directly infringed. The jury awarded Commil $3.7 million in damages. As 
to induced infringement, the jury found Cisco not liable. Commil filed a motion for 
a new trial on induced infringement and damages, which the District Court granted 
because of certain inappropriate comments Cisco’s counsel had made during the 
first trial. 
A month before the second trial Cisco went to the [PTO] asked it to reexamine 
the validity of Commil’s patent. The Office granted the request; but, undoubtedly 
to Cisco’s disappointment, it confirmed the validity of Commil’s patent. 
Back in the District Court, the second trial proceeded, limited to the issues of 
inducement and damages on that issue and direct infringement. As a defense to the 
claim of inducement, Cisco argued it had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent 
was invalid. It sought to introduce evidence to support that assertion. The District 
Court, however, ruled that Cisco’s proffered evidence of its good-faith belief in the 
patent’s invalidity was inadmissible. While the District Court’s order does not pro-
vide the reason for the ruling, it seems the court excluded this evidence on the as-
Miller’s Patent Cases 
340 
sumption that belief in invalidity is not a defense to a plaintiff’s claim that the de-
fendant induced others to infringe. 
At the close of trial, and over Cisco’s objection, the District Court instructed 
the jury that it could find inducement if “Cisco actually intended to cause the acts 
that constitute *** direct infringement and that Cisco knew or should have known 
that its actions would induce actual infringement.” The jury returned a verdict for 
Commil on induced infringement and awarded $63.7 million in damages. 
After the verdict, but before judgment, this Court issued its decision in Global-
Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). That case, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail, held that, in an action for induced infringement, it is neces-
sary for the plaintiff to show that the alleged inducer knew of the patent in question 
and knew the induced acts were infringing. Relying on that case, Cisco again urged 
that the jury instruction was incorrect because it did not state knowledge as the gov-
erning standard for inducement liability. The District Court denied Cisco’s motion 
and entered judgment in Commil’s favor. 
Cisco appealed … . The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded it was error for the District 
Court to have instructed the jury that Cisco could be liable for induced infringe-
ment if it “‘knew or should have known’” that its customers infringed. … By stating 
that Cisco could be found liable if it “‘knew or should have known that its actions 
would induce actual infringement,’” the Court of Appeals explained, the District 
Court had allowed “the jury to find [Cisco] liable based on mere negligence where 
knowledge is required.” That ruling, which requires a new trial on the inducement 
claim with a corrected instruction on knowledge, is not in question here. 
What is at issue is the second holding of the Court of Appeals, addressing Cis-
co’s contention that the trial court committed further error in excluding Cisco’s evi-
dence that it had a good-faith belief that Commil’s patent was invalid. Beginning 
with the observation that it is “axiomatic that one cannot infringe an invalid pa-
tent,” the Court of Appeals reasoned that “evidence of an accused inducer’s good-
faith belief of invalidity may negate the requisite intent for induced infringement.” 
The court saw “no principled distinction between a good-faith belief of invalidity 
and a good-faith belief of non-infringement for the purpose of whether a defendant 
possessed the specific intent to induce infringement of a patent.” 
…  
II 
Although the precise issue to be addressed concerns a claim of improper in-
ducement to infringe, the discussion to follow refers as well to direct infringement 
and contributory infringement, so it is instructive at the outset to set forth the statu-
tory provisions pertaining to these three forms of liability. These three relevant pro-
visions are found in § 271 of the Patent Act. 
Subsection (a) governs direct infringement … . Under this form of liability, a 
defendant’s mental state is irrelevant. Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense. 
Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2065 n. 2. 
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Subsection (b) governs induced infringement … . In contrast to direct in-
fringement, liability for inducing infringement attaches only if the defendant knew 
of the patent and that “the induced acts constitute patent infringement.” Id. at 
2068. In Commil and the Government’s view, not only is knowledge or belief in the 
patent’s validity irrelevant, they further argue the party charged with inducing in-
fringement need not know that the acts it induced would infringe. On this latter 
point, they are incorrect, as will be explained below. 
Subsection (c) deals with contributory infringement … . Like induced in-
fringement, contributory infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit and 
knowledge of patent infringement. Aro Mfg. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 
377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964) (Aro II). 
This case asks a question of first impression: whether knowledge of, or belief in, 
a patent’s validity is required for induced infringement under § 271(b). 
A 
Before turning to the question presented, it is necessary to reaffirm what the 
Court held in Global-Tech. Commil and the Government (which supports Commil 
in this case) argue that Global-Tech should be read as holding that only knowledge 
of the patent is required for induced infringement. That … would contravene  
Global-Tech’s explicit holding that liability for induced infringement can only attach 
if the defendant knew of the patent and knew as well that “the induced acts consti-
tute patent infringement.” 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
…  
After noting the language of § 271(b) and the case law prior to passage of the 
Patent Act did not resolve the question, the Global-Tech Court turned to Aro II, a 
case about contributory infringement. The Global-Tech Court deemed that rules 
concerning contributory infringement were relevant to induced infringement, be-
cause the mental state imposed in each instance is similar. …  
Aro II concluded that to be liable for contributory infringement, a defendant 
must know the acts were infringing. 377 U.S. at 488. In Global-Tech, the Court said 
this reasoning was applicable, explaining as follows: 
Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed 
for induced infringement under § 271(b). As noted, the two provisions 
have a common origin in the pre-1952 understanding of contributory in-
fringement, and the language of the two provisions creates the same diffi-
cult interpretive choice. It would thus be strange to hold that knowledge 
of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(c) but not under § 271(b). 
Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) 
requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement. 
131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
In support of Commil, the Government argues against the clear language of 
Global-Tech. According to the Government, all Global-Tech requires is knowledge of 
the patent … . It was not only knowledge of the existence of SEB’s patent that led 
the Court to affirm the liability finding but also it was the fact that Pentalpha copied 
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“all but the cosmetic features of SEB’s fryer,” demonstrating Pentalpha knew it 
would be causing customers to infringe SEB’s patent. Id. at 2071. 
Accepting the Government and Commil’s argument would require this Court 
to depart from its prior holding. And the Global-Tech rationale is sound. Qualifying 
or limiting its holding, as the Government and Commil seek to do, would lead to 
the conclusion, both in inducement and contributory infringement cases, that a per-
son, or entity, could be liable even though he did not know the acts were infringing. 
In other words, even if the defendant reads the patent’s claims differently from the 
plaintiff, and that reading is reasonable, he would still be liable because he knew the 
acts might infringe. Global-Tech requires more. It requires proof the defendant knew 
the acts were infringing. And the Court’s opinion was clear in rejecting any lesser 
mental state as the standard. 
B 
The question the Court confronts today concerns whether a defendant’s belief 
regarding patent validity is a defense to a claim of induced infringement. It is not. 
The scienter element for induced infringement concerns infringement; that is a dif-
ferent issue than validity. Section 271(b) requires that the defendant “actively in-
duce[d] infringement.” That language requires intent to “bring about the desired 
result,” which is infringement. 131 S. Ct. at 2065. And because infringement and 
validity are separate issues under the Act, belief regarding validity cannot negate the 
scienter required under § 271(b). 
When infringement is the issue, the validity of the patent is not the question to 
be confronted. In Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993), 
the Court explained, “A party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a 
claim independent of the patentee’s charge of infringement.” Id. at 96. It further 
held noninfringement and invalidity were “alternative grounds” for dismissing the 
suit. Id. at 98. And in Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U. S. 326, 334 
(1980), the Court explained that an accused infringer “may prevail either by suc-
cessfully attacking the validity of the patent or by successfully defending the charge 
of infringement.” These explanations are in accord with the long-accepted truth—
perhaps the axiom—that infringement and invalidity are separate matters under pa-
tent law. 
Indeed, the issues of infringement and validity appear in separate parts of the 
Patent Act. Part III of the Act deals with “Patents and Protection of Patent Rights,” 
including the right to be free from infringement. §§ 251-329. Part II, entitled “Pa-
tentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents,” defines what constitutes a valid pa-
tent. §§ 100-212. Further, noninfringement and invalidity are listed as two separate 
defenses, see §§ 282(b)(1), (2), and defendants are free to raise either or both of 
them. Were this Court to interpret § 271(b) as permitting a defense of belief in in-
validity, it would conflate the issues of infringement and validity. 
Allowing this new defense would also undermine a presumption that is a 
“common core of thought and truth” reflected in this Court’s precedents for a cen-
tury. Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., 293 U.S. 1, 8 (1934). Under the 
Patent Act, and the case law before its passage, a patent is “presumed valid.” 
§ 282(a). That presumption takes away any need for a plaintiff to prove his patent is 
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valid to bring a claim. But if belief in invalidity were a defense to induced infringe-
ment, the force of that presumption would be lessened to a drastic degree, for a de-
fendant could prevail if he proved he reasonably believed the patent was invalid. 
That would circumvent the high bar Congress is presumed to have chosen: the clear 
and convincing standard. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 
(2011). Defendants must meet that standard to rebut the presumption of validity. 
To say that an invalid patent cannot be infringed, or that someone cannot be 
induced to infringe an invalid patent, is in one sense a simple truth, both as a matter 
of logic and semantics. See M. Swift & Sons, Inc. v. W.H. Coe Mfg., 102 F. 2d 391, 
396 (1st Cir. 1939). But the questions courts must address when interpreting and 
implementing the statutory framework require a determination of the procedures 
and sequences that the parties must follow to prove the act of wrongful inducement 
and any related issues of patent validity. … To be sure, if at the end of the day, an 
act that would have been an infringement or an inducement to infringe pertains to a 
patent that is shown to be invalid, there is no patent to be infringed. But the alloca-
tion of the burden to persuade on these questions, and the timing for the presenta-
tions of the relevant arguments, are concerns of central relevance to the orderly ad-
ministration of the patent system. 
Invalidity is an affirmative defense that “can preclude enforcement of a patent 
against otherwise infringing conduct.” 6A Chisum on Patents § 19.01, at 19-5 
(2015). An accused infringer can, of course, attempt to prove that the patent in suit 
is invalid; if the patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper pro-
cedures, there is no liability. That is because invalidity is not a defense to infringe-
ment, it is a defense to liability. And because of that fact, a belief as to invalidity 
cannot negate the scienter required for induced infringement. 
There are also practical reasons not to create a defense based on a good-faith 
belief in invalidity. First and foremost, accused inducers who believe a patent is in-
valid have various proper ways to obtain a ruling to that effect. They can file a de-
claratory judgment action asking a federal court to declare the patent invalid. See 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007). They can seek inter 
partes review at the Patent Trial & Appeal Board and receive a decision as to validity 
within 12 to 18 months. See § 316. Or they can, as Cisco did here, seek ex parte 
reexamination of the patent by the [PTO]. § 302. And, of course, any accused in-
fringer who believes the patent in suit is invalid may raise the affirmative defense of 
invalidity. § 282(b)(2). If the defendant is successful, he will be immune from liabil-
ity. 
Creating a defense of belief in invalidity, furthermore, would have negative con-
sequences. It can render litigation more burdensome for everyone involved. Every 
accused inducer would have an incentive to put forth a theory of invalidity and 
could likely come up with myriad arguments. And since “it is often more difficult to 
determine whether a patent is valid than whether it has been infringed,” Cardinal, 
508 U.S. at 99, accused inducers would likely find it easier to prevail on a defense 
regarding the belief of invalidity than noninfringement. In addition the need to re-
spond to the defense will increase discovery costs and multiply the issues the jury 
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must resolve. Indeed, the jury would be put to the difficult task of separating the 
defendant’s belief regarding validity from the actual issue of validity. 
As a final note, “[o]ur law is *** no stranger to the possibility that an act may 
be ‘intentional’ for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual 
knowledge that her conduct violated the law.” Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, 
Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., 559 U.S. 573, 582-583 (2010). Tortious interference 
with a contract provides an apt example. While the invalidity of a contract is a de-
fense to tortious interference, belief in validity is irrelevant. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 766, Comment i (1979). In a similar way, a trespass “can be committed de-
spite the actor’s mistaken belief that she has a legal right to enter the property.” 
Jerman, 559 U.S. at 583 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 164, and Comment 
e (1963-1964)). And of course, “[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a 
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the Ameri-
can legal system.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). In the usual 
case, “I thought it was legal” is no defense. That concept mirrors this Court’s hold-
ing that belief in invalidity will not negate the scienter required under § 271(b). 
III 
The Court is well aware that an “industry has developed in which firms use pa-
tents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for ob-
taining licensing fees.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Some companies may use patents as a sword to 
go after defendants for money, even when their claims are frivolous. This tactic is 
often pursued through demand letters, which “may be sent very broadly and with-
out prior investigation, may assert vague claims of infringement, and may be de-
signed to obtain payments that are based more on the costs of defending litigation 
than on the merit of the patent claims.” L. Greisman, Prepared Statement of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission on Discussion Draft of Patent Demand Letter Legislation be-
fore the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, & Trade of the House Commit-
tee on Energy & Commerce 2 (2014). This behavior can impose a “harmful tax on 
innovation.” Id. 
No issue of frivolity has been raised by the parties in this case, nor does it arise 
on the facts presented to this Court. Nonetheless, it is still necessary and proper to 
stress that district courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous 
cases are dissuaded. If frivolous cases are filed in federal court, it is within the power 
of the court to sanction attorneys for bringing such suits. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11. It 
is also within the district court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing par-
ties in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. These safeguards, combined with the 
avenues that accused inducers have to obtain rulings on the validity of patents, mili-
tate in favor of maintaining the separation expressed throughout the Patent Act be-
tween infringement and validity. This dichotomy means that belief in invalidity is no 
defense to a claim of induced infringement. 
…  
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Scalia, J., dissenting (for himself and Chief Justice Roberts): 
I agree with the Court’s rejection of the main argument advanced by Commil 
and the United States, that induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) does 
not “requir[e] knowledge of the infringing nature of the induced acts.” Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 9. I disagree, however, with the Court’s holding 
that good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity is not a defense to induced infringe-
ment. 
Infringing a patent means invading a patentee’s exclusive right to practice his 
claimed invention. Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 
24, 40 (1923) (quoting 3 W. Robinson, Law of Patents § 937, at 122-23 (1890)). 
Only valid patents confer this right to exclusivity—invalid patents do not. It follows, 
as night the day, that only valid patents can be infringed. To talk of infringing an 
invalid patent is to talk nonsense. 
Induced infringement, we have said, “requires knowledge that the induced acts 
constitute patent infringement.” Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 
2060, 2068 (2011). Because only valid patents can be infringed, anyone with a 
good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity necessarily believes the patent cannot be in-
fringed. And it is impossible for anyone who believes that a patent cannot be in-
fringed to induce actions that he knows will infringe it. A good-faith belief that a 
patent is invalid is therefore a defense to induced infringement of that patent. 
The Court makes four arguments in support of the contrary position. None 
seems to me persuasive. First, it notes that the Patent Act treats infringement and 
validity as distinct issues. That is true. It is also irrelevant. Saying that infringement 
cannot exist without a valid patent does not “conflate the issues of infringement and 
validity,” any more than saying that water cannot exist without oxygen “conflates” 
water and oxygen. Recognizing that infringement requires validity is entirely con-
sistent with the “long-accepted truth *** that infringement and invalidity are sepa-
rate matters under patent law.” 
The Court next insists that permitting the defense at issue would undermine 
the statutory presumption of validity. It would do no such thing. By reason of the 
statutory presumption of validity, § 282(a), patents can be held invalid only by clear 
and convincing evidence. This presumption is not weakened by treating a good-faith 
belief in invalidity as a defense to induced infringement. An alleged inducer who 
succeeds in this defense does not thereby call a patent’s validity into question. He 
merely avoids liability for a third party’s infringement of a valid patent, in no way 
undermining that patent’s presumed validity. 
Next, the Court says that “invalidity is not a defense to infringement, it is a de-
fense to liability.” That is an assertion, not an argument. Again, to infringe a patent 
is to invade the patentee’s right of exclusivity. An invalid patent confers no such 
right. How is it possible to interfere with rights that do not exist? The Court has no 
answer. 
That brings me to the Court’s weakest argument: that there are “practical rea-
sons not to create a defense based on a good-faith belief in invalidity.” (Emphasis 
added). Ours is not a common-law court. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
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(1938). We do not, or at least should not, create defenses to statutory liability—and 
that is not what this dissent purports to do. Our task is to interpret the Patent Act, 
and to decide whether it makes a good-faith belief in a patent’s invalidity a defense 
to induced infringement. Since, as we said in Global-Tech, the Act makes knowledge 
of infringement a requirement for induced-infringement liability; and since there can 
be no infringement (and hence no knowledge of infringement) of an invalid patent; 
good-faith belief in invalidity is a defense. I may add, however, that if the desirability 
of the rule we adopt were a proper consideration, it is by no means clear that the 
Court’s holding, which increases the in terrorem power of patent trolls, is preferable. 
The Court seemingly acknowledges that consequence in Part III of its opinion. 
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
Patent Territoriality & 
Transborder Business 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. 
406 U.S. 518 (1972) 
White, Justice: 
…  
… Petitioner and respondent both hold patents on machines that devein shrimp 
more cheaply and efficiently than competing machinery or hand labor can do the 
job. Extensive litigation below has established that respondent, the Laitram Corp., 
has the superior claim and that the distribution and use of petitioner Deepsouth’s 
machinery in this country should be enjoined to prevent infringement of Laitram’s 
patents. We granted certiorar to consider a related question: Is Deepsouth, barred 
from the American market by Laitram’s patents, also foreclosed by the patent laws 
from exporting its deveiners, in less than fully assembled form, for use abroad? 
I 
A rudimentary understanding of the patents in dispute is a prerequisite to com-
prehending the legal issue presented. The District Court determined that the 
Laitram Corp. held two valid patents for machinery used in the process of deveining 
shrimp. One, granted in 1954,2 accorded Laitram rights over a “slitter” which ex-
posed the veins of shrimp by using water pressure and gravity to force the shrimp 
down an inclined trough studded with razor blades. As the shrimp descend through 
the trough their backs are slit by the blades or other knife-like objects arranged in a 
zig-zag pattern. The second patent, granted in 1958, covers a “tumbler,” “a device 
to mechanically remove substantially all veins from shrimp whose backs have previ-
ously been slit” by the machines described in the 1954 patent. This invention uses 
streams of water to carry slit shrimp into and then out of a revolving drum fabricated 
from commercial sheet metal. As shrimp pass through the drum the hooked “lips” 
                                                
2 This patent expired shortly before argument in this court and is therefore not rele-
vant to Laitram’s claim for injunctive relief. It is described, however, because 
Laitram claims damages for Deepsouth’s asserted past exportation of the parts of 
this machine. 
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of the punched metal, “projecting at an acute angle from the supporting member 
and having a smooth rounded free edge for engaging beneath the vein of a shrimp 
and for wedging the vein between the lip and the supporting member,” engage the 
veins and remove them. 
Both the slitter and the tumbler are combination patents; that is 
[n]one of the parts referred to are new, and none are claimed as new; nor is 
any portion of the combination less than the whole claimed as new, or 
stated to produce any given result. The end in view is proposed to be ac-
complished by the union of all, arranged and combined together in the 
manner described. And this combination, composed of all the parts men-
tioned in the specification, and arranged with reference to each other, and 
to other parts of the [machine] in the manner therein described, is stated 
to be the improvement, and is the thing patented. 
Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. 336, 341 (1842). 
… As is usual in combination patents, none of the elements in either of these 
patents were themselves patentable at the time of the patent, nor are they now. … 
The patents were warranted not by the novelty of their elements but by the novelty 
of the combination they represented. Invention was recognized because Laitram’s 
assignors combined ordinary elements in an extraordinary way—a novel union of old 
means was designed to achieve new ends. … 
II 
The lower court’s decision that Laitram held valid combination patents entitled 
the corporation to the privileges bestowed by 35 U.S.C. § 154, the keystone pro-
vision of the patent code. … [F]rom the [issue] date of the patent, Laitram had “the 
right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States … .” The § 154 right in turn provides the basis for affording the  
patentee an injunction against direct, induced, and contributory infringement, 35 
U.S.C. § 283, or an award of damages when such infringement has already oc-
curred, 35 U.S.C. § 284. Infringement is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271 in terms that 
follow those of § 154 … . 
As a result of these provisions the judgment of Laitram’s patent superiority 
forecloses Deepsouth and its customers from any future use (other than a use ap-
proved by Laitram or occurring after the Laitram patent has expired) of its deveiners 
“throughout the United States.” The patent provisions taken in conjunction with 
the judgment below also entitle Laitram to the injunction it has received prohibiting 
Deepsouth from continuing to “make” or, once made, to “sell” deveiners 
“throughout the United States.” Further, Laitram may recover damages for any past 
unauthorized use, sale, or making “throughout the United States.” This much is 
not disputed. 
But Deepsouth argues that it is not liable for every type of past sale and that a 
portion of its future business is salvageable. Section 154 and related provisions obvi-
ously are intended to grant a patentee a monopoly only over the United States mar-
ket; they are not intended to grant a patentee the bonus of a favored position as a 
flagship company free of American competition in international commerce. 
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Deepsouth, itself barred from using its deveining machines, or from inducing others 
to use them “throughout the United States,” barred also from making and selling 
the machines in the United States, seeks to make the parts of deveining machines, to 
sell them to foreign buyers, and to have the buyers assemble the parts and use the 
machines abroad.5 Accordingly, Deepsouth seeks judicial approval, expressed 
through a modification or interpretation of the injunction against it, for continuing 
its practice of shipping deveining equipment to foreign customers in three separate 
boxes, each containing only parts of the 1¾-ton machines, yet the whole assem-
blable in less than one hour. The company contends that by this means both the 
“making” and the “use” of the machines occur abroad and Laitram’s lawful monop-
oly over the making and use of the machines throughout the United States is not 
infringed. 
Laitram counters that this course of conduct is based upon a hypertechnical 
reading of the patent code that, if tolerated, will deprive it of its right to the fruits of 
the inventive genius of its assignors. “The right to make can scarcely be made plain-
er by definition.” Bauer v. O’Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 10 (1913). Deepsouth in all re-
spects save final assembly of the parts “makes” the invention. It does so with the 
intent of having the foreign user effect the combination without Laitram’s permis-
sion. Deepsouth sells these components as though they were the machines them-
selves; the act of assembly is regarded, indeed advertised, as of no importance. 
The District Court, faced with this dispute, noted that three prior circuit courts 
had considered the meaning of “making” in this context and that all three had re-
solved the question favorably to Deepsouth’s position. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. 
Link-Belt Co., 371 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1966); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engi-
neering & Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1956); and Radio Corp. of America 
v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935). The District Court held that its injunction 
should not be read as prohibiting export of the elements of a combination patent 
even when those elements could and predictably would be combined to form the 
whole. “It may be urged that *** [this] result is not logical. *** But it is founded 
on twin notions that underlie the patent laws. One is that a combination patent pro-
tects only the combination. The other is that monopolies—even those conferred by 
patents—are not viewed with favor. These are logic enough.” 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, thus departing from the es-
tablished rules of the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits. In the Fifth Circuit pan-
el’s opinion, those courts that previously considered the question “worked them-
selves into *** a conceptual box” by adopting “an artificial, technical construction” 
of the patent laws, a construction, moreover, which in the opinion of the panel, 
                                                
5 Deepsouth is entirely straightforward in indicating that its course of conduct is 
motivated by a desire to avoid patent infringement. Its president wrote a Brazilian 
customer: “We are handicapped by a decision against us in the United States. This 
was a very technical decision and we can manufacture the entire machine without 
any complication in the United States, with the exception that there are two parts 
that must not be assembled in the United States, but assembled after the machine 
arrives in Brazil.” 
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“[subverted] the Constitutional scheme of promoting ‘the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts’” by allowing an intrusion on a patentee’s rights. 
III 
We disagree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Under the com-
mon law the inventor had no right to exclude others from making and using his in-
vention. If Laitram has a right to suppress Deepsouth’s export trade it must be de-
rived from its patent grant, and thus from the patent statue.8 We find that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271, the provision of the patent laws on which Laitram relies, does not support its 
claim. 
Certainly if Deepsouth’s conduct were intended to lead to use of patented 
deveiners inside the United States its production and sales activity would be subject 
to injunction as an induced or contributory infringement. But it is established that 
there can be no contributory infringement without the fact or intention of a direct 
infringement. “In a word, if there is no [direct] infringement of a patent there can 
be no contributory infringer.” Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 
677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting on other grounds). Aro Mfg. Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U. S. 336, 341-342 (1961), succinctly articulates 
the law: 
It is plain that § 271 (c)—a part of the Patent Code enacted in 1952—
made no change in the fundamental precept that there can be no contrib-
utory infringement in the absence of a direct infringement. That section 
defines contributory infringement in terms of direct infringement—namely 
the sale of a component of a patented combination or machine for use “in 
an infringement of such patent.” 
The statute makes it clear that it is not an infringement to make or use a  
patented product outside of the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271. See also Dowagiac 
Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915); Brown v. Du-
chesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1857). Thus, in order to secure the injunction it 
seeks, Laitram must show a § 271(a) direct infringement by Deepsouth in the Unit-
ed States—that is, that Deepsouth “makes,” “uses,” or “sells” the patented product 
within the bounds of this country. 
Laitram does not suggest that Deepsouth “uses” the machines. Its argument 
that Deepsouth sells the machines—based primarily on Deepsouth’s sales rhetoric 
and related indicia such as price9—cannot carry the day unless it can be shown that 
Deepsouth is selling the “patented invention.” The sales question thus resolves itself 
                                                
8  “But the right of property which a patentee has in his invention, and his right to 
its exclusive use, is derived altogether from these statutory provisions; and this court 
(has) always held that an inventor has no right of property in his invention, upon 
which he can maintain a suit, unless he obtains a patent for it, according to the acts 
of Congress; and that his rights are to be regulated and measured by these laws, and 
cannot go beyond them.” Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857). 
9 Deepsouth sold the less than completely assembled machine for the same price as it 
had sold fully assembled machines. Its advertisements, correspondence, and invoices 
frequently referred to a “machine,” rather than to a kit or unassembled parts. 
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into the question of manufacture: did Deepsouth “make” (and then sell) something 
cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it “make” (and 
then sell) something that fell short of infringement? 
The Court of Appeals, believing that the word “makes” should be accorded “a 
construction in keeping with the ordinary meaning of that term,” held against 
Deepsouth on the theory that “makes” “means what it ordinarily connotes—the 
substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine.” Passing the ques-
tion of whether this definition more closely corresponds to the ordinary meaning of 
the term than that offered by Judge Swan in Andrea 35 years earlier (something is 
made when it reaches the state of final operable assembly), we find the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s definition unacceptable because it collides head on with a line of decisions so 
firmly embedded in our patent law as to be unassailable absent a congressional re-
casting of the statute. 
We cannot endorse the view that the “substantial manufacture of the constitu-
ent parts of [a] machine” constitutes direct infringement when we have so often 
held that a combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of the 
whole and not the manufacture of its parts. “For as we pointed out in Mercoid v. 
Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 676, a patent on a combination is a 
patent on the assembled or functioning whole, not on the separate parts.” Mercoid 
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 684 (1944). See also 
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 301, 318 (1909) (“A 
combination is a union of elements, which may be partly old and partly new, or 
wholly old or wholly new. But whether new or old, the combination is a means—an 
invention—distinct from them.”); id. at 320 (“[O]ne element is not the combina-
tion. Indeed, all of the elements are not. To be that—to be identical with the inven-
tion of the combination—they must be united by the same operative law.”). In sum, 
 [i]f anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination patent 
covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element, 
separately viewed, is within the grant. 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. at 344. 
It was this basic tenet of the patent system that led Judge Swan to hold in the 
leading case, Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935), that 
unassembled export of the elements of an invention did not infringe the patent. 
 [The] relationship is the essence of the patent. 
*** No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. 
His monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements 
capable of being, but never actually, associated to form the invention. Only 
when such association is made is there a direct infringement of his monop-
oly, and not even then if it is done outside the territory for which the mo-
nopoly was granted. 
Id. at 628. See also Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Engineering & Foundry Co., 235 
F.2d at 230 (“We are in full accord with the rule thus laid down in the Andrea case 
and we think that the master and the district court were right in applying it here.”); 
Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Link Belt Co., 371 F.2d at 229 (to the same effect). 
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We reaffirm this conclusion today. 
IV 
It is said that this conclusion is derived from too narrow and technical an inter-
pretation of the statute, and that this Court should focus on the constitutional man-
date 
 [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries *** 
Art. I, § 8, and construe the statute in a manner that would, allegedly, better reflect 
the policy of the Framers. 
We cannot accept this argument. The direction of Art. I is that Congress shall 
have the power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. When, as 
here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go 
can come only from Congress. We are here construing the provisions of a statute 
passed in 1952. The prevailing law in this and other courts as to what is necessary to 
show a patentable invention when a combination of old elements is claimed was 
clearly evident from the cases when the Act was passed; and at that time [the deci-
sion in] Andrea, representing a specific application of the law of infringement with 
respect to the export of elements of a combination patent, was 17 years old. When 
Congress drafted § 271, it gave no indication that it desired to change either the law 
of combination patents as relevant here or the ruling of Andrea. Nor has it on any 
more recent occasion indicated that it wanted the patent privilege to run farther 
than it was understood to run for 35 years prior to the action of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit. 
Moreover, we must consider petitioner’s claim in light of this Nation’s histori-
cal antipathy to monopoly and of repeated congressional efforts to preserve and fos-
ter competition. As this Court recently said without dissent: 
[I]n rewarding useful invention, the ‘rights and welfare of the community 
must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.’ Kendall v. Winsor, 62 
U.S. (21 How.) 322, 329 (1859). To that end the prerequisites to obtain-
ing a patent are strictly observed, and when the patent has issued the limi-
tations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 230 (1964). 
It follows that we should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying 
our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of 
privilege is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language. 
We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the  
position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege 
is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought. 
No such signal legitimizes respondent’s position in this litigation. 
In conclusion, we note that what is at stake here is the right of American com-
panies to compete with an American patent holder in foreign markets. Our patent 
system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; “these acts of Congress do not, and 
were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States,” Brown v. 
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Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 195, and we correspondingly reject the claims of 
others to such control over our markets. To the degree that the inventor needs pro-
tection in markets other than those of this country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 154 and 271 reveals a congressional intent to have him seek it abroad through 
patents secured in countries where his goods are being used. Respondent holds for-
eign patents; it does not adequately explain why it does not avail itself of them. 
V 
In sum: the case and statutory law resolves this case against the respondent. 
When so many courts have so often held what appears so evident—a combination 
patent can be infringed only by combination—we are not prepared to break the 
mold and begin anew. And were the matter not so resolved, we would still insist on 
a clear congressional indication of intent to extend the patent privilege before we 
could recognize the monopoly here claimed. Such an indication is lacking. Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the 
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Blackmun, Justice, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist 
join, dissenting: 
Because our grant of certiorari was limited, the customarily presented issues of 
patent validity and infringement are not before us in this case. I necessarily accept, 
therefore, the conclusion that the Laitram patents are valid and that the Deepsouth 
deveining machine, when manufactured and assembled in the United States, is an 
infringement. The Court so concedes. The Court, however, denies Laitram patent 
law protection against Deepsouth’s manufacture and assembly when the mere  
assembly is effected abroad. It does so on the theory that there then is no “making” 
of the patented invention in the United States even though every part is made here 
and Deepsouth ships all the parts in response to an order from abroad. 
With all respect, this seems to me to be too narrow a reading of 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 154 and 271(a). In addition, the result is unduly to reward the artful competitor 
who uses another’s invention in its entirety and who seeks to profit thereby. 
Deepsouth may be admissive and candid or, as the Court describes it, “straightfor-
ward” in its “sales rhetoric,” but for me that rhetoric reveals the very iniquitous and 
evasive nature of Deepsouth’s operations. I do not see how one can escape the con-
clusion that the Deepsouth machine was made in the United States, within the 
meaning of the protective language of §§ 154 and 271(a). … 
…  
National Steel Car v. Canadian Pacific Railway 
357 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
Clevenger, Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellee National Steel Car sued Defendants-Appellants Canadian Pa-
cific Railway [and others] in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for infringement of 
U.S. Patent No. 4,951,575. NSC moved for a preliminary injunction, and the dis-
trict court granted NSC’s motion, holding inter alia that NSC had demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits [and] that CPR’s defense to infringement under 
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35 U.S.C. § 272 lacked substantial merit … . After careful review of the district 
court’s opinion, the record, and the arguments advanced by the parties, … we re-
verse the district court’s preliminary injunction. 
I 
The ’575 patent, assigned to National Steel Car, a manufacturer of railway cars, 
addresses a particular type of railway car used to haul lumber: a depressed center-
beam flat car. Figure 1 of the ’575 patent shows a longitudinal section through one 
side of the car and is reproduced below. 
The car described in the ’575 patent is a “center-beam” car because the primary 
structure of the car is a truss-like beam element that runs the length of the center of 
the car between the wheel assemblies, or “end truck assemblies,” in the front and 
back of the car. Center-beam cars are an industry standard for hauling lumber, 
which is piled onto a floor that extends laterally to each side of the car from the bot-
tom of the center beam and then secured to the center beam. Canadian Pacific cur-
rently operates a fleet of center-beam flat cars. 
The car described in the ’575 patent is a “depressed,” or “drop-deck,” car be-
cause the portion of the floor between the end truck assemblies is lowered relative to 
the height of the floor over the end truck assemblies. The drop-deck center-beam 
flat car has two advantages over the non-drop-deck version. First, it can carry a vol-
umetrically larger load. Given the relatively low density of wood, ordinary center-
beam cars reach volume capacity before they reach weight capacity, leaving each car 
inefficiently under-loaded in terms of weight. Second, the dropping of the deck 
lowers the car’s center of the gravity, permitting safer loading, transit, and unloading 
because a higher center of gravity renders the car more vulnerable to tipping. 
…  
II 
Canadian Pacific is a Canadian railroad company that owns rail lines in Canada 
and in the United States and operates trains on these lines. On May 21, 2002, CPR 
issued a Request for Quote for a new fleet of depressed center-beam flat cars. Alt-
hough NSC was among the three companies that submitted bids, CPR awarded a 
contract for 525 cars to Greenbrier, a United States company with a Trenton-Works 
production facility in Canada at which the cars were to be produced. The contract 
was based on Greenbrier’s GBRX 20003 model of a depressed center-beam flat car. 
The contract was for a total of over $21 million and included a broad provision un-
der which Greenbrier agreed to defend patent-infringement suits brought against 
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CPR, to indemnify CPR against all damages in any such suit, and to provide a suita-
ble remedy should use of the cars be enjoined. 
CPR intends to use the GBRX 20003 depressed center-beam flat cars in the 
same way that it uses its current fleet of 2,900 lumber-carrying center-beam flat cars. 
Ninety percent of CPR’s lumber shipments travel from Canada to the United States; 
the remaining ten percent are performed entirely within Canada. Because there is no 
market need for American lumber to be shipped into Canada, CPR center-beam flat 
cars return to Canada empty 99.2 percent of the time. Measured either on the basis 
of days or track mileage traveled, a center-beam flat car is in the United States ap-
proximately 56 to 57 percent of the time. 
To service destinations in the United States, CPR engines pull the CPR cars as 
far as CPR-owned track extends into the United States. If the destination lies be-
yond the end of the CPR track, the CPR cars are switched at an interchange point, 
such as Chicago, Illinois, to trains powered by locomotives owned by United States 
railroads. At an interchange point, CPR cars from the same incoming train may end 
up on different trains heading to different United States destinations. 
III 
During the course of the bidding process on Canadian Pacific’s fleet of de-
pressed center-beam flat cars, National Steel Car apprised CPR of the existence of 
the ’575 patent and indicated that it was prepared to protect its patent rights. Less 
than a month after CPR informed NSC that its bid had not been accepted, NSC 
filed the complaint initiating the instant suit, alleging infringement of … the ’575 
patent based on CPR’s intended use of the drop-deck center-beam flat cars in the 
United States. NSC moved for a preliminary injunction against CPR, and after an 
expedited discovery period and an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the 
motion. The district court’s preliminary injunction enjoins CPR “from making, us-
ing, offering to sell, or importing the GBRX 20003 depressed center beam flat car in 
the United States.” 
In the preliminary injunction proceedings before the district court, CPR con-
ceded that limitations in the claims of the ’575 patent read on the GBRX 20003. 
The questions considered by the district court in its analysis of NSC’s likelihood of 
success on the merits, therefore, focused on CPR’s defenses to patent infringement. 
The district court held that neither of the two defenses raised by CPR had substan-
tial merit. CPR first claimed that 35 U.S.C. § 272 defines CPR’s use of the accused 
cars as noninfringing. …  
…  
V 
We first address Canadian Pacific’s defense to infringement under § 272. The 
statutory interpretation of § 272 presents an issue of law that we review without 
deference. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
Section 272, entitled “Temporary presence in the United States,” provides as 
follows: 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  355 
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any country 
which affords similar privileges to vessels, aircraft or vehicles of the United 
States, entering the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not 
constitute infringement of any patent, if the invention is used exclusively 
for the needs of the vessel, aircraft or vehicle and is not offered for sale or 
sold in or used for the manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported 
from the United States. 
In gross, § 272 provides that the use of certain foreign-owned means of transit 
or transport entering into the jurisdiction of the United States “temporarily or acci-
dentally” is not an infringing use provided a host of conditions are satisfied. CPR 
argues that its intended use of the GBRX 20003 drop-deck center-beam flat cars in 
the United States is within the scope of conduct detailed in § 272, and that its use 
of the cars therefore does not constitute infringement of the ’575 patent. The dis-
trict court disagreed … . 
Because we have never before had the opportunity to address the scope of 
§ 272, we outline briefly the statute’s history and the interpretive resources at our 
disposal. …  
A 
Although § 272 was enacted as part of the 1952 revision of the patent laws, its 
legislative history is brief, noting only that § 272 was drafted to codify the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856), and to satis-
fy the obligations of the United States under the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property (“Paris Convention”). See H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923 at 10 
(1952) (“Section 272 is a new section in the law relating to infringement, but it is 
of relatively little importance and it follows a paragraph in a treaty to which the 
United States is a party.”); S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 28 (1952) (“This section follows 
the requirement [in Article 5ter] of the International Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property, to which the United States is a party, and also codifies the 
holding of the Supreme Court [in Brown] that use of a patented invention on board 
a foreign ship does not infringe a patent.”). 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, nearly a century before the enactment 
of § 272, the Supreme Court in Brown held that the owner of a patent on an inven-
tion related to the rigging of a sailing ship had no cause of action against the master 
of [the] French schooner [Alcyon] that voyaged between Boston and a colony of 
France and that embodied the invention. See 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 193. Given “that 
the improvement in question was placed on [the ship] in a foreign port *** and was 
authorized by the laws of the country to which she belonged,” the question pre-
sented was: 
[W]hether any improvement in the construction or equipment of a foreign 
vessel, for which a patent has been obtained in the United States, can be 
used by such vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States, while she is 
temporarily there for the purposes of commerce, without the consent of 
the patentee. 
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Id. at 194. Eschewing a narrowly framed plain meaning analysis of the patent laws 
then on the books,6 the Court held that an interpretation of a patent right so broad 
as to label the French vessel’s use of the invention as an infringing use: 
[W]ould confer on patentees not only the rights of property, but also pol-
itical power, and enable them to embarrass the treaty-making power in its 
negotiations with foreign nations, and also to interfere with the legislation 
of Congress when exercising its constitutional power to regulate com-
merce. 
Id. at 197. Thus, because the Court considered it unlikely that Congress would have 
intended to delegate such broad authority to patentees, the Court construed the 
statutory rights of a patentee7 not to extend to: 
 [T]he use of [a patented] improvement, in the construction, fitting out, or 
equipment of such vessel, while she is coming into or going out of a port 
of the United States *** provided it was placed upon her in a foreign port, 
and authorized by the laws of the country to which she belongs. 
Id. at 198-99. 
The holding in Brown thus circumscribes the rights of a U.S. patent holder vis-
a-vis the use of a patented invention on foreign vessels present in the United States. 
However, other language in the opinion clearly demonstrates that the Court did not 
intend to place all conduct on such vessels outside the scope of a patentee’s rights: 
If [the invention] had been manufactured on her deck while she was lying 
in the port of Boston, or if the captain had sold it there, he would un-
doubtedly have trespassed upon the rights of the plaintiff, and would have 
been justly answerable for the profit and advantage he thereby obtained. 
Id. at 196. Only the use of a patented invention “in the construction, fitting out, or 
equipment of such vessel[s]” was held to constitute a noninfringing use. Id. at 198. 
The relevant section of Article 5ter of the Paris Convention reads as follows: 
 
                                                
6 “The general words used in the clause of the patent laws granting the exclusive 
right to the patentee to use the improvement, taken by themselves, and literally con-
strued, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of 
the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any 
enlightened tribunal—because it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the 
object which the Legislature intended to accomplish.” Brown, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 
194. 
7 Although the Court decided the case on the basis of statutory interpretation, it 
further questioned whether an individual’s ability to exercise patent rights in such a 
situation would amount to an impermissible delegation of Congress’ treaty power 
and its power to regulate international commerce, id. at 198, or whether Congress 
itself could constitutionally regulate international commerce through a statute 
passed under the auspices of the Patent and Copyright Clause, which granted a 
power that was “domestic in its character,” id. at 195. 
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In any country of the Union the following shall not be considered as in-
fringements of the rights of a patentee: 
*** 
2. the use of devices forming the subject of the patent in the construction 
or operation of aircraft or land vehicles of other countries of the Union, or 
of accessories of such aircraft or land vehicles, when those aircraft of land 
vehicles temporarily or accidentally enter the said country.8  
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature Mar. 
20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, art. 5ter, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1638-
39. 
There are only two cases in which federal courts have applied § 272. In Cali v. 
Japan Airlines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1240 (2d 
Cir. 1975), the Eastern District of New York held that the use of a patented inven-
tion in the jet engines of planes belonging to international air carriers during “their 
flights to and from the United States and their over-flights of the United States in 
the course of the regular prosecution of their scheduled air services” was within the 
scope of the noninfringing uses specified in § 272. Id. at 1122, 1124. In Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 197 (1993), the Court of Federal Claims 
held that spacecraft brought into the United States for launch into outer space prior 
to 19819 were outside the scope of § 272. Id. at 232 (“When a spacecraft is deliv-
ered to the United States for the purpose of allowing the United States to launch it, 
the spacecraft is the cargo that is brought here for an essential use, not a ‘vessel’ or 
‘vehicle’ which enters the United States as a means of conveyance.”). 
B 
First, the district court held that the invention of the ’575 patent embodied in 
the GBRX 20003 was not used in a vehicle of a country other than the United 
States. According to the district court, the train, not the rail car, is the relevant ve-
hicle to examine under § 272, and the nationality of the locomotive determines the 
nationality of the train. Therefore, because the accused rail cars will be used in the 
United States in trains powered by locomotives owned and operated by United 
States companies on the United States side of the exchange points, the district court 
held that CPR’s intended use of the GBRX 20003 was beyond the scope of § 272. 
Although we recognize that in some instances there may be ambiguity between 
containers that are merely the cargo of a vessel or vehicle, and vessels or vehicles that 
are themselves aggregated and transported in a collective fashion for greater efficien-
cy, we discern no such ambiguity here: Congress has defined “vehicle” with suffi-
cient breadth to include an individual rail car. In 1 U.S.C. § 4, a provision of the 
Dictionary Act, Congress has provided that “[t]he word ‘vehicle’ includes every de-
                                                
8 A separate provision in Article 5ter, excerpted from the quoted language, applies to 
“vessels.” 
9 In 1981, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 2457(k), which provides that “[a]ny ob-
ject intended for launch, launched, or assembled in outer space shall be considered a 
vehicle for the purpose of § 272.” 
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scription of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as 
a means of transportation on land.” The ordinary meaning of “carriage,” in turn, is 
defined to encompass “means of conveyance,” “a wheeled vehicle for people,” or “a 
wheeled support carrying a burden,” such as “a gun carriage.” Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 343 (1993). This definition controls our interpretation of 
“vehicle” in § 272, cf. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 
U.S.C.A. 1, 54 (West 1954) (stating that the definition of “vehicle” provided in 1 
U.S.C. § 4 would apply to § 272), and leads us to define a rail car individually—not 
only the train as a whole—as a vehicle within the meaning of § 272. We therefore 
conclude that a depressed center-beam flat car owned by CPR may be a foreign ve-
hicle and therefore is not disqualified from the noninfringing status created by § 272 
on this basis. 
C 
The next question presented is also a legal question involving statutory inter-
pretation: When is a vehicle only “entering the United States temporarily” under 
§ 272? The district court held that the accused rail car will not be “temporarily” pre-
sent in the United States, as required by § 272, because it “will spend the majority 
of its time delivering lumber to United States destinations” and because CPR “will 
derive significant benefits from using the accused rail car in the United States.” The 
district court thus determined that the appropriate statutory metric by which to 
measure whether a vehicle is entering “temporarily” should be either the duration of 
the vehicle’s stay in the United States, in relation to the duration of its stay else-
where, or the benefit of which the patent owner is deprived by virtue of the excep-
tion to patent rights created by § 272. We decline to adopt either metric, and in-
stead define a vehicle entering the United States “temporarily” as a vehicle entering 
the United States for a limited period of time for the sole purpose of engaging in 
international commerce. 
We begin by noting that the statutory language is ambiguous, rather than clear 
and unambiguous, insofar as it limits entries to those occurring “temporarily.” Ac-
cording to the word’s plain meaning, entering “temporarily” is entering either “for a 
brief period” or “during a limited time.” Webster’s Third New International Dic-
tionary 2353 (1993). Not only, however, is the term “temporarily” ambiguous in 
the sense that it can be understood in different manners, neither of its meanings, 
alone, leads to a permissible, self-sufficient interpretation. On the one hand, the 
concept of entry for a “brief period” does not provide sufficient content by which to 
draw a reasonable or steady line: Brief is only a relative concept and must be meas-
ured in relation to something, but the plain statutory language, considered in isola-
tion, does not provide sufficient context to determine the appropriate meaning of 
brief. In other words, “brief” is itself indeterminate. On the other hand, the idea of 
an entering for a “limited time” provides a rule that is determinable, but that seems 
to lead to absurdly broad results if applied literally without any further qualifications. 
Limited means nothing more than “restricted in *** duration.” Id. at 1312. Entry 
is literally limited provided only that it is not permanent. An interpretation of § 272 
that only required a limited entry in this literal sense—that only required a vehicle to 
exit the United States at some point before the end of its useful life—and nothing 
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more would create a loophole in a patentee’s rights too large to be a rational inter-
pretation of Congress’ intent. See Pitsker v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 234 F.3d 1378, 
1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (invoking “the canon of statutory construction that an inter-
pretation that causes absurd results is to be avoided if at all possible”) (citing Hag-
gar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389, 394 (1940)). 
Confronted with an ambiguous statute, we turn to the legislative history to dis-
cern Congress’ intent in defining “temporarily,” which in turn directs us to Brown 
and the Paris Convention. In addition to the requirement that entry be for only a 
limited period of time, both of these sources suggest that “temporarily” should be 
interpreted in light of a vehicle’s purpose to participate in international commerce at 
the time of entry—namely, a purpose to enter the United States, engage in interna-
tional commerce, and then depart. 
Brown emphasized that a construction of the patent laws under which a United 
States patentee could bring infringement suits against the use of an invention on 
vessels such as the French schooner at issue was undesirable because it “would *** 
seriously embarrass the commerce of the country with foreign nations.” Brown, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 197. The Court also noted that the vessel’s interference with the 
rights of the patentee was minimal precisely because the schooner entered the  
United States only to use the port of Boston, and departed from the jurisdiction of 
the United States after its commercial transaction was completed. See id. at 196 
(“[T]he only use made of [the invention], which can be supposed to interfere with 
the rights of the plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the harbor, 
when she arrived or was about to depart, and while she was within the jurisdiction of 
the United States.”). In sum, the Court held that the use of a patented invention in 
a vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States that was limited to the bare es-
sentials of the contact with the United States required to engage in international 
commerce was beyond the scope of the patentee’s exclusive rights. 
Although the statutory interpretation in Brown involved a unilateral act on the 
part of the United States, both Article 5ter of the Paris Convention and § 272 
demonstrate the centrality of international commerce in the statutory scheme 
through their provisions requiring reciprocal treatment for means of transport 
owned by United States companies that are “temporarily” present in foreign coun-
tries. 
Both Brown and Article 5ter of the Paris Convention demonstrate a concern to 
leave the channels of international commerce, or more accurately the vessels and ve-
hicles that pass through these channels, free from the excessive burdens that would 
result if such vessels or vehicles had to conform to the patent laws of all nations that 
the vessel or vehicle visited during its lifetime. Different inventions are likely to be 
patented in different countries, and the same invention may be owned by different 
parties in different countries. In § 272, Congress intended to join an international 
movement to place foreign-owned means of international transport beyond the 
reach of domestic patentees’ exclusive rights because the cost of complying with 
multiple, inconsistent rights of exclusion provided by the patent regimes of a large 
number of countries would likely place an excessive drag on international com-
merce. 
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Although their opinions are not binding on us, it is interesting to note that 
other courts considering similar issues have suggested the very definition of “tempo-
rary” that we adopt today. For example, the court in Cali concluded that entering 
the United States “temporarily” should be defined in relation to the vehicle’s—or in 
the case of Cali, the aircraft’s—involvement in international, as opposed to domes-
tic, commerce. In Cali, the court noted that “it is undeniable[] that *** defendants 
are major transoceanic carriers and that their passenger and freight services to the 
United States and over the United States are regular, of very considerable extent, 
long continued, and supported by ground service, marketing facilities, etc.” 380 F. 
Supp. at 1122. Nonetheless, the court held that § 272 provided a full defense to a 
patent infringement suit for the use of the patented invention because “temporarily” 
was defined in relation to the “international trade” that § 272 was intended to pro-
tect, not in relation to the duration of the entry: 
It is difficult to see any other purpose in § 272 and Article 5ter than to 
meet the needs and realities of international trade and navigation. “Tempo-
rarily,” then, could not sensibly mean any less than entering for the pur-
pose of completing a voyage, turning about, and continuing or commenc-
ing a new voyage. The distinction would be between a Caravelle, manufac-
tured in France and powered with such an [allegedly infringing] engine, 
delivered here for use by an airline in this country for domestic traffic, even 
though manufactured and sold in France, and a foreign aircraft arriving 
here on an international flight only to unload, turn about, reload and de-
part. 
Id. at 1126. 
In conclusion, we hold that the definition of entering “temporarily,” as the 
word is used in § 272, is entering for a period of time of finite duration with the sole 
purpose of engaging in international commerce. In light of our interpretation of 
§ 272, we reject both prongs of the district court’s reasoning explaining why the 
accused rail cars would not be entering the United States “temporarily.” The expec-
tation that CPR’s drop-deck center-beam flat cars will spend more than 50 percent 
of their useful lifespan in the United States is not relevant to the § 272 analysis. If 
the cars are entering the United States for a limited time—that is, they are not enter-
ing permanently—and are entering only for the purpose of engaging in international 
commerce—that is, they are entering to unload foreign goods and/or to load do-
mestic goods destined for foreign markets—they are entering “temporarily” for the 
purposes of § 272 regardless of the length of their stay within the jurisdiction of the 
United States. 
Furthermore, neither the magnitude of the benefit derived by CPR from use of 
the cars nor the burden imposed on NSC from the carve-out of CPR’s use from the 
scope of its right to exclude under the ’575 patent is relevant to the § 272 analysis. 
We agree with the reasoning that the court in Cali put forward to address the pa-
tentee’s argument that: 
 [T]he particular airlines involved, given the magnitude of their carrier op-
erations between foreign countries and this country, are such that the air-
lines are comparable to American airlines in the extent of their use of the 
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article of Cali’s patent, and that, in consequence, the subtraction from the 
grant to Cali of the right to exclude others from the use of his patent is a 
very great subtraction and one hardly tolerable under the statutory and 
treaty language, which might be thought to deal only with relatively unim-
portant (“Temporary” and “accidental”) invasions of the patent right that 
are without commercial significance. That subtraction, although large, ap-
pears nevertheless plainly to be what the statutory and treaty immunities 
intend *** . 
Id. at 1127. 
Therefore, we hold that NSC has not demonstrated that CPR’s § 272 defense 
lacks “substantial merit” because the entering “temporarily” condition is not satis-
fied. NSC does, however, advance one argument that, although not considered by 
the district court, raises a question regarding whether CPR will succeed on the mer-
its of the § 272 noninfringement defense. At the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. 
Buggs, the general manager of car management with CPR, testified that “sometimes 
*** the U.S. [r]ailway will grab one of our [center-beam flat] cars with[out]13 our 
permission *** [a]nd *** they will move it, you know, load it to another point.” 
Because CPR acknowledged that its newly acquired dropdeck center-beam flat cars 
will be used in the same fashion that its current fleet of center-beam flat cars is used, 
NSC uses the testimony of Mr. Buggs to allege that the GBRX 20003 cars enter the 
United States in part with a purpose to engage in domestic, rather than internation-
al, commerce. Certainly, the unforeseen “grabbing” of one of CPR’s large fleet of 
cars without CPR’s permission cannot lead to a reasonable inference that CPR had a 
purpose to engage in commerce other than international commerce. However, if 
CPR regularly condones such repeated “grabbing” of its cars for domestic com-
merce and CPR receives remuneration for the “grabbing” that is substantial in rela-
tion to the income that the cars produce through their use in international com-
merce, a factfinder could infer that CPR’s intent is not to engage in essentially inter-
national commerce. Based on the current record, however, we hold that NSC’s alle-
gations do not deprive CPR’s § 272 defense of substantial merit. 
D 
Third, the district court held that the drop-deck center-beam rail car invention 
was not “used exclusively for the needs of the *** vehicle” as § 272 requires. Fram-
ing § 272 narrowly around the holdings of Brown, Cali, and Hughes, the district 
court concluded that for an invention to be “used exclusively for the needs of the 
*** vehicle,” it must “help propel the trains, help in positioning the trains, or help 
in [some] other way to make the trains work.” Because the invention of the ’575 
patent defines the structure of the rail car, rather than an aspect of the locomotive’s 
propulsion system, the district court concluded that the use of invention in the ’575 
patent in the accused rail car did not fall within the scope of § 272. 
                                                
13 The transcript uses the word “with” rather than “without.” CPR has argued that 
this is a typographical error; NSC does not contest this argument on appeal. Because 
we merely note the unsettled nature of the parties dispute on this issue, our charac-
terization of the content of the testimony is not intended to be binding. 
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We disagree that the “exclusively for the needs of the *** vehicle” language in 
§ 272 should be interpreted so narrowly as to exclude inventions such as the ’575 
patent pertaining to the construction of a vehicle. The district court erroneously 
overlaid the concept of “propulsive needs” onto the statute; “structural needs” are  
also encompassed within the plain meaning of the statute. 
This reading of § 272 is consistent with Brown and the Paris Convention, the 
sources of law to which Congress referred in enacting § 272. In Brown, the Supreme 
Court characterized its own holding of noninfringement more broadly to pertain to 
inventions “used in the construction, fitting out, or equipment” of a vessel. 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) at 198 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Paris Convention extends the 
scope of noninfringing uses to inventions used “in the construction or operation of 
*** land vehicles *** or of accessories of such *** land vehicles.” Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property, 21 U.S.T. at 1639 (emphasis added). The 
text of the Paris Convention expressly applies to inventions used in either the con-
struction or the operation of a vehicle, whereas the district court limited the mean-
ing of the “exclusively for the needs of the *** vehicle” language in § 272 to only 
the latter.15 Cf. Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“Absent express Congressional language to the contrary, statutes should not 
be interpreted to conflict with international obligations.”). 
E 
Fourth and finally, the district court held that the use of the invention in the 
’575 patent in the GBRX 20003 did not qualify as a noninfringing use under § 272 
because the language of § 272 requires that the invention not be “offered for sale or 
sold in *** the United States.” The district court found that Greenbrier had “of-
fered the accused rail car for sale to at least three different companies in the United 
States,” and that “CPR, itself, may sell the accused rail cars to leasing companies in 
the United States.” We conclude that neither line of reasoning is sufficient to up-
hold the district court’s preliminary injunction against Canadian Pacific. 
First, insofar as it relied on sales by Greenbrier, who is not a party to this suit, 
of rail cars in which CPR never had any financial interest, the district court erred in 
its construction of the statute. The “offered for sale or sold in *** the United 
States” provision of § 272 does not apply to sales made by third parties of embodi-
ments of the invention other than those that temporarily enter the United States. 
Again, the language of Brown is instructive to interpret the meaning of the “of-
fered for sale or sold in *** the United States” language in § 272. In Brown, the 
Court noted that the captain would be liable under the patent laws “if the captain 
had sold [the invention] there,” namely in the port of Boston. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 
196. This concept—the prohibition on selling the very embodiment of the inven-
tion that had been used in the vessel or vehicle while the vehicle was temporarily or 
accidentally in the United States—has been codified in the language of § 272 that 
                                                
15 Furthermore, the ’575 patent itself describes the invention in question as an in-
vention related to the stability—and thus the propulsion—of the train. See ’575  
patent, col. 2, ll. 46-49 (“The reduced center of gravity *** significantly improves 
the track worthiness and ride stability of the car.”). 
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permits the statute’s application only “if the invention *** is not offered for sale or 
sold in *** the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 272. 
Second, insofar as it relied on its finding of fact that Canadian Pacific “may sell 
the accused rail cars to leasing companies in the United States,” we conclude that 
the district court’s discretion involved a clear error of judgment. 
We accept the district court’s finding of fact that CPR “may” seek to finance its 
purchase of the fleet of GBRX 20003 rail cars through a sale-leaseback arrangement 
in which CPR would sell the cars to a United States leasing company and then lease 
the cars back through a capital or operating lease. As the district court itself found, 
“[n]o decision has been made about the ownership structure of the dropped deck 
center beam flat cars” to be operated by CPR. Furthermore, we agree with the dis-
trict court’s implicit conclusion that a sale-leaseback arrangement between CPR and 
a U.S. company would, even at this preliminary-injunction phase, remove substantial 
merit from CPR’s defense of noninfringement based on § 272. Not only might the 
sale-leaseback arrangement constitute a sale of “the invention,” as prohibited by the 
language in the second half of § 272, it also might transform the rail car into a ve-
hicle of the United States and thus remove the use of the invention from the scope 
of the uses provided for in the first half of § 272. 
However, a finding that CPR “may” engage in such conduct is, alone, insuffi-
cient to deprive CPR’s § 272 defense of substantial merit. If at some point in the 
future NSC can show that a decision on ownership has been reached, and that the 
chosen ownership structure would deprive CPR’s § 272 defense of substantial merit, 
NSC may request appropriate relief at that time. 
F 
In conclusion, upon considered review of the each element of the district 
court’s reasoning, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in holding 
that Canadian Pacific’s § 272 defense lacked substantial merit. 
… 
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd. 
418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
Linn, Judge: 
Research In Motion, Ltd. (“RIM”) appeals from a judgment … entered in fa-
vor of NTP, Inc. (“NTP”) following a jury verdict that RIM’s BlackBerry system 
infringed NTP’s U.S. Patents Nos. 5,436,960 [and four continuations therefrom] 
and awarding damages to NTP in the amount of $53,704,322.69. The court, in a 
final order also appealed by RIM, permanently enjoined any further infringement by 
RIM, but stayed the injunction pending this appeal. … 
I. Background 
The technology at issue relates to systems for integrating existing electronic 
mail systems (“wireline” systems) with radio frequency (“RF”) wireless communi-
cation networks, to enable a mobile user to receive email over a wireless network. 
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A. Overview of Electronic Mail Technology 
Traditional email systems operate in the following manner: To send an email, a 
user begins by composing a message in his or her email client. An “email client” is a 
user interface, such as Microsoft Outlook, Eudora, or Hotmail, that organizes and 
displays a user’s email messages and provides the user with a means of creating and 
sending email messages. The message begins with a specific destination address, e.g., 
jdoe@***.com, that corresponds to the recipient’s user identification, “jdoe,” and 
his or her internet service provider (“ISP” or “host”), “***.com.” See generally  
Andrew S. Tanenbaum, Computer Networks 592-611 (4th ed. 2003). When the 
message is sent, it is transferred first from the sender’s machine to his or her ISP. Id. 
at 607. The sender’s host then uses a domain name server to identify the recipient’s 
ISP mail server and its associated internet protocol (“IP”) address. Id. A connection 
is then established by the sender’s host with the recipient’s ISP mail server, facili-
tating transfer of the message. Id. at 607-08. The message is next sorted by the re-
cipient’s ISP mail server into the recipient’s particular “mailbox,” where it is stored 
until the recipient initiates a connection with the server and downloads the message 
off the server onto his or her personal machine. This configuration is commonly re-
ferred to as a “pull” system because emails cannot be distributed to the user’s ma-
chine without a connection being initiated by the user to “pull” the messages from 
the mail server. 
B. Problems With the Prior Art Systems 
As societal dependence on email and computers increased throughout the 
1990s, so did the demand for mobile internet access. See generally Richard Duffy & 
Denis Gross, World Without Wires, 22 Communication Int’l 72 (June 1995) (de-
scribing “user demand” as “one of the most important driving factors behind the 
mobile data market”). The increased portability of computers via laptop machines 
exacerbated this demand. See id. Available methods of remote internet access were 
cumbersome and inefficient for the traveling businessperson, however, as the  
patents-in-suit explain: 
As personal computers are used more frequently by business travellers, the 
problem of electronic mail delivery becomes considerably more difficult. A 
business traveler carrying a portable PC has great difficulty in finding a tel-
ephone jack to connect the PC to fetch electronic mail from either a host 
computer or a gateway switch. Connections for a PC’s modem are difficult 
to find in airports. *** Hotels and motels often have internal PABX’s that 
prevent calls from automatically being placed by the user’s PC to electronic 
mail gateway switches to receive information. *** The inability to find an 
appropriate connection to connect the PC modem when travelling has 
contributed to the degradation of electronic mail reception when the recip-
ient is travelling. 
’960 patent, col. 3, l. 60 – col. 4, l. 12. RIM’s technical documentation for its 
BlackBerry products echoes the undesirability of these constraints: 
Typically, mobile professionals use a laptop when traveling and dial in to 
the corporate email server from a hotel room to manage an inbox full of 
email. The more adventurous use special software to send email notifica-
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tion to a pager or cell phone so they know what is in their inbox before 
spending the time and effort to dial in. Focus groups and market research 
on mobile email revealed common complaints with dialing in–the incon-
venience of lugging a laptop around just for email; the trouble of finding a 
connection and dialing out of the hotel; the difficulty of negotiating corpo-
rate dial-in security; and the cost of phone charges when dialing in to the 
corporate server. 
Research in Motion Ltd., Technical White Paper BlackBerry Enterprise Edition 3 
(2001) (“White Paper”). 
C. The Patents-in-Suit 
Inventors Thomas J. Campana [and others] (collectively “Campana”) deveoped 
an electronic mail system that was claimed in the ’960 patent [and its continuation 
patents]. … As continuations of that single parent application, these patents contain 
the same written descriptions as the ’960 patent. NTP now owns these five patents-
in-suit. 
Campana’s particular innovation was to integrate existing electronic mail sytems 
with RF wireless communications networks. In simplified terms, the Campana in-
vention operates in the following manner: A message originating in an electronic 
mail system may be transmitted not only by wireline but also via RF, in which case it 
is received by the user and stored on his or her mobile RF receiver. The user can 
view the message on the RF receiver and, at some later point, connect the RF re-
ceiver to a fixed-destination processor, e.g., his or her personal desktop computer, 
and transfer the stored message. Intermediate transmission to the RF receiver is ad-
vantageous because it “eliminat[es] the requirement that the destination processor 
[be] turned on and carried with the user” to receive messages. Instead, a user can 
access his or her email stored on the RF receiver and “review *** its content with-
out interaction with the destination processor,” while reserving the ability to transfer 
the stored messages automatically to the destination processor. The patents-in-suit 
do not disclose a method for composing and sending messages from the RF receiv-
er. 
D. The Accused System 
RIM is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in Waterloo, 
Ontario. RIM sells the accused BlackBerry system, which allows out-of-office users 
to continue to receive and send electronic mail, or “email” communications, using a 
small wireless device. The system utilizes the following components: (1) the Black-
Berry handheld unit (also referred to as the “BlackBerry Pager”); (2) email redirec-
tor software (such as the BlackBerry Enterprise Server (“BES”), the Desktop Redi-
rector, or the Internet Redirector); and (3) access to a nationwide wireless network 
(such as Mobitex, DataTAC, or GPRS). 
The BlackBerry system uses “push” email technology to route messages to the 
user’s handheld device without a user-initiated connection. There are multiple 
BlackBerry email “solutions” that interface with different levels of the user’s email 
system. In the Desktop solution, the BlackBerry email redirector software, the Desk-
top Redirector, is installed on the user’s personal computer. In the Corporate solu-
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tion, different BlackBerry email redirector software, the BES program, is installed on 
the organizational user’s mail server, where it can function for the benefit of the 
multiple users of that server. Also at issue in this case is RIM’s Internet solution of 
the BlackBerry system. The Internet solution operates in a manner similar to the 
Corporate solution, but it executes a different email redirector software, Internet 
Redirector. In either version, the BlackBerry email redirector software merges seam-
lessly with the user’s existing email system. The operation of the email redirector 
software is transparent to the user’s desktop email client and the organizational  
user’s mail server. That is, the user’s email system does not recognize or incorporate 
the BlackBerry wireless system into its operation. No modification of the underlying 
email system is required to run RIM’s wireless email extension. When new mail is 
detected in the Desktop solution, the Desktop Redirector is notified and retrieves 
the message from the mail server. It then copies, encrypts, and routes the message to 
the BlackBerry “Relay” component of RIM’s wireless network, which is located in 
Canada. In the Corporate solution, the BES software performs this same function 
but intercepts the email before the message reaches the individual user’s personal 
computer. The individual user’s personal computer need not be turned on for the 
BES software to properly redirect the user’s emails. However, the user retains some 
control over message forwarding by using the BlackBerry “Desktop Manager.” This 
additional software permits the user to specify his or her email redirection prefer-
ences. In both systems, the message travels through the BlackBerry Relay, where it is 
translated and routed from the processors in the user’s email system to a partner 
wireless network. That partner network delivers the message to the user’s BlackBerry 
handheld, and the user is “notified virtually instantly” of new email messages. This 
process, accomplished without any command from the BlackBerry user, is an exam-
ple of “push” email architecture. There are significant advantages to “push” email 
architecture. Most importantly, the user is no longer required to initiate a connec-
tion with the mail server to determine if he or she has new email. As RIM’s technical 
literature explains, “[b]y having the desktop connect to the user, time spent dialing 
up and connecting to the desktop (possibly to find that there is no new email) is 
eliminated as users *** are notified virtually instantly of important messages,  
enabling the user to respond immediately.” 
RIM’s system also permits users to send email messages over the wireless net-
work from their handhelds. This functionality is achieved through the integration of 
an RF transmitter and a processor in the BlackBerry handheld unit. The processor 
allows the user to manipulate, view, and respond to email on his or her BlackBerry 
handheld. Sending a message from the handheld requires the same steps as the pro-
cess for receiving email, only in reverse. When the user composes a message on his 
or her handheld, it is sent back to that user’s desktop machine over the partner and 
BlackBerry wireless networks. The BlackBerry email redirector software then re-
trieves the outgoing message from the user’s mail server and places it in the user’s 
desktop email software, where it is dispersed through normal channels. In this way, 
messages sent from the BlackBerry handheld are identical to messages sent from the 
user’s desktop email–they originate from the same address and also appear in the 
“sent mail” folder of the user’s email client. 
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E. Procedural History 
On November 13, 2001, NTP filed suit against RIM … alleg[ing] that over 
forty system and method claims from its several patents-in-suit had been infringed 
by various configurations of the BlackBerry system (comprised of the numerous 
handheld units; the BES, the Desktop Redirector, and the ISP Redirector software; 
and the associated wireless networks). 
In an Order dated August 14, 2002, the district court construed thirty-one dis-
puted claim terms. … A series of summary judgment motions followed the court’s 
Markman decision. Setting forth several alternate theories, RIM asked for summary 
judgment of both non-infringement and invalidity. [One of t]he issues raised in … 
RIM’s summary judgment motions remain[s] relevant on appeal: RIM argued … 
that the physical location of the “Relay” component of the BlackBerry system put 
RIM’s allegedly infringing conduct outside the reach of 35 U.S.C. § 271. The dis-




2. Section 271(a) 
Section 271(a) of title 35 sets forth the requirements for a claim of direct in-
fringement of a patent. It provides: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the  
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The territorial reach of section 271 is limited. Section 271(a) is 
only actionable against patent infringement that occurs within the United States. See 
Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[As] the 
U.S. Supreme Court explained nearly 150 years ago in Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 
(19 How.) 183 (1856), *** the U.S. patent laws do not, and were not intended to, 
operate beyond the limits of the United States.”); Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi 
Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that “extraterritorial activities 
*** are irrelevant to the case before us, because ‘the right conferred by a patent un-
der our law is confined to the United States and its territories, and infringement of 
this right cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country’”) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 
(1915)). 
Ordinarily, whether an infringing activity under § 271(a) occurs within the 
United States can be determined without difficulty. This case presents an added de-
gree of complexity, however, in that: (1) the “patented invention” is not one single 
device, but rather a system comprising multiple distinct components, or a method 
with multiple distinct steps; and (2) the nature of those components or steps permits 
their function and use to be separated from their physical location. 
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In its complaint, NTP alleged that RIM had infringed its patents by “making, 
using, selling, offering to sell and importing into the United States products and 
services, including the Defendant’s BlackBerry products and their related software 
*** .” NTP’s theory of infringement tracks the language of § 271(a). In the district 
court, RIM moved for summary judgment of noninfringement, arguing that it could 
not be held liable as a direct infringer under § 271(a). According to RIM, the statu-
tory requirement that the allegedly infringing activity occur “within the United 
States” was not satisfied because the BlackBerry Relay component of the accused 
system is located in Canada. The Relay component is alleged to meet the “interface” 
or the “interface switch” limitation in [four of] the … patents. RIM’s argument 
based on the location of its Relay outside the United States does not apply to the 
asserted claims of [one of] the … patent[s] because those claims do not include the 
“interface” or “interface switch” limitation. 
The district court declined to grant summary judgment in RIM’s favor. The 
court agreed that “to establish direct infringement under § 271(a), NTP must show 
that RIM practiced all of the steps of the process patented in the Campana inven-
tions in the United States.” However, because there remained “a genuine dispute 
*** with regards to whether RIM operates a Relay facility in Virginia,” the court 
decided it could not resolve this issue on summary judgment. Subsequently, during 
trial, the court changed its position and specifically held that “the fact that the 
BlackBerry relay is located in Canada is not a bar to infringement in this matter.” 
The court therefore instructed the jury that “the location of RIM’s Relay in Canada 
does not preclude infringement.” In the district court, the jury found direct, in-
duced, and contributory infringement by RIM on all asserted claims. The asserted 
claims included both systems and methods for transmitting an email message be-
tween an originating processor and a destination processor. By holding RIM liable 
for contributory infringement and inducing infringement, the jury necessarily found 
that its customers are direct infringers of the claimed systems and methods. Dyna-
core Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“Indirect infringement, whether inducement to infringe or contributory infringe-
ment, can only arise in the presence of direct infringement, though the direct in-
fringer is typically someone other than the defendant accused of indirect infringe-
ment.”). 
On appeal, RIM argues that the district court erred in its interpretation of the 
infringement statute. RIM does not appeal the jury’s finding that its customers use, 
i.e., put into service, its systems and methods for transmitting email messages. RIM 
has, however, appealed whether any direct infringement, by it or its customers, can 
be considered “within the United States” for purposes of section 271(a). Citing the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth, RIM contends that an action for infringe-
ment under section 271(a) may lie only if the allegedly infringing activity occurs 
within the United States. RIM urges that, in this case, that standard is not met be-
cause the BlackBerry Relay component, described by RIM as the “control point” of 
the accused system, is housed in Canada. For section 271(a) to apply, RIM asserts 
that the entire accused system and method must be contained or conducted within 
the territorial bounds of the United States. RIM thus contends that there can be no 
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direct infringement as a matter of law because the location of RIM’s Relay outside 
the United States precludes a finding of an infringing act occurring within the  
United States. 
This court reviews the statutory construction of a district court de novo. Merck 
& Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In our interpretation of the 
statute, we “give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning, absent an indication Congress intended them to bear some different im-
port.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000). We begin with the words of 
the statute, see Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1993), 
but may consult dictionaries, see Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and legislative history, see Neptune Mut. Ass’n Ltd. of Ber-
muda v. United States, 862 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1988), if necessary to con-
strue the statute. 
The question before us is whether the using, offering to sell, or selling of a  
patented invention is an infringement under § 271(a) if a component or step of the 
patented invention is located or performed abroad. … Pursuant to § 271(a), who-
ever without authority “uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within 
the United States *** during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 
35 U.S.C. § 271(a). The grammatical structure of the statute indicates that “within 
the United States” is a separate requirement from the infringing acts clause. Thus, it 
is unclear from the statutory language how the territoriality requirement limits direct 
infringement where the location of at least a part of the “patented invention” is not 
the same as the location of the infringing act. 
RIM argues that Deepsouth answers this question. However, Deepsouth did not 
address this issue. In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court considered whether § 271(a) 
prevented, as direct infringement, the domestic production of all component parts 
of a patented combination for export, assembly, and use abroad. 406 U.S. at 527. 
The Court held that the export of unassembled components of an invention could 
not infringe the patent. Id. at 529. The Court said that it could not “endorse the 
view that the ‘substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of a machine’ consti-
tutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a combination patent pro-
tects only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its 
parts.” Id. at 528. Thus, the Court concluded that the complete manufacture of the 
operable assembly of the whole within the United States was required for infringe-
ment by making under § 271(a). In that case, however, both the act of making and 
the resulting patented invention were wholly outside the United States. By contrast, 
this case involves a system that is partly within and partly outside the United States 
and relates to acts that may be occurring within or outside the United States. 
Although Deepsouth does not resolve these issues, our predecessor court’s de-
cision in Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976), is instructive. 
In Decca, the plaintiff sued the United States for use and manufacture of its patent-
ed invention under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The claimed invention was a radio navigation 
system requiring stations transmitting signals that are received by a receiver, which 
then calculates position by the time difference in the signals. At the time of the suit, 
the United States was operating three such transmitting stations, one of which was 
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located in Norway and thus was outside the territorial limits of the United States. 
Only asserted claim 11 required three transmitting stations. Thus, in considering 
infringement of claim 11, the court considered the extraterritorial reach of the  
patent laws as applied to a system in which a component was located outside the  
United States. The court recognized that Deepsouth did not address this issue. Id. at 
1081. In analyzing whether such a system was “made” in the United States, how-
ever, the court focused on the “operable assembly of the whole” language from 
Deepsouth and concluded that “[t]he plain fact is that one of the claimed elements is 
outside of the United States so that the combination, as an operable assembly, sim-
ply is not to be found solely within the territorial limits of this country.” Id. at 1082. 
The court recognized that what was located within the United States was as much of 
the system as was possible, but the court reached no clear resolution of whether the 
accused system was “made” within the United States. Nevertheless, the court said, 
“Analyzed from the standpoint of a use instead of a making by the United States, a 
somewhat clearer picture emerges.” Id. The court concluded that “it is obvious that, 
although the Norwegian station is located on Norwegian soil, a navigator employing 
signals from that station is, in fact, ‘using’ that station and such use occurs wherever 
the signals are received and used in the manner claimed.” Id. at 1083. In reaching 
its decision, the court found particularly significant “the ownership of the equip-
ment by the United States, the control of the equipment from the United States and 
*** the actual beneficial use of the system within the United States.” Id. Although 
Decca was decided within the context of § 1498, which raises questions of use by 
the United States, the question of use within the United States also was implicated 
because direct infringement under § 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government 
liability under § 1498. Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
Decca provides a legal framework for analyzing this case. As our predecessor 
court concluded, infringement under § 271(a) is not necessarily precluded even 
though a component of a patented system is located outside the United States. 
However, as is also evident from Decca, the effect of the extraterritorial component 
may be different for different infringing acts. In Decca, the court found it difficult to 
conclude that the system had been made within the United States but concluded 
that the system had been used in the United States even though one of the claim 
limitations was only met by including a component located in Norway. Not only 
will the analysis differ for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ as the 
result of differences between different types of claims. Because the analytical frame-
works differ, we will separately analyze the alleged infringing acts, considering first 
the system claims and then the claimed methods. 
a. “uses *** within the United States” 
The situs of the infringement “is wherever an offending act [of infringement] is 
committed.” N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc., 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[Section 271] on its face clearly suggests the conception that the 
‘tort’ of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is committed and not 
where the injury is felt.”). The situs of the infringing act is a “purely physical occur-
rence[].” Id. In terms of the infringing act of “use,” courts have interpreted the 
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term “use” broadly. In Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913), the Supreme 
Court stated that “use,” as used in a predecessor to title 35, is a “comprehensive 
term and embraces within its meaning the right to put into service any given inven-
tion.” Id. at 10-11. The ordinary meaning of “use” is to “put into action or ser-
vice.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2523 (1993). The few court 
decisions that address the meaning of “use” have consistently followed the Supreme 
Court’s lead in giving the term a broad interpretation. E.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v.  
Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that testing is a 
“use”), superseded-in-part by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 
The use of a claimed system under § 271(a) is the place at which the system as a 
whole is put into service, i.e., the place where control of the system is exercised and 
beneficial use of the system obtained. See Decca, 544 F.2d at 1083. Based on this 
interpretation of § 271(a), it was proper for the jury to have found that use of 
NTP’s asserted system claims occurred within the United States. RIM’s customers 
located within the United States controlled the transmission of the originated in-
formation and also benefited from such an exchange of information. Thus, the loca-
tion of the Relay in Canada did not, as a matter of law, preclude infringement of the 
asserted system claims in this case. 
RIM argues that the BlackBerry system is distinguishable from the system in 
Decca because the RIM Relay, which controls the accused systems and is necessary 
for the other components of the system to function properly, is not located within 
the United States. While this distinction recognizes technical differences between 
the two systems, it fails to appreciate the way in which the claimed NTP system is 
actually used by RIM’s customers. When RIM’s United States customers send and 
receive messages by manipulating the handheld devices in their possession in the 
United States, the location of the use of the communication system as a whole oc-
curs in the United States. This satisfactorily establishes that the situs of the “use” of 
RIM’s system by RIM’s United States customers for purposes of § 271(a) is the 
United States. Therefore, we conclude that the jury was properly presented with 
questions of infringement as to NTP’s system claims containing the “interface” or 
“interface switch” limitation … . 
We reach a different conclusion as to NTP’s asserted method claims. Under 
§ 271(a), the concept of “use” of a patented method or process is fundamentally 
different from the use of a patented system or device. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing “the distinction between a claim to a product, 
device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which 
consists of a series of acts or steps. *** [A process] consists of doing something, and 
therefore has to be carried out or performed.”); see Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 
F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“The law is unequivocal that the sale of equipment 
to perform a process is not a sale of the process within the meaning of section 
271(a).”). Although the Supreme Court focused on the whole operable assembly of 
a system claim for infringement in Deepsouth, there is no corresponding whole oper-
able assembly of a process claim. A method or process consists of one or more oper-
ative steps, and, accordingly, “[i]t is well established that a patent for a method or 
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process is not infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized.” 
Roberts Dairy Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
Because a process is nothing more than the sequence of actions of which it is 
comprised, the use of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the 
steps recited. This is unlike use of a system as a whole, in which the components are 
used collectively, not individually. We therefore hold that a process cannot be used 
“within” the United States as required by § 271(a) unless each of the steps is per-
formed within this country. In the present case, each of the asserted method claims 
of [three of] the … patents recites a step that utilizes an “interface” or “interface 
switch,” which is only satisfied by the use of RIM’s Relay located in Canada. There-
fore, as a matter of law, these claimed methods could not be infringed by use of 
RIM’s system. 
Thus, we agree with RIM that a finding of direct infringement by RIM’s cus-
tomers under § 271(a) of the method claims reciting an “interface switch” or an 
“interface” is precluded by the location of RIM’s Relay in Canada. As a conse-
quence, RIM cannot be liable for induced or contributory infringement of the as-
serted method claims, as a matter of law. 
b. “offers to sell, or sells” 
Because we conclude that RIM’s customers could not have infringed the assert-
ed method claims of [three] patents under the “use” prong of § 271(a), and thus, 
could not have provided the necessary predicate for the charges of induced or con-
tributory infringement of those claims, we must consider whether RIM could have 
directly infringed the method claims under the “sell” or “offer to sell” prongs of 
§ 271(a). The cases cited by RIM are concerned primarily with the “use” and 
“make” prongs of § 271(a) and do not directly address the issue of whether a meth-
od claim may be infringed by selling or offering to sell within the meaning of 
§ 271(a). 
Because the relevant precedent does not address the issue of whether a sale of a 
claimed method can occur in the United States, even though the contemplated per-
formance of that method would not be wholly within the United States, the issue is 
one of first impression. We begin with the language of the statute. Section 271(a) 
does not define “sells” or “offers to sell,” nor does the statute specify which infring-
ing acts apply to which types of claims. Section 271(a) was merely a codification of 
the common law of infringement that had developed up to the time of passage of 
the 1952 Patent Act. It was not meant to change the law of infringement. 
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530 n.10. A claim directed to a method or process, although 
somewhat controversial in the Nineteenth Century, is now a well-established form 
of claiming. See In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 857-65 (CCPA 1968) (de-
scribing the evolution of Supreme Court precedent concerning process claims). 
Nevertheless, the precise contours of infringement of a method claim have not been 
clearly established. 
In Enercon GmbH v. International Trade Commission, 151 F.3d 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), this court considered the meaning of the phrase “sale for importation” 
in the International Trade Commission’s governing statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Be-
cause the term “sale” was not defined in the statute, we assumed that Congress in-
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tended to give the term its ordinary meaning, id. at 1381. In considering the ordi-
nary meaning, we looked to dictionaries and to the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. 
at 1382. We employ a similar methodology here, looking to the ordinary meaning 
of the term “sale.” The definition of “sale” is: “1. The transfer of property or title 
for a price. 2. The agreement by which such a transfer takes place. The four ele-
ments are (1) parties competent to contract, (2) mutual assent, (3) a thing capable 
of being transferred, and (4) a price in money paid or promised.” Black’s Law Dic-
tionary 1337 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, the ordinary meaning of a sale includes the con-
cept of a transfer of title or property. The definition also requires as the third ele-
ment “a thing capable of being transferred.” It is difficult to apply this concept to a 
method claim consisting of a series of acts. See Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 
Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] process is a series of acts, and the 
concept of sale as applied to those acts is ambiguous.”). It is difficult to envision 
what property is transferred merely by one party performing the steps of a method 
claim in exchange for payment by another party. Moreover, performance of a meth-
od does not necessarily require anything that is capable of being transferred. 
Congress has consistently expressed the view that it understands infringement 
of method claims under § 271(a) to be limited to use. The committee reports sur-
rounding the passage of the Process Patents Amendments Act of 1987 [creating a 
new subsection, 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)] indicate that Congress did not understand all 
of the infringing acts in § 271(a) to apply to method claims. The Senate Report ex-
plains, “Under our current patent laws, a patent on a process gives the patentholder 
the right to exclude others from using that process in the United States without au-
thorization from the patentholder. The other two standard aspects of the patent 
right—the exclusive right to make or sell the invention—are not directly applicable 
to a patented process.” S. Rep. No. 100-83, at 30 (1987). The House Report ex-
presses a similar view: “With respect to process patents, courts have reasoned that 
the only act of infringement is the act of making through the use of a patented pro-
cess *** .” H.R. Rep. No. 99-807, at 5 (1986). Although this issue has not been 
directly addressed, this court expressed a similar view in Joy Technologies, Inc. v. 
Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In that case, we said, “A method claim is 
directly infringed only by one practicing the patented method.” Id. at 775. 
In 1994, Congress passed legislation to implement the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 
Stat. 4809 (1994). That legislation modified § 271(a) to include the infringing acts 
of offering to sell and importing into the United States. § 533, 108 Stat. at 4988. 
The portion of the Uruguay Round being implemented in the modification of 
§ 271(a) was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. That agreement clearly spells out the rights to be protected. It states: 
1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: 
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third par-
ties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offer-
ing for sale, selling or importing for these purposes that product; 
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third par-
ties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and 
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from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these 
purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, art. 28, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1634 (1994) (footnote omitted). The 
agreement makes clear that claimed processes are to be directly protected only from 
“the act of using the process.” The joint committee report from the Senate reflects 
the same understanding: “The list of exclusive rights granted to patent owners is 
expanded to preclude others from offering to sell or importing products covered by 
a U.S. patent or offering to sell the products of patented processes.” S. Rep. 103-
412, at 230 (1994). Thus, the legislative history of § 271(a) indicates Congress’s 
understanding that method claims could only be directly infringed by use. 
In the context of the on sale bar, we have held that a method claim may be in-
valid if an offer to perform the method was made prior to the critical date. Scaltech, 
Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The on sale bar 
rule applies to the sale of an ‘invention,’ and in this case, the invention was a pro-
cess, as permitted by § 101. As a result, the process involved in this case is subject to 
§ 102(b).”); see also Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming invalidity of claimed method under on sale bar where 
device capable of performing claimed method was sold). Nevertheless, we have pre-
viously “decline[d] to import the authority construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) 
into the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a).” 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 
160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As the Supreme Court cautioned in 
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531: “We would require a clear and certain signal from Con-
gress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that 
the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts 
had previously thought.” The indication we have from Congress on infringement by 
selling or offering to sell method claims shows that it believes the beachhead is nar-
row. 
In this case, we conclude that the jury could not have found that RIM infringed 
the asserted method claims under the “sells” or “offers to sell” prongs of § 271(a). 
We need not and do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the 
“sells” and “offers to sell” prongs of § 271(a). Rather, we conclude only that RIM’s 
performance of at least some of the recited steps of the asserted method claims as a 
service for its customers cannot be considered to be selling or offering to sell the 
invention covered by the asserted method claims. The sale or offer to sell handheld 
devices is not, in and of itself, enough. Thus, we conclude as a matter of law that 
RIM did not sell or offer to sell the invention covered by NTP’s method claims 
within the United States. 
c. “imports into the United States” 
Because the jury’s instruction on direct infringement by RIM included the act 
of importing, we must consider next whether the jury could have found that RIM 
imported any of the processes covered by the asserted method claims in violation of 
§ 271(a). Like the sell and offer to sell provisions discussed above, the question of 
whether a method claim can be infringed by importation is a difficult one conceptu-
ally. The legislative history cited with respect to the sell and offer to sell provisions 
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indicates that Congress did not consider the “import” prong of § 271(a) to apply to 
method claims. However, we need not decide that broad issue. We hold only that 
for the same reasons that the jury could not have found that RIM infringed the 
method claims under the sale or offer for sale prongs, it could not have found in-
fringement by importation under the facts of this case. 
… 
Meyer Intellectual Properties Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc. 
690 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
O’Malley, Judge: 
In this patent case, Meyer Intellectual Properties Limited and Meyer Corpora-
tion, U.S. (collectively, “Meyer”) filed suit against Bodum, Inc. (“Bodum”) …  
alleging that Bodum infringed two of Meyer’s patents, both of which are directed to 
a method for frothing milk: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,780,087 and 5,939,122. …  
The district court granted Meyer’s motions for summary judgment that Bo-
dum’s products infringed the patents-in-suit. … The jury returned a verdict in favor 
of Meyer, finding that the patents-in-suit were not proven to be invalid, finding that 
Bodum’s infringement was willful, and awarding Meyer damages in the amount of 
$50,000. The district court subsequently denied Bodum’s post-trial motions for 
judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) and granted Meyer’s motion requesting en-
hanced damages and attorney fees. 
Bodum appeals from the district court’s final judgment awarding damages and 
attorney fees to Meyer in the amount of $906,487.56. On appeal, Bodum challeng-
es several of the court’s rulings … [including] granting summary judgment in favor 
of Meyer on infringement … . For the reasons explained below, we reverse-in-part, 
vacate-in-part, and remand. 
Background 
A. Factual Background 
1. The Patents-in-Suit 
Frank Brady (“Brady”) is the sole inventor of the ’087 and ’122 Patents. For 
approximately ten years, from 1986 to 1996, Brady was an independent sales repre-
sentative for Bodum, a company that designs and sells housewares products, includ-
ing coffee makers, milk frothers, and other kitchen products. In that capacity, and as 
the Chief Executive Officer of Brady Marketing Company, Inc., Brady marketed and 
sold a number of Bodum’s household products, including Bodum’s French press 
coffee makers. Brady explained that he first conceived of a frother using aeration in-
stead of steam in the mid-1990s, and that he introduced it for sale at a trade show in 
May 1996. Around that same time, Brady began selling his frothers through his 
company BonJour, Inc. (“BonJour”). 
On September 23, 1996, Brady filed a patent application directed to a “Meth-
od for Frothing Liquids.” That application became the ’087 Patent, which issued on 
July 14, 1998. During prosecution of the application that resulted in the ’087  
Patent, the PTO examiner initially rejected Claim 1 as anticipated by a prior art ref-
erence: U.S. Patent No. 5,580,169 (“the Ghidini Patent”). In response, Brady 
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amended the claim to provide: (1) a dimensional limitation requiring that the con-
tainer have a height that is at least two times the diameter; and (2) a plunger with a 
screen and a spring, where the spring is “positioned about the circumference of the 
plunger body such that the spring is biased to hold the screen in place in contact 
with, though not sealably connected to, the container.” With these changes, Claim 
1 of the ’087 Patent was allowed. 
While the application that resulted in the ’087 Patent was pending, Brady filed 
a continuation application that later became the ’122 Patent. The ’122 Patent issued 
on August 17, 1999. 
The patents-in-suit, which share a common specification, are directed to a 
method for frothing liquids such as milk. Specifically, the patents relate to “an appa-
ratus and method for frothing, which allows the user to obtain foamy, frothed milk 
without the use of a complicated steamer device.” …  
Generally speaking, the claims disclose four steps: (1) providing a container that 
has a height to diameter aspect ratio of 2:1; (2) pouring liquid (e.g., milk) into the 
container; (3) introducing a plunger that includes at least a rod and plunger body 
with a screen; and (4) pumping the plunger to aerate the liquid.  
2. Bodum’s Accused Products 
Meyer accuses three of Bodum’s milk frothers of infringement: (1) the Cham-
bord Frother Model No.1964; (1) the Aerius Frother Model No. 1364; and (3) the 
Shin Bistro Frother Model No. 10492. Bodum began selling a first generation of 
accused milk frothers—referred to as the Version 1 frothers—in 1999. The Version 
1 frothers departed from Bodum’s previous non-electric milk frothers in that: (1) 
the carafe was taller and thinner; and (2) the plunger had a different construction 
involving a mesh and spring design. The following images show a comparison be-
tween Bodum’s Version 1 Chambord Frother and the Figures from Meyer’s ’087 
Patent: 
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B. Procedural History 
In May 2005, Brady sold his company—BonJour—to Meyer. In the sale, Bon-
Jour transferred its intellectual property rights to Meyer, and it is undisputed that 
Meyer owns the patents-in-suit. 
On November 20, 2006, Meyer filed suit against Bodum … alleging infringe-
ment of the patents-in-suit. In the Complaint, Meyer alleged that Bodum “has been 
and still is using, selling, offering for sale and/or importing one or more milk froth-
er products for frothing liquids that infringe, directly, indirectly, contributorily 
and/or by inducement” the ’087 Patent and the ’122 Patent. …  
…  
Roughly six months after it was served with the complaint, Bodum ceased 
manufacturing its Version 1 frothers and transitioned to Version 2 frothers with a 
new plunger design. Bodum did not change the name or designation of its frother 
products. According to Bodum, “[u]nlike the Version 1 plunger, the Version 2 
plunger does not have a spring or other biasing element that holds the screen 
against the inside wall of the container or housing, and the screen does not extend 
beyond the diameter of the plunger plate.” Instead, the Version 2 plunger contains 
an O-ring around the circumference of the plunger body. Bodum subsequently re-
moved the O-ring from the Version 2 frother and began selling the new design as 
Version 3 in July 2008. 
…  
On September 2, 2008, Meyer moved for partial summary judgment, arguing 
that, by providing its Version 1 frothers along with instructions for their use, Bo-
dum induced others—specifically Meyer’s own expert Albert Karvelis—to infringe 
the patents-in-suit. In response, Bodum argued that: (1) Meyer failed to provide 
sufficient evidence of an intent to induce infringement; (2) Bodum could not induce 
infringement because it believed in good faith that the Meyer patents are invalid; 
(3) Bodum could not be liable for inducement because no single third party could 
perform all the steps in the patented claims, not even Mr. Karvelis; and (4) even if 
Mr. Karvelis had performed all of the steps of the method claims, his acts could not 
be acts of “infringement” since he was acting under an implied license created by 
the umbrella of the parties’ litigation. 
Two things are notable about the parties’ summary judgment filings. First, 
Meyer presented no evidence that anyone other than its own expert had directly “in-
fringed” the ’087 and ’122 Patents. Second, both parties discussed what it meant to 
“provide a container” for frothing though, again, neither expressly sought construc-
tion of that term. 
On February 11, 2009, the district court granted Meyer’s motion for partial 
summary judgment, finding that Bodum had induced infringement of certain claims 
in the ’087 and ’122 Patents by its sales of the Version 1 frothers.  
Meyer then filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, this time ar-
guing that Bodum’s sale of its Version 2 and 3 frothers both directly infringed and 
induced infringement of the ‘122 Patent. The court granted summary judgment of 
direct infringement and inducement as to the Version 2 frothers, but found genuine 
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issues of material fact as to literal infringement with respect to the Version 3 froth-
ers. …  
… 
Discusssion 
On appeal, Bodum argues that the district court erred when it … granted 
summary judgment of direct infringement and inducement of the asserted method 
claims, despite the lack of evidence that any one party—including Bodum—actually 
performed each step of the asserted claims … .  
A. Infringement 
The district court issued two separate decisions granting summary judgment 
that Bodum directly infringed and induced infringement of the patents-in-suit. First, 
with respect to Bodum’s Version 1 frothers, the court found that: (1) Bodum con-
ceded direct infringement; and (2) whenever a Bodum customer uses its milk frother 
and follows the instructions contained therein, that customer directly infringes the 
patents-in-suit, and Bodum induces the same as a matter of law. Bodum moved the 
district court to clarify its decision, arguing that it could not be a direct infringer 
because it only practices the first step of the claim—“providing a container”—and its 
customers could not be direct infringers because, while they practice each of the 
other steps, they do not practice the “providing” step. The district court judge con-
ducted a status hearing and explained to Bodum that: 
I took a look at the box that contains this plunger. And everything that 
you have done is everything except hold the customer’s hand on the 
plunger. I mean you know, you have given the direct—you have got essen-
tially a one purpose invention. And you have done everything, including 
the first step to practice the thing, because again all that you lack is putting 
your client’s hot hand on the plunger, because you instructed the custom-
er, “Here is how you use the thing.” 
Accordingly, the court denied Bodum’s motion to clarify. 
The district court subsequently granted Meyer’s motion for summary judgment 
that Bodum’s sale of the Version 2 frothers infringe the claims of the ’122 Patent, 
finding that: (1) Bodum must have tested its products before putting them on the 
market; and (2) “[t]hough Meyer does not provide evidence of specific instances of 
direct infringement by Bodum’s customers, such proof is not required because *** 
Version 2 ‘necessarily infringes’ the patented method when operated as directed.” 
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment without deference, 
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. King Pharm., 
Inc. v. Eon Labs., Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010). … Evaluating a dis-
trict court decision granting summary judgment of infringement requires two steps: 
(1) claim construction; and (2) comparison of the properly construed claims to the 
accused product or process. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009). 
Where, as here, the asserted patent claims are method claims, the sale of a 
product, without more, does not infringe the patent. i4i Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 
F.3d 831, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Instead, direct infringement of a method claim re-
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quires a showing that every step of the claimed method has been practiced. Lucent 
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), a party who “actively induces infringement of a pa-
tent shall be liable as an infringer.” To prevail on an inducement claim, a patentee 
must establish that: (1) there has been direct infringement; (2) the defendant, with 
knowledge of the patent, actively and knowingly aided and abetted such direct in-
fringement. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). It is well-established that a finding of direct infringement is a prerequisite to a 
finding of inducement. Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] finding of inducement requires a threshold finding of direct 
infringement.”). 
On appeal, Bodum argues both that the district court assumed that acts of di-
rect infringement occurred when there was no evidence in the record that they did 
and that the district court misapplied the law with respect to inducement in the con-
text of method claims. According to Bodum, because there was no evidence that any 
single party, including Bodum itself, actually performed each step of the asserted 
method claims, there can be no finding of direct infringement or inducement. …  
Meyer responds that: (1) as the district court held, Bodum waived its direct in-
fringement argument with respect to Version 1; and (2) Bodum’s own witnesses 
admitted actual use of Bodum’s Version 1 and Version 2 frothers during testing of 
the frothers. …  
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment of infringement with respect to both the Version 1 and 
Version 2 frothers because the record was inadequate to support such a conclusion 
as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion … we find that, properly construed, 
each step of the method claims could be performed by a single user. 
1. Waiver 
First, we disagree with the district court’s finding that Bodum conceded direct 
infringement as to its Version 1 frother. In its initial motion seeking summary 
judgment, Meyer’s sole argument with respect to direct infringement was that “lit-
eral and direct infringement exists by one, such as Meyer’s expert, Albert Karvelis, 
when practicing the method prescribed in Bodum’s instructions while using Bo-
dum’s accused milk frothers.” Meyer did not argue that anyone other than Mr. 
Karvelis practiced each step of the claimed method by using Bodum’s Version 1 
frother. Nor did Meyer offer evidence of or even argue that anyone at Bodum ever 
practiced every step of the method claim or that there was any known customer who 
did so. 
In response, Bodum both rejected the notion that Mr. Karvelis’ actions could 
constitute acts of infringement and argued that no single person or entity—not even 
Mr. Karvelis—could perform all steps of the method claim because Bodum itself 
practiced the “providing a container” step, and only that step. Recognizing that in-
duced infringement requires proof of both direct infringement and that the alleged 
inducer knowingly aided and abetted that direct infringement, Bodum argued that: 
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Meyer’s allegation of direct infringement is improper for at least the reason 
that, as drafted, no one party can directly infringe any of the independent 
method claims. Only Bodum performs the first step of each independent 
claim, the step of providing a container or housing associated with its Ac-
cused Products. The remaining steps are each performed only by Bodum’s 
customers. As a result there is no direct infringement and consequently, no 
inducement. 
Given this language, we find that the district court erred in concluding that 
Bodum “raise[d] no defense to the argument that its products directly infringed the 
Meyer Patents.” In these circumstances, we agree with Bodum that no waiver oc-
curred. 
2. Claim Construction 
Resolution of the parties’ dispute turns, in large part, on the construction of the 
term “providing” as it is used in the patent claims. … 
To ascertain the scope and meaning of the asserted claims, we look to the claim 
language, the specification, the prosecution history, and any relevant extrinsic evi-
dence. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315-17 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
As a general rule, a claim term is given the plain and ordinary meaning as under-
stood by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention. Id. at 1312-
13. 
Although claim construction begins with the language of the claims themselves, 
the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). Indeed, the specification “is the single best guide to the meaning of a disput-
ed term” and it “acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms used in the 
claims or when it defines terms by implication.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). We 
have also recognized that dictionaries “are often useful to assist in understanding the 
commonly understood meaning of words.” Id. at 1322. As such, we have held that 
judges are free to rely on dictionary definitions when construing claims, “so long as 
the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained 
by a reading of the patent documents.” Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d 
at 1584 n. 6). 
As noted, representative Claim 1 of the ‘087 Patent generally discloses four 
steps: (1) providing a container with a 2:1 height to diameter ratio; (2) pouring milk 
into the container; (3) introducing a plunger; and (4) pumping the plunger to aer-
ate the liquid. The parties’ summary judgment arguments, and the district court’s 
ruling thereon, focused on the first step: “providing a container.” It is undisputed 
that the patents-in-suit do not explicitly define the term “providing.” 
During claim construction, neither party asked the court to construe the term 
“providing.” Although claim construction is a question of law, we are generally hesi-
tant to construe claim terms for the first time on appeal. Wavetronix v. EIS Elec. In-
tegrated Sys., 573 F.3d 1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Under the circumstances of 
this case, however, we find it appropriate to do so. While the parties specifically ad-
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dressed the meaning and scope of this term in their summary judgment briefing to 
the district court, the court did not formally construe the claim term because it 
found no reason to do so. Instead, the court found that Bodum could be liable for 
induced infringement even if it, and only it, performed the providing step because 
Bodum thereafter directed its customers on how to perform the remaining steps of 
the claim. Because the record is sufficiently developed to enable us to construe the 
term, and because the parties’ debate really focuses on the scope, rather than the 
meaning of the claim terms, we choose to address the question the trial court side-
stepped. 
In opposition to Meyer’s motion for summary judgment, Bodum supplied the 
following dictionary definition for the word “provide”: “1. To furnish; supply. 2. To 
make available; afford. 3. To set down as a stipulation. 4. Archaic: To make ready 
ahead of time; prepare.” Am. Heritage College Dictionary 1102 (3d ed. 2000). 
Bodum argued that, because it supplies, furnishes, and otherwise makes the accused 
products available for sale, it is the only party that can carry out the providing step. 
In its reply, Meyer agreed that providing should be given its common ordinary 
meaning, but argued that “there is no limitation in the claims on who does the 
‘providing,’ and none exists. Bodum can do the providing or the end user com-
pleting the claimed method steps can do the providing. In either event, direct in-
fringement occurs.”  
In its decision granting summary judgment as to Bodum’s Version 1 frothers, 
the district court acknowledged Bodum’s proffered dictionary definition and its ar-
gument that, because an end user “cannot ‘provide’ the container as called for by 
the claims,” Bodum does not induce infringement. Rather than analyze the scope of 
the term “providing,” however, the district court found that, even under Bodum’s 
definition, Bodum’s argument fails because “it impermissibly distorts the fundamen-
tal concept of patent infringement.” Specifically, the court held that, “[w]hen any 
end user ‘uses’ a Bodum milk frother—a container—that has been ‘provided’ by 
Bodum, and in doing so follows Bodum’s instructions detailing the steps to be tak-
en in such use of the frother *** it thus directly infringes the Meyer Patents.” No-
tably, however, nothing in the district court’s decision suggests that Bodum is the 
only party that can “provide” the container for use. 
After careful review of the intrinsic evidence, we find that nothing in the claim 
language or the patent specification limits the “providing” step to a specific party. 
Under Bodum’s proffered dictionary definition, it is clear that Bodum “furnishes” 
or “supplies” the container by manufacturing and selling its milk frothers. It is also 
clear under that same definition, however, that anyone who takes a Bodum frother 
from the kitchen cabinet and places it on the counter before filling it with milk can 
satisfy the “providing” step. That person has undoubtedly made the container avail-
able for use and prepared it for frothing. Accordingly, we construe the term 
“providing” to mean “furnishing, supplying, making available, or preparing” and 
find that anyone—Bodum or the end user of its products—can satisfy the providing 
step. Given this construction, we find that the claims at issue here are drawn to ac-
tions that can be performed by a single party. 
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3. Direct Infringement 
Having concluded that a single party is capable of infringing the patents-in-suit, 
we move to the parties’ arguments regarding infringement. We turn first to the issue 
of direct infringement. As noted, in its motion for summary judgment with respect 
to Bodum’s Version 1 frother, Meyer’s only evidence of direct infringement was the 
activities of Meyer’s own expert. On appeal, Bodum argues that Meyer did not in-
troduce any evidence that either Bodum or its customers used the claimed method. 
Meyer responds that Bodum’s witnesses conceded use. Again, Meyer does not argue 
that there was evidence of customer infringement. For the reasons explained below, 
we agree with Bodum that the district court’s judgments of infringement as to both 
the Version 1 and Version 2 frothers suffer from the same deficiency: there was no 
evidence of direct infringement in the record. 
As to the Version 1 frothers, the district court relied only on its conclusion that 
Bodum had conceded direct infringement, though the court never explained to 
whom that concession pertained. Because we find that Bodum made no such con-
cession, Meyer points to no other evidence of direct infringement as to the Version 
1 frothers, and we find none in the underlying summary judgment papers, we con-
clude that the trial court erred in finding direct infringement as a matter of law as to 
those frothers. 
In its decision granting Meyer summary judgment with respect to the Version 2 
frothers, the district court rejected Bodum’s argument that Meyer failed to prove 
direct infringement. Specifically, the court found it unbelievable that “an established 
company such as Bodum would have placed Version 2 and later Version 3 on the 
market for public sale, and would have kept those products on the market for sub-
stantial periods of time, without having first confirmed for itself that each product 
would perform its allotted task *** .” In other words, the court assumed that Bo-
dum must have tested its products. Given this assumption, the court concluded that 
Bodum’s use of the ’122 Patent method “has been established as a matter of law.” 
We find it troubling that the district court based its direct infringement analysis 
on what it assumed happened, rather than on actual evidence of record. This as-
sumption contradicts our well-established law that a patentee must prove infringe-
ment by a preponderance of the evidence. See Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc. v. 
Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637 F.3d 1269, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“Patent infringement, whether literal or by equivalence, is an issue of fact, which 
the patentee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence.”). And, by assuming 
testing without any evidence in the record, the court improperly drew an inference 
in favor of Meyer and against Bodum. Because factual inferences must be drawn in 
favor of the nonmoving party on summary judgment, we find that the district 
court’s decision cannot stand. See IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206 
F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
For the first time on appeal, Meyer cites to deposition testimony from Bodum’s 
President, Thomas Perez, as evidence that Bodum used the claimed method in test-
ing and developing its frothers. Specifically, Meyer points to Perez’s testimony that 
Bodum’s design team always tests each of its products. Bodum argues that Meyer’s 
reliance on this testimony is misplaced because the portions cited were neither sub-
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mitted with the motions for summary judgment nor introduced at trial. In addition, 
Bodum points to the testimony of Jorgen Bodum, Bodum’s Chief Executive Officer 
(hereinafter referred to as “Jorgen”), that he conducts product development with 
his design team which consists of five people in Hong Kong and fifteen people in 
Switzerland. In other words, there is no evidence that Bodum used or tested its milk 
frother products in the United States. 
We agree with Bodum that Meyer cannot for the first time on appeal introduce 
deposition testimony that was not before the district court when it was deciding the 
motions for summary judgment. And, given Jorgen’s trial testimony that Bodum’s 
product development team is located in Hong Kong and Switzerland, Meyer has 
not—at this stage—shown any instances of direct infringement in the United States. 
Because direct infringement of a method claim requires that each of the claimed 
steps are performed within the United States, the evidence of record is insufficient as 
a matter of law to support the court’s decision granting summary judgment. See 
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We 
therefore hold that a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required 
by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country.”). 
Based on the foregoing, we find that Meyer failed to point to specific instances 
of direct infringement and failed to offer any evidence that someone at Bodum used 
its Version 1 and Version 2 frothers. Accordingly, we find that there are genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether anyone at Bodum practiced each step of the as-
serted method claims. 
We now turn to the trial court’s conclusion that Bodum intended that its cus-
tomers would use the frothers to produce froth liquid and that the act of frothing 
thereafter would constitute direct infringement. While it may be true that Bodum’s 
customers may be characterized as direct infringers under our now-controlling con-
struction of the providing step, Meyer never argued at the summary judgment stage 
that they were, and it does not make that argument here. Indeed, Meyer presented 
no evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment regarding either prod-
uct sales or customer use; it relied only on Mr. Karvelis’ testing of the product. 
Judgment as a matter of law on such a sparse record is simply not appropriate. 
Because we conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain, we reverse the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Bodum’s Version 1 and 
Version 2 frothers and remand for further consideration … . 
… 
Dyk, Judge, concurring: 
While I agree with and join the thorough majority opinion, in looking at this 
case from a broader perspective, one cannot help but conclude that this case is an 
example of what is wrong with our patent system. The patents essentially claim the 
use of a prior art French press coffee maker to froth milk. Instead of making coffee 
by using the plunger to separate coffee from coffee grounds, the plunger is de-
pressed to froth milk. The idea of frothing cold milk by the use of aeration rather 
than steam is not new as reflected in the prior art Ghidini patent. Under the  
Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 
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(2007), and its predecessors, it would be reasonable to expect that the claims would 
have been rejected as obvious by the examiner, and, if not, that they would have 
been found obvious on summary judgment by the district court. But no such thing. 
The parties have spent hundreds of thousand of dollars and several years litigating 
this issue, and are invited by us to have another go of it in a second trial. Such 
wasteful litigation does not serve the interests of the inventorship community, nor 
does it fulfill the purposes of the patent system. 
Export 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 512-517 
Union Carbide Chems. v. Shell Oil Co. 
425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
Rader, Judge: 
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted final 
judgment to Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corporation and  
Union Carbide Corporation (collectively Union Carbide) after a jury found that 
Shell Oil Company, Shell Chemical Company, and CRI Catalyst Company (collec-
tively Shell) infringed claim 4 of Union Carbide’s U.S. Patent No. 4,916,243 (the 
’243 patent). Because substantial evidence supports the jury verdict, this court af-
firms that finding. However, because the district court improperly excluded Shell’s 
exportation of catalysts in its damages calculation, this court vacates the damage 
award and remands. 
I. 
In 1999, Shell filed a declaratory judgment action in … Texas alleging that  
Union Carbide’s U.S. Patent No. 5,057,481 (the ’481 patent), U.S. Patent No. 
4,908,343 (the ’343 patent), and the ’243 patent were invalid, unenforceable, and 
not infringed. One month later, Union Carbide sued Shell in … Delaware alleging 
that six of Shell’s catalysts infringed those same patents. The two cases were consoli-
dated for trial in Delaware. After a twelve day trial, a jury returned a verdict for Shell 
on issues of infringement and invalidity. Upon appeal, this court affirmed-in-part, 
reversed-in-part, and remanded. 
In 2003, the district court held a second jury trial on the remanded issues in-
volving only the ’243 patent. The jury returned a verdict finding that Shell’s S-880 
and S-882 catalysts directly infringed claim 4 in the production of ethylene oxide 
(EO). The jury also found that Shell contributorily infringed claim 4 by selling its S-
863, S-880 and S-882 catalysts to third parties. Accordingly, the jury awarded 
$112,198,893 in damages to Union Carbide. The trial court first adjusted that 
award to $111,212,665 after correcting for a clerical error and later to 
$153,615,774 for prejudgment interest. This damages award, however, did not ac-
count for Shell’s exportation of catalysts because the district court ruled in limine 
that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) damages are not available for process claims, such as claim 4 
of the ’243 patent. After considering post-trial motions from both parties, the dis-
trict court entered a final judgment for Union Carbide and a permanent injunction 
against Shell, which it stayed pending Shell’s appeal to this court. 
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Shell appeals the district court’s denial of its Judgment as a Matter of Law 
(JMOL) motions and the damages amount. Union Carbide cross-appeals the district 
court’s holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) does not apply to process claims and the 
jury verdict finding that Shell’s infringement was not willful. … 
II. 
This court described the technology at issue in this case at length in [the prior 
appeal]. … In brief, the ’243 patent claims improved silver catalysts for the commer-
cial production of EO. EO gas is used primarily in the industrial production of eth-
ylene glycol, which is used, in turn, to produce polyester fiber, resin and film. Most 
of the EO produced each year is converted into monoethylene glycol (MEG). Un-
ion Carbide and its parent corporation, Dow Chemical, produce twenty-five percent 
of the MEG sold domestically. Shell is a direct competitor of Union Carbide and 
Dow Chemical in EO production and MEG sales. 
Union Carbide’s proprietary process for EO production involves a highly exo-
thermic reaction between ethylene and oxygen occurring between 250 and 300° C. 
’243 patent, col. 12, l. 50 to col. 13, l. 30. Before 1971, the ordinary artisan in this 
field understood that a silver catalyst decreased the reaction temperature and in-
creased reaction efficiency without consuming or altering the silver itself. However, 
no producer managed to increase the reaction efficiency beyond 65 percent. In 
1971, scientists discovered that certain alkali metals in small amounts further pro-
moted the efficiency of silver-catalyzed reactions. Union Carbide thus undertook 
considerable research on catalysts with silver and other alkali metals. This research 
led to the invention now claimed in the ’243 patent. 
The ’243 patent claims a process for the production of EO with a greater de-
crease in the reaction temperature than processes using pure silver catalysts. Thus, 
this new process reduces the formation of oxygen and water byproducts and increas-
es the efficiency of the reaction. ’243 patent, col. 8, ll. 39-55. Claim 4, the sole 
claim at issue in the present appeal, concerns a process involving a catalyst including 
silver, cesium and lithium. … 
… 
At trial, Union Carbide provided evidence showing that 58 samples of Shell 
catalysts met the comparison and characterizable limitations of claim 4. Specifically, 
Union Carbide’s expert witness, Professor Haller, tested samples sold by Shell 
commercially and catalysts that he produced by following recipes detailed in Shell’s 
internal documents. … 
… 
IX. 
On the cross appeal, Union Carbide asserts that the district court erred as a 
matter of law by ruling in limine that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) “is not directed to process 
claims.” In doing so, the court prohibited Union Carbide from submitting evidence 
of Shell’s foreign sales for the purpose of recovering additional damages under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f)(2). This prohibition was in error. 
Section 271(f) of title 35 is generally directed at the exportation, from the 
United States, of components of patented inventions. Specifically, § 271(f)(2) states: 
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Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the 
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made 
or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, where 
such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such 
component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will 
be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe 
the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be 
liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (emphasis added). This case again questions the meaning of 
the phrase “any component of a patented invention” in the statute. In other words, 
does this phrase apply to components used in the performance of patented process/ 
method inventions? Eolas Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), recently answered this question in the affirmative, holding that every com-
ponent of every form of invention deserves the protection of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 
i.e., that “components” and “patented inventions” under § 271(f) are not limited to 
physical machines. In Eolas, this court stated: 
Section 271(f) refers to “components of a patented invention.” This statu-
tory language uses the broad and inclusive term “patented invention.”  
Title 35, in the definitions section, defines “invention” to mean “invention 
or discovery”—again broad and inclusive terminology. 35 U.S.C. § 100(a). 
The next section in Title 35, section 101, explains that an invention in-
cludes “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition 
of matter.” 
Id. at 1338-39. Thus, as Eolas explained, the statute makes no distinction between 
patentable method/process inventions and other forms of patentable inventions. 
Moreover, Eolas and this case featured similar facts. In Eolas, Microsoft export-
ed a master computer disc with program code that caused a computer to perform 
various method steps. Thus, both this case and Eolas feature the exportation of a 
component (i.e., a computer disc with program code in Eolas and a catalyst in this 
case) used in the performance of a patented process or method (i.e., the method 
steps executed by the computer in response to the computer readable program code 
in Eolas and the commercial production of EO in this case). In that setting, Eolas 
applied § 271(f) to Microsoft’s exported component. Similarly, § 271(f) applies to 
Shell’s exportation of catalysts (i.e., a “component”) used in the commercial produc-
tion of EO abroad (i.e., a “patented invention”). 
… 
In brief, because § 271(f) governs method/process inventions, Shell’s exporta-
tion of catalysts may result in liability under § 271(f). Accordingly, the district court 
abused its discretion in excluding Shell’s exportation of catalysts as part of its dam-
ages award. This court remands this case to the district court for additional findings 
on Shell’s potential liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
… 
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Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 
550 U.S. 437 (2007) 
Ginsburg, Justice: 
It is the general rule under United States patent law that no infringement oc-
curs when a patented product is made and sold in another country. There is an ex-
ception. Section 271(f) of the Patent Act, adopted in 1984, provides that infringe-
ment does occur when one “supplies *** from the United States,” for “combina-
tion” abroad, a patented invention’s “components.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). This 
case concerns the applicability of § 271(f) to computer software first sent from the 
United States to a foreign manufacturer on a master disk, or by electronic transmis-
sion, then copied by the foreign recipient for installation on computers made and 
sold abroad. 
AT&T holds a patent on an apparatus for digitally encoding and compressing 
recorded speech. Microsoft’s Windows operating system, it is conceded, has the po-
tential to infringe AT&T’s patent, because Windows incorporates software code 
that, when installed, enables a computer to process speech in the manner claimed by 
that patent. It bears emphasis, however, that uninstalled Windows software does not 
infringe AT&T’s patent any more than a computer standing alone does; instead, the 
patent is infringed only when a computer is loaded with Windows and is thereby 
rendered capable of performing as the patented speech processor. The question be-
fore us: Does Microsoft’s liability extend to computers made in another country 
when loaded with Windows software copied abroad from a master disk or electronic 
transmission dispatched by Microsoft from the United States? Our answer is “No.” 
The master disk or electronic transmission Microsoft sends from the United 
States is never installed on any of the foreign-made computers in question. Instead, 
copies made abroad are used for installation. Because Microsoft does not export 
from the United States the copies actually installed, it does not “suppl[y] *** from 
the United States” “components” of the relevant computers, and therefore is not 
liable under § 271(f) as currently written. 
Plausible arguments can be made for and against extending § 271(f) to the 
conduct charged in this case as infringing AT&T’s patent. Recognizing that 
§ 271(f) is an exception to the general rule that our patent law does not apply extra-
territorially, we resist giving the language in which Congress cast § 271(f) an expan-
sive interpretation. Our decision leaves to Congress’ informed judgment any  
adjustment of § 271(f) it deems necessary or proper. 
I 
Our decision some 35 years ago in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 
406 U.S. 518 (1972), a case about a shrimp deveining machine, led Congress to 
enact § 271(f). In that case, Laitram, holder of a patent on the time-and-expense-
saving machine, sued Deepsouth, manufacturer of an infringing deveiner. 
Deepsouth conceded that the Patent Act barred it from making and selling its 
deveining machine in the United States, but sought to salvage a portion of its  
business: Nothing in United States patent law, Deepsouth urged, stopped it from  
making in the United States the parts of its deveiner, as opposed to the machine it-
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self, and selling those parts to foreign buyers for assembly and use abroad. Id. at 
522-524. We agreed. 
Interpreting our patent law as then written, we reiterated in Deepsouth that it 
was “not an infringement to make or use a patented product outside of the United 
States.” Id. at 527. Deepsouth’s foreign buyers did not infringe Laitram’s patent, we 
held, because they assembled and used the deveining machines outside the United 
States. Deepsouth, we therefore concluded, could not be charged with inducing or 
contributing to an infringement. Id. at 526-527. Nor could Deepsouth be held  
liable as a direct infringer, for it did not make, sell, or use the patented invention—
the fully assembled deveining machine—within the United States. The parts of the 
machine were not themselves patented, we noted, hence export of those parts, unas-
sembled, did not rank as an infringement of Laitram’s patent. Id. at 527-529. 
Laitram had argued in Deepsouth that resistance to extension of the patent privi-
lege to cover exported parts “derived from too narrow and technical an interpreta-
tion of the [Patent Act].” Id. at 529. Rejecting that argument, we referred to prior 
decisions holding that “a combination patent protects only against the operable as-
sembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.” Id. at 528. Congress’ 
codification of patent law, we said, signaled no intention to broaden the scope of 
the privilege. Id. at 530 (“When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of 
how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”). And we again 
emphasized that 
 [o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; these acts of 
Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of 
the United States; and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to 
such control over our markets. 
Id. at 531 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857)). Ab-
sent “a clear congressional indication of intent,” we stated, courts had no warrant to 
stop the manufacture and sale of the parts of patented inventions for assembly and 
use abroad. 406 U.S. at 532. 
Focusing its attention on Deepsouth, Congress enacted § 271(f). See Patent Law 
Amendments Act of 1984, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383; Fisch & Allen, The Application of 
Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 557, 565 (2004) (“Congress specifically intended § 271(f) as a response to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth.”).3 The provision expands the defini-
tion of infringement to include supplying from the United States a patented inven-
tion’s components: 
                                                
3 See also, e.g., S. Rep. No. 98-663, pp. 2-3 (1984) (describing § 271(f) as “a re-
sponse to the Supreme Court’s 1972 Deepsouth decision which interpreted the  
patent law not to make it infringement where the final assembly and sale is abroad”); 
Section-by-Section Analysis of H.R. 6286, 130 Cong. Rec. 28069 (1984) (“This 
proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth *** 
concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole in [the] patent 
law.”). 
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(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from 
the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a  
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or 
in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such com-
ponents outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the 
patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be  
liable as an infringer. 
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from 
the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially 
made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article 
or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, 
where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that 
such component is so made or adapted and intending that such compo-
nent will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, 
shall be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
II 
Windows is designed, authored, and tested at Microsoft’s Redmond, Washing-
ton, headquarters. Microsoft sells Windows to end users and computer manufac-
turers, both foreign and domestic. Purchasing manufacturers install the software on-
to the computers they sell. Microsoft sends to each of the foreign manufacturers a 
master version of Windows, either on a disk or via encrypted electronic transmission. 
The manufacturer uses the master version to generate copies. Those copies, not the 
master sent by Microsoft, are installed on the foreign manufacturer’s computers. 
Once assembly is complete, the foreign-made computers are sold to users abroad.4  
AT&T’s patent (’580 patent) is for an apparatus (as relevant here, a computer) 
capable of digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech. Windows, the par-
ties agree, contains software that enables a computer to process speech in the man-
ner claimed by the ’580 patent. In 2001, AT&T filed an infringement suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charging  
Microsoft with liability for domestic and foreign installations of Windows. 
Neither Windows software (e.g., in a box on the shelf) nor a computer standing 
alone (i.e., without Windows installed) infringes AT&T’s patent. Infringement oc-
curs only when Windows is installed on a computer, thereby rendering it capable of 
performing as the patented speech processor. Microsoft stipulated that by installing 
Windows on its own computers during the software development process, it directly 
infringed the ’580 patent. Microsoft further acknowledged that by licensing copies 
of Windows to manufacturers of computers sold in the United States, it induced 
infringement of AT&T’s patent. 
                                                
4 Microsoft also distributes Windows to foreign manufacturers indirectly, by sending 
a master version to an authorized foreign “replicator”; the replicator then makes 
copies and ships them to the manufacturers. 
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Microsoft denied, however, any liability based on the master disks and electron-
ic transmissions it dispatched to foreign manufacturers, thus joining issue with 
AT&T. By sending Windows to foreign manufacturers, AT&T contended,  
Microsoft “supplie[d] *** from the United States,” for “combination” abroad, 
“components” of AT&T’s patented speech processor; accordingly, AT&T urged, 
Microsoft was liable under § 271(f). Microsoft responded that unincorporated soft-
ware, because it is intangible information, cannot be typed a “component” of an 
invention under § 271(f). In any event, Microsoft urged, the foreign-generated  
copies of Windows actually installed abroad were not “supplie[d] *** from the 
United States.” Rejecting these responses, the District Court held Microsoft liable 
under § 271(f). On appeal, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari and now reverse. 
III 
A 
This case poses two questions: First, when, or in what form, does software qual-
ify as a “component” under § 271(f)? Second, were “components” of the foreign-
made computers involved in this case “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United 
States”?7  
As to the first question, no one in this litigation argues that software can never 
rank as a “component” under § 271(f). The parties disagree, however, over the 
stage at which software becomes a component. Software, the “set of instructions, 
known as code, that directs a computer to perform specified functions or opera-
tions,” Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287 F.3d 1108, 1118 
(Fed. Cir. 2002), can be conceptualized in (at least) two ways. One can speak of 
software in the abstract: the instructions themselves detached from any medium. (An 
analogy: The notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.) One can alternatively envision 
a tangible “copy” of software, the instructions encoded on a medium such as a CD-
ROM. (Sheet music for Beethoven’s Ninth.) AT&T argues that software in the ab-
stract, not simply a particular copy of software, qualifies as a “component” under 
§ 271(f). Microsoft and the United States argue that only a copy of software, not 
software in the abstract, can be a component. 
The significance of these diverse views becomes apparent when we turn to the 
second question: Were components of the foreign-made computers involved in this 
case “supplie[d]” by Microsoft “from the United States”? If the relevant compo-
nents are the copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign computers, AT&T 
could not persuasively argue that those components, though generated abroad, were 
“supplie[d] *** from the United States” as § 271(f) requires for liability to attach.9 
                                                
7 The record leaves unclear which paragraph of § 271(f) AT&T’s claim invokes. 
While there are differences between § 271(f)(1) and (f)(2), the parties do not sug-
gest that those differences are outcome determinative. For clarity’s sake, we focus 
our analysis on the text of § 271(f)(1). 
9 On this view of “component,” the copies of Windows on the master disks and 
electronic transmissions that Microsoft sent from the United States could not them-
selves serve as a basis for liability, because those copies were not installed on the for-
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If, on the other hand, Windows in the abstract qualifies as a component within 
§ 271(f)’s compass, it would not matter that the master copies of Windows software 
dispatched from the United States were not themselves installed abroad as working 
parts of the foreign computers.10  
With this explanation of the relationship between the two questions in view, we 
further consider the twin inquiries. 
B 
First, when, or in what form, does software become a “component” under 
§ 271(f)? We construe § 271(f)’s terms “in accordance with [their] ordinary or  
natural meaning.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). Section 271(f) applies 
to the supply abroad of the “components of a patented invention, where such com-
ponents are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components.” § 271(f)(1) (emphasis added). The provision thus 
applies only to “such components”11 as are combined to form the “patented inven-
tion” at issue. The patented invention here is AT&T’s speech-processing computer. 
Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e.g., on a CD-ROM, Win-
dows software—indeed any software detached from an activating medium—remains 
uncombinable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the 
Internet; it cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software code is 
an idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does not match § 271(f)’s cat-
egorization: “components” amenable to “combination.” Windows abstracted from a 
tangible copy no doubt is information—a detailed set of instructions—and thus 
might be compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design information, e.g., 
a schematic, template, or prototype). A blueprint may contain precise instructions 
for the construction and combination of the components of a patented device, but it 
is not itself a combinable component of that device. AT&T and its amici do not 
suggest otherwise. Cf. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117-19 
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (transmission abroad of instructions for production of patented 
computer chips not covered by § 271(f)). 
AT&T urges that software, at least when expressed as machine-readable object 
code, is distinguishable from design information presented in a blueprint. Software, 
unlike a blueprint, is “modular”; it is a stand-alone product developed and marketed 
“for use on many different types of computer hardware and in conjunction with 
                                                                                                                                
eign manufacturers’ computers. See § 271(f)(1) (encompassing only those compo-
nents “combin[ed] *** outside of the United States in a manner that would in-
fringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States”). 
10 The Federal Circuit panel in this case, relying on that court’s prior decision in Eo-
las Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), held that 
software qualifies as a component under § 271(f). We are unable to determine, 
however, whether the Federal Circuit panels regarded as a component software in 
the abstract, or a copy of software. 
11 “Component” is commonly defined as “a constituent part,” “element,” or “in-
gredient.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
466 (1981). 
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many other types of software.” Software’s modularity persists even after installation; 
it can be updated or removed (deleted) without affecting the hardware on which it 
is installed. Software, unlike a blueprint, is also “dynamic.” After a device has been 
built according to a blueprint’s instructions, the blueprint’s work is done (as AT&T 
puts it, the blueprint’s instructions have been “exhausted”). Software’s instructions, 
in contrast, are contained in and continuously performed by a computer. 
The distinctions advanced by AT&T do not persuade us to characterize soft-
ware, uncoupled from a medium, as a combinable component. Blueprints too, or 
any design information for that matter, can be independently developed, bought, 
and sold. If the point of AT&T’s argument is that we do not see blueprints lining 
stores’ shelves, the same observation may be made about software in the abstract: 
What retailers sell, and consumers buy, are copies of software. Likewise, before soft-
ware can be contained in and continuously performed by a computer, before it can 
be updated or deleted, an actual, physical copy of the software must be delivered by 
CD-ROM or some other means capable of interfacing with the computer. 
Because it is so easy to encode software’s instructions onto a medium that can 
be read by a computer, AT&T intimates, that extra step should not play a decisive 
role under § 271(f). But the extra step is what renders the software a usable, com-
binable part of a computer; easy or not, the copy-producing step is essential. More-
over, many tools may be used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a de-
vice. A machine for making sprockets might be used by a manufacturer to produce 
tens of thousands of sprockets an hour. That does not make the machine a “com-
ponent” of the tens of thousands of devices in which the sprockets are incorporated, 
at least not under any ordinary understanding of the term “component.” Congress, 
of course, might have included within § 271(f)’s compass, for example, not only 
combinable “components” of a patented invention, but also “information, instruc-
tions, or tools from which those components readily may be generated.” It did not. 
In sum, a copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a “compo-
nent” under § 271(f).13  
C 
The next question, has Microsoft “supplie[d] *** from the United States” 
components of the computers here involved? Under a conventional reading of 
§ 271(f)’s text, the answer would be “No,” for the foreign-made copies of Windows 
actually installed on the computers were “supplie[d]” from places outside the  
United States. The Federal Circuit majority concluded, however, that “for software 
‘components,’ the act of copying is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying.’” A master 
sent abroad, the majority observed, differs not at all from the exact copies, easily, 
inexpensively, and swiftly generated from the master; hence “sending a single copy 
                                                
13 We need not address whether software in the abstract, or any other intangible, can 
ever be a component under § 271(f). If an intangible method or process, for in-
stance, qualifies as a “patented invention” under § 271(f) (a question as to which we 
express no opinion), the combinable components of that invention might be intan-
gible as well. The invention before us, however, AT&T’s speech-processing com-
puter, is a tangible thing. 
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abroad with the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for th[e]  
foreign-made copies.” 
Judge Rader, dissenting, noted that “supplying” is ordinarily understood to 
mean an activity separate and distinct from any subsequent “copying, replicating, or 
reproducing—in effect manufacturing.” He further observed: “The only true differ-
ence between making and supplying software components and physical components 
[of other patented inventions] is that copies of software components are easier to 
make and transport.” But nothing in § 271(f)’s text, Judge Rader maintained, ren-
ders ease of copying a relevant, no less decisive, factor in triggering liability for in-
fringement. We agree. 
Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components “from the United States *** 
in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.” 
§ 271(f)(1) (emphasis added). Under this formulation, the very components sup-
plied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when 
combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue. Here, as we have repeat-
edly noted, the copies of Windows actually installed on the foreign computers were 
not themselves supplied from the United States. Indeed, those copies did not exist 
until they were generated by third parties outside the United States. Copying soft-
ware abroad, all might agree, is indeed easy and inexpensive. But the same could be 
said of other items: “Keys or machine parts might be copied from a master; chemical 
or biological substances might be created by reproduction; and paper products 
might be made by electronic copying and printing.” Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 24. Section 271(f) contains no instruction to gauge when duplication is 
easy and cheap enough to deem a copy in fact made abroad nevertheless “supplie[d] 
*** from the United States.” The absence of anything addressing copying in the 
statutory text weighs against a judicial determination that replication abroad of a 
master dispatched from the United States “supplies” the foreign-made copies from 
the United States within the intendment of § 271(f).16  
D 
Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be 
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality, on which we have already 
touched. The presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not 
rule the world applies with particular force in patent law. The traditional under-
standing that our patent law “operate[s] only domestically and d[oes] not extend to 
foreign activities,” Fisch & Allen at 559, is embedded in the Patent Act itself, which 
                                                
16 Our analysis, while focusing on § 271(f)(1), is equally applicable to § 271(f)(2). 
While the two paragraphs differ, among other things, on the quantity of compo-
nents that must be “supplie[d] *** from the United States” for liability to attach, 
that distinction does not affect our analysis. Paragraph (2), like (1), covers only a 
“component” amenable to “combination.” Paragraph (2), like (1), encompasses 
only the “[s]uppl[y] *** from the United States” of “such [a] component” as will 
itself “be combined outside of the United States.” It is thus unsurprising that 
AT&T does not join the dissent in suggesting that the outcome might turn on 
whether we view the case under paragraph (1) or (2). 
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provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention within the United 
States. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (patentee’s rights over invention apply to manufac-
ture, use, or sale “throughout the United States” and to importation “into the 
United States”). See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (“Our patent system makes no 
claim to extraterritorial effect”; our legislation “d[oes] not, and [was] not intended 
to, operate beyond the limits of the United States, and we correspondingly reject 
the claims of others to such control over our markets.” (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) at 195)). 
As a principle of general application, moreover, we have stated that courts 
should “assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of 
other nations when they write American laws.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Em-
pagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). Thus, as the United States accurately conveyed in this 
case: “Foreign conduct is [generally] the domain of foreign law,” and in the area 
here involved, in particular, foreign law “may embody different policy judgments 
about the relative rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inven-
tions.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. Applied to this case, the pre-
sumption tugs strongly against construction of § 271(f) to encompass as a “com-
ponent” not only a physical copy of software, but also software’s intangible code, 
and to render “supplie[d] *** from the United States” not only exported copies of 
software, but also duplicates made abroad. 
AT&T argues that the presumption is inapplicable because Congress enacted 
§ 271(f) specifically to extend the reach of United States patent law to cover certain 
activity abroad. But as this Court has explained, “the presumption is not defeated 
*** just because [a statute] specifically addresses [an] issue of extraterritorial applica-
tion,” Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993); it remains instructive in 
determining the extent of the statutory exception. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 161-
62, 164-65; Smith, 507 U.S. at 204. 
AT&T alternately contends that the presumption holds no sway here given that 
§ 271(f), by its terms, applies only to domestic conduct, i.e., to the supply of a pa-
tented invention’s components “from the United States.” § 271(f)(1). AT& 
T’s reading, however, “converts a single act of supply from the United States into a 
springboard for liability each time a copy of the software is subsequently made 
[abroad] and combined with computer hardware [abroad] for sale [abroad.]” Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 29. In short, foreign law alone, not United 
States law, currently governs the manufacture and sale of components of patented 
inventions in foreign countries. If AT&T desires to prevent copying in foreign coun-
tries, its remedy today lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents. See Deepsouth, 
406 U.S. at 531.17  
                                                
17 AT&T has secured patents for its speech processor in Canada, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Japan, and Sweden. AT&T and its amici do not relate what protec-
tions and remedies are, or are not, available under these foreign regimes. 
  Miller’s Patent Cases 
  395 
IV 
AT&T urges that reading § 271(f) to cover only those copies of software actu-
ally dispatched from the United States creates a “loophole” for software makers.  
Liability for infringing a United States patent could be avoided, as Microsoft’s prac-
tice shows, by an easily arranged circumvention: Instead of making installation  
copies of software in the United States, the copies can be made abroad, swiftly and 
at small cost, by generating them from a master supplied from the United States. 
The Federal Circuit majority found AT&T’s plea compelling: 
Were we to hold that Microsoft’s supply by exportation of the master ver-
sions of the Windows software—specifically for the purpose of foreign rep-
lication—avoids infringement, we would be subverting the remedial nature 
of § 271(f), permitting a technical avoidance of the statute by ignoring the 
advances in a field of technology—and its associated industry practices—
that developed after the enactment of § 271(f). *** Section 271(f), if it is 
to remain effective, must therefore be interpreted in a manner that is ap-
propriate to the nature of the technology at issue. 
While the [Federal Circuit] majority’s concern is understandable, we are not per-
suaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of § 271(f) is in order. The “loophole,” 
in our judgment, is properly left for Congress to consider, and to close if it finds 
such action warranted. 
There is no dispute, we note again, that § 271(f) is inapplicable to the export of 
design tools—blueprints, schematics, templates, and prototypes—all of which may 
provide the information required to construct and combine overseas the com-
ponents of inventions patented under United States law. We have no license to at-
tribute to Congress an unstated intention to place the information Microsoft dis-
patched from the United States in a separate category. 
Section 271(f) was a direct response to a gap in our patent law revealed by this 
Court’s Deepsouth decision. The facts of that case were undeniably at the fore when 
§ 271(f) was in the congressional hopper. In Deepsouth, the items exported were kits 
containing all the physical, readily assemblable parts of a shrimp deveining machine 
(not an intangible set of instructions), and those parts themselves (not foreign-made 
copies of them) would be combined abroad by foreign buyers. Having attended to 
the gap made evident in Deepsouth, Congress did not address other arguable gaps: 
Section 271(f) does not identify as an infringing act conduct in the United States 
that facilitates making a component of a patented invention outside the United 
States; nor does the provision check “suppl[ying] *** from the United States” in-
formation, instructions, or other materials needed to make copies abroad. Given that 
Congress did not home in on the loophole AT&T describes, and in view of the ex-
panded extraterritorial thrust AT&T’s reading of § 271(f) entails, our precedent 
leads us to leave in Congress’ court the patent-protective determination AT&T 
seeks. Cf. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 
(1984) (“In a case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, 
we must be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative en-
actment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”). 
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Congress is doubtless aware of the ease with which software (and other elec-
tronic media) can be copied, and has not left the matter untouched. In 1998, Con-
gress addressed “the ease with which pirates could copy and distribute a copyright-
able work in digital form.” Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435 
(2d Cir. 2001). The resulting measure, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., “backed with legal sanctions the efforts of copyright owners 
to protect their works from piracy behind digital walls such as encryption codes or 
password protections.” Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 435. If the patent law is 
to be adjusted better “to account for the realities of software distribution,” the alter-
ation should be made after focused legislative consideration, and not by the Ju-
diciary forecasting Congress’ likely disposition. 
… 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc. 
576 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc in part) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., Guidant Sales Corporation, Mirowski Family Ven-
tures, LLC, and Anna Mirowski (collectively, “Cardiac” or “appellants”) appeal 
from the decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana [regarding the alleged infringement of] claim 4 of U.S. Patent 4,407,288. 
… 
St. Jude Medical, Inc. and Pacesetter, Inc. (collectively, “St. Jude”) cross-appeal 
from the district court’s decision permitting damages under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f). 
The en banc court reverses the district court’s determination that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
applies to method claims and hence permits damages in this case on devices export-
ed where the claimed method is carried out in countries other than the United 
States (see Section C.2 of this opinion). 
Background 
This patent dispute concerning implantable cardioverter defibrillators 
(“ICDs”), has been before us on four previous occasions. … 
ICDs are small devices that detect and correct abnormal heart rhythms that can 
be fatal if left untreated. The ICDs in this case work by administering electrical 
shocks to the heart, those shocks being calibrated to restore normal heart function-
ing. Implantable cardiac devices can be programmed to administer different types of 
electrical shocks, including pacing shocks (which are relatively low power shocks), 
defibrillation (relatively high power shocks), and cardioversion, the definition of 
which has been a source of dispute throughout the protracted litigation of this case. 
Cardiac owns various patents relating to cardiac defibrillators, including the 
’288 patent. The ’288 patent claims a method of heart stimulation using an im-
plantable heart stimulator that is capable of detecting heart arrhythmias, or irregular 
heart rhythms, and of being programmed to treat the arrhythmia through either 
single or multimode operation. Multimode operation allows a heart stimulator to 
respond to arrhythmias by applying first one type of shock and then, if unsuccessful, 
administering a second type of shock. … 
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2. Section 271(f) 
The court hears this section C(2) en banc. The district court, following our de-
cision in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 
F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), found that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) applied to method 
claims and that St. Jude’s shipment of ICDs abroad could result in a violation of 
that section. On cross-appeal to this court, St. Jude challenged the court’s decision. 
The panel affirmed the court’s decision on the basis of Union Carbide. St. Jude filed 
a petition for rehearing en banc, which we granted, thus vacating the panel decision. 
The en banc court heard oral argument on this issue on May 29, 2009. For the  
reasons stated below, we reverse and hold that § 271(f) does not cover method 
claims and is therefore not implicated in this case. 
… 
In 2006, a panel of this court explicitly held that § 271(f) applied to method 
claims. In Union Carbide, the court was presented with a case in which a catalyst, 
which was necessary to perform a patented method for producing ethylene oxide, 
was exported from the United States. 425 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The 
court held that § 271(f) was applicable to the exportation of the catalyst and use of 
the patented method abroad. In doing so, the court referred to the catalyst as the 
“component” referred to in § 271(f). … Indeed, the court considered that the 
shipment of the chemical catalyst was an even stronger candidate for the application 
of § 271(f) than the shipment of master disks in Eolas because, unlike [the accused 
infringer in] Eolas, Shell used the shipped components directly in its process instead 
of using copies of the exported components. Id. at 1379. Thus, the court held that 
“because § 271(f) governs method/process inventions, Shell’s exportation of cata-
lysts may result in liability” under that section. Id. at 1380. 
The Supreme Court subsequently examined § 271(f) when it granted certiorari 
and reversed our decision in AT&T. 550 U.S. 437 (2007). The Court held that  
Microsoft did not supply combinable components of a patented invention when it 
shipped master disks abroad to be copied. Because the foreign-made copies of Win-
dows that were installed on computers were supplied “from places outside of the 
United States,” the Court held that Microsoft had not supplied components from 
the United States. Id. at 452. The court reserved judgment on whether “an intan-
gible method or process … qualifies as a ‘patented invention’ under § 271(f),” but 
noted that if so, the “combinable components of that invention might be intan-
gible.” Id. at n.13. The Court sent a clear message that the territorial limits of  
patents should not be lightly breached. Id. at 454-56. 
… 
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In construing the terms of § 271(f), we do so “in accordance with [their] ordi-
nary or natural meaning.” Id. at 449 (alteration in original). Section 271(f)(1) pro-
vides that one who “supplies *** in or from the United States, all or a substantial 
portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are un-
combined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination 
of such components” shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Section 
271(f)(2) contains similar language. 
Cardiac argues that the use of the term “patented invention” in 271(f) indicates 
Congress’s intent to include all classes of invention within that statute’s reach. Car-
diac rightly notes that “invention” is defined in the U.S. Code to include “any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, and thus is broad enough to include method patents. However, examination 
of the statute before us is not quite so simple. While the isolated “patented inven-
tion” language in § 271(f) by itself might seem to extend to all inventions within 
the definition of “invention,” we cannot disregard all the other language of that sec-
tion, which, as we shall demonstrate, makes it clear that it does not extend to meth-
od patents. We also cannot ignore the context of the statute and its legislative his-
tory, which lead us to the same conclusion, which is that § 271(f) does not encom-
pass method patents. 
In interpreting the terms of § 271(f), it is critical to recall what a “patented in-
vention” consists of when method patents are at issue. We have noted “the distinc-
tion between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible 
items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of acts or steps.” In re Kol-
lar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Thus, a component of a tangible prod-
uct, device, or apparatus is a tangible part of the product, device, or apparatus, 
whereas a component of a method or process is a step in that method or process. As 
we demonstrate herein, this fundamental distinction between claims to a product, 
device, or apparatus on one hand and claims to a process or method on the other, is 
critical to the meaning of the statute and dooms Cardiac’s argument on this issue. 
Cardiac relies on the Supreme Court’s language in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. 
LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), in which the Court stated: “Apparatus 
and method claims may approach each other so nearly that it will be difficult to dis-
tinguish the process from the function of the apparatus.” Id. at 629. However, the 
Court’s language throughout the Quanta opinion is focused on the similarities be-
tween method and apparatus patents in the unique context of patent exhaustion. 
See, e.g., id. at 628 (noting that a method may be “embodied” in devices for pur-
poses of a “sale”); id. at 629 (method patents may be “exhausted by the sale of an 
item”). Moreover, in an exhaustion context, which considers whether a patent own-
er has been fully compensated when a sale or license of his invention has occurred, it 
matters little whether the patent involved claims to a product (apparatus) or a meth-
od. If a patent owner sells or licenses a product, it is not unreasonable to hold that 
the patent owner has received his due compensation under the patent, whether it is 
a product or a method patent. Thus, as the Supreme Court stated, for purposes of 
exhaustion, it may “be difficult to distinguish the process from the function of the 
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apparatus.” Id. The Supreme Court’s statement in an exhaustion context has no ap-
plication here. 
Our precedents draw a clear distinction between method and apparatus claims 
for purposes of infringement liability, which is what § 271 is directed to. See, e.g., Joy 
Tech., 6 F.3d at 773-75 (stating that method claims are infringed only by practicing 
the steps of the method). Section 271(f) “applies only to ‘such components’ as are 
combined to form the ‘patented invention’ at issue.” AT&T, 550 U.S. at 449. 
“Component” is defined as “a constituent part,” “element,” or “ingredient.” Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 466 (1981). As 
we have seen, the patented invention at issue when a method patent is implicated 
consists of a “series of acts or steps.” In re Kollar, 286 F.3d at 1332. The elements 
of a method are the steps that comprise the method. Thus, method patents do have 
“components,” viz., the steps that comprise the method, and thus they meet that 
definitional requirement of § 271(f), but the steps are not the physical components 
used in performance of the method. 
Cardiac disagrees that a component of a patented method is a step of that 
method. Instead, Cardiac urges us to adopt a definition of “component” that would 
encompass “the apparatus that performed the process.” That position is clearly con-
trary to the text of § 271(f). … 
Another subsection of § 271 further undercuts Cardiac’s proposed definition of 
“component.” It is a “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words 
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme.” Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Sec-
tion 271(c) illustrates the contrasting treatment that § 271 gives to tangible inven-
tions and method inventions and the meaning of the term “component.” Section 
271(c) contrasts “a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, 
or composition” with a “material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented pro-
cess.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Congress clearly believed that a “component” was sepa-
rate and distinct from a “material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented pro-
cess.” Thus, a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process is not a 
component of that process. The components of the process are the steps of the pro-
cess. 
Although such patented methods do have components, as indicated, § 271(f) 
further requires that those components be “supplied.” That requirement eliminates 
method patents from § 271(f)’s reach. The ordinary meaning of “supply” is to 
“provide that which is required,” or “to furnish with *** supplies, provisions, or 
equipment.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
2297 (1981). These meanings imply the transfer of a physical object. Supplying an 
intangible step is thus a physical impossibility, a position that not even Cardiac 
seems to dispute. … 
… 
Any ambiguity as to Congress’s intent in enacting § 271(f) is further resolved 
by the presumption against extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court took a narrow 
view of § 271(f) by stating that the presumption against extraterritoriality still ap-
plies to § 271(f), even though that section specifically extends the reach of U.S.  
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patent law in a limited manner. AT&T, 550 U.S. at 454-56. In light of the near 
complete absence of any Congressional intent to protect patented methods under 
§ 271(f) and the explicit Congressional purpose of overruling Deepsouth’s holding, 
the presumption compels us not to extend the reach of § 271(f) to method patents. 
In sum, the language of § 271(f), its legislative history, and the provision’s 
place in the overall statutory scheme all support the conclusion that § 271(f) does 
not apply to method patents. We therefore overrule, to the extent that it conflicts 
with our holding today, our decision in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Tech-
nology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), as well as any implica-
tion in Eolas or other decisions that § 271(f) applies to method patents. 
We now turn to the facts of this case. Cardiac alleges that St. Jude violates 
§ 271(f) when it ships its ICDs outside of the United States. We disagree. Claim 4 
of the ’288 patent is comprised of the steps of determining a heart condition, select-
ing cardioversion as the appropriate therapy, and executing a cardioverting shock. 
Cardiac does not allege that all of those steps are carried out in the United States 
with respect to certain of the ICDs. Moreover, it cannot allege that the steps of the 
method are supplied, a contradiction in terms. Rather, Cardiac alleges that St. Jude’s 
shipment of a device that is capable of performing the method is sufficient to fall 
within the scope of § 271(f). Although the ICD that St. Jude produces can be used 
to perform the steps of the method, as we have demonstrated, § 271(f) does not 
apply to method or process patents. As § 271(f) does not encompass devices that 
may be used to practice a patented method, St. Jude is therefore not liable for in-
fringement of claim 4 of the ‘288 patent under § 271(f) for ICDs exported abroad. 
… 
Import 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 518-519 
Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc. 
80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
Lourie, Judge: 
Bio-Technology General Corp. and Bio-Technology General (Israel), Ltd. (col-
lectively “BTG”) appeal from the decision … granting a preliminary injunction in 
favor of Genentech, Inc. Because the court did not abuse its discretion in granting a 
preliminary injunction, we affirm. 
Background 
Human growth hormone (“hGH”) is a 191-amino acid polypeptide hormone 
secreted by the anterior pituitary gland. It has important metabolic effects, including 
stimulation of protein synthesis and cellular uptake of amino acids. Genentech is the 
assignee of two patents relating to hGH that are at issue in this lawsuit. The first 
patent, U.S. Patent 4,601,980, is directed to a recombinant DNA method for pro-
ducing a 191- or 192-amino acid human growth hormone product that is identical, 
or essentially identical, and functionally equivalent to the natural hormone. The 
product is useful in treating hypopituitary dwarfism in children. 
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Prior to the ’980 invention, hGH could be obtained for therapeutic use only by 
extracting it from the pituitary glands of human cadavers. Known recombinant 
DNA methods for producing hGH were deficient; they yielded not only the amino 
acid sequence of the protein, but also a “leader sequence” of additional amino acids 
at the beginning of the protein. In the natural synthesis of hGH, the leader se-
quence enables the protein to emerge from a pituitary cell after expression; the lead-
er is then enzymatically removed. When the product is recombinantly expressed in a 
bacterial host, however, the leader is not removed and it renders the resulting prod-
uct biologically inactive. 
The invention claimed in the ’980 patent solved this problem by providing a 
method for directly expressing a human growth hormone expression product with-
out a leader sequence. The inventors started with complementary DNA (“cDNA”) 
encoding hGH and its leader sequence, and cleaved the cDNA encoding the leader 
sequence along with a portion of the codons encoding hGH to obtain a cDNA 
fragment containing hGH codons 24-191. Next, they synthesized a DNA fragment 
corresponding to the 23 missing codons plus a “start” codon, and fused that DNA 
fragment to the cDNA fragment. They inserted the resulting semi-synthetic gene 
into bacterial cells, which directly expressed a 192-amino acid product, met-hGH, 
consisting of the hGH molecule and one additional amino acid, methionine 
(“met”), coded for by the start codon. Met-hGH has essentially the same biological 
activity as the natural hormone, hGH. The ’980 patent teaches that the amino acid, 
methionine, may be cleaved intracellularly in the bacterial host to produce a product 
that is identical to the natural hormone. Genentech sells met-hGH and hGH under 
the trademarks Protropin and Humatrope, respectively. 
The second patent in suit, U.S. Patent 4,342,832, also assigned to Genentech, 
contains essentially the same disclosure as the ’980 patent.3 The ’832 patent claims, 
however, are directed to a method for constructing a replicable cloning vehicle (e.g., 
a plasmid) capable, in a microbial organism, of expressing a particular polypeptide 
(e.g., human growth hormone). 
Like Genentech, BTG manufactures hGH by recombinant DNA techniques  
using a plasmid that contains a semi-synthetic gene engineered to express hGH 
without a leader sequence. BTG incorporates the plasmid into bacteria, which then 
express insoluble met-hGH in the form of biologically-inactive inclusion bodies. In a 
final step, BTG carries out a purification process that involves recovering soluble 
met-hGH free of inclusion bodies and cleaving the extra methionine residue to pro-
duce the final product, biologically-active hGH. BTG manufactures hGH in Israel, 
and it plans to import the product for sale in the United States under the trademark 
Bio-Tropin. 
BTG filed an Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”) for hGH with the 
[FDA] in 1985. In 1986, BTG granted American Critical Care (“ACC”) an exclu-
sive license under BTG’s patents and technology to use and sell hGH in the United 
States. ACC agreed to make payments to BTG, purchase hGH from BTG, and con-
duct clinical studies to obtain FDA approval for the product. In 1986, E.I. du Pont 
                                                
3 The ’980 patent is a division of the ’832 patent. 
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de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”) purchased ACC and subsequently became the  
assignee of the ACC-BTG agreement. During 1986-1987, DuPont paid for and 
completed human clinical studies directed to the use of hGH to treat growth hor-
mone deficiency in children. In September 1987, DuPont filed a New Drug Appli-
cation (“NDA”) for BTG’s hGH product. In 1991 and 1992, BTG reacquired cer-
tain rights to the NDA from DuPont. The FDA approved the NDA in May 1995. 
In January 1995, BTG sued Genentech in district court, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the ’980 and ’832 patents are invalid, unenforceable, and not in-
fringed by BTG. Genentech counterclaimed for infringement and moved for a pre-
liminary injunction, arguing that BTG’s importation of hGH into the United States 
would infringe the ’980 and ’832 patents. After a hearing, the district court found 
that Genentech had established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of 
its counterclaim, since BTG’s process for producing hGH was within the literal 
scope of claim 2 of the ’980 patent, BTG’s process for making a plasmid was within 
the literal scope of claim 1 of the ’832 patent, and BTG’s asserted infringement de-
fenses lacked merit. The court also found that Genentech would suffer irreparable 
harm absent a preliminary injunction and that the balance of the hardships and the 
public interest favored the grant of an injunction. The court therefore entered a pre-
liminary injunction against BTG. This appeal followed. … 
Discussion  
… 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
The district court found it likely that BTG, by importing hGH into the United 
States, would infringe Genentech’s patent under the Process Patent Amendments 
Act of 1988 (“PPAA”),4 since BTG’s process for making hGH was within the literal 
scope of claim 2 of the ’980 patent and its process for constructing a replicable  
cloning vehicle (plasmid) was within the literal scope of claim 1 of the ’832 patent. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). The court rejected BTG’s several asserted defenses. 
On appeal, BTG raises numerous challenges to the court’s determination of 
likelihood of success. As discussed below, each of these arguments lacks merit. 
1. Infringement of the ’980 Patent 
Claim 2 of the ’980 patent reads as follows: 
2. A method for producing human growth hormone which method com-
prises [1] culturing bacterial transformants containing recombinant plas-
mids which will, in a transformant bacterium, express a gene for human 
growth hormone unaccompanied by the leader sequence of human growth 
                                                
4 Congress enacted the PPAA as Title IX of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 35 
U.S.C.). The PPAA made it an act of patent infringement to import, sell, or use in 
the United States, without authorization, a product made by a process patented in 
the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). A provision concerning offers to sell was 
added to § 271(g) by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809, 4988 
(1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). 
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hormone or other extraneous protein bound thereto, and [2] isolating and 
purifying said expressed human growth hormone. 
BTG advances three non-infringement arguments with respect to claim 2. First, 
BTG contends that the product expressed by the bacterial host cells in its process is 
not “human growth hormone” as specified in claim 2, but rather is insoluble met-
hGH in the form of biologically-inactive inclusion bodies. This argument is unper-
suasive. 
The ’980 specification defines the expression product produced by the claimed 
process as follows: 
Of course, the expression product will in every case commence with the 
amino acid coded for by the translation start signal (in the case of ATG, f-
methionine). One can expect this to be removed intracellularly, or in any 
event to leave the bioactivity of the ultimate product essentially unaffected. 
Col. 7, ll. 52-57. The specification therefore teaches that the expression product 
produced by the claimed process is met-hGH, which may or may not be converted 
to hGH depending on whether or not the extra methionine residue is cleaved intra-
cellularly in the bacterial host. Thus, met-hGH is an expression product within the 
scope of the claimed process. See Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 
F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e construe the claim term ‘human 
growth hormone’ [in claim 2 of the ’980 patent] to encompass both met-hGH and 
hGH.”). 
Furthermore, at the preliminary injunction hearing there was expert testimony 
that an “inclusion body” is simply an aggregation of protein chains and that insol-
uble, biologically-inactive met-hGH that form inclusion bodies is still met-hGH. 
BTG points to no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Moreover, nothing in the 
claim language, specification, or prosecution history of the ’980 patent indicates that 
the expression product must be biologically active at the time of expression, before 
it has been isolated and purified. Rather, the district court found that recombinant 
expression products, whether formed as inclusion bodies or otherwise, are not bio-
logically active until they are isolated from the bacterial host cells and purified. BTG 
has not shown any error in that conclusion. Thus, that the met-hGH formed during 
BTG’s process is not biologically active is neither surprising nor meaningful; BTG’s 
isolated and purified final product, hGH, is biologically active. We therefore reject 
BTG’s contention that its product is not “human growth hormone.” 
Second, BTG contends that it uses its own patented purification process to re-
cover soluble, biologically-active hGH from the inclusion bodies of met-hGH and 
that the ’980 patent does not disclose BTG’s unique purification process. Thus, 
BTG argues that its process does not involve “isolating and purifying” a human 
growth hormone expression product as required by claim 2. We disagree. 
Claim 2 uses broad, generic language to define the steps of isolating and purify-
ing the recombinantly produced hGH product. Nothing in the claim language, 
specification, or prosecution history suggests that the claim is limited to any particu-
lar technique for isolating and purifying the product. Further, BTG’s process meets 
these claim limitations. In its NDA, for example, BTG characterized its recovery of 
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soluble, biologically-active hGH from insoluble, biologically-inactive met-hGH in 
the form of inclusion bodies as a “purification” step. Similarly, at the preliminary 
injunction hearing there was expert testimony that these processes constitute a  
“purification” step within the meaning of claim 2. Thus, BTG’s process clearly in-
volves “isolating and purifying [the] expressed human growth hormone,” as generi-
cally defined in claim 2. That BTG patented its unique purification method is irrele-
vant: “[T]he existence of one’s own patent does not constitute a defense to in-
fringement of someone else’s patent. It is elementary that a patent grants only the 
right to exclude others and confers no right on its holder to make, use, or sell.” 
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 879 n.4 
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
Third, BTG argues that, assuming its process falls within the literal scope of 
claim 2, it “materially changes” the product made by the patented process, met-
hGH, into hGH before importing the product into the United States. Thus, BTG 
contends that its importation of hGH into the United States would not be an act of 
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).5 We disagree. This argument is based on 
an assumption that met-hGH is the only “product which is made by [the] process 
patented in the United States” under § 271(g). However, as indicated above, the 
production of hGH must also be considered to be within the literal scope of claim 2. 
See Novo Nordisk of N. Am., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 77 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996).6 Thus, BTG’s imported product (hGH) is within the scope of claim 2. 
BTG therefore cannot maintain that the “materially changed” exception to in-
fringement applies, because the product made by the patented process is not 
changed at all, let alone “materially changed.” The “materially changed” exception 
of § 271(g) requires, at a minimum, that there be a real difference between the 
product imported, offered for sale, sold, or used in the United States and the  
products produced by the patented process. If claim 2 were limited to a method for 
producing met-hGH, then we would have to determine whether BTG’s conversion 
of met-hGH to hGH produced a “materially changed” product. But claim 2 is not 
so limited and thus BTG’s argument lacks merit. 
                                                
5 Section 271(g) provides: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, 
sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process 
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importa-
tion, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of 
such process patent. *** A product which is made by a patented process will, 
for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after— 
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another prod-
uct. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (emphasis added). 
6 An hGH product could be produced by the claimed process by expressing met-
hGH followed by intracellular cleavage of the extra methionine residue in the bac-
terial host, as taught in the ’980 specification, and then isolating and purifying the 
final product. 
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We therefore conclude that BTG has not shown that the district court clearly 
erred in finding that Genentech established a likelihood of success in proving literal 
infringement of claim 2 of the ’980 patent. See Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engi-
neered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (literal infringement 
is established when every limitation of the patent claim is met in the accused device 
or process). 
2. Infringement of the ’832 Patent 
With respect to claim 1 of the ’832 patent, directed to a method of construct-
ing a replicable cloning vehicle (e.g., a plasmid), BTG argues that it does not in-
fringe because it only constructed the plasmid once, in Israel in 1983, before enact-
ment of § 271(g). BTG contends that the district court erred in retroactively apply-
ing § 271(g) to conduct that was not an act of infringement when it occurred. We 
disagree. 
Infringement under § 271(g) does not consist of the making of a product by a 
process patented in the United States; it is the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use 
of a product made by such process. Liability arises if “the importation, sale, offer to 
sell, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent.” § 271(g). 
BTG clearly intends to import and sell hGH in the United States during the term of 
the ’832 patent. This meets the statutory requirement and does not amount to a 
retroactive imposition of liability. 
Furthermore, the PPAA provides that it “shall apply only with respect to  
products made or imported after the effective date of the amendments made by this 
subtitle.” Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, § 9006(a), 102 Stat. 1107, 
1567. Again, because BTG plans to make and import hGH after the effective date of 
the PPAA (and during the term of the ’832 patent), there is no merit to BTG’s con-
tention that the district court retroactively imposed liability on BTG. 
The more difficult question is whether hGH is “a product which is made by a 
process patented in the United States,” even though claim 1 of the ’832 patent is 
directed to a method for producing a replicable cloning vehicle (e.g., a plasmid), not 
hGH. The statute does not directly answer this question, because it only defines, at 
least in part, what products “will *** not be considered” to have been “made by” a 
patented process, namely, those that have been “materially changed by subsequent 
processes” or that have become “a trivial and nonessential component of another 
product.” § 271(g) (emphasis added). The statute does not specify what products 
will be considered to have been “made by” the patented process, apparently because 
Congress wanted the courts to resolve this critical question of proximity to the 
product of the patented process on a case-by-case basis. See S. Rep. No. 83, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1987) (“Inevitably the courts will have to assess the permuta-
tions of this issue of proximity to or distance from the process on a case-by-case  
basis.”); id. at 49 (“The Committee expects the courts to exercise careful judgment 
in distinguishing those products that are too far removed from the patented process, 
and those that have been changed only in insignificant ways.”). 
Here, the district court held that hGH is a product that is “made by” the ’832 
patented process under § 271(g). In so holding, the court relied on the fact that 
BTG uses the claimed process of making a replicable cloning vehicle as an essential 
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part of an overall process for producing hGH. The court also relied on the legislative 
history of the PPAA, particularly the Senate Report, which states: 
In the biotechnology field it is well known that naturally occurring orga-
nisms contain within them particular genetic sequences composed of 
unique structural characteristics. The patented process may be for the pro-
cess of preparing a DNA molecule comprising a specific genetic sequence. 
A foreign manufacturer uses the patented process to prepare the DNA 
molecule which is the product of the patented process. The foreign manu-
facturer inserts the DNA molecule into a plasmid or other vector and the 
plasmid or other vecot [sic, vector] containing the DNA molecule is, in 
turn, inserted into a host organism; for example, a bacterium. The plasmid-
containing host organism still containing the specific genetic sequence un-
dergoes expression to produce the desired polypeptide. Even if a different 
organism was created by this biotech procedure, if it would not have been 
possible or commercially viable to make the different organism and  
product expressed therefrom but for the patented process, the [polypep-
tide] product will be considered to have been made by the patented pro-
cess. 
S. Rep. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1987). 
There is little doubt that the plasmid product of the claimed process and hGH 
are entirely different materials, one being more than materially changed in relation 
to the other. hGH is not a mere modification of the plasmid. However, the above 
excerpt from the legislative history of the PPAA indicates the correctness of the dis-
trict court’s analysis. The legislative history precisely anticipated this fact situation 
and indicated Congress’s intent that infringement of a process for making a plasmid 
is not to be avoided by using it to express its intended protein. Moreover, the ’832 
patent itself explicitly contemplates that the patented process will be used as part of 
an overall process for producing hGH; indeed, the patent discloses in detail how to 
make hGH by carrying out the claimed process and other necessary steps. Thus, it 
cannot be said as a matter of law that the production of hGH is too remote from the 
claimed process of making a replicable cloning vehicle. We therefore find no error in 
the court’s conclusion that hGH is a product that is “made by” the ’832 patented 
process. 
Furthermore, since BTG has not shown that the district court erred in deter-
mining that BTG’s process for making a plasmid falls within the literal scope of 
claim 1 of the ’832 patent, the district court did not err in finding that Genentech 
established a likelihood of success in proving literal infringement of that claim. See 
Mannesmann Demag Corp., 793 F.2d at 1282. 
… 
BTG also contends that [the equitable defense of] laches bars Genentech’s in-
fringement counterclaim. BTG asserts that in 1985 and 1986, Genentech knew that 
BTG had developed an hGH product and imported it into the United States for use 
in clinical trials. BTG contends that Genentech should have brought suit against 
BTG soon after it learned of this information. We disagree. 
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Prior to 1988, when § 271(g) became effective, importation of a product made 
abroad by a process patented in the United States was not an act of infringement. 
Thus, Genentech had no infringement claim against BTG before 1988. With no  
legal right to enforce, it cannot be said that Genentech unreasonably delayed during 
that time period. 
Furthermore, even after § 271(g) was enacted in 1988, BTG was only im-
porting hGH into the United States for use in clinical trials in support of its applica-
tion for FDA approval. The district court found that this was non-infringing activity, 
see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1),10 and that Genentech did not know before 1993 that 
BTG had imported hGH into the United States for purposes outside the scope of 
§ 271(e)(1). BTG has not demonstrated error in these findings. Thus, we conclude 
that the court did not err in rejecting BTG’s laches defense. 
… 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. 
82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
Bryson, Judge: 
The ongoing struggle between “pioneer” drug manufacturers and generic drug 
distributors has once more come before our court. Eli Lilly and Company (Lilly), 
the “pioneer” drug manufacturer in this case, has filed suit for patent infringement 
against the appellees, who are involved in various ways in the distribution of a par-
ticular generic drug. Lilly sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that the importa-
tion and sale of the generic drug in this country infringed Lilly’s patent on a process 
for making a related compound. After a hearing, the [district court] denied Lilly’s 
request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that Lilly had failed to show 
that it was likely to prevail on the merits of its infringement claim and had failed to 
show that it would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive 
relief. Because Lilly has failed to overcome the substantial hurdle faced by a party 
seeking to overturn the denial of a preliminary injunction, we affirm. 
I 
The pharmaceutical product at issue in this case is a broad-spectrum antibiotic 
known as “cefaclor.” Cefaclor is a member of the class of cephalosporin antibiotics, 
all of which are based on the cephem nucleus. Although there are many different 
cephem compounds, only a few have utility as antibiotic drugs. Each of the known 
commercial methods for producing cefaclor requires the production of an inter-
mediate cephem compound known as an enol. Once the desired enol cephem in-
termediate is obtained, it is then subjected to several processing steps in order to 
produce cefaclor. 
                                                
10 In 1988, § 271(e)(1) provided that “[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to 
make, use, or sell a patented invention *** solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1). 
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Lilly developed cefaclor and patented it in 1975. Until recently, Lilly has been 
the exclusive manufacturer and distributor of cefaclor in this country. In addition to 
its product patent on cefaclor, Lilly obtained several patents covering different as-
pects of the manufacture of cefaclor, including processes for producing enol cephem 
intermediates. Many of those patents have now expired. 
In 1995, Lilly purchased the patent at issue in this case, U.S. Patent No. 
4,160,085. Claim 5 of that patent defines a method of producing enol cephem 
compounds, including what is called “compound 6,” an enol cephem similar to the 
one Lilly uses in its process for manufacturing cefaclor. The ’085 patent will expire 
on July 3, 1996. 
Compound 6 differs from cefaclor in three respects. Although both compound 
6 and cefaclor are based on the cephem nucleus, compound 6 has a hydroxy group 
at the 3-position on the cephem nucleus, a para-nitrobenzyl carboxylate ester at the 
4-position, and a phenylacetyl group at the 7-position. Cefaclor has different groups 
at each of those positions: it has a chlorine atom at the 3-position, a free carboxyl 
group at the 4-position, and a phenylglycyl group at the 7-position. Each of those 
differences between compound 6 and cefaclor contributes to the effectiveness of 
cefaclor as an orally administered antibiotic drug. The free carboxyl group at the 4-
position is believed important for antibacterial activity; the chlorine increases 
cefaclor’s antibiotic potency; and the phenylglycyl group enables cefaclor to be effec-
tive when taken orally. 
To produce cefaclor from compound 6 requires four distinct steps. First, the 
hydroxy group is removed from the 3-position and is replaced by a chlorine atom, 
which results in the creation of “compound 7.” Second, compound 7 is subjected to 
a reaction that removes the phenylacetyl group at the 7-position, which results in 
the creation of “compound 8.” Third, a phenylglycyl group is added at the 7-
position, which results in the creation of “compound 9.” Fourth, the para-
nitrobenzyl carboxylate ester is removed from the 4-position, which results in the 
creation of cefaclor. 
B 
On April 27, 1995, defendants Zenith Laboratories and American Cyanamid 
Co. obtained permission from the Food & Drug Administration to distribute 
cefaclor in this country. Defendant Biocraft Laboratories had applied for FDA ap-
proval to manufacture and sell cefaclor in the United States but had not yet ob-
tained that approval. All three have obtained large quantities of cefaclor that were 
manufactured in Italy by defendant Biochimica Opos, S.p.A. 
On the same day that Zenith and Cyanamid obtained FDA approval to sell 
cefaclor in this country, Lilly obtained the rights to the ’085 patent and filed suit 
against Zenith, Cyanamid, Biocraft, and Opos. In its complaint, Lilly sought a dec-
laration that the domestic defendants’ importation of cefaclor manufactured by 
Opos infringed Lilly’s rights under several patents, including the ’085 patent. Lilly 
also requested a preliminary injunction, based on the alleged infringement of claim 5 
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of the ’085 patent, to bar the defendants from importing or inducing the importa-
tion of cefaclor manufactured by Opos. 
The district court held a three-day hearing on the motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Following the hearing, the court denied the motion in a comprehensive 
opinion. The court devoted most of its attention to the question whether Lilly had 
met its burden of showing that it was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim that 
the defendants were liable for infringing claim 5 of the ’085 patent. 
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the district court concluded 
that Lilly had shown that it was likely to prevail on the issue of the validity of the 
’085 patent. With respect to the infringement issue, however, the court held that 
Lilly had not met its burden of showing that it was likely to prevail. 
The district court correctly framed the issue as whether, under the Process  
Patent Amendments Act of 1988, the importers of cefaclor infringed claim 5 of the 
’085 patent, which granted U.S. patent protection to the process that Opos used to 
make compound 6. The Process Patent Amendments Act makes it an act of in-
fringement to import, sell, offer to sell, or use in this country a product that was 
made abroad by a process protected by a U.S. patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). The Act, 
however, does not apply if the product made by the patented process is “ma-terially 
changed by subsequent processes” before it is imported. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1). 
The district court found that compound 6 and cefaclor differ significantly in 
their structure and properties, including their biological activity. Citing the Senate 
Report on the Process Patent Amendments Act, the district court found that, be-
cause the processing steps necessary to convert compound 6 to cefaclor “‘change the 
physical or chemical properties of the product in a manner which changes the basic 
utility of the product,’” (citing S. Rep. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1987)), 
Lilly was not likely to succeed on its claim that the defendants infringed Lilly’s rights 
under claim 5 of the ’085 patent by importing and selling cefaclor. 
The district court also found that Lilly had failed to prove that it would suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction. … [T]he court was not 
persuaded by Lilly’s arguments that it faced irreparable economic injury if it were 
not granted immediate equitable relief. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
district court found that an award of money damages would be an adequate remedy 
in the event that Lilly ultimately proves that the importation of cefaclor made by the 
Opos process infringes the ’085 patent. In light of Lilly’s failure to establish either a 
likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the court found it unneces-
sary to articulate findings regarding the other factors bearing on the propriety of 
preliminary injunctive relief—the balance of the hardships and the effect of the 
court’s action on the public interest. 
II 
The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988 was enacted to close a perceived 
loophole in the statutory scheme for protecting owners of United States patents. 
Prior to the enactment of the 1988 statute, a patentee holding a process patent 
could sue for infringement if others used the process in this country, but had no 
cause of action if such persons used the patented process abroad to manufacture 
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products, and then imported, used, or sold the products in this country. In that set-
ting, the process patent owner’s only legal recourse was to seek an exclusion order 
for such products from the International Trade Commission under section 337a of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337a. By enacting the Process Patent Amend-
ments Act, the principal portion of which is codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), Con-
gress changed the law by making it an act of infringement to import into the United 
States, or to sell or use within the United States “a product which is made by a pro-
cess patented in the United States *** if the importation, sale, or use of the product 
occurs during the term of such process patent.” 
A concern raised during Congress’s consideration of the process patent legisla-
tion was whether and to what extent the new legislation would affect products other 
than the direct and unaltered products of patented processes—that is, whether the 
new statute would apply when a product was produced abroad by a patented process 
but then modified or incorporated into other products before being imported into 
this country. Congress addressed that issue by providing that a product that is 
“made by” a patented process within the meaning of the statute “will *** not be 
considered to be so made after—(1) it is materially changed by subsequent process-
es; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.” 35 
U.S.C. § 271(g). 
That language, unfortunately, is not very precise. Whether the product of a  
patented process is a “trivial and nonessential component” of another product is 
necessarily a question of degree. Even less well defined is the question whether the 
product of a patented process has been “materially changed” before its importation 
into this country. While applying that statutory language may be relatively easy in 
extreme cases, it is not at all easy in a closer case such as this one. 
A 
Lilly argues that the “materially changed” clause of section 271(g) must be 
construed in light of its underlying purpose, which is to protect the economic value 
of U.S. process patents to their owners. Prior to the enactment of the Process Patent 
Amendments Act, the value of a U.S. process patent could be undermined by a 
manufacturer who used the process abroad and then imported the product into this 
country. Because the purpose of the process patent legislation was to protect against 
such subversion of protected economic rights, Lilly argues that the statute should be 
read to apply to any such scheme that undercuts the commercial value of a U.S. pro-
cess patent. In Lilly’s view, the product of a patented process therefore should not 
be considered “materially changed” if the principal commercial use of that product 
lies in its conversion into the product that is the subject of the infringement charge. 
Because cefaclor is the only product of compound 6 that is sold in the United States 
market, Lilly argues, the change in compound 6 that results in cefaclor—no matter 
how significant as a matter of chemical properties or molecular structure—is not a 
“material change” for purposes of section 271(g). 
Although we are not prepared to embrace Lilly’s argument, we acknowledge 
that it has considerable appeal. Congress was concerned with the problem of the 
overseas use of patented processes followed by the importation of the products of 
those processes, and a grudging construction of the statute could significantly limit 
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the statute’s effectiveness in addressing the problem Congress targeted. That is es-
pecially true with respect to chemical products, as to which simple, routine reactions 
can often produce dramatic changes in the products’ structure and properties. 
Nonetheless, while the general purpose of the statute informs the construction 
of the language Congress chose, purpose cannot displace language, and we cannot 
stretch the term “materially changed” as far as Lilly’s argument would require. The 
problem is that the language of the statute refers to changes in the product; the 
statute permits the importation of an item that is derived from a product made by a 
patented process as long as that product is “materially changed” in the course of its 
conversion into the imported item. The reference to a “changed” product is very 
hard to square with Lilly’s proposed test, which turns on the quite different question 
of whether the use or sale of the imported item impairs the economic value of the 
process patent. 
The facts of this case demonstrate how far Lilly’s test strays from the statutory 
text. While Lilly notes that there are only four steps between compound 6 and 
cefaclor, and that all four steps involve relatively routine chemical reactions, Lilly 
does not suggest any limiting principle based on the structure of the intermediate 
product or the nature of the steps necessary to produce the imported product. Thus, 
even if there were ten complex chemical reactions that separated compound 6 from 
cefaclor, Lilly’s test would characterize the two compounds as not “materially” dif-
ferent as long as the primary commercial use of compound 6 in this country was to 
produce cefaclor. 
Besides not responding to the natural meaning of the term “changed,” Lilly’s 
construction of the “materially changed” clause would create a curious anomaly. 
Lilly’s value-based construction of the clause turns in large measure on Lilly’s con-
tention that the only commercial use for compound 6 in this country is to produce 
cefaclor; that is, Lilly views compound 6 and cefaclor as essentially the same product 
because compound 6 has no commercial use in the U.S. market except to produce 
cefaclor. Under that approach, however, the question whether compound 6 was 
“materially changed” in the course of its conversion to cefaclor would depend on 
whether and to what extent other derivative products of compound 6 are marketed 
in this country. Thus, under Lilly’s theory compound 6 would become materially 
different from cefaclor if and when compound 6 came to have other commercial  
uses in the United States, even though the respective structures and properties of 
the two compounds remained unchanged. 
That is asking the statutory language to do too much work. We cannot accept 
the argument that the question whether one compound is “materially changed” in 
the course of its conversion into another depends on whether there are other  
products of the first compound that have economic value. We therefore do not 
adopt Lilly’s proposed construction of section 271(g). We look instead to the sub-
stantiality of the change between the product of the patented process and the  
product that is being imported. 
In the chemical context, a “material” change in a compound is most naturally 
viewed as a significant change in the compound’s structure and properties. Without 
attempting to define with precision what classes of changes would be material and 
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what would not, we share the district court’s view that a change in chemical struc-
ture and properties as significant as the change between compound 6 and cefaclor 
cannot lightly be dismissed as immaterial. Although compound 6 and cefaclor share 
the basic cephem nucleus, which is the ultimate source of the antibiotic potential of 
all cephalosporins, the cephem nucleus is common to thousands of compounds, 
many of which have antibiotic activity, and many of which are dramatically different 
from others within the cephem family. Beyond the cephem nucleus that they have in 
common, compound 6 and cefaclor are different in four important structural re-
spects, corresponding to the four discrete chemical steps between the two com-
pounds. While the addition or removal of a protective group, standing alone, might 
not be sufficient to constitute a “material change” between two compounds (even 
though it could dramatically affect certain of their properties), the conversion pro-
cess between compound 6 and cefaclor involves considerably more than the removal 
of a protective group. We therefore conclude that the statutory text of § 271(g) 
does not support Lilly’s contention that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its in-
fringement claim. 
B 
In aid of their differing approaches to the issue of statutory construction, both 
sides in this dispute seek support for their positions in the legislative history of the 
1988 statute. As is often the case, there is something in the legislative history for 
each side. On Lilly’s side, for example, are characterizations of the legislation as  
creating process patent protection that is “meaningful and not easily evaded,” H.R. 
Rep. No. 60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1987), and as excluding products only if 
they “cease to have a reasonable nexus with the patented process,” S. Rep. No. 83, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1987). On the other side are directions for applying the 
statute to chemical intermediates—directions that suggest a narrower construction 
of the statute than Lilly proposes. On balance, while we do not find the legislative 
history dispositive, we conclude that it does not unequivocally favor Lilly’s position 
and thus does not raise doubts about the district court’s statutory analysis as applied 
to the facts of this case. 
…  
The question of how to define the required relationship between the product of 
the patented process and the imported product came to the fore during the 99th 
Congress’s consideration of process patent legislation. In 1985, the Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks told a Senate subcommittee that the proposed legislation 
should specifically provide that the product must be the “direct” product of the  
patented process in order “to lay to rest arguments that, for example, a product re-
sulting from a series of processes would be covered by a process patent for an inter-
mediate step.” Process Patents: Hearing on S. 1543 before the Subcomm. on  
Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 9 (1985). The Commissioner pointed out that inserting the word “direct-
ly” in the proposed statute would make U.S. law consistent with the laws of many 
foreign countries, which protect only the “direct” products of patented processes. 
Id. at 15. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association agreed that the proposed 
limiting language would be appropriate, as long as it was understood that “imma-
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terial and minor later steps such as salt formation or removal of protective [groups] 
should not be construed in such a way that importation of the final product of that 
added step would not be an infringement.” Id. at 71. Other interest groups likewise 
offered support for the proposed limiting language, subject to similar qualifications. 
See id. at 63 (statement of the Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.); id. at 186 
(statement of the American Intellectual Property Law Association). 
The following year, the Administration again suggested adding the term “di-
rectly” to the proposed statute, this time in a hearing before a House committee. 
See Intellectual Property and Trade: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Courts,  
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 58-59 (1986). The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
agreed that the scope of process patent protection should be limited, but regarded 
the word “directly” as too restrictive; instead, the NAM suggested that the statute 
“not apply to products materially changed chemically by subsequent steps or pro-
cesses from the product resulting from the patented process.” Id. at 275-76 (em-
phasis in original). That language, according to the NAM representative, would 
cover the case of “a chemical intermediate made abroad by a patented process,” but 
then “subjected to a common chemical reaction” and converted into “a salt or  
amino-derivative.” Id. at 275; see also id. at 280. 
The drafters of subsequent process patent bills embraced the Administration’s 
suggestion to restrict the scope of the statute, but they did so by using the language 
suggested by the NAM. Thus, the term “materially changed” was adopted to ex-
clude from the reach of the proposed statute those products that were significantly 
altered before their importation. 
The House report on the 1986 version of the process patent legislation was the 
first committee report to discuss the meaning of the “materially changed” clause. It 
explained that if the patented process is for chemical X, and “subsequent modifica-
tions change the basic structure of chemical X so that a clearly different chemical Y 
results, the connection between the patented process and the product, chemical Y, is 
broken.” H.R. Rep. No. 807, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1986). The report noted, 
however, that chemical X would not be “materially changed” within the meaning of 
the statute if the subsequent modifications of chemical X were only “trivial or con-
ventional in nature” such as “modifications which result in the formation of simple 
derivatives, including salts or esters, or the removal of impurities,” or if the subse-
quent processing steps “only change [the] shape, size or form” of the product, such 
as by being diluted or put in tablet form. Id. at 21-22. 
Efforts to enact process patent legislation continued the following year; those 
efforts ultimately bore fruit in 1988 with the enactment of the Process Patent 
Amendments Act. Although several persons during the 1987 Senate hearings called 
attention to the need to clarify the “materially changed” clause in light of the diffi-
culty of applying it to chemical intermediates, see Process Patent Legislation:  
Hearing on S. 568, S. 573, and S. 635 before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights 
& Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 114 
(1987) (statement on behalf of the Intellectual Property Owners, Inc.); id. at 146, 
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the bills considered during 1987 and 1988 continued to employ the prior language 
without modification. 
The pertinent portion of the 1987 House report on the process patent bill was 
identical to the portion of the 1986 House report summarized above, except for 
some new material that was inserted into one paragraph of the 1987 report. The 
new material appears to have been intended to express the notion that, under certain 
circumstances, significant changes in the properties or structure of a chemical  
product do not render the product “materially changed” within the meaning of the 
statutory language. The principal portion of the added matter explained that a hypo-
thetical chemical product, chemical X, is not “materially changed” if 
chemical X is an important intermediate product, such as a polymer, which 
can materially be changed into an end product, albeit by trivial or conven-
tional processes. In this respect, a product will be considered made by the 
patented process, regardless of any subsequent changes, if it would not be 
possible or commercially viable to make that product but for the use of the 
patented process. In judging the commercial viability, the courts shall use a 
flexible standard which is appropriate to the competitive circumstances. 
H.R. Rep. No. 60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1987). 
The inserted language is not easy to interpret, in part because it purports to 
identify some products that can “materially be changed” without being “materially 
changed.” In any event, however, the inserted language appears not to apply to the 
present case, as it seems to contemplate that when an intermediate that is the  
product of a patented process undergoes significant changes in the course of conver-
sion into an end product, the end product will be deemed to be made by the  
patented process if (and only if) it would not be commercially feasible to make the 
end product other than by using the patented process. In this case, Lilly concedes 
that it is both possible and commercially viable to make cefaclor by methods that do 
not include the process defined by claim 5 of the ’085 patent. Therefore, even if the 
explanatory language from the 1987 House report were accorded equal status with 
the language of the statute itself, the explanatory language would not require that 
§ 271(g) be read to reach the defendants’ conduct in this case. 
Lilly seizes on the statement in the House report that suggests that a change in 
“the basic structure” of the intermediate is necessary in order to break “the connec-
tion between the patented process and the [final, imported] product.” H.R. Rep. 
No. 60 at 13. Because both compound 6 and cefaclor share the core cephem nucle-
us, Lilly contends that the process of converting compound 6 to cefaclor does not 
alter the “basic structure” of compound 6, and that compound 6 is therefore not 
“materially changed” by the process of converting it into cefaclor. 
While Lilly’s argument on this point cannot be lightly dismissed, we do not 
think the use of the term “basic structure” in the House report limits the “materially 
changed” clause, as applied to a cephem compound, to a change that alters the core 
cephem nucleus. If adopted, Lilly’s argument would mean that there would never 
be a “material change” resulting from the conversion of one cephem compound to 
another. Lilly’s argument would also leave open the question whether even a change 
in the cephem nucleus would be sufficiently “basic” if, for example, the initial and 
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end products both contained the beta lactam ring, which is one of the components 
of the cephalosporin nucleus, and thus were members of the beta lactam “super-
family” of compounds. The effect of Lilly’s construction of § 271(g)(1), both within 
the family of cephem compounds and within other families of compounds that are 
based on a common nucleus, would be sweeping. Absent clearer congressional di-
rection, we decline to adopt so broad a principle. We therefore decline Lilly’s invita-
tion to find the answer to this case in the House report’s reference to changes in the 
“basic structure” of chemical intermediates. 
Like the House report, the 1987 Senate report contains a detailed elaboration 
on the statutory term “material change.” In fact, the Senate report contains what 
may best be described as a detailed set of instructions to courts called on to construe 
that term as it applies to particular fields of technology. The report noted that many 
foreign patent statutes extending process patent protection to a product require that 
the product in question be made “directly” from the patented process and suggested 
that the term “materially changed” in section 271(g) was intended to embody a 
similar but somewhat broader scope of protection; as the Senate Committee ex-
plained, the term “directly” was not used, because it might have been read to  
“exempt too many products that have been altered in insignificant ways after manu-
facture by the patented process.” S. Rep. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1987). 
Acknowledging that the task of determining whether a product was “materially 
changed” prior to its importation would ultimately be left to the courts, the Com-
mittee then set out a “two-phased test” to “give the courts Congressional guidance 
in what may be a difficult determination.” S. Rep. No. 83 at 50. The first part of the 
test restated the test set forth in the House report, i.e., that a product “will be con-
sidered made by the patented process *** if it would not be possible or commercial-
ly viable to make that product but for the use of the patented process.” Id. 
The Senate report provided an analysis of how the first part of the test should 
be applied in the case of chemical intermediates. The report explained (S. Rep. No. 
83 at 51): 
If the only way to have arrived at Y is to have used the patented process at 
some step, e.g., producing X as an intermediate, Y is infringing. 
If there is more than one way to have arrived [at] Y, but the patented pro-
cess is the only commercially viable way to have done so, Y is infringing. 
If there are commercially viable non-infringing processes to have arrived at 
X, the connection between the patented process for producing chemical X 
and the ultimate product, chemical Y, is broken, and Y would be a non-
infringing product having satisfied both phases of the test. 
As we noted above, the record makes clear that there is at least one commercial-
ly viable process for making cefaclor that does not involve the patented method of 
synthesizing enol cephems (including compound 6). Opos does not use that non-
infringing process, but under the test set forth in the Senate report, it is enough to 
defeat the claim of infringement that there is another way of producing the inter-
mediate, even if the alleged infringer does not use that alternative process. 
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The Senate Committee described the second portion of the two-part test for 
identifying a “material change” as follows (S. Rep. No. 83 at 50): 
A product will be considered to have been made by a patented process if 
the additional processing steps which are not covered by the patent do not 
change the physical or chemical properties of the product in a manner 
which changes the basic utility of the product [produced] by the patented 
process. However, a change in the physical or chemical properties of a 
product, even though minor, may be “material” if the change relates to a 
physical or chemical property which is an important feature of the product 
produced by the patented process. Usually a change in the physical form of 
a product (e.g., the granules to powder, solid to liquid) or minor chemical 
conversion, (e.g., conversion to a salt, base, acid, hydrate, ester, or addition 
or removal of a protection group) would not be a “material” change. 
It seems fairly clear that under this second part of the test, the change from 
compound 6 to cefaclor would be regarded as a material change. The chemical 
properties of the two compounds are completely different, the “basic utility” of the 
products is different, and the chemical structure of the two products is significantly 
different. The changes between compound 6 and cefaclor go far beyond the minor 
changes that the report described as not material, such as the conversion to a salt, 
base, acid, hydrate or ester, or the removal of a protective group. 
Lilly interprets the references in the Senate report to the “basic utility” and 
“properties” of the product of the patented process in a quite different manner. The 
“basic utility” and principal “property” of compound 6 in the U.S. market, accord-
ing to Lilly, is to serve as an intermediate for the production of cefaclor. Because the 
defendants have “exploited” that utility or property, Lilly argues, compound 6 can-
not be regarded as undergoing a “material change” in the course of its conversion to 
cefaclor. 
Lilly’s argument distorts the terms “utility” and “properties” beyond recog-
nition. The chemical and biological properties of compound 6 are plainly different 
from those of cefaclor, and the utility of the two compounds, as that term is conven-
tionally used, is quite different. Cefaclor is a powerful oral antibiotic, with a set of 
chemical and biological properties that give it great utility in that regard; compound 
6 has no such properties, and it has no significant utility as an antibiotic. Moreover, 
the premise of Lilly’s argument—that compound 6 has “utility” only as an inter-
mediate in the preparation of cefaclor—is flawed. As the district court noted, com-
pound 6 can be used to produce a variety of cephalosporin antibiotics, of which 
cefaclor is only one. While Lilly claims that cefaclor was the only derivative of com-
pound 6 that was on the commercial market in the United States at the time of the 
district court’s decision in this case, other cephalosporin antibiotics that are pro-
ducible from compound 6 were on sale in other countries, and proceedings were 
pending to obtain authorization to market at least one of those antibiotics in this 
country. Thus, despite Lilly’s creative effort to draw support from the references to 
“utility” and “properties” in the Senate report, the two-part test in the Senate report 
appears to offer no aid to Lilly’s statutory argument. 
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The conference report on the process patent bill contained only a short discus-
sion of the “material change” issue, but that report reiterated the test found in both 
the House and Senate reports: that infringement can be found, even in the case of a 
significant change in the imported product, if “it would not have been possible or 
commercially viable to make the different [product] but for the patented process.” 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1087 (1988). See also Bio-
Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1562-63 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(citing the same test, in the biotechnology context, from the Senate report). Once 
again, because there is at least one known commercial method for making cefaclor 
that does not use the patented process, the language in the conference report on the 
Process Patent Amendments Act does not help Lilly. 
At the end of this Long March through the legislative history, we cannot claim 
that the legislative background of the 1988 Act provides a conclusive answer to the 
question of how the “materially changed” clause should be construed in general, 
and how it should be applied to the facts of this case in particular. What we are able 
to say, however, is that the legislative history does not compel adoption of Lilly’s 
proposed analysis of the statute. In fact, to the extent that Congress intended the 
courts to look to the committee reports for guidance in construing the “materially 
changed” clause, the reports support the conclusion that the district court reached 
and that we uphold: that compound 6 is likely to be found to have been “materially 
changed” in the process of its conversion into cefaclor, and that the importation and 
sale of cefaclor is therefore not likely to be held to infringe Lilly’s rights under claim 
5 of the ‘085 patent. 
… 
Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
Dyk, Judge: 
Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Housey”) appeals from the judgement … dis-
missing its counterclaim for infringement of United States Patent Nos. 4,980,281, 
5,266,464, 5,688,655, and 5,877,007 (collectively “the Housey patents”) for fail-
ure to state a claim. Because we conclude that infringement under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(g) is limited to physical goods that were manufactured and does not include 
information generated by a patented process, and because the physical goods here 
(drug products) were not “manufactured” by a process claimed in the asserted  
patents, we affirm the dismissal of Housey’s infringement claims. 
Background 
Housey is the assignee of [the patents in suit], all entitled “Method of Screen-
ing for Protein Inhibitors and Activators.”1 The patents are directed to “a method of 
                                                
1 All four Housey patents claim priority from U.S. Application No. 154,206 filed 
February 10, 1988, although the final three patents included additional disclosure 
via a continuation-in-part application filed August 10, 1989. For purposes of this 
appeal the patents are identical in all material aspects, and so will be described with 
respect to the final issued patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,877,007. 
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screening for substances which specifically inhibit or activate a particular protein af-
fecting the cultural or morphological characteristics of the cell expressing the pro-
tein.” U.S. Pat. No. 5,877,007. The expression of the “particular protein” (referred 
to as the “protein of interest”) results in a change in one or more identifiable char-
acteristics of the cells expressing it. According to the disclosed and claimed method, 
a cell line is produced that is characterized by a higher production of the protein of 
interest relative to an original cell line. By applying substances (“agents”) to both 
cell lines, it is possible to determine whether the agent is an activator or inhibitor of 
protein activity. Thus, for example, if a link between a protein and a disease is dis-
covered, the disclosed method provides a process for identifying the effect that dif-
ferent agents have on the activity of the suspect protein. 
On March 6, 2001, Bayer AG and Bayer Corporation (“Bayer”) filed a com-
plaint seeking declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, and non-
infringement of the Housey patents. On March 27, 2001, Housey filed an answer to 
the complaint and asserted a counterclaim for infringement of the Housey patents. 
The counterclaim alleged that Bayer “directly infringed claims of each of the  
patents-in-suit” and “contributed to infringement or induced others to infringe the 
patents-in-suit.” Additionally, Housey alleged that Bayer “infringed the method 
claims of the patents in suit pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).” The factual basis of 
Housey’s infringement claim as stated in the counterclaim was that: 
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 295, this Court may presume that a product was 
made [by Housey’s] patented methods where there is a substantial likeli-
hood that it was so made by and [Housey] has made reasonable efforts to 
determine the process actually used. Here, there is substantial likelihood 
that [Housey’s] methods were used by Bayer to make the characterization 
of a pharmacologically active agent. Further, [Housey] has requested the 
defendants to identify the methods used in its facilities, but the [sic] Bayer 
has failed to do so. [Housey] has made the required reasonable efforts. 
On April 16, 2001, Bayer filed a motion to dismiss … with respect to Housey’s 
counterclaim for infringement under § 271(g), arguing that the provision “applies 
only to methods of manufacture, and does not apply to [Housey’s] method patent 
claims *** [which] cover methods of use, not methods of manufacturing.” Bayer 
argued that “Section 271(g) is inapplicable as a matter of law and [Housey’s] claim 
for infringement of its method claims under § 271(g) should be dismissed.” Bayer 
characterized Housey’s infringement allegations as follows: 
1. Bayer is liable as an infringer when it sells in the United States a pharma-
ceutical composition containing a substance determined to be an inhibitor 
or activator of a target protein by use either in the United States or abroad 
of the [Housey] United States patented methods. 
2. Bayer AB is liable as an infringer when it imports into the United States 
research data or information obtained from using the [Housey] patented 
methods. 
In its opposition to Bayer’s motion to dismiss, Housey similarly described its 
counterclaim for infringement under § 271(g) as comprising two separate claims, 
the first of which was directed to “the critical information, the identification and 
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characterization of a drug, [which] is made by [the] patented process” and the  
second of which was directed to “the drug made by [the] patented process.” The 
parties, therefore, were in substantial agreement as to the scope of the counterclaim 
for infringement, characterizing it as extending to both the importation of a phar-
maceutical composition identified by the patented process and the importation of 





This case presents questions concerning the interpretation of § 271(g) … . We 
are concerned here in particular with the meaning of the phrase “a product which is 
made by a [patented] process.” We have construed portions of this statute in a 
number of previous cases. However, this case presents issues not previously ad-
dressed. …  
II 
Housey offers two theories as to why § 271(g) is applicable here. First, it con-
tends that the information produced by Bayer using the patented processes claimed 
in the Housey patents is itself a product made by a patented process. Bayer, in turn, 
argues that (1) the word “made” means “manufactured” and that (2) information is 
not a manufactured product. There is no serious dispute between the parties con-
cerning the second of these two propositions: if only products that have been “man-
ufactured” are within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), it necessarily follows that the 
statute applies only to physical goods and that information is not included. Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary defines the verb form of “manufacture” as “to 
make (as raw material) into a product suitable for use *** to make from raw ma-
terials by hand or by machinery.” Webster’s at 1378 (1968). Similarly, Random 
House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary defines “manufacture” as “the making of 
goods or wares by manual labor or by machinery.” Random House at 1172 (2d ed. 
1998) (emphasis added).4 These definitions are consistent in referring to tangible 
objects and not intangibles such as information. Thus, the production of infor-
mation is not within the scope of processes of “manufacture.” Housey, in fact, does 
not argue that information is within the statute if the term “made” is construed to 
mean “manufactured.” We thus turn to the central question—whether the statutory 
term “made” means “manufactured.” 
III 
                                                
4 In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., the Supreme Court defined the 
verb form of “manufacture” as “the production of articles for use from raw or pre-
pared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or 
combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machinery.” 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931) 
(quoting the Century Dictionary). An “article” is “one of a class of material things 
*** piece of goods: COMMODITY.” Webster’s at 123 (emphasis added). 
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As used in the statute, the term “made” is the past tense of the verb “make.” 
The dictionaries offer multiple definitions of the term “make.” Some definitions are 
limited to manufacturing, for example, “to bring (a material thing) into being by 
forming, shaping, or altering material: FASHION, MANUFACTURE.” Webster’s at 
1363.5 Other definitions broadly encompass activities in addition to manufacturing. 
For example, Webster’s defines “make” as “form as a result of calculation or design.” 
Id.6 Under these circumstances the text is ambiguous, and we must look beyond the 
particular language being construed. 
In order to resolve the ambiguity in the statutory language, we look first to 
other provisions of the statute. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 
U.S. 843, 852 (2001); Gade v. Natl. Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 98 
(1992). In a related section of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(which added 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)), the Act describes a person that uses a patented 
process to “produce” a product as a “manufacturer.” 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3)(B)(iii). 
Similarly, § 287(b)(4)(A) refers to “a person then engaged in the manufacture of a 
product” as a person that makes the product. By referring to the party that produces 
a product as a “manufacturer” and the maker as a “person engaged in the manufac-
ture of a product,” the statute clearly contemplates that “made” means “manufac-
tured.” 
There are other indications as well that the statute is concerned exclusively with 
products that are physical goods produced by a manufacturing process. One statuto-
ry exception to section 271(g) rules out infringement where the allegedly infringing 
product “is materially changed by subsequent processes.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1). 
Housey’s position that information itself is a “product” is difficult to reconcile with 
the existence of this exception, which appears to contemplate a change in a physical 
product. Similarly, the second exception to section 271(g), which provides that 
there is no infringement where the accused product “becomes a trivial and nones-




Finally, reading the statute to cover processes other than manufacturing pro-
cesses could lead to anomalous results. The importation of information in the ab-
stract (here, the knowledge that a substance possesses a particular quality) cannot be 
easily controlled. As Bayer points out, a person possessing the allegedly infringing 
information could, under Housey’s interpretation, possibly infringe by merely enter-
ing the country. Such an illogical result cannot have been intended. See Paul v.  
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1976). 
Under these circumstances we think it is best to leave to Congress the task of 
expanding the statute if we are wrong in our interpretation. Congress is in a far bet-
                                                
5 Random House states: “to bring into existence by shaping or changing material, 
combining parts, etc.” Random House at 1161. 
6 Random House states: “to bring into existence by shaping or changing material, 
combining parts, etc.” Random House at 1161. 
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ter position to draw the lines that must be drawn if the product of intellectual pro-
cesses rather than manufacturing processes are to be included within the statute. 
We, therefore, hold that in order for a product to have been “made by a process 
patented in the United States” it must have been a physical article that was “manu-
factured” and that the production of information is not covered. 
VI 
This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. As characterized by Bayer in its 
motion to dismiss, Housey’s counterclaim of infringement also extended to “a 
pharmaceutical composition containing a substance determined to be an inhibitor or 
activator of a target protein by use either in the United States or abroad of the 
[Housey] United States patented methods.” In opposing dismissal, Housey agreed 
that the counterclaim included drug products, stating that “the drug [itself was] 
made by [the] patented process.” The factual basis upon which Housey made its 
counterclaim for infringement by the drug product was that: 
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 295, [the district court] may presume that a 
product was made [by Housey’s] patented methods where there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that it was so made by and [Housey] has made reason-
able efforts to determine the process actually used. Here, there is substan-
tial likelihood that [Housey’s] methods were used by Bayer to make the 
characterization of a pharmacologically active agent. 
Thus, Housey alleged that, as a result of the claimed research process, Bayer pro-
duced drugs using information created by the patented processes. 
It is beyond dispute that a drug is a physical product that has been manufac-
tured. The issue, therefore, is the necessary relationship under the statute between 
the “process patented in the United States” and the resulting product, i.e., we must 
determine whether a drug that was identified as useful through the use of a patented 
process is a “product which [was] made by [that] process.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). As 
we have previously noted: 
 [t]he statute does not specify what products will be considered to have 
been ‘made by’ the patented process, apparently because Congress wanted 
the courts to resolve this critical question of proximity to the product of 
the patented process on a case-by-case basis. 
Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genetech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). In Bio-Technology we affirmed the district court’s ruling that a protein made 
by a host organism expressing an inserted plasmid was a product “made by” the  
patented process for creating the plasmid itself. Id. Here, unlike the process in Bio-
Technology, the patented process is not used in the actual synthesis of the drug  
product. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that “processes of identifica-
tion and generation of data are not steps in the manufacture of a final drug  
product.” 
The statute requires that the allegedly infringing product have been “made by a 
process patented in the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). The pertinent dic-
tionary definitions of “by” are “through the means or instrumentality of[;] *** 
through the direct agency of[;] *** through the medium of[;] *** through the 
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work or operation of.” Webster’s at 307.12 Thus, the process must be used directly in 
the manufacture of the product, and not merely as a predicate process to identify the 
product to be manufactured. A drug product, the characteristics of which were  
studied using the claimed research processes, therefore, is not a product “made by” 
those claimed processes. …  
… 
A Note about the NTP Case 
Earlier in this chapter, you considered NTP v. Research In Motion, the Black-
Berry case. In a portion of the opinion not excerpted earlier, the Federal Circuit 
considered an infringement theory that was based on § 271(g), thus prompting dis-
cussion of the Housey case. That portion of NTP is as follows: 
… The next question is whether RIM can be said to “import[] into *** 
or offer[] to sell, sell[], or use[] within the United States a product which is 
made by a process patented in the United States” and thus infringe under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(g). The district court held that “wireless electronic mail” spe-
cially formatted by a patented process can be a “product” under section 
271(g). The district court compared the breadth of “product” to the breadth 
of patentable subject matter, cited to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980) [(holding that a genetically modified bacterium is a patentable “manu-
facture” under 35 U.S.C. § 101)], and explained that specially formatted 
wireless e-mail is not naturally occurring, an abstract idea, or a physical phe-
nomenon. 
RIM argues that the product created by the NTP process is data or in-
formation, and that Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2003), held that section 271(g) does not cover the production of 
intangible items. NTP counters that Bayer held only that a “product” cannot 
be “information in the abstract.” NTP asserts that the “email packets” flowing 
from the BES, to the interface, and back to the RF receiver, have a “tangible” 
structure which includes the interface address, an RF address, and the in-
putted message. … NTP adds that RIM “manufactures” email into its tangi-
ble structure and “imports” email using patented methods, in part, by replac-
ing the interface address with the RF receiver address at the interface Relay. 
RIM responds that the email packets that it may transfer into the United 
States are not manufactured, physical goods, and therefore are not “products” 
under § 271(g). 
In Bayer, we considered whether research data from the performance of a 
method to identify substances, which inhibit or activate a protein affecting 
characteristics of the cell, was “a product which is made by a process.” 340 
F.3d at 1370. We held that “the production of information is not covered” by 
§ 271(g), explaining that the process must be for the “manufacturing” of “a 
physical article.” Id. at 1377. In this case, the relevant claims are directed to 
                                                
12 Random House similarly defines “by” as “through the agency, efficacy, work, par-
ticipation, or authority of.” Random House at 287. 
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methods for the transmission of information in the form of email messages. 
Because the “transmission of information,” like the “production of infor-
mation,” does not entail the manufacturing of a physical product, § 271(g) 
does not apply to the asserted method claims in this case any more than it did 
in Bayer. 
Defenses: Exhaustion, 
Reconstruction & Repair 
Bowman v. Monsanto 
133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) 
Kagan, Justice: 
…  
Respondent Monsanto invented a genetic modification that enables soybean 
plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides 
(including Monsanto’s own Roundup). Monsanto markets soybean seed containing 
this altered genetic material as Roundup Ready seed. Farmers planting that seed can 
use a glyphosate-based herbicide to kill weeds without damaging their crops. Two 
patents issued to Monsanto cover various aspects of its Roundup Ready technology, 
including a seed incorporating the genetic alteration. 
Monsanto sells, and allows other companies to sell, Roundup Ready soybean 
seeds to growers who assent to a special licensing agreement. That agreement per-
mits a grower to plant the purchased seeds in one (and only one) season. He can 
then consume the resulting crop or sell it as a commodity, usually to a grain elevator 
or agricultural processor. But under the agreement, the farmer may not save any of 
the harvested soybeans for replanting, nor may he supply them to anyone else for 
that purpose. These restrictions reflect the ease of producing new generations of 
Roundup Ready seed. Because glyphosate resistance comes from the seed’s genetic 
material, that trait is passed on from the planted seed to the harvested soybeans: In-
deed, a single Roundup Ready seed can grow a plant containing dozens of gen-
etically identical beans, each of which, if replanted, can grow another such plant—
and so on and so on. The agreement’s terms prevent the farmer from co-opting that 
process to produce his own Roundup Ready seeds, forcing him instead to buy from 
Monsanto each season. 
Petitioner Vernon Bowman is a farmer in Indiana who, it is fair to say, appreci-
ates Roundup Ready soybean seed.  He purchased Roundup Ready each year, from 
a company affiliated with Monsanto, for his first crop of the season. In accord with 
the agreement just described, he used all of that seed for planting, and sold his en-
tire crop to a grain elevator (which typically would resell it to an agricultural proces-
sor for human or animal consumption). 
Bowman, however, devised a less orthodox approach for his second crop of 
each season. Because he thought such late-season planting “risky,” he did not want 
to pay the premium price that Monsanto charges for Roundup Ready seed.  He 
therefore went to a grain elevator; purchased “commodity soybeans” intended for 
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human or animal consumption; and planted them in his fields.1 Those soybeans 
came from prior harvests of other local farmers. And because most of those farmers 
also used Roundup Ready seed, Bowman could anticipate that many of the pur-
chased soybeans would contain Monsanto’s patented technology. When he applied a 
glyphosate-based herbicide to his fields, he confirmed that this was so; a significant 
proportion of the new plants survived the treatment, and produced in their turn a 
new crop of soybeans with the Roundup Ready trait. Bowman saved seed from that 
crop to use in his late-season planting the next year—and then the next, and the 
next, until he had harvested eight crops in that way. Each year, that is, he planted 
saved seed from the year before (sometimes adding more soybeans bought from the 
grain elevator), sprayed his fields with glyphosate to kill weeds (and any non-
resistant plants), and produced a new crop of glyphosate-resistant—i.e., Roundup 
Ready—soybeans. 
After discovering this practice, Monsanto sued Bowman for infringing its  
patents on Roundup Ready seed. Bowman raised patent exhaustion as a defense, 
arguing that Monsanto could not control his use of the soybeans because they were 
the subject of a prior authorized sale (from local farmers to the grain elevator). The 
District Court rejected that argument, and awarded damages to Monsanto of 
$84,456. The Federal Circuit affirmed. … We granted certiorari to consider the im-
portant question of patent law raised in this case and now affirm. 
II 
The doctrine of patent exhaustion limits a patentee’s right to control what  
others can do with an article embodying or containing an invention. Under the doc-
trine, “the initial authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to 
that item.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 
(2008). And by “exhaust[ing] the [patentee’s] monopoly” in that item, the sale 
confers on the purchaser, or any subsequent owner, “the right to use [or] sell” the 
thing as he sees fit. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249-250 (1942). 
We have explained the basis for the doctrine as follows: “[T]he purpose of the  
patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has re-
ceived his reward *** by the sale of the article”; once that “purpose is realized the 
patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.” 
Id. at 251. 
Consistent with that rationale, the doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as 
to the “particular article” sold; it leaves untouched the patentee’s ability to prevent a 
buyer from making new copies of the patented item. “[T]he purchaser of the  
[patented] machine *** does not acquire any right to construct another machine 
either for his own use or to be vended to another.” Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 
                                                
1 Grain elevators … purchase grain from farmers and sell it for consumption; under 
federal and state law, they generally cannot package or market their grain for use as 
agricultural seed. See 7 U.S.C. § 1571; Ind. Code § 15-15-1-32. But because soy-
beans are themselves seeds, nothing (except, as we shall see, the law) prevented 
Bowman from planting, rather than consuming, the product he bought from the 
grain elevator. 
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Wall.) 544, 548 (1873); see Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422, 424 (1964) 
(holding that a purchaser’s “reconstruction” of a patented machine “would impinge 
on the patentee’s right ‘to exclude others from making’ *** the article” (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 154)). Rather, “a second creation” of the patented item “call[s] the  
monopoly, conferred by the patent grant, into play for a second time.” Aro Mfg. Co. 
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961). That is because the 
patent holder has “received his reward” only for the actual article sold, and not for 
subsequent recreations of it. Univis, 316 U.S. at 251. If the purchaser of that article 
could make and sell endless copies, the patent would effectively protect the inven-
tion for just a single sale. Bowman himself disputes none of this analysis as a general 
matter: He forthrightly acknowledges the “well settled” principle “that the exhaus-
tion doctrine does not extend to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” Brief for  
Petitioner 37 (citing Aro, 365 U.S. at 346). 
Unfortunately for Bowman, that principle decides this case against him. Under 
the patent exhaustion doctrine, Bowman could resell the patented soybeans he pur-
chased from the grain elevator; so too he could consume the beans himself or feed 
them to his animals. Monsanto, although the patent holder, would have no business 
interfering in those uses of Roundup Ready beans. But the exhaustion doctrine does 
not enable Bowman to make additional patented soybeans without Monsanto’s 
permission (either express or implied). And that is precisely what Bowman did. He 
took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his fields at the time he 
thought best; applied glyphosate to kill weeds (as well as any soy plants lacking the 
Roundup Ready trait); and finally harvested more (many more) beans than he start-
ed with. That is how “to ‘make’ a new product,” to use Bowman’s words, when the 
original product is a seed. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1363 
(1961) (“make” means “cause to exist, occur, or appear,” or more specifically, 
“plant and raise (a crop)”). Because Bowman thus reproduced Monsanto’s patented 
invention, the exhaustion doctrine does not protect him.3 
Were the matter otherwise, Monsanto’s patent would provide scant benefit. Af-
ter inventing the Roundup Ready trait, Monsanto would, to be sure, “receiv[e] [its] 
reward” for the first seeds it sells. Univis, 316 U.S. at 251. But in short order, other 
seed companies could reproduce the product and market it to growers, thus de-
priving Monsanto of its monopoly. And farmers themselves need only buy the seed 
                                                
3 This conclusion applies however Bowman acquired Roundup Ready seed: The 
doctrine of patent exhaustion no more protected Bowman’s reproduction of the 
seed he purchased for his first crop (from a Monsanto-affiliated seed company) than 
the beans he bought for his second (from a grain elevator). The difference between 
the two purchases was that the first—but not the second—came with a license from 
Monsanto to plant the seed and then harvest and market one crop of beans. We do 
not here confront a case in which Monsanto (or an affiliated seed company) sold 
Roundup Ready to a farmer without an express license agreement. For reasons we 
explain below, we think that case unlikely to arise. And in the event it did, the 
farmer might reasonably claim that the sale came with an implied license to plant 
and harvest one soybean crop. 
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once, whether from Monsanto, a competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator. The 
grower could multiply his initial purchase, and then multiply that new creation, ad 
infinitum—each time profiting from the patented seed without compensating its 
inventor. Bowman’s late-season plantings offer a prime illustration. After buying 
beans for a single harvest, Bowman saved enough seed each year to reduce or elimi-
nate the need for additional purchases. Monsanto still held its patent, but received 
no gain from Bowman’s annual production and sale of Roundup Ready soybeans. 
The exhaustion doctrine is limited to the “particular item” sold to avoid just such a 
mismatch between invention and reward. 
Our holding today also follows from J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred 
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). We considered there whether an inventor could 
get a patent on a seed or plant, or only a certificate issued under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (PVPA), 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. We decided a patent was available, 
rejecting the claim that the PVPA implicitly repealed the Patent Act’s coverage of 
seeds and plants. On our view, the two statutes established different, but not con-
flicting schemes: The requirements for getting a patent “are more stringent than 
those for obtaining a PVP certificate, and the protections afforded” by a patent are 
correspondingly greater. J.E.M., 534 U.S. at 142. Most notable here, we explained 
that only a patent holder (not a certificate holder) could prohibit “[a] farmer who 
legally purchases and plants” a protected seed from saving harvested seed “for re-
planting.” Id. at 140; see id. at 143 (noting that the Patent Act, unlike the PVPA, 
contains “no exemptio[n]” for “saving seed”). That statement is inconsistent with 
applying exhaustion to protect conduct like Bowman’s. If a sale cut off the right to 
control a patented seed’s progeny, then (contrary to J.E.M.) the patentee could not 
prevent the buyer from saving harvested seed. Indeed, the patentee could not stop 
the buyer from selling such seed, which even a PVP certificate owner (who, recall, is 
supposed to have fewer rights) can usually accomplish. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2543. 
Those limitations would turn upside-down the statutory scheme J.E.M. described. 
Bowman principally argues that exhaustion should apply here because seeds are 
meant to be planted. The exhaustion doctrine, he reminds us, typically prevents a 
patentee from controlling the use of a patented product following an authorized 
sale. And in planting Roundup Ready seeds, Bowman continues, he is merely using 
them in the normal way farmers do. Bowman thus concludes that allowing Monsan-
to to interfere with that use would “creat[e] an impermissible exception to the  
exhaustion doctrine” for patented seeds and other “self-replicating technologies.” 
Brief for Petitioner 16. 
But it is really Bowman who is asking for an unprecedented exception—to what 
he concedes is the “well settled” rule that “the exhaustion doctrine does not extend 
to the right to ‘make’ a new product.” Reproducing a patented article no doubt 
“uses” it after a fashion. But as already explained, we have always drawn the boun-
daries of the exhaustion doctrine to exclude that activity, so that the patentee retains 
an undiminished right to prohibit others from making the thing his patent protects. 
See, e.g., Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1882) (holding that a pur-
chaser could not “use” the buckle from a patented cotton-bale tie to “make” a new 
tie). That is because, once again, if simple copying were a protected use, a patent 
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would plummet in value after the first sale of the first item containing the invention. 
The undiluted patent monopoly, it might be said, would extend not for 20 years (as 
the Patent Act promises), but for only one transaction. And that would result in less 
incentive for innovation than Congress wanted. Hence our repeated insistence that 
exhaustion applies only to the particular item sold, and not to reproductions. 
Nor do we think that rule will prevent farmers from making appropriate use of 
the Roundup Ready seed they buy. Bowman himself stands in a peculiarly poor po-
sition to assert such a claim. As noted earlier, the commodity soybeans he purchased 
were intended not for planting, but for consumption. Indeed, Bowman conceded in 
deposition testimony that he knew of no other farmer who employed beans bought 
from a grain elevator to grow a new crop. So a non-replicating use of the com-
modity beans at issue here was not just available, but standard fare. And in the more 
ordinary case, when a farmer purchases Roundup Ready seed qua seed—that is, seed 
intended to grow a crop—he will be able to plant it. Monsanto, to be sure, con-
ditions the farmer’s ability to reproduce Roundup Ready; but it does not—could 
not realistically—preclude all planting. No sane farmer, after all, would buy the 
product without some ability to grow soybeans from it. And so Monsanto, pre-
dictably enough, sells Roundup Ready seed to farmers with a license to use it to 
make a crop.  Applying our usual rule in this context therefore will allow farmers to 
benefit from Roundup Ready, even as it rewards Monsanto for its innovation. 
Still, Bowman has another seeds-are-special argument: that soybeans naturally 
“self-replicate or ‘sprout’ unless stored in a controlled manner,” and thus “it was the 
planted soybean, not Bowman” himself, that made replicas of Monsanto’s patented 
invention. But we think that blame-the-bean defense tough to credit. Bowman was 
not a passive observer of his soybeans’ multiplication; or put another way, the seeds 
he purchased (miraculous though they might be in other respects) did not spon-
taneously create eight successive soybean crops. As we have explained, Bowman de-
vised and executed a novel way to harvest crops from Roundup Ready seeds without 
paying the usual premium. He purchased beans from a grain elevator anticipating 
that many would be Roundup Ready; applied a glyphosate-based herbicide in a way 
that culled any plants without the patented trait; and saved beans from the rest for 
the next season. He then planted those Roundup Ready beans at a chosen time; 
tended and treated them, including by exploiting their patented glyphosate-
resistance; and harvested many more seeds, which he either marketed or saved to 
begin the next cycle. In all this, the bean surely figured. But it was Bowman, and 
not the bean, who controlled the reproduction (unto the eighth generation) of 
Monsanto’s patented invention. 
Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us, rather than 
every one involving a self-replicating product. We recognize that such inventions are 
becoming ever more prevalent, complex, and diverse. In another case, the article’s 
self-replication might occur outside the purchaser’s control. Or it might be a neces-
sary but incidental step in using the item for another purpose. Cf. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(a)(1) (“[I]t is not [a copyright] infringement for the owner of a copy of a 
computer program to make *** another copy or adaptation of that computer pro-
gram provide[d] that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in 
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the utilization of the computer program”). We need not address here whether or 
how the doctrine of patent exhaustion would apply in such circumstances. In the 
case at hand, Bowman planted Monsanto’s patented soybeans solely to make and 
market replicas of them, thus depriving the company of the reward patent law pro-
vides for the sale of each article. Patent exhaustion provides no haven for that con-
duct. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Comm’n 
474 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
Dyk, Judge: 
Appellants Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. (“Fuji”) and Jack Benun (“Benun”), one 
of the principals of Jazz Photo Corp. (“Jazz”), separately appeal the International 
Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) final determination concerning civil penalties 
for violation of a cease and desist order issued to Jazz and “its principals, stockhold-
ers, officers, directors, employees, [and] agents.” The cease and desist order barred 
Jazz from importing (or selling, marketing, advertising, distributing, etc. previously 
imported) disposable cameras that infringed fifteen of Fuji’s patents. The central 
questions before the Commission were whether: (1) the cameras were first sold 
abroad (making their refurbishment infringing regardless of whether they were re-
paired or reconstructed); and (2) whether the processes Jazz used to refurbish the 
cameras first sold in the United States constituted permissible repair or impermis-
sible reconstruction. Fuji challenges the order on the ground that the Commission 
erred in finding that certain of Jazz’s lens-fitted film packages (“LFFPs” or “camer-
as”) were permissibly repaired. On appeal Benun, the principal consultant and later 
Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of Jazz, challenges the order insofar as it imposes 
civil penalties. 
We conclude that Fuji lacked standing to bring this appeal. With respect to  
Benun’s appeal, we conclude that the Commission had the authority to issue an or-
der against Benun; that the order applied to Benun; and that adequate notice was 
provided that the order applied to Benun. We also hold that substantial evidence 
supports the finding that the majority of the cameras were first sold abroad and that, 
while the Commission did not err in finding impermissible reconstruction with re-
spect to most of the cameras first sold in the United States, the Commission erred in 




Cases arising from the same factual background have been before this court 
four other times [including in] … Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 
1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Jazz I”). We will therefore recite only the facts most rele-
vant to the present appeal. 
I 
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Fuji is the owner of fifteen patents directed at LFFPs, popularly known as dis-
posable, single use, or one time use cameras. Fuji and its licensees, Eastman Kodak 
Co. and Konica Corp., manufacture and sell LFFPs. The LFFP consists of a plastic 
shell that is encased in a cardboard cover and equipped with a button-activated shut-
ter, a lens, a viewfinder, a film advance mechanism, and optional flash units and but-
tons. The LFFP is preloaded with both film and a film cartridge into which the ex-
posed film winds. The typical consumer of these inexpensive cameras brings the en-
tire LFFP to a film processor to be developed and receives back only the negatives 
and prints, but not the LFFP itself. During the period in question Jazz collected 
used LFFP shells originally made by Fuji or its licensees, inserted new film and oth-
erwise refurbished the shells, and sold them in the United States. Some of the shells 
that Jazz collected were originally sold by Fuji and its licensees in the United States, 
while others were first sold abroad. 
… 
II 
On March 25, 1998, the Commission instituted an investigation against 27 re-
spondents that imported and sold LFFPs, including Jazz, to determine whether they 
were violating one or more claims of Fuji’s fifteen patents. The Commission found 
that Jazz and other respondents were infringing the patents unless the respondents’ 
activities involved permissible repair. Thus, a central issue was whether cameras first 
sold in the United States were permissibly repaired or impermissibly reconstructed. 
The Commission held that the respondents had the burden of proof on this issue. 
To some extent, the Commission found that the respondents had failed to satisfy 
their burden because they had not supplied complete information about their refur-
bishment processes, which occurred abroad. However, the Commission also iden-
tified eight common steps that Jazz and some additional respondents admitted util-





Benun argues … that Jazz did not violate the cease and desist order because 
Jazz’s activities constituted permissible repair. Repair is an affirmative defense to a 
claim of infringement, and Benun, as the party raising the affirmative defense, had 
the burden of establishing this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. … “The 
Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of conduct that constitutes permissible 
repair of a patented combination of unpatented elements.” Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon 
Indus., Inc., 45 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
                                                
1 The eight steps were: 1) removing the cardboard cover; 2) opening the LFFP 
body; 3) replacing the winding wheel or modifying the film cartridge to be inserted; 
4) resetting the film counter; 5) replacing the battery in flash LFFPs; 6) winding 
new film out of a canister onto a spool or into a roll; 7) resealing the LFFP body 
using tape and/or glue; 8) applying a new cardboard cover. 
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A 
The affirmative defense of repair only applies to products whose patent rights 
have been exhausted through a first sale in the United States. Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 
1105.13 The Commission concluded that 40% of the LFFPs in issue were first sold 
abroad and had unexhausted patent rights. This conclusion was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. It was based on studies conducted by Fuji’s expert that used the 
identifying numbers printed on the LFFPs and Fuji’s production and shipping data-
bases to determine where samples of Fuji-type LFFPs with Jazz packaging (i.e., ones 
that were refurbished by Jazz) were first sold. 
…  
B 
Benun … contends that the Commission erred in concluding that no evidence 
had been provided of the process used for refurbishing most of the cameras in issue. 
The Commission found that “there is a lack of complete and credible information 
verifying the LFFP refurbishing process at many of Jazz’s supplier factories” and 
therefore that Jazz had failed to prove permissible repair for cameras made at these 
factories. The burden was on Benun, as the party seeking to invoke the affirmative 
defense of repair, to provide “evidence to show that the activities performed in pro-
cessing the used cameras constituted permissible repair.” Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1102. 
Benun argues that the Commission erred in finding the evidence insufficient to 
show the processes used at many facilities. First, Benun contends that the Commis-
sion erroneously held that videotape evidence was essential. We do not read the 
Commission decision as imposing any such absolute requirement with respect to 
videotape evidence; it merely held that Benun’s videotape evidence in many in-
stances was not authenticated and credited expert testimony that the videotapes 
were not reliable evidence of what transpired at these factories. Second, Benun  
asserts that Jazz required its suppliers to use only Jazz-approved processes, but fails 
to show that he provided any evidence as to what these processes actually involved. 
Third, Benun relies on Fuji’s failure to visit factories until 2003 or identify any  
patented parts that were replaced, but ignores the fact that Jazz, not Fuji, had the 
burden of proof. Finally, Benun points to testimony by several witnesses about how 
the cameras were refurbished. This testimony was only from employees of Jazz and 
its suppliers, not disinterested witnesses, and the Commission could properly decline 
to credit it. 
                                                
13 A different rule applies in the copyright context. In Quality King Distributors, Inc. 
v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), the Supreme Court 
held that “the owner of goods lawfully made under the [Copyright] Act is entitled 
to the protection of the first sale doctrine in an action in a United States court even 
if the first sale occurred abroad.” Id. at 145 n.14. 
[ Ed. Note—The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a broad exhaustion defense 
to copyright. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). ] 
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C 
Finally, as to some of the cameras, the Commission found that the replacement 
of the full backs of the cameras involved impermissible reconstruction. Benun con-
tends that these cameras were permissibly repaired. “The application of the law of 
repair and reconstruction to fact is *** a legal determination, and is reviewed with-
out deference.” Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1099. 
First, contrary to Fuji’s assertion, our original decision in Jazz I did not limit 
the scope of permissible repair to the eight common steps it considered; rather we 
did not reach the question of what other activities constituted permissible repair. See 
Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1109 (“We can not exculpate unknown processes from the 
charge of infringing reconstruction.”). On appeal in this case, the Commission and 
Benun agree that the eight step refurbishment discussed in Jazz I and the nineteen 
step refurbishment described in the Commission order here both involve permissible 
repair. The question then is whether one additional action by Jazz, the addition of a 
new plastic back cover, converts the activity into impermissible reconstruction.15 
In Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd. v. R & D Tool & Engineering Co., 291 
F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002), we concluded that the replacement of a spent part was a 
fundamental example of a permissible repair. Id. at 785-86. Benun contends that the 
back covers were spent parts and their replacement was permissible repair. This is so, 
he argues, because as a practical matter the backs had to be broken to remove the 
film, and once new film was inserted the back covers could no longer serve their 
function of enclosing the camera and keeping light out. The backs therefore were 
spent and could properly be replaced. Although Fuji did not intend the LFFP to be 
refurbished, “the patentee’s unilateral intent, without more, does not bar reuse of 
the patented article, or convert repair into reconstruction.” Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 
1106; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 
1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
Benun’s factual premise that the backs had to be broken to repair the film is not 
contested by the Commission on appeal. This court and other tribunals have repeat-
edly concluded that, in view of the continued utility of the shutter mechanism, lens, 
viewfinder, film advance mechanism, and other significant parts in the original cam-
era, replacing the film is a permissible repair and reattaching or replacing a part that 
must be removed or broken to replace the film also constitutes permissible repair. 
See Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1106 (reattachment of the back cover); Fuji II, 249 F. Supp. 
2d. 434, 446 (D.N.J. 2003), aff’d, 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (removal of the 
film door that was broken in removing the film). Significantly, there is no conten-
tion here that the extent of the refurbishment is disproportionate to the overall value 
of the parts that were not replaced. See Husky, 291 F.3d at 786-87; Jazz I, 264 F.3d 
at 1106. 
                                                
15 This issue arises in the context of an extensive market for refurbishment of the 
cameras in question. See Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 673 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (holding that the existence of a market to manufacture or service spent 
parts tends to prove that there is a reasonable expectation that the spent parts can be 
permissibly replaced). 
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In a variety of other contexts we have also held that replacement of a part that 
must be broken or removed to repair the device does not convert permissible repair 
into impermissible reconstruction. For example, in Bottom Line Management, Inc. v. 
Pan Man, Inc., 228 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000), we found that “incidental repairs 
to minor damages” necessary to replace a spent part did not justify a finding of re-
construction. Id. at 1356. In that case studs that held a spent part in place had to be 
broken in order to remove that part for replacement, and we concluded that re-
placement of these studs did not justify a finding of reconstruction. Id. at 1355. 
Similarly, in Everpure, Inc. v. Cuno, Inc., 875 F.2d 300, 303 (Fed. Cir. 1989), we 
held that a patentee who designed a product so that the neck which connects a fil-
tering cartridge to the base of the device had to be replaced in order to replace the 
worn-out cartridge itself could not claim impermissible reconstruction from the re-
placement of the neck. We concluded that “Everpure and Everpure alone made the 
business decision to sell disposable cartridges and to render its filter irreplaceable 
without replacement of the entire cartridge.” Id. Likewise, in this case, it would ap-
pear that Jazz’s actions in replacing the back covers, which must be broken in order 
to replace the spent film and film cartridge, does not justify a finding of impermissi-
ble reconstruction. 
The Commission’s sole basis for reaching a contrary conclusion was its reliance 
on an erroneous repair-reconstruction test. The Commission found that by re-
placing the back cover, Jazz was completely replacing two horizontal ribs that satis-
fied the “means for exerting force” element of claim 5 of the ’495 patent,16 as well 
as completely replacing two other elements of claim 5 (the film and the film car-
tridge) and partially replacing the fourth element (the light-tight film case). The 
Commission said, “if a component is integral to a specific patent claim, and it is re-
placed with a new part, such replacement would weigh heavily towards a finding of 
reconstruction.” Here the back cover of the LFFPs was part of a patent directed to a 
combination of elements; the back cover was not separately patented. 
The Supreme Court in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961), rejected a test for repair/reconstruction that would look 
to whether an “essential” or “distinguishing” part of the patented combination had 
been replaced. Id. at 345. In doing so, the Court concluded “that the combination 
patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element,  
separately viewed, is within the grant” and “that there is no legally recognizable or 
protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination  
                                                
16 Claim 5 of the ’495 patent states in full: 
5. A lens-fitted photographic film package having exposure effecting means 
and a taking lens comprising: a light-tight film case which must be de-
stroyed to open the same; a film which is formed in a roll and contained in 
a film roll chamber of said light-tight film case; a film container received in 
said light-tight film case into which said film, after exposure, is advanced 
frame by frame and wound in a roll; and means to exert a frictional force 
on said film upon said film being advanced. 
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patent.” Id. at 344-45. We see no material difference between the Commission’s 
test that focused on whether an “integral” component has been replaced, and the 
tests previously rejected by the Supreme Court that focus on whether an “essential” 
or “distinguishing” part, or part that is at the “gist” or “heart” of the invention, has 
been replaced. See Husky, 291 F.3d at 787 (noting that the Supreme Court has  
“eschewed the suggestion that the legal distinction between ‘reconstruction’ and 
‘repair’ should be affected by whether the element of the combination that has been 
replaced is an ‘essential’ or ‘distinguishing’ part of the invention”) (quoting Dawson 
Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 217 (1980)). Moreover, the Com-
mission’s test is not in accord with our earlier decision in Jazz I itself: Two of the 
eight steps found by this court to be permissible repair in that decision likewise re-
placed elements of claim 5 of the ’495 patent—the film and the film cartridge. 264 
F.3d at 1098. 
Thus, we conclude that the Commission erred in holding that the cameras in 
which full backs were replaced were impermissibly reconstructed; we hold that the 
replacement of the full backs was part of a permissible repair. We accordingly re-
mand to the Commission for the limited purpose of considering an appropriate ad-
justment in the amount of civil penalties in light of our holding that the 998,250 
LFFPs refurbished by replacing the full backs were permissibly repaired. 
… 
Editor’s Note 
On April 14, 2015, the Federal Circuit ordering that an appeal styled Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., Nos. 2014-1617, -1619, be heard en banc. (The 
case had been briefed and, on March 6, 2015, argued, but “[t]he panel [that heard 
argument] sua sponte requested a poll on whether to consider th[e] case en banc in 
the first instance,” Order at 2, and a majority vote took it en banc.) 
The court ordered new briefing on the following issues: 
(a) The case involves certain sales, made abroad, of articles patented in 
the United States. In light of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 1351 (2012), should this court overrule Jazz Photo Corp. v. Interna-
tional Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), to the extent it 
ruled that a sale of a patented item outside the United States never gives 
rise to United States patent exhaustion. 
(b) The case involves (i) sales of patented articles to end users under a 
restriction that they use the articles once and then return them and 
(ii) sales of the same patented articles to resellers under a restriction that 
resales take place under the single-use-and-return restriction. Do any of 
those sales give rise to patent exhaustion? In light of Quanta Computer, 
Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), should this court over-
rule Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992), 
to the extent it ruled that a sale of a patented article, when the sale is made 
under a restriction that is otherwise lawful and within the scope of the  
patent grant, does not give rise to patent exhaustion? 
Order at 2. The case remains pending as of the time of this writing. 
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Chapter 8: Patentable Subject Matter 
Biotech & Medicine 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 343-345, 376-383 
What is patentable? What is not? The operative statutory provision has, with the 
exception of one word, been the same since 1793: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and re-
quirements of this title. 
35 U.S.C. § 101. The word “process” replaced the word “art” in 1952. 
What common thread runs through these statutory categories of patentable 
subject matter? Human intervention appears to be key to at least three of the four 
groups: “machines” and “manufactures” are not found in nature, and naturally oc-
curring materials are not “compos[ed].” And the patentable subject matter require-
ment has, in fact, been easy to apply for most technologies. 
Two technologies—genome modifications, and computer-implemented pro-
cesses—have presented challenging line-drawing problems. In two cases, decided a 
year apart over 30 years ago, the Supreme Court considered the patent-eligibility of 
inventions from each of these fields. The first case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303 (1980), pitted the PTO—which had rejected the claims—against microbi-
ologist Ananda Chakrabarty. Chakrabarty had developed a “human-made, genetical-
ly engineered bacterium [that was] capable of breaking down multiple components 
of crude oil.” Id. at 305. The PTO “concluded that § 101 was not intended to cov-
er living things such as these laboratory created micro-organisms.” Id. at 306. The 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed. As a general matter, the Court con-
cluded that the text of § 101 sweeps broadly: “In choosing such expansive terms as 
‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ 
Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.” Id. 
at 308. Using legislative history, the Court put a gloss on the text: “The Committee 
Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory 
subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’” Id. at 309 
(quoting Senate and House reports). This “made by man” gloss effectively resolved 
the case in favor of Chakrabarty: “His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of mat-
ter—a product of human ingenuity … .” Id. The fact that Chakrabarty’s manufac-
ture was also a living organism proved irrelevant to the Supreme Court. 
The following year, the Court took up the patentability of a process that in-
cluded, among other limitations, the use of a digital computer to run a complex 
computation. The Court had, in the then-recent past, rejected the patentability of 
two such inventions on the ground that they were tantamount to abstract mathe-
matical algorithms. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U. S. 63 (1972). In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), by contrast, the 
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Court followed Chakrabarty’s more expansive approach. And just as in Chakrabarty, 
the vote was a closely divided 5-4. The technology in Diehr was a computer-
controlled, heated pressure mold for curing synthetic rubber into finished products. 
The patent claim recited not only the mold, but also the computer controller for the 
mold and the long-known algorithm the controller used to calculate the best time to 
stop the cure and open the mold. Claim 1 from the application is set forth in the 
margin.* The inventors in Diehr 
characterize[d] their contribution to the art to reside in the process of con-
stantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold. These tempera-
ture measurements are then automatically fed into a computer which re-
peatedly recalculates the cure time by use of the Arrhenius equation. When 
the recalculated time equals the actual time that has elapsed since the press 
was closed, the computer signals a device to open the press. According to 
the respondents, the continuous measuring of the temperature inside the 
mold cavity, the feeding of this information to a digital computer which 
constantly recalculates the cure time, and the signaling by the computer to 
open the press are all new in the art. 
                                                
* Claim 1 in the Diehr application was as follows, with bracketed numbers and let-
ters that I have added to make the limitations/elements of the claim more clear: 
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded 
compounds with the aid of a digital computer, comprising: 
[a] providing said computer with a database for said press, including at 
least, 
[1] natural logarithm conversion data (ln), 
[2] the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said 
compound being molded, and 
[3] a constant (x) dependent upon the geometry of the particular 
mold of the press, 
[b] initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the 
press for monitoring the elapsed time of said closure, 
[c] constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location 
closely adjacent to the mold cavity in the press during molding, 
[d] constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z), 
[e] repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during 
each cure, the Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which 
is 
[1] ln v = CZ + x 
[2] where v is the total required cure time, 
[f] repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during 
the cure each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated 
with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed time, and 
[g] opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equi-
valence. 
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450 U.S. at 178-79. The Court rejected the PTO’s decision to deny patent protec-
tion, concluding that 
a physical and chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber 
products falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject 
matter. That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an article, 
in this case raw, uncured synthetic rubber, into a different state or thing 
cannot be disputed. The respondents’ claims describe in detail a step-by-
step method for accomplishing such, beginning with the loading of a mold 
with raw, uncured rubber and ending with the eventual opening of the 
press at the conclusion of the cure. Industrial processes such as this are the 
types which have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our 
patent laws. 
Id. at 184. Moreover, its conclusion was “not altered by the fact that, in several 
steps of the process, a mathematical equation and a programmed digital computer 
are used.” In the Court’s view, the Diehr inventors did “not seek to patent a math-
ematical formula. Instead, they s[ought] patent protection for a process of curing 
synthetic rubber.” Id. at 187. And although “[t]heir process admittedly employ[ed] 
a well-known mathematical equation, … they d[id] not seek to preempt the use of 
that equation.” Id.; see also id. at 188 (“Arrhenius’ equation is not patentable in iso-
lation, but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a 
more efficient solution of the equation, that process is, at the very least, not barred 
at the threshold by § 101.”); id. at 192 (“[W]hen a claim containing a mathematical 
formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when 
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed 
to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), 
then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.”). 
After Diehr, patent applicants sought to locate the dividing line between a  
patentable practical application of a formula, algorithm, or idea on the one hand, 
and an unpatentable abstract idea on the other hand, by submitting multiple claims 
to progressively less and less contextualized algorithms in the patent application. 
The Supreme Court stayed out of the patentable subject matter area for almost 30 
years, allowing the caselaw to develop in the newly created Federal Circuit. The 
Federal Circuit proved quite receptive to the patentability of computer-implemented 
processes. For a decade, the Federal Circuit tested patent-eligibility by inquiring 
whether the claimed invention yields “a useful, concrete, and tangible result.” State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). A number that represented a real-world item qualified as such a 
result in the State Street case. Id. at 1373 (holding “that the transformation of data, 
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical 
calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathe-
matical algorithm”).  
In 2006, three members of the Supreme Court expressed concern that the Fed-
eral Circuit’s approach to the issue had become too permissive. Justice Breyer, for 
himself and Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the Court’s dismissal of re-
view in a case concerning the patentability of a two-step process for diagnosing a 
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particular vitamin deficiency. Quoting the Federal Circuit’s “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result” test for patentable subject matter from State Street, Justice Breyer 
noted that the Supreme Court “has never made such a statement and, if taken liter-
ally, the statement would cover instances where this Court has held the contrary.” 
Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
In 2010, the Supreme Court returned to this doctrine. Specifically, in Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), the Court struck down claims to risk-hedging meth-
ods as too abstract for patenting. The day after it decided Bilski, the Supreme Court 
vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision in a case called Prometheus Labs. v. Mayo Col-
laborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), sending the case back for recon-
sideration in light of Bilski. The Federal Circuit had upheld the medical-diagnostic-
method claims at issue in Mayo on the ground that practicing the method entailed 
the physical transformation of matter. Claim 1 of one of the key patents at issue is 
set forth below: 
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:  
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said 
immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and  
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said im-
mune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8 x 108 
red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subse-
quently administered to said subject and  
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8 x 
108 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said subject. 
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623. 
The Federal Circuit, in the post-Bilski remand decision, once again held that 
the claims at issue constituted patentable subject matter. 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). As you will see in a moment, the Supreme Court struck down these patents 
when it took up the case again in its October 2011 Term. 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. 
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) 
Breyer, Justice: 
… 
The Court has long held that [§ 101] contains an important implicit exception. 
“[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 
3225 (2010); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v.  
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 62, 112-120 (1854). Thus, the Court has written that “a new mineral dis-
covered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject mat-
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ter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could 
Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of *** 
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 
309 (quoting Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)). 
“Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). And monopoli-
zation of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation 
more than it would tend to promote it. 
The Court has recognized, however, that too broad an interpretation of this ex-
clusionary principle could eviscerate patent law. For all inventions at some level em-
body, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas. Thus, in Diehr the Court pointed out that “‘a process is not unpatentable 
simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical algorithm.’” 450 U.S. 
at 187 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)). It added that “an ap-
plication of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process 
may well be deserving of patent protection.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. And it empha-
sized Justice Stone’s similar observation in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio 
Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 (1939): 
“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a pa-
tentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be.” 
450 U.S. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94). See also Funk Brothers, 
333 U.S. at 130 (“If there is to be invention from [a discovery of a law of nature], it 
must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end”). 
Still, as the Court has also made clear, to transform an unpatentable law of  
nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simp-
ly state the law of nature while adding the words “apply it.” See, e.g., Benson, 409 
U.S. at 71-72. 
The case before us lies at the intersection of these basic principles. It concerns 
patent claims covering processes that help doctors who use thiopurine drugs to treat 
patients with autoimmune diseases determine whether a given dosage level is too 
low or too high. The claims purport to apply natural laws describing the relation-
ships between the concentration in the blood of certain thiopurine metabolites and 
the likelihood that the drug dosage will be ineffective or induce harmful side-effects. 
We must determine whether the claimed processes have transformed these un-
patentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those laws. We conclude 
that they have not done so and that therefore the processes are not patentable. 
Our conclusion rests upon an examination of the particular claims before us in 
light of the Court’s precedents. Those cases warn us against interpreting patent stat-
utes in ways that make patent eligibility “depend simply on the draftsman’s art” 
without reference to the “principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 
[natural laws].” Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. They warn us against upholding patents that 
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claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a natural law. Morse, 56 U.S. 
(15 How.) at 112-120; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. And they insist that a process 
that focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a combina-
tion of elements, sometimes referred to as an “inventive concept,” sufficient to en-
sure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the 
natural law itself. Flook, 437 U.S. at 594; see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (“[T]he 
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting 
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding 
‘insignificant postsolution activity’”) (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92). 
We find that the process claims at issue here do not satisfy these conditions. In 
particular, the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) 
involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by re-
searchers in the field. At the same time, upholding the patents would risk dispropor-
tionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the 
making of further discoveries. 
I 
A 
The patents before us concern the use of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of 
autoimmune diseases, such as Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. When a patient 
ingests a thiopurine compound, his body metabolizes the drug, causing metabolites 
to form in his bloodstream. Because the way in which people metabolize thiopurine 
compounds varies, the same dose of a thiopurine drug affects different people differ-
ently, and it has been difficult for doctors to determine whether for a particular pa-
tient a given dose is too high, risking harmful side effects, or too low, and so likely 
ineffective. 
At the time the discoveries embodied in the patents were made, scientists al-
ready understood that the levels in a patient’s blood of certain metabolites, includ-
ing … 6-thioguanine and its nucleotides (6-TG) and 6-methyl-mercaptopurine (6-
MMP), were correlated with the likelihood that a particular dosage of a thiopurine 
drug could cause harm or prove ineffective. See U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col. 8, 
ll. 37-40. (“Previous studies suggested that measurement of 6-MP metabolite levels 
can be used to predict clinical efficacy and tolerance to azathioprine or 6-MP”)  
(citing Cuffari, Théorêt, Latour, & Seidman, 6-Mercapto-purine Metabolism in 
Crohn’s Disease: Correlation with Efficacy and Toxicity, 39 Gut 401 (1996)). But 
those in the field did not know the precise correlations between metabolite levels 
and likely harm or ineffectiveness. The patent claims at issue here set forth processes 
embodying researchers’ findings that identified these correlations with some pre-
cision. 
More specifically, the patents [at issue here]—U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 and 
U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302—embody findings that concentrations in a patient’s 
blood of 6-TG or of 6-MMP metabolite beyond a certain level (400 and 7000 
picomoles per 8 × 108 red blood cells, respectively) indicate that the dosage is likely 
too high for the patient, while concentrations in the blood of 6-TG metabolite low-
er than a certain level (about 230 picomoles per 8 × 108 red blood cells) indicate 
that the dosage is likely too low to be effective. 
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The patent claims seek to embody this research in a set of processes. Like the 
Federal Circuit we take as typical claim 1 of the ’623 patent, which describes one of 
the claimed processes … .  
For present purposes we may assume that the other claims in the patents do not 
differ significantly from claim 1. 
B 
Respondent, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (Prometheus), is the sole and ex-
clusive licensee of the ’623 and ’302 patents. It sells diagnostic tests that embody 
the processes the patents describe. For some time petitioners, Mayo Clinic Roches-
ter and Mayo Collaborative Services (collectively Mayo), bought and used those 
tests. But in 2004 Mayo announced that it intended to begin using and selling its 
own test—a test using somewhat higher metabolite levels to determine toxicity (450 
pmol per 8 × 108 for 6-TG, and 5700 pmol per 8 × 108 for 6-MMP). Prometheus 
then brought this action claiming patent infringement. 
The District Court found that Mayo’s test infringed claim 7 of the ’623 patent. 
In interpreting the claim, the court accepted Prometheus’ view that the toxicity-risk 
level numbers in Mayo’s test and the claim were too similar to render the tests sig-
nificantly different. … The District Court also accepted Prometheus’ view that a 
doctor using Mayo’s test could violate the patent even if he did not actually alter his 
treatment decision in the light of the test. …  
Nonetheless the District Court ultimately granted summary judgment in 
Mayo’s favor. The court reasoned that the patents effectively claim natural laws or 
natural phenomena—namely the correlations between thiopurine metabolite levels 
and the toxicity and efficacy of thiopurine drug dosages—and so are not patentable.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. It pointed out that in addition to these 
natural correlations, the claimed processes specify the steps of (1) “administering a 
[thiopurine] drug” to a patient and (2) “determining the [resulting metabolite] lev-
el.” These steps, it explained, involve the transformation of the human body or of 
blood taken from the body. Thus, the patents satisfied the Circuit’s “machine or 
transformation test,” which the court thought sufficient to “confine the patent  
monopoly within rather definite bounds,” thereby bringing the claims into compli-
ance with §101. 581 F.3d 1336, 1345, 1346-1347 (2009). 
Mayo filed a petition for certiorari. We granted the petition, vacated the judg-
ment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Bilski, which clarified 
that the “machine or transformation test” is not a definitive test of patent eligibility, 
but only an important and useful clue. On remand the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its 
earlier conclusion. It thought that the “machine-or-transformation test,” under-
stood merely as an important and useful clue, nonetheless led to the “clear and 
compelling conclusion *** that the *** claims *** do not encompass laws of nature 
or preempt natural correlations.” 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (2010). Mayo again filed a 
petition for certiorari, which we granted. 
II 
Prometheus’ patents set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between 
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage 
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of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm. Claim 1, for example, 
states that if the levels of 6-TG in the blood (of a patient who has taken a dose of a 
thiopurine drug) exceed about 400 pmol per 8 × 108 red blood cells, then the ad-
ministered dose is likely to produce toxic side effects. While it takes a human action 
(the administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation of this relation 
in a particular person, the relation itself exists in principle apart from any human ac-
tion. The relation is a consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are 
metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes. And so a patent that simply 
describes that relation sets forth a natural law. 
The question before us is whether the claims do significantly more than simply 
describe these natural relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent 
claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to allow the processes they 
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws? We believe 
that the answer to this question is no. 
A 
If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of na-
ture, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that 
the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature 
itself. A patent, for example, could not simply recite a law of nature and then add 
the instruction “apply the law.” Einstein, we assume, could not have patented his 
famous law by claiming a process consisting of simply telling linear accelerator oper-
ators to refer to the law to determine how much energy an amount of mass has pro-
duced (or vice versa). Nor could Archimedes have secured a patent for his famous 
principle of flotation by claiming a process consisting of simply telling boat builders 
to refer to that principle in order to determine whether an object will float. 
What else is there in the claims before us? The process that each claim recites 
tells doctors interested in the subject about the correlations that the researchers dis-
covered. In doing so, it recites an “administering” step, a “determining” step, and a 
“wherein” step. These additional steps are not themselves natural laws but neither 
are they sufficient to transform the nature of the claim. 
First, the “administering” step simply refers to the relevant audience, namely 
doctors who treat patients with certain diseases with thiopurine drugs. That audi-
ence is a pre-existing audience; doctors used thiopurine drugs to treat patients suf-
fering from autoimmune disorders long before anyone asserted these claims. In any 
event, the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by 
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environ-
ment.’” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-192). 
Second, the “wherein” clauses simply tell a doctor about the relevant natural 
laws, at most adding a suggestion that he should take those laws into account when 
treating his patient. That is to say, these clauses tell the relevant audience about the 
laws while trusting them to use those laws appropriately where they are relevant to 
their decision-making (rather like Einstein telling linear accelerator operators about 
his basic law and then trusting them to use it where relevant). 
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Third, the “determining” step tells the doctor to determine the level of the rel-
evant metabolites in the blood, through whatever process the doctor or the labora-
tory wishes to use. As the patents state, methods for determining metabolite levels 
were well known in the art. ’623 patent, col. 9, ll. 12-65. Indeed, scientists routinely 
measured metabolites as part of their investigations into the relationships between 
metabolite levels and efficacy and toxicity of thiopurine compounds. ’623 patent, 
col. 8, ll. 37-40. Thus, this step tells doctors to engage in well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by scientists who work in the field. Pure-
ly “conventional or obvious” “[pre]-solution activity” is normally not sufficient to 
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a 
law. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590; see also Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (“[T]he prohibition 
against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by’ *** adding ‘insignifi-
cant post-solution activity’” (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92)). 
Fourth, to consider the three steps as an ordered combination adds nothing to 
the laws of nature that is not already present when the steps are considered separate-
ly. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. Anyone who wants to make use of these laws must 
first administer a thiopurine drug and measure the resulting metabolite concentra-
tions, and so the combination amounts to nothing significantly more than an in-
struction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their patients. 
The upshot is that the three steps simply tell doctors to gather data from which 
they may draw an inference in light of the correlations. To put the matter more suc-
cinctly, the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of nature; any ad-
ditional steps consist of well-understood, routine, conventional activity already en-
gaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add 
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken separately. For these reasons 
we believe that the steps are not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correla-
tions into patentable applications of those regularities. 
B 
1 
A more detailed consideration of the controlling precedents reinforces our con-
clusion. The cases most directly on point are Diehr and Flook, two cases in which the 
Court reached opposite conclusions about the patent eligibility of processes that 
embodied the equivalent of natural laws. …  
[In Diehr the] Court pointed out that the basic mathematical equation, like a 
law of nature, was not patentable … [but that] the overall process [was] patent eli-
gible because of the way the additional steps of the process integrated the equation 
into the [rubber curing] process as a whole. … And so the patentees did not “seek 
to pre-empt the use of [the] equation,” but sought “only to foreclose from others 
the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed 
process.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187. These other steps apparently added to the formula 
something that in terms of patent law’s objectives had significance—they trans-
formed the process into an inventive application of the formula. 
…  
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… [In Flook the Court] characterized the claimed process as doing nothing 
other than “provid[ing] a[n unpatentable] formula for computing an updated alarm 
limit.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 586. … [T]he other steps in the process did not limit the 
claim to a particular application. … “[P]ostsolution activity” that is purely “conven-
tional or obvious” the Court wrote, “can[not] transform an unpatentable principle 
into a patentable process.” Id. at 589, 590.  
The claim before us presents a case for patentability that is weaker than the  
(patent-eligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable) claim in 
Flook. Beyond picking out the relevant audience, namely those who administer doses 
of thiopurine drugs, the claim simply tells doctors to: (1) measure (somehow) the 
current level of the relevant metabolite, (2) use particular (unpatentable) laws of na-
ture (which the claim sets forth) to calculate the current toxicity/inefficacy limits, 
and (3) reconsider the drug dosage in light of the law. These instructions add noth-
ing specific to the laws of nature other than what is well-understood, routine, con-
ventional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field. And since they are 
steps that must be taken in order to apply the laws in question, the effect is simply to 
tell doctors to apply the law somehow when treating their patients. The process in 
Diehr was not so characterized; that in Flook was characterized in roughly this way. 
…  
3 
The Court has repeatedly emphasized … a concern that patent law not inhibit 
further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature. Thus, in 
Morse the Court set aside as unpatentable Samuel Morse’s general claim for “‘the 
use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current *** however developed, 
for making or printing intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances,’” 56 
U.S. (15 How.) at 86. The Court explained: 
For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the onward march 
of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a distance by 
means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of the 
process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. His inven-
tion may be less complicated—less liable to get out of order—less expen-
sive in construction, and in its operation. But yet if it is covered by this pa-
tent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the benefit of it 
without the permission of this patentee. 
Id. at 113. 
Similarly, in Benson the Court said that the claims before it were “so abstract 
and sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [mathematical for-
mula].” 409 U.S. at 67, 68. In Bilski the Court pointed out that to allow “petition-
ers to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields.” 130 S. 
Ct. at 3231. And in Flook the Court expressed concern that the claimed process was 
simply “a formula for computing an updated alarm limit,” which might “cover a 
broad range of potential uses.” 437 U.S. at 586. 
These statements reflect the fact that, even though rewarding with patents 
those who discover new laws of nature and the like might well encourage their dis-
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covery, those laws and principles, considered generally, are “the basic tools of scien-
tific and technological work.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. And so there is a danger that 
the grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future innovation premised  
upon them, a danger that becomes acute when a patented process amounts to no 
more than an instruction to “apply the natural law,” or otherwise forecloses more 
future invention than the underlying discovery could reasonably justify. See generally 
Lemley, Risch, Sichelman, & Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315 
(2011) (arguing that §101 reflects this kind of concern); see also C. Bohannan & 
H. Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Inno-
vation 112 (2012) (“One problem with [process] patents is that the more abstractly 
their claims are stated, the more difficult it is to determine precisely what they cover. 
They risk being applied to a wide range of situations that were not anticipated by 
the patentee”); W. Landes & R. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Prop-
erty Law 305-306 (2003) (The exclusion from patent law of basic truths reflects 
“both *** the enormous potential for rent seeking that would be created if property 
rights could be obtained in them and *** the enormous transaction costs that 
would be imposed on would-be users [of those truths]”). 
The laws of nature at issue here are narrow laws that may have limited applica-
tions, but the patent claims that embody them nonetheless implicate this concern. 
They tell a treating doctor to measure metabolite levels and to consider the resulting 
measurements in light of the statistical relationships they describe. In doing so, they 
tie up the doctor’s subsequent treatment decision whether that treatment does, or 
does not, change in light of the inference he has drawn using the correlations. And 
they threaten to inhibit the development of more refined treatment recommenda-
tions (like that embodied in Mayo’s test), that combine Prometheus’ correlations 
with later discovered features of metabolites, human physiology or individual patient 
characteristics. The “determining” step too is set forth in highly general language 
covering all processes that make use of the correlations after measuring metabolites, 
including later discovered processes that measure metabolite levels in new ways. 
We need not, and do not, now decide whether were the steps at issue here less 
conventional, these features of the claims would prove sufficient to invalidate them. 
For here, as we have said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural laws 
themselves. Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or a new way of using an ex-
isting drug, the patent claims do not confine their reach to particular applications of 
those laws. The presence here of the basic underlying concern that these patents tie 
up too much future use of laws of nature simply reinforces our conclusion that the 
processes described in the patents are not patent eligible, while eliminating any 
temptation to depart from case law precedent. 
III 
… 
[Finally], Prometheus, supported by several amici, argues that a principle of law 
denying patent coverage here will interfere significantly with the ability of medical 
researchers to make valuable discoveries, particularly in the area of diagnostic re-
search. That research, which includes research leading to the discovery of laws of 
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nature, is expensive; it “ha[s] made the United States the world leader in this field”; 
and it requires protection. Brief for Respondent 52. 
Other medical experts, however, argue strongly against a legal rule that would 
make the present claims patent eligible, invoking policy considerations that point in 
the opposite direction. The American Medical Association, the American College of 
Medical Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the American Society of Hu-
man Genetics, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association for 
Molecular Pathology, and other medical organizations tell us that if “claims to ex-
clusive rights over the body’s natural responses to illness and medical treatment are 
permitted to stand, the result will be a vast thicket of exclusive rights over the use of 
critical scientific data that must remain widely available if physicians are to provide 
sound medical care.” Brief for American College of Medical Genetics et al. as Amici 
Curiae 7; see also App. to Brief for Association Internationale pour la Protection de 
la Propriété Intellectuelle et al. as Amici Curiae A6, A16 (methods of medical 
treatment are not patentable in most of Western Europe). 
We do not find this kind of difference of opinion surprising. Patent protection 
is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights 
provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery. On the 
other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might 
permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the  
patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and time-
consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent applications, and requir-
ing the negotiation of complex licensing arrangements. At the same time, patent 
law’s general rules must govern inventive activity in many different fields of human 
endeavor, with the result that the practical effects of rules that reflect a general effort 
to balance these considerations may differ from one field to another. See Bohannan 
& Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint at 98-100. 
In consequence, we must hesitate before departing from established general  
legal rules lest a new protective rule that seems to suit the needs of one field produce 
unforeseen results in another. And we must recognize the role of Congress in craft-
ing more finely tailored rules where necessary. Cf. 35 U.S. C. §§ 161-164 (special 
rules for plant patents). We need not determine here whether, from a policy per-
spective, increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable. 
*   *   * 
For these reasons, we conclude that the patent claims at issue here effectively 
claim the underlying laws of nature themselves. The claims are consequently invalid. 
…  
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After Mayo, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded a case to the Federal 
Circuit for reconsideration. That case, Myriad Genetics, relates to whether isolated, 
purified DNA molecules are patentable subject matter under § 101. On remand,  
the Federal Circuit divided on the question and, in the October 2012 Term, the  
Supreme Court took up the Myriad Genetics case again. 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) 
Thomas, Justice: 
Respondent Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), discovered the precise location 
and sequence of two human genes, mutations of which can substantially increase the 
risks of breast and ovarian cancer. Myriad obtained a number of patents based upon 
its discovery. This case involves claims from three of them and requires us to resolve 
whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is patent 
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human 
genome. We also address the patent eligibility of synthetically created DNA known 
as complementary DNA (cDNA), which contains the same protein-coding infor-
mation found in a segment of natural DNA but omits portions within the DNA 
segment that do not code for proteins. For the reasons that follow, we hold that a 
naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible 
merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is patent eligible because it is 
not naturally occurring. …  
I 
A 
Genes form the basis for hereditary traits in living organisms. The human  
genome consists of approximately 22,000 genes packed into 23 pairs of chromo-
somes. Each gene is encoded as DNA, which takes the shape of the familiar “double 
helix” … . Each “cross-bar” in the DNA helix consists of two chemically joined nu-
cleotides. The possible nucleotides are adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and 
guanine (G), each of which binds naturally with another nucleotide: A pairs with T; 
C pairs with G. The nucleotide cross-bars are chemically connected to a sugar-
phosphate backbone that forms the outside framework of the DNA helix. Sequences 
of DNA nucleotides contain the information necessary to create strings of amino 
acids, which in turn are used in the body to build proteins. Only some DNA nucleo-
tides, however, code for amino acids; these nucleotides are known as “exons.”  
Nucleotides that do not code for amino acids, in contrast, are known as “introns.” 
Creation of proteins from DNA involves two principal steps, known as tran-
scription and translation. In transcription, the bonds between DNA nucleotides sep-
arate, and the DNA helix unwinds into two single strands. A single strand is used as 
a template to create a complementary ribonucleic acid (RNA) strand. The nucleo-
tides on the DNA strand pair naturally with their counterparts, with the exception 
that RNA uses the nucleotide base uracil (U) instead of thymine (T). Transcription 
results in a single strand RNA molecule, known as pre-RNA, whose nucleotides 
form an inverse image of the DNA strand from which it was created. Pre-RNA still 
contains nucleotides corresponding to both the exons and introns in the DNA mol-
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ecule. The pre-RNA is then naturally “spliced” by the physical removal of the in-
trons. The resulting product is a strand of RNA that contains nucleotides cor-
responding only to the exons from the original DNA strand. The exons-only strand 
is known as messenger RNA (mRNA), which creates amino acids through transla-
tion. In translation, cellular structures known as ribosomes read each set of three 
nucleotides, known as codons, in the mRNA. Each codon either tells the ribosomes 
which of the 20 possible amino acids to synthesize or provides a stop signal that 
ends amino acid production. 
DNA’s informational sequences and the processes that create mRNA, amino  
acids, and proteins occur naturally within cells. Scientists can, however, extract DNA 
from cells using well known laboratory methods. These methods allow scientists to 
isolate specific segments of DNA—for instance, a particular gene or part of a gene—
which can then be further studied, manipulated, or used. It is also possible to create 
DNA synthetically through processes similarly well known in the field of genetics. 
One such method begins with an mRNA molecule and uses the natural bonding 
properties of nucleotides to create a new, synthetic DNA molecule. The result is the 
inverse of the mRNA’s inverse image of the original DNA, with one important dis-
tinction: Because the natural creation of mRNA involves splicing that removes in-
trons, the synthetic DNA created from mRNA also contains only the exon sequenc-
es. This synthetic DNA created in the laboratory from mRNA is known as comple-
mentary DNA (cDNA). 
Changes in the genetic sequence are called mutations. Mutations can be as 
small as the alteration of a single nucleotide—a change affecting only one letter in 
the genetic code. Such small-scale changes can produce an entirely different amino 
acid or can end protein production altogether. Large changes, involving the dele-
tion, rearrangement, or duplication of hundreds or even millions of nucleotides, can 
result in the elimination, misplacement, or duplication of entire genes. Some muta-
tions are harmless, but others can cause disease or increase the risk of disease. As a 
result, the study of genetics can lead to valuable medical breakthroughs. 
B 
This case involves patents filed by Myriad after it made one such medical break-
through. Myriad discovered the precise location and sequence of what are now 
known as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Mutations in these genes can dramatically 
increase an individual’s risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer. The average 
American woman has a 12- to 13-% risk of developing breast cancer, but for women 
with certain genetic mutations, the risk can range between 50 and 80 % for breast 
cancer and between 20 and 50 % for ovarian cancer. Before Myriad’s discovery of 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, scientists knew that heredity played a role in estab-
lishing a woman’s risk of developing breast and ovarian cancer, but they did not 
know which genes were associated with those cancers. 
Myriad identified the exact location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes on 
chromosomes 17 and 13. Chromosome 17 has approximately 80 million nucleo-
tides, and chromosome 13 has approximately 114 million. Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1328 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). Within those chromosomes, the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are each 
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about 80,000 nucleotides long. If just exons are counted, the BRCA1 gene is only 
about 5,500 nucleotides long; for the BRCA2 gene, that number is about 10,200. 
Id. Knowledge of the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes allowed Myriad to 
determine their typical nucleotide sequence. That information, in turn, enabled 
Myriad to develop medical tests that are useful for detecting mutations in a patient’s 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and thereby assessing whether the patient has an in-
creased risk of cancer. 
Once it found the location and sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, 
Myriad sought and obtained a number of patents. Nine composition claims from 
three of those patents are at issue in this case. Claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 from the ’282 
patent are representative. The first claim asserts a patent on “[a]n isolated DNA  
coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide,” which has “the amino acid sequence set forth in 
SEQ ID NO:2.” SEQ ID NO:2 sets forth a list of 1,863 amino acids that the typical 
BRCA1 gene encodes. Put differently, claim 1 [is] a patent claim on the DNA code 
that tells a cell to produce the string of BRCA1 amino acids listed in SEQ ID NO:2. 
Claim 2 of the ’282 patent operates similarly. It claims “[t]he isolated DNA of 
claim 1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1.” 
Like SEQ ID NO:2, SEQ ID NO:1 sets forth a long list of data, in this instance the 
sequence of cDNA that codes for the BRCA1 amino acids listed in claim 1. Im-
portantly, SEQ ID NO:1 lists only the cDNA exons in the BRCA1 gene, rather than 
a full DNA sequence containing both exons and introns. As a result, the Federal 
Circuit recognized that claim 2 asserts a patent on the cDNA nucleotide sequence 
listed in SEQ ID NO:1, which codes for the typical BRCA1 gene. 
Claim 5 of the ’282 patent claims a subset of the data in claim 1. In particular, 
it claims “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1.” 
The practical effect of claim 5 is to assert a patent on any series of 15 nucleotides 
that exist in the typical BRCA1 gene. Because the BRCA1 gene is thousands of  
nucleotides long, even BRCA1 genes with substantial mutations are likely to contain 
at least one segment of 15 nucleotides that correspond to the typical BRCA1 gene. 
Similarly, claim 6 of the ’282 patent claims “[a]n isolated DNA having at least 15 
nucleotides of the DNA of claim 2.” This claim operates similarly to claim 5, except 
that it references the cDNA-based claim 2. The remaining claims at issue are similar, 
though several list common mutations rather than typical BRCA1 and BRCA2  
sequences. 
C 
Myriad’s patents would, if valid, give it the exclusive right to isolate an individ-
ual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes (or any strand of 15 or more nucleotides within the 
genes) by breaking the covalent bonds that connect the DNA to the rest of the indi-
vidual’s genome. The patents would also give Myriad the exclusive right to synthet-
ically create BRCA cDNA. In Myriad’s view, manipulating BRCA DNA in either of 
these fashions triggers its “right to exclude others from making” its patented com-
position of matter under the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). 
But isolation is necessary to conduct genetic testing, and Myriad was not the 
only entity to offer BRCA testing after it discovered the genes. The University of 
Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory (GDL) and others provided genetic 
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testing services to women. Petitioner Dr. Harry Ostrer, then a researcher at New 
York University School of Medicine, routinely sent his patients’ DNA samples to 
GDL for testing. After learning of GDL’s testing and Ostrer’s activities, Myriad sent 
letters to them asserting that the genetic testing infringed Myriad’s patents. In re-
sponse, GDL agreed to stop testing and informed Ostrer that it would no longer 
accept patient samples. Myriad also filed patent infringement suits against other enti-
ties that performed BRCA testing, resulting in settlements in which the defendants 
agreed to cease all allegedly infringing activity. Myriad, thus, solidified its position as 
the only entity providing BRCA testing. 
Some years later, petitioner Ostrer, along with medical patients, advocacy 
groups, and other doctors, filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration that Myriad’s  
patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. … The District Court … granted sum-
mary judgment to petitioners on the composition claims at issue in this case based 
on its conclusion that Myriad’s claims, including claims related to cDNA, were in-
valid because they covered products of nature. …  
… [T]he Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court in part and reversed in 
part, with each member of the panel writing separately. …  
… [T]he court held that both isolated DNA and cDNA were patent eligible 
under § 101. The central dispute among the panel members was whether the act of 
isolating DNA—separating a specific gene or sequence of nucleotides from the rest 
of the chromosome—is an inventive act that entitles the individual who first isolates 
it to a patent. Each of the judges on the panel had a different view on that question. 
Judges Lourie and Moore agreed that Myriad’s claims were patent eligible under 
§ 101 but disagreed on the rationale. Judge Lourie relied on the fact that the entire 
DNA molecule is held together by chemical bonds and that the covalent bonds at 
both ends of the segment must be severed in order to isolate segments of DNA. … 
Judge Lourie found this chemical alteration to be dispositive, because isolating a 
particular strand of DNA creates a nonnaturally occurring molecule, even though 
the chemical alteration does not change the information-transmitting quality of the 
DNA. …  
Judge Moore concurred in part but did not rely exclusively on Judge Lourie’s 
conclusion that chemically breaking covalent bonds was sufficient to render isolated 
DNA patent eligible. Instead, Judge Moore also relied on the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office’s (PTO) practice of granting such patents and on the reliance 
interests of patent holders. …  
Finally, Judge Bryson concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that 
isolated DNA is not patent eligible. … [H]e relied on the fact that “[t]he nucleotide 
sequences of the claimed molecules are the same as the nucleotide sequences found 
in naturally occurring human genes.” [689 F.3d] at 1355. Judge Bryson then con-
cluded that genetic “structural similarity dwarfs the significance of the structural dif-
ferences between isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA, especially where the 
structural differences are merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent bonds, a pro-
cess that is itself not inventive.” Id. …  
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Although the judges expressed different views concerning the patentability of 
isolated DNA, all three agreed that patent claims relating to cDNA met the patent 
eligibility requirements of § 101. …  
II 
A 
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful * * * composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this  
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
We have “long held that this provision contains an important implicit excep-
tion[:] Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012). 
Rather, “‘they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work’” that lie be-
yond the domain of patent protection. Id. As the Court has explained, without this 
exception, there would be considerable danger that the grant of patents would “tie 
up” the use of such tools and thereby “inhibit future innovation premised upon 
them.” Id. at 1301. This would be at odds with the very point of patents, which ex-
ist to promote creation. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309 (1980) 
(Products of nature are not created, and “‘manifestations *** of nature [are] free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none’”). 
The rule against patents on naturally occurring things is not without limits, 
however, for “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,” and “too broad an interpreta-
tion of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 
1293. As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a delicate balance be-
tween creating “incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery” and 
“imped[ing] the flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention.” Id. 
at 1305. We must apply this well-established standard to determine whether  
Myriad’s patents claim any “new and useful *** composition of matter,” §101, or 
instead claim naturally occurring phenomena. 
B 
It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic infor-
mation encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The location and order of the 
nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them. Nor did Myriad create or 
alter the genetic structure of DNA. Instead, Myriad’s principal contribution was un-
covering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
within chromosomes 17 and 13. The question is whether this renders the genes  
patentable. 
Myriad recognizes that our decision in Chakrabarty is central to this inquiry. In 
Chakrabarty, scientists added four plasmids to a bacterium, which enabled it to 
break down various components of crude oil. 447 U.S. at 305 & n.1. The Court 
held that the modified bacterium was patentable. It explained that the patent claim 
was “not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occur-
ring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having 
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a distinctive name, character [and] use.’” Id. at 309-310 (quoting Hartranft v. 
Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887); alteration in original). The Chakrabarty 
bacterium was new “with markedly different characteristics from any found in  
nature,” 447 U.S. at 310, due to the additional plasmids and resultant “capacity for 
degrading oil.” Id. at 305 n.1. In this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create any-
thing. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene 
from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention. 
Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy 
the § 101 inquiry. In Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 
(1948), this Court considered a composition patent that claimed a mixture of natu-
rally occurring strains of bacteria that helped leguminous plants take nitrogen from 
the air and fix it in the soil. Id. at 128-129. The ability of the bacteria to fix nitrogen 
was well known, and farmers commonly “inoculated” their crops with them to im-
prove soil nitrogen levels. But farmers could not use the same inoculant for all crops, 
both because plants use different bacteria and because certain bacteria inhibit each 
other. Id. at 129-130. Upon learning that several nitrogen-fixing bacteria did not 
inhibit each other, however, the patent applicant combined them into a single inoc-
ulant and obtained a patent. Id. at 130. The Court held that the composition was 
not patent eligible because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way. 
Id. at 132. His patent claim thus fell squarely within the law of nature exception. So 
do Myriad’s. Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but that 
discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes “new *** composition[s] of 
matter,” § 101, that are patent eligible. 
Indeed, Myriad’s patent descriptions highlight the problem with its claims. For 
example, a section of the ’282 patent’s Detailed Description of the Invention indi-
cates that Myriad found the location of a gene associated with increased risk of 
breast cancer and identified mutations of that gene that increase the risk. In subse-
quent language Myriad explains that the location of the gene was unknown until 
Myriad found it among the approximately eight million nucleotide pairs contained 
in a subpart of chromosome 17. The ’473 and ’492 patents contain similar language 
as well. Many of Myriad’s patent descriptions simply detail the “iterative process” of 
discovery by which Myriad narrowed the possible locations for the gene sequences 
that it sought.6 Myriad seeks to import these extensive research efforts into the 
§ 101 patent eligibility inquiry. But extensive effort alone is insufficient to satisfy the 
demands of § 101. 
Nor are Myriad’s claims saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human 
genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally occurring mole-
                                                
6 Myriad first identified groups of relatives with a history of breast cancer (some of 
whom also had developed ovarian cancer); because these individuals were related, 
scientists knew that it was more likely that their diseases were the result of genetic 
predisposition rather than other factors. Myriad compared sections of their chromo-
somes, looking for shared genetic abnormalities not found in the general popula-
tion. It was that process which eventually enabled Myriad to determine where in the 
genetic sequence the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes reside. 
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cule. Myriad’s claims are simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor 
do they rely in any way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a 
particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on the genetic 
information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. If the patents depended  
upon the creation of a unique molecule, then a would-be infringer could arguably 
avoid at least Myriad’s patent claims on entire genes (such as claims 1 and 2 of the 
’282 patent) by isolating a DNA sequence that included both the BRCA1 or 
BRCA2 gene and one additional nucleotide pair. Such a molecule would not be 
chemically identical to the molecule “invented” by Myriad. But Myriad obviously 
would resist that outcome because its claim is concerned primarily with the infor-
mation contained in the genetic sequence, not with the specific chemical compo-
sition of a particular molecule. 
Finally, Myriad argues that the PTO’s past practice of awarding gene patents is 
entitled to deference, citing J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 
U.S. 124 (2001). We disagree. J.E.M. held that new plant breeds were eligible for 
utility patents under § 101 notwithstanding separate statutes providing special pro-
tections for plants, see 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq. (Plant Variety Protection Act); 35 
U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (Plant Patent Act of 1930). After analyzing the text and struc-
ture of the relevant statutes, the Court mentioned that the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences had determined that new plant breeds were patent eligible under 
§ 101 and that Congress had recognized and endorsed that position in a subsequent 
Patent Act amendment. 534 U.S. at 144-145 (citing In re Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 
(1985) and 35 U.S.C. § 119(f)). In this case, however, Congress has not endorsed 
the views of the PTO in subsequent legislation. …  
Further undercutting the PTO’s practice, the United States argued in the Fed-
eral Circuit and in this Court that isolated DNA was not patent eligible under 
§ 101, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-33, and that the PTO’s practice 
was not “a sufficient reason to hold that isolated DNA is patent-eligible.” Id. at 26. 
These concessions [by the Solicitor General of the United States, on behalf of the 
United States,] weigh against deferring to the PTO’s determination. 
C 
cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occur-
ring, isolated DNA segments. As already explained, creation of a cDNA sequence 
from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring.8 Pe-
titioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that “the non-coding re-
                                                
8 Some viruses rely on an enzyme called reverse transcriptase to reproduce by copy-
ing RNA into cDNA. In rare instances, a side effect of a viral infection of a cell can 
be the random incorporation of fragments of the resulting cDNA, known as a 
pseudogene, into the genome. Such pseudogenes … are not expressed in protein 
creation because they lack genetic sequences to direct protein expression. See J. Wat-
son et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene 142, 144 fig. 7-5 (6th ed. 2008). … The 
possibility that an unusual and rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule 
similar to one created synthetically through human ingenuity does not render a 
composition of matter nonpatentable. 
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gions have been removed.” They nevertheless argue that cDNA is not patent eligible 
because “[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab 
technician.” That may be so, but the lab technician unquestionably creates some-
thing new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of 
DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA 
is not a “product of nature” and is patent eligible under § 101, except insofar as very 
short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating 
cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from 
natural DNA.9   
III 
It is important to note what is not implicated by this decision. First, there are 
no method claims before this Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method of 
manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could pos-
sibly have sought a method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate 
DNA were well understood by geneticists at the time of Myriad’s patents “were well 
understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the 
search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach,” 702 F. Supp. 2d at 
202-203, and are not at issue in this case. 
Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of knowledge 
about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, “[a]s the first 
party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an 
excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged 
claims are limited to such applications.” 689 F.3d at 1349. 
Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the natural-
ly occurring nucleotides has been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code 
presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of 
§ 101 to such endeavors. We merely hold that genes and the information they en-
code are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because they have been isolated 
from the surrounding genetic material. 
…  
  
                                                
9 We express no opinion whether cDNA satisfies the other statutory requirements of 
patentability. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112. 
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Computed-Implemented Processes 
Mueller’s Patent Law: 350-352, 356-366 
In the most recent Supreme Court decision about patentable subject matter, is-
sued in June 2014, the Court synthesized its approaches in Bilski and Mayo into a 
unified two-step analysis. 
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l 
134 S. Ct. 2347 (June 19, 2014) 
Thomas, Justice: 
The patents at issue in this case disclose a computer-implemented scheme for 
mitigating “settlement risk” (i.e., the risk that only one party to a financial transac-
tion will pay what it owes) by using a third-party intermediary. The question pre-
sented is whether these claims are patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, or are in-
stead drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. We hold that the claims at issue are 
drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring 
generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-
eligible invention. We therefore affirm the judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
I 
A 
Petitioner Alice Corporation is the assignee of several patents that disclose 
schemes to manage certain forms of financial risk. According to the specification 
largely shared by the patents, the invention “enabl[es] the management of risk relat-
ing to specified, yet unknown, future events.” The specification further explains that 
the “invention relates to methods and apparatus, including electrical computers and 
data processing systems applied to financial matters and risk management.” 
The claims at issue relate to a computerized scheme for mitigating “settlement 
risk”—i.e., the risk that only one party to an agreed-upon financial exchange will 
satisfy its obligation. In particular, the claims are designed to facilitate the exchange 
of financial obligations between two parties by using a computer system as a third-
party intermediary.2 The intermediary creates “shadow” credit and debit records 
                                                
2 The parties agree that claim 33 of [U.S. Patent No. 5,970, 479] is representative 
… . Claim 33 recites: 
A method of exchanging obligations as between parties, each party 
holding a credit record and a debit record with an exchange institution, the 
credit records and debit records for exchange of predetermined obliga-
tions, the method comprising the steps of: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party to be held independently by a supervisory institution 
from the exchange institutions; 
(b) obtaining from each exchange institution a start-of-day balance for 
each shadow credit record and shadow debit record; 
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(i.e., account ledgers) that mirror the balances in the parties’ real-world accounts at 
“exchange institutions” (e.g., banks). The intermediary updates the shadow records 
in real time as transactions are entered, allowing “only those transactions for which 
the parties’ updated shadow records indicate sufficient resources to satisfy their  
mutual obligations.” 717 F.3d 1269, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concur-
ring). At the end of the day, the intermediary instructs the relevant financial institu-
tions to carry out the “permitted” transactions in accordance with the updated 
shadow records, thus mitigating the risk that only one party will perform the agreed-
upon exchange. 
In sum, the patents in suit claim (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obli-
gations (the method claims), (2) a computer system configured to carry out the 
method for exchanging obligations (the system claims), and (3) a computer-
readable medium containing program code for performing the method of exchang-
ing obligations (the media claims). All of the claims are implemented using a com-
puter; the system and media claims expressly recite a computer, and the parties have 
stipulated that the method claims require a computer as well. 
B 
Respondents CLS Bank International and CLS Services Ltd. (together, CLS 
Bank) operate a global network that facilitates currency transactions. In 2007, CLS 
Bank filed suit against petitioner, seeking a declaratory judgment that the claims at 
issue are invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Petitioner counterclaimed, alleging 
infringement. Following this Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 
(2010), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether the as-
serted claims are eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The District 
Court held that all of the claims are patent ineligible because they are directed to the 
[same] abstract idea … .  
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
reversed, holding that it was not “manifestly evident” that petitioner’s claims are 
directed to an abstract idea. 685 F.3d 1341, 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The 
Federal Circuit granted rehearing en banc, vacated the panel opinion, and affirmed 
the judgment of the District Court in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. 717 F.3d 
at 1273. Seven of the ten participating judges agreed that petitioner’s method and 
                                                                                                                                
(c) for every transaction resulting in an exchange obligation, the  
supervisory institution adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit rec-
ord or shadow debit record, allowing only these transactions that do not 
result in the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of 
the shadow credit record at any time, each said adjustment taking place in 
chronological order, and 
(d) at the end-of-day, the supervisory institution instructing on[e] of 
the exchange institutions to exchange credits or debits to the credit record 
and debit record of the respective parties in accordance with the adjust-
ments of the said permitted transactions, the credits and debits being irrev-
ocable, time invariant obligations placed on the exchange institutions. 
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media claims are patent ineligible. With respect to petitioner’s system claims, the en 
banc Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment by an equally divided 
vote. 
Writing for a five-member plurality, Judge Lourie concluded that all of the 
claims at issue are patent ineligible. In the plurality’s view, under this Court’s deci-
sion in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 
(2012), a court must first “identif[y] the abstract idea represented in the claim,” and 
then determine “whether the balance of the claim adds ‘significantly more.’” 717 
F.3d at 1286. The plurality concluded that petitioner’s claims “draw on the abstract 
idea of reducing settlement risk by effecting trades through a third-party inter-
mediary,” and that the use of a computer to maintain, adjust, and reconcile shadow 
accounts added nothing of substance to that abstract idea. 
…  
II 
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent pro-
tection. …  
“We have long held that this provision contains an important implicit excep-
tion: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013). We have interpreted § 101 and its predecessors in light of this exception for 
more than 150 years. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-120 (1854); Le 
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-175 (1853). 
We have described the concern that drives this exclusionary principle as one of 
pre-emption. See, e.g., Bilski,  561 U.S. at 611-612 (upholding the patent “would 
pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly 
over an abstract idea”). Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
“[M]onopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to im-
pede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the 
primary object of the patent laws. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293; see U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8 (Congress “shall have Power *** To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts”). We have “repeatedly emphasized this *** concern that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use” of these building 
blocks of human ingenuity. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301. 
At the same time, we tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle 
lest it swallow all of patent law. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. At some level, “all inven-
tions *** embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenome-
na, or abstract ideas.” Id. Thus, an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent 
simply because it involves an abstract concept. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
187 (1981). “[A]pplication[s]” of such concepts “‘to a new and useful end,’” we 
have said, remain eligible for patent protection. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 
67 (1972). 
Accordingly, in applying the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between pa-
tents that claim the “buildin[g] block[s]” of human ingenuity and those that inte-
Miller’s Patent Cases 
458 
grate the building blocks into something more, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303, thereby 
“transform[ing]” them into a patent-eligible invention, id. at 1294. The former 
“would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying” ideas, id., and are 
therefore ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of 
preemption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our  
patent laws. 
III 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of 
those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one 
of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id. at 1296-97. If so, we then ask, “[w]hat else 
is there in the claims before us?” Id. at 1297. To answer that question, we consider 
the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to 
determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into 
a patent-eligible application. Id. 1297-98. We have described step two of this analy-
sis as a search for an “‘inventive concept’”—i.e., an element or combination of ele-
ments that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly 
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Id. at 1294.3  
A 
We must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-
ineligible concept. We conclude that they are: These claims are drawn to the abstract 
idea of intermediated settlement. 
The “abstract ideas” category embodies “the longstanding rule that ‘[a]n idea 
of itself is not patentable.’” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. In Benson, for example, this 
Court rejected as ineligible patent claims involving an algorithm for converting  
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form, holding that the claimed 
patent was “in practical effect *** a patent on the algorithm itself.” 409 U.S. at 71-
72. And in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594-595 (1978), we held that a mathe-
matical formula for computing “alarm limits” in a catalytic conversion process was 
also a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 
We most recently addressed the category of abstract ideas in Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593 (2010). …  
 “[A]ll members of the Court agree[d]” that the patent at issue in Bilski 
claimed an “abstract idea.” Id. at 609; see also id. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment). Specifically, the claims described “the basic concept of hedging, or 
protecting against risk.” Id. at 611. The Court explained that “‘[h]edging is a fun-
                                                
3 Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers all claim elements, both 
individually and in combination, it is consistent with the general rule that patent 
claims “must be considered as a whole.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 
(1981); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Our approach *** is *** 
not at all inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a 
whole”). 
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damental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in 
any introductory finance class.’” Id. “The concept of hedging” as recited by the 
claims in suit was therefore a patent-ineligible “abstract idea, just like the algorithms 
at issue in Benson and Flook.” Id. 
It follows from our prior cases, and Bilski in particular, that the claims at issue 
here are directed to an abstract idea. Petitioner’s claims involve a method of ex-
changing financial obligations between two parties using a third-party intermediary 
to mitigate settlement risk. The intermediary creates and updates “shadow” records 
to reflect the value of each party’s actual accounts held at “exchange institutions,” 
thereby permitting only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient re-
sources. At the end of each day, the intermediary issues irrevocable instructions to 
the exchange institutions to carry out the permitted transactions. 
On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated 
settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk. Like the risk 
hedging in Bilski, the concept of intermediated settlement is “‘a fundamental eco-
nomic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce.’” Id.; see, e.g., Emery, 
Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States, in 7 Studies in 
History, Economics and Public Law 283, 346-356 (1896) (discussing the use of a 
“clearing-house” as an intermediary to reduce settlement risk). The use of a third-
party intermediary (or “clearing house”) is also a building block of the modern 
economy. See, e.g., Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Mar-
kets, 101 Geo. L.J. 387, 406-412 (2013); J. Hull, Risk Management and Financial 
Institutions 103-104 (3d ed. 2012). Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is 
an “abstract idea” beyond the scope of § 101. 
Petitioner acknowledges that its claims describe intermediated settlement, see 
Brief for Petitioner 4, but rejects the conclusion that its claims recite an “abstract 
idea.” Drawing on the presence of mathematical formulas in some of our abstract-
ideas precedents, petitioner contends that the abstract-ideas category is confined to 
“preexisting, fundamental truth[s]” that “‘exis[t] in principle apart from any human 
action.’” Id. at 23, 26 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). 
Bilski belies petitioner’s assertion. The concept of risk hedging we identified as 
an abstract idea in that case cannot be described as a “preexisting, fundamental 
truth.” The patent in Bilski simply involved a “series of steps instructing how to 
hedge risk.” 561 U.S. at 599. Although hedging is a longstanding commercial prac-
tice, id. at 599, it is a method of organizing human activity, not a “truth” about the 
natural world “that has always existed,” Brief for Petitioner 22. One of the claims in 
Bilski reduced hedging to a mathematical formula, but the Court did not assign any 
special significance to that fact, much less the sort of talismanic significance petition-
er claims. Instead, the Court grounded its conclusion that all of the claims at issue 
were abstract ideas in the understanding that risk hedging was a “fundamental eco-
nomic practice.” 561 U.S. at 611. 
In any event, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the “abstract 
ideas” category in this case. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful 
distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the concept of inter-
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mediated settlement at issue here. Both are squarely within the realm of “abstract 
ideas” as we have used that term. 
B 
Because the claims at issue are directed to the abstract idea of intermediated set-
tlement, we turn to the second step in Mayo’s framework. We conclude that the 
method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to 
transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. 
1 
At Mayo step two, we must examine the elements of the claim to determine 
whether it contains an “‘inventive concept’” sufficient to “transform” the claimed 
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. 132 S. Ct. 1294, 1298. A claim that 
recites an abstract idea must include “additional features” to ensure “that the 
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].” 
Id. 1297. Mayo made clear that transformation into a patent-eligible application re-
quires “more than simply stat[ing] the [abstract idea] while adding the words ‘apply 
it.’” Id. 1294. 
Mayo itself is instructive. The patents at issue in Mayo claimed a method for 
measuring metabolites in the bloodstream in order to calibrate the appropriate  
dosage of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases. Id. at 1295. 
The respondent in that case contended that the claimed method was a patent-
eligible application of natural laws that describe the relationship between the con-
centration of certain metabolites and the likelihood that the drug dosage will be 
harmful or ineffective. But methods for determining metabolite levels were already 
“well known in the art,” and the process at issue amounted to “nothing significantly 
more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws when treating their 
patients.” Id. at 1297-98. “Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high 
level of generality,” was not “enough” to supply an “inventive concept.” Id. at 
1300, 1297, 1294. 
The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis at 
Mayo step two. In Benson, for example, we … “held that simply implementing a 
mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer, [i]s not a patent-
able application of that principle.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citing Benson, 409 
U.S. at 64). 
Flook is to the same effect. … In holding that the process was patent ineligible, 
we rejected the argument that “implement[ing] a principle in some specific fashion” 
will “automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject matter of § 101.” Id. at 593. 
Thus, “Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting ab-
stract ideas cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the idea] to a 
particular technological environment.” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-611. 
In Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, by contrast, we held that a computer-implemented 
process for curing rubber was patent eligible, but not because it involved a compu-
ter. The claim employed a “well-known” mathematical equation, but it used that 
equation in a process designed to solve a technological problem in “conventional 
industry practice.” Id. at 177, 178. The invention in Diehr used a “thermocouple” 
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to record constant temperature measurements inside the rubber mold—something 
“the industry ha[d] not been able to obtain.” Id. at 178 & n.3. The temperature 
measurements were then fed into a computer, which repeatedly recalculated the re-
maining cure time by using the mathematical equation. Id. at 178-79. These ad-
ditional steps, we recently explained, “transformed the process into an inventive ap-
plication of the formula.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. In other words, the claims in 
Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, 
not because they were implemented on a computer. 
These cases demonstrate that the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot 
transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an 
abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’” is not enough for patent eligibility. 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular 
technological environment.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610-11. Stating an abstract idea 
while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two 
steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer 
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea “on *** a com-
puter,” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301, that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This 
conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our § 101 juris-
prudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementa-
tion is not generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical 
assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the 
[abstract idea] itself.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. 
The fact that a computer “necessarily exist[s] in the physical, rather than purely 
conceptual, realm,” Brief for Petitioner 39, is beside the point. There is no dispute 
that a computer is a tangible system (in § 101 terms, a “machine”), or that many 
computer-implemented claims are formally addressed to patent-eligible subject mat-
ter. But if that were the end of the § 101 inquiry, an applicant could claim any prin-
ciple of the physical or social sciences by reciting a computer system configured to 
implement the relevant concept. Such a result would make the determination of  
patent eligibility “depend simply on the draftsman’s art,” Flook, 437 U.S. at 593, 
thereby eviscerating the rule that “‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and ab-
stract ideas are not patentable,’” Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. 
2 
The representative method claim in this case recites the following steps: 
(1) “creating” shadow records for each counterparty to a transaction; (2) “obtain-
ing” start-of-day balances based on the parties’ real-world accounts at exchange in-
stitutions; (3) “adjusting” the shadow records as transactions are entered, allowing 
only those transactions for which the parties have sufficient resources; and 
(4) issuing irrevocable end-of-day instructions to the exchange institutions to carry 
out the permitted transactions. Petitioner principally contends that the claims are 
patent eligible because these steps “require a substantial and meaningful role for the 
computer.” Brief for Petitioner 48. As stipulated, the claimed method requires the 
use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple transactions, and issue 
simultaneous instructions; in other words, “[t]he computer is itself the intermedi-
ary.” Id. 
Miller’s Patent Cases 
462 
In light of the foregoing, the relevant question is whether the claims here do 
more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of inter-
mediated settlement on a generic computer. They do not. 
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer 
at each step of the process is “[p]urely conventional.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298. 
Using a computer to create and maintain “shadow” accounts amounts to electronic 
recordkeeping—one of the most basic functions of a computer. See, e.g., Benson, 409 
U.S. at 65 (noting that a computer “operates *** upon both new and previously 
stored data”). The same is true with respect to the use of a computer to obtain data, 
adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer 
functions are “well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]” previously known 
to the industry. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1298. In short, each step does no more than re-
quire a generic computer to perform generic computer functions. 
Considered “as an ordered combination,” the computer components of pe-
titioner’s method “ad[d] nothing *** that is not already present when the steps are 
considered separately.” Id. Viewed as a whole, petitioner’s method claims simply 
recite the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. 
See 717 F.3d at 1286 (Lourie, J., concurring) (noting that the representative meth-
od claim “lacks any express language to define the computer’s participation”). The 
method claims do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the com-
puter itself. See id. (“There is no specific or limiting recitation of *** improved 
computer technology *** .”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28-30. Nor 
do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See, e.g., 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-178. Instead, the claims at issue amount to “nothing signifi-
cantly more” than an instruction to apply the abstract idea of intermediated settle-
ment using some unspecified, generic computer. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1298. Under our 
precedents, that is not “enough” to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible 
invention. Id. at 1297. 
C 
Petitioner’s claims to a computer system and a computer-readable medium fail 
for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded below that its media claims 
rise or fall with its method claims. As to its system claims, petitioner emphasizes that 
those claims recite “specific hardware” configured to perform “specific computer-
ized functions.” Brief for Petitioner 53. But what petitioner characterizes as specific 
hardware—a “data processing system” with a “communications controller” and  
“data storage unit,” for example—is purely functional and generic. Nearly every 
computer will include a “communications controller” and “data storage unit” ca-
pable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions re-
quired by the method claims. See 717 F.3d at 1290 (Lourie, J., concurring). As a 
result, none of the hardware recited by the system claims “offers a meaningful limi-
tation beyond generally linking ‘the use of the [method] to a particular technologi-
cal environment,’ that is, implementation via computers.” Id. at 1291 (quoting Bil-
ski, 561 U.S. at 610-611). 
Put another way, the system claims are no different from the method claims in 
substance. The method claims recite the abstract idea implemented on a generic 
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computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic computer components con-
figured to implement the same idea. This Court has long “warn[ed] *** against” 
interpreting § 101 “in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the 
draftsman’s art.’” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1294 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 593); see Flook, 
437 U.S. at 590 (“The concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not ‘like 
a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction *** .’”) (quoting 
White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)). Holding that the system claims are pa-
tent eligible would have exactly that result. 
Because petitioner’s system and media claims add nothing of substance to the 
underlying abstract idea, we hold that they too are patent ineligible under § 101. 
…  
Clones 
In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh) 
750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
Dyk, Judge: 
The Roslin Institute of Edinburgh, Scotland, is the assignee of U.S. Patent Ap-
plication No. 09/225,233 [originally filed Jan. 4, 1999,] and appeals from a final 
decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. The Board held that all of Roslin’s 
pending claims … were unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The 
Board also rejected Roslin’s claims as anticipated and obvious … . We affirm the 
Board’s rejection of the claims under § 101. 
Background 
On July 5, 1996, Keith Henry Stockman Campbell and Ian Wilmut successfully 
produced the first mammal ever cloned from an adult somatic cell: Dolly the Sheep. 
A clone is an identical genetic copy of a cell, cell part, or organism. 
The cloning method Campbell and Wilmut used to create Dolly constituted a 
breakthrough in scientific discovery. Known as somatic cell nuclear transfer, this 
process involves removing the nucleus of a somatic cell and implanting that nucleus 
into an enucleated (i.e., without a nucleus) oocyte. A somatic cell is any body cell 
other than gametes (egg or sperm). An oocyte is a female gametocyte (an egg cell 
prior to maturation), and a nucleus is the organelle that holds a cell’s genetic ma-
terial (its DNA). Often referred to as “adult” cells, somatic cells are differentiated, 
i.e., they are specialized to perform specific functions. For example, liver, heart, and 
muscle cells are all differentiated, somatic cells. 
To create Dolly, Campbell and Wilmut fused the nucleus of an adult, somatic 
mammary cell with an enucleated oocyte. Specifically, Campbell and Wilmut found 
that if the donor somatic cell is arrested in the stage of the cell cycle where it is 
dormant and non-replicating (the quiescent phase) prior to nuclear transfer, the re-
sulting fused cell will develop into a reconstituted embryo. Once the nucleus of a 
somatic donor cell is removed, that nucleus is fused with an oocyte, which develops 
into an embryo. The embryo can then be implanted into a surrogate mammal, 
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where it develops into a baby animal. The resulting cloned animal is an exact genetic 
replica of the adult mammal from which the somatic cell nucleus was taken. 
Campbell and Wilmut obtained a patent on the somatic method of cloning 
mammals, which has been assigned to Roslin. See U.S. Patent No. 7,514,258. The 
’258 patent is not before us in this appeal. Instead, the dispute here concerns the 
PTO’s rejection of Campbell’s and Wilmut’s claims to the clones themselves, set 
forth in the ’233 application, titled Quiescent Cell Populations for Nuclear Transfer. 
The ’233 application claims the products of Campbell’s and Wilmut’s cloning 
method: cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats. Claims 155 and 164 are representative: 
155. A live-born clone of a pre-existing, nonembryonic, donor mammal, 
wherein the mammal is selected from cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats. 
164. The clone of any of claims 155-159, wherein the donor mammal is non-
foetal. 
As the Board described, “[c]laims 156-159 depend from claim 155 and further 
specify that the claimed clones are limited to clones of cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats, 
respectively.” 
On November 10, 2008, the examiner issued a nonfinal rejection of Campbell’s 
and Wilmut’s patent claims because she found that they were directed to nonstatu-
tory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as well as anticipated and obvious … . 
On February 7, 2013, the Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of all of Camp-
bell’s and Wilmut’s claims. Although the Board acknowledged that the claimed 
clones “may be called a composition of matter or a manufacture” as required by 
§ 101, it concluded that the claimed subject matter was ineligible for patent protec-
tion under § 101 because it constituted a natural phenomenon that did not possess 




An inventor may obtain a patent for “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement there-
of.” 35 U.S.C. § 101; see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). An inven-
tion that falls within one of these categories of patentable subject matter may still be 
ineligible for patent protection if it meets one of three exceptions. Laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection. See 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
Even before the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013), the Court’s opinions in 
Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), 
made clear that naturally occurring organisms are not patentable. 
In Funk Bros., the Supreme Court considered a patent that claimed a mixture of 
naturally occurring strains of bacteria that helped leguminous plants extract nitrogen 
from the air and fix it in soil. 333 U.S. at 128-29. The Court concluded that this 
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mixture of bacteria strains was not patent eligible because the patentee did not alter 
the bacteria in any way. Id. at 132 (“[T]here is no invention here unless the dis-
covery that certain strains of the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive 
and may thus be safely mixed is invention. But we cannot so hold without allowing 
a patent to issue on one of the ancient secrets of nature now disclosed.”). Critically, 
in Funk Bros., the Court explained: 
[w]e do not have presented the question whether the methods of selecting 
and testing the noninhibitive strains are patentable. We have here only 
product claims. [The patentee] does not create a state of inhibition or of 
non-inhibition in the bacteria. Their qualities are the work of nature. 
Those qualities are of course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for 
the discovery of the phenomena of nature. The qualities of these bacteria, 
like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of na-
ture, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. 
Id. at 130. Thus, while the method of selecting the strains of bacteria might have 
been patent eligible, the natural organism itself—the mixture of bacteria—was un-
patentable because its “qualities are the work of nature” unaltered by the hand of 
man. Id. 
In Chakrabarty, the Court clarified the scope of Funk. The patent at issue in 
Chakrabarty claimed a genetically engineered bacterium that was capable of break-
ing down various components of crude oil. 447 U.S. at 305. The patent applicant 
created this non-naturally occurring bacterium by adding four plasmids to a specific 
strain of bacteria. Id. at 305 n.1. Overturning the Board’s rejections, the Court held 
that the modified bacterium was patentable because it was “new” with “markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for 
significant utility.” Id. at 310 (emphasis added). As the Court explained, the patent-
ee’s “discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own.” Id. 
Accordingly, discoveries that possess “markedly different characteristics from 
any found in nature,” id., are eligible for patent protection. In contrast, any existing 
organism or newly discovered plant found in the wild is not patentable. Id. at 309; 
see also In re Beineke, 690 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a newly 
discovered type of plant is not eligible for plant patent protection, in part, because 
such a plant was not “in any way the result of [the patent applicant’s] creative efforts 
or indeed anyone’s creative efforts.”). 
More recently, in Myriad, the Court held that claims on two naturally occur-
ring, isolated genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2), which can be examined to determine 
whether a person may develop breast cancer, were invalid under § 101. 133 S. Ct. at 
2112-13, 2117-18. The Supreme Court concluded that the BRCA genes themselves 
were unpatentable products of nature. 
While Roslin does not dispute that the donor sheep whose genetic material was 
used to create Dolly could not be patented, Roslin contends that copies (clones) are 
eligible for protection because they are “the product of human ingenuity” and “not 
nature’s handiwork, but [their] own.” Appellant’s Br. 17, 18. Roslin argues that 
such copies are either compositions of matter or manufactures within the scope of 
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§ 101. However, Dolly herself is an exact genetic replica of another sheep and does 
not possess “markedly different characteristics from any [farm animals] found in na-
ture.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310; see Reply Br. 13 (stating that “the clones are 
genetic copies”). Dolly’s genetic identity to her donor parent renders her unpatent-
able. 
In Myriad, the Court concluded that “isolated,” naturally occurring DNA 
strands are not eligible for patent protection. 133 S. Ct. at 2111. Here, as in  
Myriad, Roslin “did not create or alter any of the genetic information” of its 
claimed clones, “[n]or did [Roslin] create or alter the genetic structure of [the] 
DNA” used to make its clones. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. Instead, Roslin’s chief 
innovation was the preservation of the donor DNA such that the clone is an exact 
copy of the mammal from which the somatic cell was taken. Such a copy is not eli-
gible for patent protection. 
Related areas of Supreme Court patent case law reinforce this conclusion. For 
example, Supreme Court decisions regarding the preemptive force of federal patent 
law confirm that individuals are free to copy any unpatentable article, such as a live 
farm animal, so long as they do not infringe a patented method of copying. Sears 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. clarified that a state may not “prohibit the copying of 
[an] article itself or award damages for such copying” when that article is ineligible 
for patent protection. 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964). In Sears, the question was 
whether the defendant, Sears Roebuck & Co., could be held liable under state law 
for copying a lamp design whose patent protection had expired. Id. at 225-26. The 
Court explained that “when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, 
too, and the right to make the article—including the right to make it in precisely the 
shape it carried when patented—passes to the public.” Id. at 230 (citing Kellogg Co. 
v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938), and Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. 
Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)). The Court further clarified that “[a]n unpatent-
able article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain 
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.” Id. at 231; see also Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Roslin’s claimed 
clones are exact genetic copies of patent ineligible subject matter.2 Accordingly, they 
are not eligible for patent protection. 
II 
However, Roslin argues that its claimed clones are patent eligible because they 
are distinguishable from the donor mammals used to create them. First, Roslin con-
tends that “environmental factors” lead to phenotypic differences that distinguish its 
clones from their donor mammals. A phenotype refers to all the observable charac-
teristics of an organism, such as shape, size, color, and behavior, that result from the 
interaction of the organism’s genotype with its environment. A mammal’s pheno-
type can change constantly throughout the life of that organism not only due to en-
                                                
2 The ’233 patent application clarifies that “[a]nimals produced by transfer of nuclei 
from a source of genetically identical cells share the same nucleus,” i.e., they share 
the same nuclear genome. 
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vironmental changes, but also the physiological and morphological changes associ-
ated with aging. 
Roslin argues that environmental factors lead to phenotypic differences between 
its clones and their donor mammals that render their claimed subject matter patent-
able. However, these differences are unclaimed. Indeed, the word “cloned” in the 
pending claims connotes genetic identity, and the claims say nothing about a pheno-
typic difference between the claimed subject matter and the donor mammals. More-
over, Roslin acknowledges that any phenotypic differences came about or were pro-
duced “quite independently of any effort of the patentee.” Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 
131; see id. at 130 (“Their qualities are the work of nature. Those qualities are of 
course not patentable. For patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena 
of nature.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (“Here, by contrast, the patentee has 
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not na-
ture’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under 
§ 101.”). Contrary to Roslin’s arguments, these phenotypic differences do not con-
fer eligibility on their claimed subject matter. Any phenotypic differences between 
Roslin’s donor mammals and its claimed clones are the result of “environmental fac-
tors,” Appellant’s Br. 21, uninfluenced by Roslin’s efforts.3  
Second, Roslin urges that its clones are distinguishable from their original do-
nor mammals because of differences in mitochondrial DNA, which originates from 
the donor oocyte rather than the donor nucleus. Mitochondria are the organelles 
(cellular bodies) that produce the energy eukaryotic cells need to function. Mito-
chondria possess their own DNA, which is distinct from the DNA housed in the 
cell’s nucleus. In the cloning process, the clone inherits its mitochondrial DNA from 
its donor oocyte, instead of its donor somatic cell. Therefore, Dolly’s mitochondrial 
DNA came from the oocyte used to create her, not her donor mammary cell. Roslin 
argues that this difference in mitochondrial DNA renders its product claims patent 
eligible. 
But any difference in mitochondrial DNA between the donor and cloned 
mammals is, too, unclaimed. Furthermore, Roslin’s patent application does not 
identify how differences in mitochondrial DNA influence or could influence the 
characteristics of cloned mammals. As the Board found below, 
 [a]s for the influence of the oocyte into which the donor nucleus is trans-
ferred, the ’233 Specification teaches that “[a]nimals produced by transfer 
of nuclei from a source of genetically identical cells share the same nucleus, 
but are not strictly identical as they are derived from different oocytes. The 
                                                
3 Roslin itself explained that “[c]loned offspring may vary phenotypically due to en-
vironment.” Appellant’s Br. 3; see also id. (“[E]nvironmental factors, such as uterine 
environment, generate differences that prevent a clone and its parent from being 
phenotypically identical. *** [Therefore,] [a] clone that contains the same set of 
chromosomes as a single parental mammal can be distinguished from the parental 
mammal due to these environmental influences.”), 21 (“[E]nvironmental influences 
*** result in phenotypic differences.”). 
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significance of this different origin is not clear, but may affect commercial 
traits.” The Specification cautions further that “[i]t remains *** to consid-
er whether it is possible or necessary in specific situations to consider the 
selection of oocytes.” Thus *** the Specification does not disclose any sys-
tematic differences in the clones that arise from the capture of the recipient 
oocyte. 
There is nothing in the claims, or even in the specification, that suggests that 
the clones are distinct in any relevant way from the donor animals of which they are 
copies. The clones are defined in terms of the identity of their nuclear DNA to that 
of the donor mammals. To be clear, having the same nuclear DNA as the donor 
mammal may not necessarily result in patent ineligibility in every case. Here, how-
ever, the claims do not describe clones that have markedly different characteristics 
from the donor animals of which they are copies. 
Finally, Roslin argues that its clones are patent eligible because they are time-
delayed versions of their donor mammals, and therefore different from their original 
mammals. But this distinction cannot confer patentability. As the Board noted, 
“[t]he difficulty with the timedelayed characteristic is that it is true of any copy of an 
original.” Thus, we affirm the Board’s finding that Roslin’s clones are unpatentable 
subject matter under § 101. 
 
